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Abstract 
In this dissertation I reflect on the concept of culture from a political, philosophical 
and anthropological angle. The perspective from where I attempt to analyze them all 
together is epistemological. This means two things: first of all it consists in a critical 
reflection that focus on the concepts and logics that constitutes the way we 
understand culture. One tendency is that the view of culture as something closed and 
static is being reproduced despite the intention or conviction that the opposite is true. 
This means that we have not fully comprehended that which hinders us in developing 
a non-essentialist thinking, or that we comprehend it but still have difficulties of 
articulating an alternative. A central objective in the dissertation is thus the 
description of the problem or epistemological obstacle that hinders the development 
of our thinking. Secondly, an epistemological perspective implies an attempt at taking 
this epistemological obstacle into account in order to supersede it and thus indicate a 
thinking about culture which does not work on essentialist premises. The question of 
obstacle and superseding this obstacle is a question of what kind of language we 
should use when we discuss culture. In order to do this I am scrutinizing the 
metaphor branchements as it is used by anthropologist Jean-Loup Amselle, and 
translation as it is discussed by philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Together they intervene 
into two aspects, or themes, central in the constitution of culture: identity and 
language. As I try to show do we need both a genealogical account for the 
constitutive role of identity and language on culture, and alternative ways to 
conceptualise them. The thesis aims at elaborating branchements and translation 
further by looking at the epistemological implications these notions could have for 
both understanding the hindrance and the overcoming of the hindrance.        
Culture seems to have a rather confused meaning depending on who discusses 
it, where and how it is discussed. Culture is conceived as both a problem and as a 
solution, as significant and insignificant to human beings, and it is conceived as both 
static and as dynamic. My philosophical contribution to this is to reflect on what we 
mean by the concept of “culture” when we discuss these questions and why the 
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mixing of levels creates confusion as to what we are discussing and what kind of 
concept of culture we end up with. One central question in these discussions is if 
culture is static, pure and closed, or open and dynamic. If it is so that culture is open 
and dynamic, why is it still so difficult to break with the idea that it is closed? Why 
does a view of culture as something pure and closed seem to be reproduced? This 
question takes us into a philosophical and epistemological discussion on the 
conditions for thinking culture in a culturally diverse society.  
 One of my claims is that the reason why the view of culture as closed is 
reproduced is the way culture is discussed in the political discourse. Because, here, in 
the political discourse, culture is linked to identity or a certain version of it: identity is 
placed within an oppositional logic. And this oppositional logic recognizes only that 
which is identical or different. Furthermore, when linked to culture identity becomes 
closely connected to the idea of origin suggesting that human beings must be 
understood as having a pure source as point of departure. It is when re-invoking 
identity and origin that culture can receive a role in the exclusion and inclusion into a 
society and thus becomes an obstacle to how we can think an open society.  
  Even though the perspective of the dissertation is epistemological in the sense 
that I want to reflect critically on the link between culture and identity in the political 
discourse, I also want to go further than just describing this problem. Since what is at 
stake concerns the question of building and living in a society together this obstacle 
must be surpassed. Another kind of thinking should at least be attempted. In order to 
develop thinking that does not work on purity and closure as premises, we must be 
critical to the conditions that allow us to continue to think in terms of purity and 
closure, at the same time as a change of language for understanding culture is in 
order. The problem then becomes whether it is possible to think culture without purist 
and essentialist premises. The driving hypothesis of the dissertation is that the 
metaphor branchements, as used by Amselle in anthropology, and translation, as it is 
understood by Ricoeur, represent notions that can help us with this. Breaking with the 
idea of origina and identity-thinking in the early anthropology’s comparative method, 
 ix 
 
 
raciology and the hybrid as metaphor for culture, branchements describes a network 
without a pure beginning or end. Translation on the other hand breaks with the 
obstacle of seeing languages either as diverse and untranslatable or as already united 
and translatable.  
 It is my intention to discuss the obstacle of culture as an interlacing of 
anthropology and political discourse. I discuss how the use of metaphors and 
alternative terms (branchements, translation) in relation to practices (anthropological 
fieldwork, the practice of translation) helps anthropology to overcome its 
epistemological obstacles, how this obstacle has partly been transferred to the 
political discourse, and finally how the theoretical-practice of branchements and 
translation can helps us to develop another kind of thinking.   
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1. Introduction 
This dissertation examines the concept of culture as a joint political, philosophical, 
and anthropological problem. Culture seems to be extensively used to describe some 
of the most central questions in our time: How can we live together in a culturally 
diverse society? How far should a society go in recognising a cultural minority? What 
will happen to the Norwegian cultural identity when we allow increased 
immigration? These are some of the questions where “culture” is used as a way of 
articulating a problem. My philosophical approach to this is to reflect on what we 
mean by the concept of “culture” when we discuss these questions. Taking some 
ideas and thoughts offered by philosopher Paul Ricoeur and social-anthropologist 
Jean-Loup Amselle as points of departure, I reflect critically on the logic and 
concepts that constitute culture, how we think of it, and the role it plays in 
contemporary debates. In these discussions a view of culture as something static 
seems to be repeated although many would hold that it is not. In fact it seems, despite 
the opposite intention, difficult to establish an alternative to the view of culture as 
static and closed. So why does a view of culture as something pure and closed seem 
to be reproduced? This question takes us into a philosophical and epistemological 
discussion on the conditions for thinking culture in a culturally diverse society. When 
I say condition I mean concepts with which culture is connected and from which it 
receives its meaning. And one such condition is identity. The link between culture 
and identity seems to be central to ensuring a reproduction of culture as closed. Now, 
since the static and closed view plays a role in the exclusion and inclusion into a 
society and thus is an obstacle to how we can think an open society, this obstacle 
must be surpassed. Another kind of thinking should at least be attempted. And in 
order to develop another kind of thinking, this partnership could be described as the 
obstacle that must be surpassed. The problem with the view of culture as something 
closed and pure is the role it plays in understanding human beings and the 
consequences this has for the question of whether we can live together. So in order to 
develop thinking that does not work on purity and closure as premises, we must be 
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critical to the conditions that allow us to continue to think in terms of purity and 
closure, at the same time as a change of language for understanding culture is in 
order. The problem then becomes whether it is possible to think culture without purist 
and essentialist premises. The driving hypothesis of the dissertation is that the 
metaphor branchements, as used by Amselle in anthropology, and translation, as it is 
understood by Ricoeur, represent notions that can help us reflect on culture without 
taking essentialist notions as the point of departure.   
 
1.1 Culture in political discourse: identity, rights, and a new racism 
Culture is difficult to define, but has nevertheless sufficient rhetorical force to be used 
when some of the most central issues in our societies are being discussed. Culture is 
given the power to explain human behaviour and conduct, it is related to people’s 
identity, to the identity of nations, and for some it is linked to rights. Culture is used 
both when articulating the problems that our societies are facing (multicultural 
society and the question of rights, the crisis of national identity) and the solution to 
these challenges (multiculturalism, interculturalism, transculturalism, Leitkultur). 
Recently David Cameron and Angela Merkel have declared multicultural society as a 
failure and we are one way or another led to believe that the problems are cultural, 
and not for instance social (The Guardian 2010, New Statesman 2011). But why does 
the concept have such a place? Even though the concept of culture to a large extent 
has been abandoned by anthropologist today, it still seems to have a strong hold in 
the political discourse. What other signs are there that may indicate that “culture” is 
alive and well?  
 For one, in the last thirty years research on racism has pointed to a 
displacement from race to that of culture. Few, if any, refer today to a quasi-
biological entity called race or claim the existence of a hierarchy of races. But that 
does not mean that the idea that humankind is divided or all kinds of hierarchy have 
disappeared. New hierarchies based on transformation of old distinctions are silently 
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raised. Few want to be called a racist these days, but exclusion and inclusion based on 
prejudice, cultural origin, and identity are still relevant. 
Even though few people will explicitly hold that culture is pure and static, the logic 
and the concepts to which culture is linked nevertheless ensure the reproduction of 
such a view. Identity and origin are concepts that co-constitute culture and thus 
ensure the continuation of a static and pure understanding of culture. As the late 
Norwegian anthropologist Marianne Gullestad writes, the play of inclusion and 
exclusion is governed by what she calls an “imagined sameness” (Gullestad 2002, 
2004). She shows how there is a strong link between equality in a constitutional sense 
and the idea that in order to be equal one must also feel that one is similar to others 
living in the same society. This sameness is thus a cultural sameness and refers to a 
certain notion of identity. A discussion of culture thus almost inevitably leads to a 
discussion and critique of identity.   
 Through the linking of culture and identity emerges the question of (cultural 
minority) rights on the one hand, and the debates on norms on the other. Since culture 
is (part of) my identity as an individual, culture becomes part of the question of 
individual rights. The discussion of norms is important. However, it entails an image 
of culture as a set of norms that stand in opposition to another set of norms. This 
abstract notion of culture which reduces culture to norms is detached from the 
practices of everyday life, of interactions, interconnections, and transgressions of so 
called boundaries. It is the same with cultural rights: since culture is part of my 
identity it becomes something abstract and closed which defines my being.  
 Vital to my argument is to show how culture nevertheless is linked to and 
constituted by a series of other concepts and terms. Culture is entangled, explicitly 
and implicitly, with identity, purity, and origin on the one hand and language on the 
other. And it is this chain of concepts that reproduces a view of culture as closed. I 
wish to undo this entanglement by critically analysing the language through which 
we discuss culture or through which culture is related.     
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1.2 Branchements and translation beyond the pure and closed 
But I want to go beyond the level of criticism and indicate a thinking which is 
conscious of the pitfalls and which to a certain degree is able to overcome the 
obstacles. The thesis rests mainly on two related but different notions which both 
help us question cultural closure and purity of origin: On the one hand the metaphor 
“branchements”, taken from electronics and informatics and introduced into social 
anthropology by Jean-Loup Amselle (Amselle 2001). Branchements is a way of 
reflecting upon culture which, contrary to the metaphor hybridity, does not suppose 
purity and closure. The other notion is “translation” as it is understood by Paul 
Ricoeur (Ricoeur 2004a). Translation gives us both a deconstructive perspective on 
the logic of closure and a model for thinking openness in domains that resemble 
languages.   
 The link between Ricoeur and Amselle is both implicit and explicit. Amselle 
refers to Ricoeur as someone who substantiates his anthropological theory-practice. 
What they are both dealing with is a discussion of identity. However, if one follows 
this link, it is not entirely clear whether they are talking about the same thing. Having 
said that, they have many points in common that make examining the link 
worthwhile, and the reason for seeing them together goes beyond this explicit 
reference. The implicit reference to Ricoeur is when Ricoeur’s thinking is also 
applied as a more general reading of Amselle. The second theme with which they are 
both occupied, and which is neither explicit nor implicit, is translation. Translation is 
a joint problem for both Amselle and Ricoeur and this strengthens the consistency of 
seeing Amselle and Ricoeur together. Furthermore, the problems Ricoeur discusses 
regarding translation and language run parallel to, or could be even called identical 
with, the problems Amselle discusses regarding culture and language. Having said 
that, by turning to the theme of translation as it is understood by Ricoeur the 
dissertation takes a slight turn. Whereas the metaphor branchements is here seen 
primarily as a deconstructive and critical notion, translation also takes us in a 
constructive direction by seeing it as a paradigm for thinking openness.      
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 In addition to the themes they have in common, their similarity of approach is 
also interesting: both Amselle and Ricoeur emphasise practice rather than theory, or 
rather see practice as the point of departure for theory. And secondly, both localise 
comparativism as an intellectual operation that ensures the reproduction of static non-
relational identites. Although I will discuss the theme of comparativism only to some 
extent, it strengthens the reasons for analysing and including them both.     
 The two notions at play, branchements and translation, do to a certain extent 
overlap. For Amselle translation is an aspect of branchements and translation, as it is 
described by Ricoeur, has many of the same “qualities” that branchements has. Why 
do I include both of them and as two separate notions? I here want to make some 
important distinctions as to what we may achieve by using these notions and at what 
level they are relevant. First of all branchements and translation intervene into two of 
the concepts or logics that constitute how we see culture: identity and language. This 
will be analyzed genealogically in the first part. I then intend to show how 
branchements intervenes into the identity-thinking, and translation intervenes into 
how we think language. Secondly, whereas branchements, at least to a certain extent, 
could be called a metaphor and primarily aims at questioning our understanding of 
culture, translation is in line with Ricoeur a paradigm for thinking openness in 
domains that resemble languages. Thirdly, I take branchements primarily to be a 
metaphor that helps us deconstruct a view of culture as closed, whereas translation 
has a broader scope that takes us into an ethical problematic that also focuses on 
construction: translation helps us overcome misunderstanding or the lack of 
understanding.    
 The context of the dissertation is both a general concern and an attempt at 
locating this concern in a Norwegian context. I do not aim to scrutinise the 
Norwegian context as such but I do from time to time draw on some examples from 
Norway. This does not mean that such reflections are primarily relevant for Norway. 
On the contrary, many of the points may perhaps be even more relevant elsewhere. It 
matters not, since I see the relevance of theoretical reasoning to be local: some 
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theoretical reflections might be more relevant than others depending on the context. 
Even though this work could very well be read and criticised from a theoretical angle, 
I think that the reader’s specific context might determine to what degree my ideas and 
reflections are relevant. Having said that, in the light of the economic crisis and the 
reemerging of the extreme right all over Europe, a critical approach to culture, 
identity, and origin seems to be relevant everywhere.    
 Why is it important to develop this kind of thinking? At the same time as 
culture is an admittedly difficult term which is linked with anthropology and has 
caused epistemological problems internal to the discipline, it is at the same time part 
of a political discourse and rhetoric shared by both proponents and opponents to 
culture. In other words, it is part of the political and social imaginary and the 
metaphysical assumptions therein.   
In addition to treating the subject of culture and bringing branchements and 
translation into the discussion of this subject, I also aim at making some points 
concerning theory. As will be discussed, I think that the question of what theory is in 
the social sciences and the humanities, and what it could be, merits some 
consideration. When we think development of theory we tend to think that this is 
meant to supplant other theories, that it is a kind of solution to the problems in 
previous theories. And to some extent this is right. My claim is that translation and 
branchements are interesting because these notions do not work on essentialist 
premises. But I do not claim that these notions solve the problem the way new 
theories in science may solve problems. Neither will I claim that this constitutes the 
only alternatives to essentialism.      
 When I discuss the theme of culture and whether or not it is closed, I am 
neither the first to take this up nor the only one to defend a view that cultures are 
open. In fact, the literature in this field has turned into a small library and all kinds of 
positions are represented. So why go into this again, and what is innovative about it? 
First of all it seems that even though we seem to be progressing, we keep falling back 
into old ways of thinking, both at a practical and a theoretical level. In practice we see 
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it when the origin and identity of man is invoked in everything from everyday 
language when we use the concept of immigrant to the discussion of the identity of 
the nation. Theoretically it seems like it- despite the opposite intention- is difficult to 
escape the language of purity. This indicates to me that we are still not, and perhaps 
never can be, done with these questions. Secondly, the innovative aspect does, I 
think, neither lie in identifying the problem of the closing of culture nor in the claim 
that cultures are open and dynamic. These points have already been made by others. 
It is rather my explication and interpretation of translation and branchements and the 
way I try to show how they may help us reflect that is interesting. This has, as far as I 
know, not been done to this extent with these two notions. But if this has been 
pointed out by others, why should we take up this discussion again? This way of 
continuing to return to the basic and fundamental question is essential to philosophy 
and keep doing this as long as we are dealing with questions that has not been or can 
not be solved. This thesis could thus be read as a way of elaborating on an old 
problem of culture as closed and open, but in a new way. And, I hope, this new way 
also can commence another kind of thinking and not only point to old problems.  
The reemergence of racism- as an almost universal tendency to differentiate 
and hierarchise humans- dressed as “culture” rather than “race”- indicates to me that 
these problems go deep. History is not just past events but also a way of articulating 
both problems and answers. As long as the obstacles that we face are not overcome, 
history is as much present as it is past. This thesis and the innovative aspect of it are 
more an elaboration of the problem than a claim of having solved it. The way I see it 
this gives us another approach to what it means to develop a new thinking. 
Branchements and translation help us to develop our thinking but neither is a 
substitute for other ways of thinking nor will they make the problem disappear 
forever. This is intended not as an attempt to escape all criticism nor will I disregard 
the state of the art. I think it is still possible to claim that one way of thinking is 
preferable to another even though one does not stand in the same tradition. And some 
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works are better and more interesting than others. My point is just to underline to the 
reader what kind of project this dissertation is.         
 
1.3 Epistemology as approach and structure 
Now, the approach to the problem is not just philosophical but more specifically 
epistemological. Epistemology can, however, mean several things, and what does it 
mean here? I want to stress two main points regarding epistemology. First of all, the 
tradition of thinking within which I am writing is influenced by French philosophy of 
science. In France this tradition is called French epistemology and it is this meaning 
of the word epistemology that I refer to throughout the dissertation. French 
epistemology is a way of thinking philosophy of science where the role of philosophy 
is not to determine the premises for justification in scientific activity. The task of 
philosophy is rather to examine the development of a science historically by looking 
at how methods and techniques are developed, how obstacles hinder scientific 
development, and how these obstacles are overcome. One of the most well-known 
representatives of this tradition, and whose reflections I draw on throughout the 
dissertation, is Georges Canguilhem (Canguilhem 2000, 2002). With Canguilhem this 
study of obstacles, methods, and objects becomes a question of the inside and outside 
of science: the language of science does not (always) come from science itself. The 
language and concepts which science uses to articulate both its problems and answers 
are non-scientific, so in order to do philosophy of science one must reflect critically 
on the relation between language, methods, and objects. What Canguilhem observes 
is that science must sometimes change its language or conceptual frame in order to be 
able to progress. The reason I find this tradition and the works of Canguilhem 
relevant to the question of culture is that they can help us reflect critically on the 
reasons why we tend to fall back into essentialist thinking on the one hand, and to see 
what it takes to overcome this problem on the other. My point is not that no one else 
has seen that an essentialist view of culture is problematic. This is an old observation 
discussed by many. But what I think is fruitful and innovative with such an 
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epistemological take is that it is both a way of reflecting on the obstacles and on what 
it takes to overcome these obstacles.  
 With the two notions in the dissertation, branchements and translation, at the 
center I claim that they help us develop a thinking that can transgress an essentialist 
view of culture precisely because the epistemological perspective is taken into 
account. In addition to elaborating on what Amselle and Ricoeur say about 
branchements and translation, my contribution is to analyse their work from an 
epistemological perspective. Branchements and translation both have practices as the 
point of departure: the establishement of N’ko in West-Africa and translation of texts 
in general. These practices show openness one way or another. Translation and 
branchements are thus theoretical tools that articulate such openness. But this 
openness is scrutinised on different levels and in different ways by translation and 
branchements respectively. Whereas branchements helps us go beyond an essentialist 
understanding of culture, I introduce translation as an assessment of the parallel 
between culture and language.               
 Both translation and branchements are involved in a process which transfers 
something from linguistics, informatics, or electricity into another domain. I think a 
reflection on this process itself is worth spending some time on. And this is where an 
epistemological approach is particularly fruitful. I think we have something to learn 
from Canguilhem in the observation that the overcoming of obstacles may depend on 
a change of language. And when it comes to understanding culture the obstacle is 
purity and closure.  
If I most of the time draw on the work of Amselle, Ricoeur, and Canguilhem 
what does my contribution consist in? First of all I think that this particular 
epistemological approach to branchements and translation is interesting as a way of 
working with this problem. My point is to see the parallel between the 
epistemological problems in branchements and translation on the on hand, and the 
epistemological problems we are facing when we discuss culture as a political 
concern. Secondly it is a reading of Amselle and Ricoeur from an epistemological 
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angle which has not been done before. And thirdly I elaborate on some points where 
they are silent but where I think there is more to be said.      
 Regarding epistemology I also want to say something to the reader about the 
relation between theory and practice and the different levels the dissertation operates 
on. My overall aim is to reflect on the possibility for developing a thinking around 
culture which does not run on essentialist assumptions. And in order to do this I draw 
on Ricoeur and Amselle whose work may be said to be situated in practices in some 
way or another. The first part of the thesis also takes as its points of departure 
contemporary society and history. At the same time my focus is not on practice but 
on a theoretical reflection on the language we use. And I will, in large parts of the 
text, remain in a theoretical mode. And although I consider some of the innovative 
aspects of the dissertation to be just these internal theoretical elaborations, I do not 
wish to remain there. The aim of the epistemological approach is to point beyond 
epistemology and theory and back into practices, even though the operationalisation 
of these epistemological findings will not be elaborated here.     
 The second point regarding the meaning of the word epistemology is that it is 
a way of structuring the dissertation. The specific French epistemological approach 
requires a specific procedure which focuses on the notion of epistemological 
obstacles. The aim is to develop a thinking which does not operate on essentialist or 
purist premises and in order to do this we must both change language and see whether 
this change works on such premises. It thus becomes essential to understand the 
obstacle. Differently put, I will spend most of the first part describing the problem or 
obstacle before going on to the second part to indicate ways to overcome the obstacle. 
In other words the epistemological aspect in the dissertation concerns both an 
analysis of conditions for thinking culture and a way of structuring the attempt at 
challenging these conditions.   
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1.4 Plan for the thesis 
As stated above, epistemology is not just a perspective on the problem: it is also a 
way of structuring the work in the examination of the obstacle and the attempt at 
overcoming it. The dissertation thus consists of two main parts. In the first part 
(chapters 2-5) I try to localise the problem or obstacle: culture as something pure and 
closed and how the concept of culture becomes closed. The focus of the link between 
culture and identity- which is found in the political discourse or rhetoric- aims at 
examining the reason why culture is perceived as something closed and raises the 
question why these notions have been linked in the first place. This takes us to a 
reflection on the history of their unity where I want to see the constitution of the 
obstacle. I will provide a chapter of transition between the first and second part where 
I elaborate on the epistemological aspects. In the second part (chapters 6-10) I try to 
reflect on how one may overcome the obstacle through branchements and translation. 
Both notions will be treated with a chapter on epistemology and then discussed in 
connection with the overall problematic.      
 The second chapter attempts to localise the way culture is presented within the 
political rhetoric and discourse. My point is here to reflect on how the linking of 
culture and identity is constitutive for our understanding of culture as something 
closed. In debates on multiculturalism, recognition of minorities, the idea of national 
cultural identity, the reawakening of the thesis of clash of civilisations, cultural 
differentialism, cultural racism, and through normative and constitutional debates, 
culture is seen as an inevitable topic and challenge. The broad tendency is that culture 
is thought of as closed and static. This observation is in itself not innovative. A view 
of culture as static has been challenged for a long time in both theory and practice. 
However, it seems difficult to shake it. In this chapter I aim to show that this has 
something to do with the link between culture and identity and the specific way we 
think identity. In order to develop another kind of thinking it is vital to understand 
how this link between identity and culture could come about. This leads us to the next 
chapter.   
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 In chapter 3 I want to see how culture, identity, the nation, and biology (or 
rather the quasi-biology of raciology) are intertwined. The concept of culture in the 
public debates is constituted in this mix of identity, colonial and political history, 
ideology of race, and the myth of the origin. The notion of culture borrows ideas from 
raciology on the difference and original separation of the peoples of the world. At the 
same time the notion of identity seems to be involved in a kind of double constitution 
where identity constitutes the logic of raciology and is constituted by the myth of 
origin.  
In chapter 4 I return to the question of identity as term and as logic. But where 
identity in the first chapter is treated from a descriptive angle, I aim in this chapter to 
be more critical. Why is culture linked to the term “identity” in the first place? And 
what kind of identity-thinking is at play when we discuss culture? Here Ricoeur in 
the continuity from Heidegger and Arendt represents an initial attempt to examine 
identity critically.  
 In chapter 5 I reflect on the aforementioned epistemological tradition and the 
role it plays in this dissertation: as an approach to the problem and as a structure of 
reasoning in the dissertation. I explain how the ability to find another path for 
thinking culture is linked to an historical account of the problem of thinking culture 
and the obstacles of closure. In other words, the chapter connects the two first 
chapters with the rest of the dissertation. It is here that the two main notions in the 
dissertation are introduced; branchements from the work of Jean-Loup Amselle and 
translation as it is thought by Paul Ricoeur. The emphasis on problems rather than 
theory allows me to make another point which concerns the core of humanistic and in 
particular philosophical research. Canguilhem makes a distinction between theories 
and problems in the study of science. Whereas studying science from the perspective 
of theory closes the object of study, problems and concepts remain open. So, contrary 
to seeking an alternative theory of culture, branchements and translation are not 
theories or parts of theories, but concepts that allow us to ask questions, not to find 
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solutions or answers. The point is to question the notions that steer our perception, 
not to replace them with our own. 
 In the second part I go into branchements and translation and present a 
theoretical approach to the problem of culture. In chapter 6 I present the metaphor 
branchements from an epistemological perspective by analysing how Amselle, in 
order to escape the language of pure origin, change metaphor from hybridisation or 
mestizo to branchements. This renders it necessary to reconstruct parts of the context 
for Amselle’s anthropological thinking and to look into his anthropological 
fieldwork.  
 But I think there is more to be said about branchements theoretically speaking. 
And this is what I undertake in the seventh chapter. Here I read branchements as a 
kind of dialectical thinking that draws on Hegelian thinking on the one hand and the 
philosophy of Paul Ricoeur on the other. This is the first opportunity to reflect on the 
relation between Amselle and Ricoeur and takes this chapter in a somewhat 
exegetical direction. Ricoeur or themes discussed by Ricoeur are implicitly and 
explicitly present in Amselle’s thinking at the same time as I want to underline some 
nuances. The theme of dialectics goes, however, beyond the theoretical elaboration of 
Amselle and into the overall problem. Dialectics is, as I see it, an important way to 
criticise purity and closure and takes us into a question of genesis and culture. Central 
to branchements is that a clear cut inside and outside of cultural identity are not 
assumed but that the relation is more fundamental than identity. But the discussion of 
dialectical aspects in the thinking of Amselle takes us into some problems as well. 
Since Ricoeur, whom Amselle refers to, is informed by the dialectics in Plato’s 
Sophist and branchements is described as a third element, this does not take us in the 
same direction. This has consequences for how we can examine branchements 
theoretically.   
 But in order to develop branchements further, the notion must be discussed 
and analysed critically. In chapter 8 I do this in three steps. I commence by 
contrasting branchements and hybridity as metaphors that due to their different 
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premises have different outcomes as far as thinking is concerned. I continue by 
discussing origin and I contrast branchements with an expressionist theory of genesis. 
Ricoeur, Canguilhem, Hegel, Spinoza, and Taylor are vital in this elaboration. In the 
last part I raise some critical questions regarding the idea of branchements.  
The second main point in the second part and in the whole dissertation is 
translation, which is the topic of the next two chapters. In chapter 9 I follow the same 
structure as with branchements, commencing with epistemological considerations on 
translation. In Ricoeur’s account of translation, a vital part of his approach is the 
displacement from the theory of translation to the practice of translation. The practice 
of translation renders it possible to question any theory of translation or whether it is 
possible or not to translate. Translation is thus linked to the question of culture in 
more than one sense. Translation has many relevant levels. Linguistic translation 
reflects the aspect of language in culture. But translation also reflects human 
existence as a being in search of understanding of himself. In order to become selves 
(culturally and individually) we must translate what is foreign to ourselves and 
ourselves to what is foreign. Translation thus articulates a continuum between self 
and other, or between different cultures, which does not take substantial distinctions 
as point of departure. Furthermore, translation reflects the relation between different 
languages, as well as those internal to one language. Translation is equivalent to 
reflection as translation is to say the same thing in another way. In this operation the 
same- in the sense of an original meaning the translation was a translation of- escapes 
the horizon. The original meaning is lost, but does continue to have a reinterpreted 
and translated meaning. Hence, translation helps us to question two notions of 
culture: Since translation is practically possible, the cultural difference between 
different peoples cannot be an ontological distinction. If cultural diversity was like 
biodiversity, translation would not be practically possible.  
 In the tenth chapter I discuss translation in relation to hermeneutics and 
tradition. Translation is connected to hermeneutics and tradition. However, 
translation takes us into another kind of understanding of hermeneutics and tradition 
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than Heidegger and Gadamer. With Gadamer’s and Heidegger’s ontologisation of 
hermeneutics, tradition becomes something closed and homogenised. From the 
perspective of Ricoeur and translation we do not always already understand 
ourselves. Misunderstanding and plurality are as much hallmarks to tradition as 
understanding. It thus seems to me that translation is a way of articulating nuances 
between Gadamer and Ricoeur, nuances that have relevance for how we think culture 
as tradition.  
In the conclusion in the eleventh chapter I present the general conclusion 
drawn from my reflections. In addition to summarise the main points in the 
dissertation I will also comment on some limitations which take us beyond this thesis. 
In order to develop this project further, or rather in order to initiate new and fruitful 
projects, practice should be taken more into account. And since I am writing on the 
border of both epistemology and politics, this could take us in several directions. 
Whereas translation has already been used in anthropology, branchements has to my 
knowledge not been extensively used. I would have liked to work with them both in 
relation to an anthropological or historical material. I think then that I could get an 
even better understanding of the epistemological aspects of these notions at the same 
time as they might shed light on new materials. When it comes to the more political 
or social implications I see that translation and branchements could be put to work in 
a way that could shed some light on historical and contemporary examples where 
kinds of cultural exchanges have been parts of a succesfull integration. As part of the 
reflections on both the political implications and the question of what language we 
should apply when dealing with culture, comes the question of whether the term 
intercultural could be developed as an alternative to multicultural.   
All quotes originaly in French and German, except the translations accounted 
for in the bibliography, has been translated by me. I take full responsibility for the 
content and shortcomings of the thesis.   
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Part 1: The epistemological obstacle of culture 
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2. Culture and identity as political rhetoric and 
discourse  
 
Introduction 
Alongside identity, religion, and ethnicity, the notion of culture is presented in the 
media and public debates as central to the analysis and understanding of democratic 
societies and the problems they face (Tibi 2000, Wieviorka 2005, Süssmuth 2006, 
Gahr Støre 2007). This is further linked to questions of immigration and integration. I 
will here leave religion, ethnicity, immigration, and integration aside and focus on 
why and how we use culture and identity-often in the combination cultural identity- 
as a way of articulating both the problems and the solution for our societies. Culture 
and cultural identity seem to be notions that at the same time define human beings 
and which might be part of his or her rights (Taylor 1992a, 1992b), are parts of 
political solutions such as multiculturalism and interculturalism (EYID 2008), as well 
as what threats a society to disintegrate when the cultural diversity becomes too large 
(Andersen and Tybring-Gjedde 2010, Hustad 2013), and may be used as an argument 
for keeping people separate (Taguieff 2010). Regarding this last point in particular, it 
is interesting to look into why it is precisely “culture” which is perceived as a threat 
to society. It seems to me that a view that cultures initially stand in opposition to each 
other underlies this perception and that this oppositional thinking is in need of a 
critical examination.  
 But why are cultures thought as oppositional? Most people agree that culture is 
not static and closed, and yet it seems as if this view is present in the political 
discourse where culture is presented as a challenge. As far as I can see all this has 
something to do with how culture is linked to identity. The aim in this chapter is thus 
to show how the political discourse draws on a specific notion of culture that joins 
culture with identity. The Norwegian anthropologist Unni Wikan shows how the 
extensive use of the notion “culture” has led to a culturalisation of human beings and 
that this has resulted in a hierarchical treatment of immigrants. This is covered in her 
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expression that “culture is loose on the street” (Wikan 1999). To me it seems that the 
same goes with identity, that identity too is “loose on the street”.  
I want to show how culture and identity are linked by looking at two different 
contexts: on the one hand the discussion about politics of recognition and cultural 
rights, on the other the re-emergence of racism in the form of cultural differentalism. 
The coupling of culture and identity to rights is something that has been present in the 
discussion of multiculturalism; a discourse which still seems to have a hold on how 
we think the challenges related to culture. This discussion is closely linked to how we 
perceive the (identity of the) individual and the rights ascribed to the individual. 
Parallel to the discussion of culture, identity, and rights, a number of researchers 
claim that culture is the new concept of race and that this is a new way of 
reintroducing old distinctions and hierarchies (Balibar and Wallerstein 1997, Wikan 
1999, Gullestad 2002, Taguieff 2010). As Pierre André Taguieff points out, in the 
struggle between racists and anti-racists in the post-Nazi era the questions concerns 
the fear of or defence of the right to be culturally different. The outcome is that they 
co-constitute cultural difference. My claim is that these two contexts are part of a 
broader political discourse where they both draw on the same logic: the binary logic 
of sameness and difference, and that it is this logic that should be questioned.       
     
2.1 The confusion about culture and cultural identity 
Even though culture has been on the political agenda for some years now1, increased 
immigration, the hardening of cultural identities in the aftermath of 11th September 
2001, the debate on the caricatures of the Prophet Mohamed in 2005, and the 
subsequent violence have given culture a strengthened position as a main concern in 
Western societies.2 Most European countries have had a debate on values, identity, 
                                              
1Cultural particularism is not a new subject in European history with its religious wars, linguistic purification etc. However, 
in modern times the political debates on Multiculturalism in Canada goes back to the 70ties, UNESCO presented its rapport 
on cultural diversity in 1995, Samuel Huntington wrote his famous book the Clash of civilizations in 1996.  
2 Recently, these questions have taken a particularly tragic turn for Norway, in view of the terrorist attack on Oslo and the 
massacre at the Norwegian Labour Party’s youth camp 22. July 2011. Even though there is an on-going debate on whether 
 19 
 
 
and the role of culture. France has had a debate on national identity for quite some 
time, the Germans have discussed the need for a German or European Leitkultur, and 
in Norway the foreign minister launched a debate in 2008 on the need to enlarge our 
national identity to encompass new citizens with different cultural backgrounds. All 
this somehow implies a discussion and debate on national and/or European culture on 
one side, and foreign and non-European culture on the other (Süssmuth 2006, Tibi 
2010, Noiriel 2007, Støre 2008). An attempt at a positive approach to cultural 
diversity was launched with the European year of intercultural dialogue (EYID) in 
2008. Being outside the European Union, the Norwegian government followed this 
up with a White paper Mangfoldsåret 2008 implementing the main aims and values 
of the European event.   
 The discussion of the term culture is often but not always guided by identity. 
In a debate on Norwegian values in 2009 Knut Olav Åmås argued that a debate on 
Norwegian values is important as such values are about identity and who we define 
ourselves to be (NRK, 2009). In the same debate the politician Abid Raja claims that 
”it is important to be accepted and recognised as Norwegian for young people, as 
many minorities’ feeling of self and identity is related to the Norwegian.”Then 
Norwegian Foreign minister Jonas Gahr Støre stated in an article that”our loyalty 
goes in several directions, our belonging is complex. One type of identity does not 
exclude another…Our identity is complex” (Støre 2008). It seems that we are all 
postmodernists now, as it is not at all clear to me what this talk of identity means. But 
even though the use of identity and complexity is rather superficial, we can still try to 
make some sense of it. Identity is here on one side connected to the Norwegian in the 
sense that it is important to Norwegian society to know its own identity and to those 
with minority background to feel they belong to what is Norwegian. For some this 
diversity of cultural identities poses a threat to a given Norwegian cultural identity, 
                                                                                                                                           
the terrorist Anders Behring Breivik should be held legally accountable for his actions or whether he is psychotic, Breivik 
claims to be motivated by ideas and values which are held by a larger audience. These ideas include conspiracy theories 
such as that the Arab world attempts to invade Europe in order to establish Muslim rule of law. 
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i.e. the politicians of the Progressive Party Kent Andersen and Christian Tybring-
Gjedde. They wrote in 2010 that: “We, who love Norway, and appreciate the 
belonging and identity that the country’s cultural community represents, are 
astonished and concerned with regard to how this community is deteriorating and 
undermined by an unsustainable immigration politics” (Andersen and Tybring-
Gjedde 2010). This begs the question of whether a country and a culture can have an 
identity, and if so, what does this entail? On the other hand identity is something 
connected to individuals and there are several competing or complementary 
identities, even for one individual. In the following paragraphs I will look at these 
two themes where culture and cultural identity are expressed beginning with identity 
and rights.    
 
2.1.2 Culture, identity, and rights 
In this first part I want to lay emphasis on how the focus on identity, the individual, 
and its rights is a way of constructing a view of culture as something static, abstract 
and closed. When culture becomes a right it is because it is part of our individual 
identity. The recognition of particular minority groups which one way or the other 
comes under multiculturalist thinking draws on a view of culture as synonymous with 
identity. What is more, the reduction of culture to a question of rights strengthens the 
tendency to see cultures as opposing each other and not as related to each other.    
 
2.1.3 The fixing of identitites? 
Central to the debates on cultural minorities in the previous decades has been the 
debate between the so-called liberals and the communitarians. The point of departure 
for the whole debate was the launching of John Rawls’ monumental work A theory of 
justice (1999). Here Rawls continued the tradition of contract theory as an approach 
to the problem of distributive justice. How should scarce resources be distributed in a 
just manner? In order to arrive at a neutral point of view from where we can view 
things and where there is justice for all, it is necessary to bracket any knowledge of 
one’s own or others’ actual situation. Now his book was attacked by thinkers who did 
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not subscribe to Rawls’ view of man. Among them was Michael Walzer who in 
Spheres of justice writes that the real problem is: “What would individuals like us 
choose, who are situated as we are, who share a culture and are determined to go on 
sharing it” (Walzer 1982: 5)? An important problem with Rawls’ thinking is thus his 
understanding or the assumption of the human being as abstracted from his or her 
tradition, history, and context. The so-called communitarian point of view is that 
human beings first and foremost share a culture and that this must be taken into 
consideration when we discuss political theory.  
 We shall not dwell on this debate here but only mention that within this debate 
culture became a political issue in an unfortunate way. The French sociologist Michel 
Wieviorka expresses in his comment on the philosophical approaches to cultural 
difference the limitation and paradox of philosophers’ attempt to construct the debate. 
The limitations in the philosophers’ reasoning is that they, according to him, deny the 
unstable, dynamic, and moving character inherent to all cultures and rather fixes it as 
a given entity. The paradox is that philosophy has a too central a role in the making 
of the premises (Wieviorka 2001: 52). The problem for philosophy is that it grasps 
the problematic concerned at a political and juridical level and misses out on the 
processes. It is difficult to disagree with Wieviorka’s critique. What Wieviorka 
proposes is a sociological approach that entails taking into account “processes of 
mixing, of mestizo, of hybridization” (ibid). So how should a philosopher respond to 
this? Should we leave the question of cultural difference to sociology, or social-
anthropology, or may philosophy have something to add after all? I do not think that 
the only alternative for philosophy is a purely theoretical and/or normative reflection 
which leaves the understanding of the processes of hybridisation to the social 
sciences. Neither do I see philosophy and social science in opposition to each other. 
But the problem for empirical science- more sensitive to processes than theoretical 
and normative political philosophy-is that no empirical fact speaks without a 
language. In order for empirical findings to make sense they have to be interpreted or 
ordered according to a conceptual frame. And it is this scrutinising of language that 
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opens up for philosophy. And when it comes to metaphors such as mestizo and 
hybridity which Wieviorka uses in order to conceptualise the cultural processes, I will 
claim that they do not escape what he sees as the problem of fixed identity. The 
question is whether it possible to speak about identity at all without always already 
having fixed it. Hybridity might be a more complex and elegant way of approaching 
identity, but I do not think the problem is solved. Hybridity is dependent upon an idea 
of initial purity: in order to mix something you have to have pure elements to mix. So 
even if I agree with Wieviorka that the empirical is vital, I find the theoretical 
reflection insufficient. Hence it is in the intersection between theory and practice that 
I situate my reflections. In other words, the relation between theory and practice must 
be thought in another manner.  
 The way I see it Wieviorka’s criticism is not merely a critique justified by 
empirical studies. It is in itself a philosophical critique of abstraction, a line of 
thought which goes back to Hegel. I think it is possible to take up Wieviorka’s 
challenge without doing empirical fieldwork, through reflecting on the language 
which grasps the processes of hybridisation. Even though I subscribe to Wieviorkas’s 
concern that the politics of recognition abstracts cultural processes, there is no reason 
to accept the image Wieviorka gives of philosophy as only capable of thinking 
substances and static entities. Having said that, the link between culture and identity 
that Wieviorka points to but does not question further is central. I think it is 
impossible to develop such a process oriented approach to culture (that is also needed 
in order to take empirical findings into account) that Wieviorka calls upon without 
questioning the oppositional thinking within which we see identity and difference.  
 But if we leave the question of theory and the empirical aside and look at the 
point of departure for Wieviorka, we notice that the reason why culture becomes 
something static is that the philosophers turns it into a question of rights. 
Consequently this implies that rights are a way of turning culture into something 
static. How so? This link between rights and cultural identity is what underpins much 
of the discussion about multiculturalism which I will now go on to talk about.   
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2.1.4 Multiculturalism and the question of rights 
Republicanism and multiculturalism are two political models or lines of thought in 
the modern Western political theory and have been presented as alternatives in 
coping with cultural diversity. These two models have been mixed, must be thought 
in relation to the various national traditions and histories, and have thus many 
versions. Even though they comprise more than models for political government, 
such as philosophical anthropology, ideology, and norms and demographical 
description (Wieviorka 1998), I limit myself to the political aspect and its 
consequences for the understanding of culture.  
 On the one hand we have modern Republicanism, with its different modes, in 
the Western world. Developed and constituted through the French Revolution it 
became the establishment of a political order in which no groups or individuals have 
economic and juridical privileges. A vital hallmark for our discussion is of course the 
separation of the private and the public sphere where the public sphere should not be 
dominated by private interests or by the interest of particular groups. Cultural 
belonging is hence deemed as a private matter and should be kept separate from the 
public sphere.3 The atom of society is the free and equal citizen which the state shall 
protect by securing a public sphere separate from the private sphere. To open up for 
public recognition of a cultural group through rights is thus absurd and dangerous as 
it undermines the idea of neutrality.   
 On the other hand we have the multicultural approach which partly overlaps 
the debate between liberals and communitarians in political philosophy. 
                                              
3This can, as Elaine R. Thomas writes, be interpreted in different ways. In the US the separation is thought of as the 
protection of the private sphere from governmental intervention in line with the liberal protection of the individual. In 
France it is the protection of the private sphere from private interests. “Whereas Americans historically sought to protect 
religion from the state, France’s combat for laïcité sought to free the state from undue religious influence” (Thomas 2006: 
241). In what concerns the coping with difference, the French republican tradition “oscillates between assimilation, the 
dominant position, and tolerance” where both despise communitarian thinking (Wieviorka 1998:899). At least for the 
French republicanism cultural difference represents a threat of undermining the political foundation of society. A vital 
motive for the French Revolution was the limitation of the church’s political power. However, the faith itself also 
represented a threat to the state and was from the point of view of the Enlightenment regarded as part of the society built on 
superstition. 
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Multiculturalism is a concept used in Canada and the US at the beginning of the 
1970s but has not been particularly developed until the last twenty years (Wieviorka 
1998). Much of the literature on multiculturalism concerns the question of minority 
rights. An important contribution to the debates on multiculturalism is the essay of 
Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor: The politics of recognition (1992a) which 
context is the multicultural society of Canada. In 1982 Canada undertook a review of 
its legislation on all levels of government. What is of importance was how this 
judicial schedule was related to the demands of different groups for a certain degree 
of autonomy due to a desire for survival as a group.4  
What does it mean for citizens with different cultural backgrounds to be 
recognised, and why is it important? These questions are addressed in Charles 
Taylors` text. By exploring the anthropological aspects of recognition, Taylor tries to 
distance himself from the limitations of liberal approaches to cultural identity: “The 
thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition” (Taylor 1992a: 25). A 
multicultural approach in the liberal tradition is the Canadian philosopher Will 
Kymlicka who in Multicultural citizenship (1995) writes about different kinds of 
minority rights and is positive to those minority rights that ensure the integration and 
participation of individuals into the democratic society and economic life. He does 
not go as far as Taylor in ascribing to culture a worth of its own, but limits himself to 
seeing culture as something that “provides its members with meaningful ways of life 
                                              
4Quebec, for instance, has, in order to survive as a French speaking community, passed laws that limit the impact of 
Anglophone culture. Children with Francophone parents cannot attend English-speaking schools. Businesses with more 
than fifty employees must be run by French management. All signposts must be in French. The constitutional amendment 
that treated these cases, The Meech Lake, concluded that Quebec was a “distinct society”. This led to an opening up for 
other areas as well, which for some was totally unacceptable. As most constitutions the Canadian Charter constitutes on the 
one hand a set of individual rights, and on the other protection against discrimination. Both these elements contradict the 
Meech Lake amendments. It is the philosophical reflection upon and defense of cultural rights through recognition that are 
Taylor’s concerns. 
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across the full range of human activities” (Kymlicka 1995: 76). But analytically 
speaking the individual can be separated from the culture it is part of.  
 How does the position of Taylor differ from such a liberal approach to cultural 
belonging? Taylor thinks here as often elsewhere through an historical account of the 
ideas that constitute the modern man, and central here is recognition. Recognition is a 
vital human need, Taylor states, or at least is at the center of the constitution of 
modern identity. For Taylor, Rousseau established an account of recognition by 
establishing the notion that all men are free and equal. It amounts to saying that what 
is universal is that we are all of equal worth. This is the politics of equal dignity 
(Taylor 1992a: 38). However, with the insight from Herder in mind, what is universal 
is that we are all different depending on the context that we stand in. Acknowledging 
this is vital for what he calls the politics of recognition. So far Taylor argues for 
culture through the development of the modern individual. And Taylor is clear when 
it comes to how far a government should go in recognising a cultural minority that 
basic human rights cannot be violated.   
 So the individual is both what has priority for protection as well as being the 
perspective through which culture is understood. However, Taylor also seems to go 
beyond this when claiming that “the further demand we are looking at here is that we 
all recognize the equal value of different cultures; that we not only let them survive, 
but acknowledge their worth” (Ibid: 64). To recognise equality is to recognise 
difference in itself and not only as a means to something else such as the individual’s 
self-realisation or the role of culture in a competition. The value of difference is what 
is at stake. We should, according to Taylor, approach another culture with the 
presumption that “all human cultures that have stretched over time have something 
important to say to all human beings” (Ibid: 66).  
 It seems to me that culture in Taylor’s thinking is both constituted by and 
through the individual at the same time as it has a worth of its own. Taylor thus 
argues from the individual as does Kymlicka, but in order to avoid the detachment of 
the individual and culture, he ascribes to culture a status of its own. My point is not to 
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intervene into the discussion between a liberal defence of minority rights and 
Taylor’s philosophy of recognition but to reflect on how Taylors understanding on 
culture draws on identity. As far as I can see, both the argument from the perspective 
of the individual and from culture’s own worth draw on an oppositional logic of 
identity and difference. From the perspective of the individual culture becomes, like 
the individual, something un-dividable. Like the individual, by being un-dividable, by 
being identical to itself and stand in opposition to (being different from) another 
individual, the culture - as far as it determines the identity of the individual- is 
identical to itself. That is why culture on a second level can be abstracted from the 
individual and be given “a worth of its own”. In other words, culture draws, in 
Taylors account, on an explicit and implicit notion of identity which makes culture a 
closed entity regardless of whether this is the intention or not.        
 What then about Wieviorka’s critique of philosophers who fix identities by 
turning culture into a question of rights? Does it strike Taylor? And how do rights fix 
anything? The discussion of cultural rights is, as far as I can see, dependent upon 
identity which seems to underpin the multicultural discourse in the sense that cultures 
are linked to the identity of persons, and secondly that cultures are discernible and 
differentiated from each other. Briefly put: since rights are something we attach or 
ascribe to individuals who are fixed by being identifiable, and culture is part of this 
identifiable individual, then culture becomes fixed too. When Taylor talks about 
culture’s own worth it seems to me that he tries to distance himself from the liberal 
representation of human beings which detaches humans from their cultural context. 
This abstract operation draws, however, also on the same logic in which culture is 
abstractable from the individuals and cultures are abstractable from each other and 
presented as diversity. When it comes to giving cultures a right to survival, it is clear 
that this have to presuppose a fixation of what is to be protected.  
 
 27 
 
 
2.1.5 The problem of abstraction 
From what has been said so far about culture, the fixing of identities, and the way this 
draws on a binary logic, I want to say something about what kind of operation 
underpins this thinking, namely abstraction. One problem that pervades the 
dissertation is abstraction, and culture as an abstract entity. How can we say that what 
we have seen so far are examples of abstraction? When Wieviorka claims that Taylor 
and the likes of Taylor are constructing their problematic from an image of identities 
as fixed and disregard the cultural processes, this is due to a procedure of abstraction. 
The localisation of cultural identities and differences is possible through abstraction. 
As we shall see later, this is present in the comparative method in anthropology: In 
order to understand something we must compare it with something else. From this we 
derive similarities and differences. But this assumes that what we compare can be 
clearly distinguishable from each other. My point is not that we can do without 
abstraction altogether but rather to see the limitations of such thinking and if it is 
possible go beyond it. This leads us of course to the question of what an abstraction 
is.  
I will discuss this more thoroughly in later chapters, but for now it suffices to 
say that this is a thinking for which Hegel has been an important critic. When I draw 
on Hegel I do not talk about the system of Hegel or the idea of the absolute, the end 
of history etc. It is rather Hegel’s thinking as a way of questioning abstraction that I 
seek. The Hegel interpreter Herbert Schnädelbach presents the problem of abstraction 
as the founding problem and key to understanding Hegel’s philosophy. And central to 
the problem of abstraction is the relation between the whole and the parts. 
Schnädelbach writes that the idea of the whole, where the whole is something more 
than the sum of its parts, becomes problematic when the whole is thought of as an 
entity which exists independent of its parts. Examples of this are the soul or the 
German people (Schnädelbach 2007: 14). What is the soul in itself (without the 
body)? What is the German people in itself (without the Germans)? The question is 
whether we have seen a version of this on a theoretical and practical level concerning 
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culture in the political discourse. When one discusses the Norwegian culture or the 
Norwegian cultural identity on the one hand (Andersen and Tybring-Gjedde 2010), 
and minority rights and cultural minoritites on the other (Taylor 1992a), we abstract 
the entity we discuss and compare it: we compare Norwegian and Pakistani cultures 
and find similarities and differences among them. And if we find a sufficient amount 
of differences we might draw the conclusion that it will be difficult to live together. 
In a debate about “Norwegian culture” the journalist Jon Hustad writes, addressing 
himself to the minister of culture:  
 
Next time she gets a question about what Norwegian culture is, Tajik can compare Pakistani and Norwegian 
culture. I feel sure she will find differences. And then she can tell us which model for society she thinks will 
give the best results, and if she does not have the slightest worry (Hustad 2013).  
 
Mind you, it is not people who are compared, but the structure through which people 
live.5 However, the consequence of comparison is that people are reduced to culture. I 
will from time to time throughout the dissertation reflect on the theme of comparison 
as a joint practical and epistemological problem. The discussion of translation in 
chapters 9 and 10 tries to elaborate a thinking that does not start from the abstract 
premises in comparison.  
From all this we see that culture is seen as an entitity which is independent of 
its parts and, might I add, independent of the historical and dialectical processes 
(which I will return to later) with which a culture is involved. The reproduction of the 
view that culture is something closed depends on this operation of abstraction. When 
I want to address the problem that culture is seen as something closed and static, it is 
to show that this depends on its link to identity and that we abstract. What we lose in 
the discussion of culture by thinking abstractly is that we miss out on the historical 
processes that led us to where we are, and secondly we lose the processes that 
                                              
5 There are of course more things to be said about this quote. For instance that Hustad mixes culture and model for society.   
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continue to play out in front of our eyes. These processes are the exchange between 
the parts (the different inhabitants of Norway, the different kinds of symbolic and 
normative expressions of these inhabitants) and the whole (Norway). We cannot 
know Norway (the whole) without going through its parts (the inhabitants of Norway, 
the symbolic expressions etc.). So why is it that we speak as if we could draw out the 
Norwegian culture from this process? As long as we think of culture as linked to 
identity and abstraction, this seems inevitable. It ensures, even for those who have the 
opposite conviction, the view that culture is and has been identical to itself (it is the 
same) throughout time and space.          
 Now, having located the problem of abstraction as a tendency in the political 
discourse on culture, the next question is how we proceed in order not to place 
ourselves in a position where we abstract. Is it even possible? Do we not have to fix 
what we are talking about in order to discuss it? First of all, the problem, as I see it, is 
the status we give to that which we fix. Secondly, it seems difficult to establish an 
alternative which does not embrace change as an anti-thesis to the closed and static. 
In Hegelian terms the opposite of abstract thinking is concrete thinking. And in 
concrete thinking the parts and the whole are thought together. It is not possible to 
have the one without the other. For Hegel nothing can be articulated without the 
mediation through something else: the whole cannot be understood without its parts 
and vice verca. Hegel is in this sense most interesting as a critic of abstraction.  
Seeing the whole and the part together allows us to see culture as temporal and 
as relational. And it is this relational aspect of culture that I will try to develop by 
reflecting on the metaphor branchements (Amselle 2001). What we take as a culture 
is a process stretched out in time and space and where the unity we call culture is the 
result of a persistent reinterpretation. On the one hand this takes us into a problem: 
For if the parts that culture is composed of on the one hand and the whole that 
comprises or encompasses all the parts on the other should be seen together, then this 
must implicate that there is something third that holds together and separates parts 
and whole at the same time. This is the problem of all such entities such as humanity, 
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Norwegian cultural identity: They depend on something third which is a metaphysical 
entity. On the other hand this opens up to a reflection on more pragmatic approaches 
that neither presupposes thirdness as a metaphysical entity (the Spirit of culture so to 
speak), nor refutes the relative existence of culture. Entities such as the nation and the 
cultural identity of a nation depend upon the narratives that constitute these entities. 
Their identities are, as we will discuss, narrative with all their problems and 
shortcomings (Ricoeur 1992). But before we get there, we will dwell some more on 
the representation of culture in the political discourse.      
 
2.2 Cultural sameness, differentialism, and origin 
In this second part we are still examining a political discourse which reproduces a 
view of culture as static and closed. As seen in the first part, the precondition for this 
view seems to me to be the link to identity. In the second part I will go into a theme 
that is linked to this joining of culture and identity, but which takes us more into the 
work on anti-racism.   
 
2.2.1 Differentialism and cultural racism  
Sociologist Jan Nederveen Pieterse mentions in his book Globalization and culture 
(2009) differentialism as one of three paradigms for approaching culture in a 
globalised world, with Samuel Huntington’s book the Clash of civilizations (2003) as 
being emblematic for such a position.6 Various versions of differentialist thinking go 
through the history of ideas. The German philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s view 
of the nation is regarded by some as a kind of differentialism. To him the spiritual 
essence of the German people was to be found in the German language. To Fichte the 
language presents a totality to which the language users adhere. The German 
language does not evolve, but is only repeated by its users. An individual user of 
language is, on the contrary, a threat to the purity of the language (Vincent 2009).  
                                              
6 It does not seem to matter to Pieterse that Huntington writes about civilisations and not cultures.  
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 The point here is not to remain in history, but to see how these ideas have 
persisted into modern times. A thinking akin to differentialism is racism, not in an 
explicitly biological sense but in a cultural sense. Among others, Étienne Balibar and 
Immanuel Wallerstein (1997) were early with warnings against the change of racist 
thinking from a biological racism to a cultural racism. Similar to the old 
differentialism this new racism feeds on the notion that there are given cultural 
differences that do not communicate or change, but exist side by side and which will 
result in violence when confronted. 
 
2.2.2 Culture as the new concept of race 
As Pierre-André Taguieff has shown in several of his books, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to understand the concept and phenomena of racism (Taguieff 2010). 
Racism shares hallmarks-such as stigmatisation, discrimination, and exclusion- with 
ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and other doctrines. It might be a universal 
anthropological trait or a phenomena emerging in a particular historical context. And 
can we speak of racism despite the fact that traditional biological racism is no longer 
held by anyone? Due to the works of, among others, Taguieff, a “new” field of study 
has appeared: new racism. New racism is among other things a transformation of 
racism in which the old quasi-biological hierarchisation of races is abandoned in 
favour of the concept of culture. In other words, racism is hard to locate and thus hard 
to prevent. However, this does not mean that racism does not occur or that it is 
impossible to get an intelligible grasp of it. And even though the notion of race has 
been de-legitimised, has this resulted in the disappearance of distinctions between 
men, of hierarchical thinking, stigmatisation, and exclusion? No. And yet, with this 
problem of defining racism we have difficulties discussing it.  
So, how then should we act to prevent racism if there is a consensus that there 
races do not exist? For Taguieff, this abandoning of the concept of race has 
nevertheless led the anti-racism movement into an impasse. On the one hand race is 
abandoned as significant concept by all. On the other hand, open discrimination of 
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minority groups cannot be comprehended without a collective understanding of this 
group. After all, the individuals in a group must have something in common to make 
them a group and which becomes the “reason” for discrimination. And since it is not 
race; what is it? This “new”7 name for the interpretation of the collective is culture 
and has, according to Taguieff, led the anti-racism movement into a defence of 
(cultural) difference. This notion of cultural difference is, however, shared by these 
neo-racist proponents.8 Or as Taguieff discusses in his major work La force du 
préjudge, the heterophobic and the heterophile (neologisms created by Taguieff) 
share an understanding of difference. Now since racism is a difficult phenomenon 
and concept to understand, it makes it perhaps even more dangerous. On the one hand 
the existence of racism can be rejected since there is no way to prove the existence of 
races. On the other hand discrimination and exclusion of groups occur. It thus seems 
like Taguieff claims that the displacement from race to culture is a co-construct of 
neo-racists and anti-racists.      
 The revitalisation of cultural differentialism has also a historical root going 
back to the work of UNESCO from the fifties. As Alana Lentin shows in the article 
“Replacing ‘race’, historicising ‘culture’ in multiculturalism”, “culture” as a concept 
met the need to find an alternative to the concept of race (Lentin 2005). The turn to 
culture was thus part of the anti-racism of UNESCO. However, this need revealed a 
certain notion of men and the difference between them. Or rather, it revealed a focus 
on difference as such. Culture was thus used on the one hand to replace the notion of 
race and on the other hand as “an adequate mean of describing human difference”, 
Lentin writes. And she continues: “UNESCO wanted to be able to answer questions 
about why human groups differed from each other in appearance, in tradition and in 
                                              
7 The study of cultural racism as a new kind of racism is not exactly new, but has been going on for some thirty years.   
8Taguieff writes that:”New racism, symbolical or hidden, is the racism of the antiracist age itself. That is a racism adapted 
to the post- Nazi era characterized by a basic consensus of rejecting racism” (Taguieff 2010: 55). 
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levels of “progress”” (Lentin 2005: 385). It is this difference and the role it plays that 
I seek to understand and question.  
 Central to UNESCO’s fight against racism in the postwar period was, as is 
well known, anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss who presented the outcome of this 
process in the book Race et histoire (2003). Here he replaced race with culture and 
racism with ethnocentrism. Levi-Strauss took on both the hierarchical aspects and the 
opposition between the civilised and the primitive- a remnant from colonial thought- 
as key concerns. Furthermore, in order to avoid the evolutionary aspect of racism 
where the level of development among the races could be measured, he introduced 
cultural relativism where the reduction to one evolutionary scheme would be 
impossible. There is a cultural diversity where the one culture is not reducible to the 
other. According to Lentin the best way, in Levi-Strauss’s view, to handle 
ethnocentrism was by stimulating intercultural exchange. However, it is a solution 
that makes us repeat the same mistake of reducing human beings to culture. As 
Lentin states, the problem for the reemerging of racism is the very notion of culture 
itself: 
 
It is now increasingly obvious that culturalist policies have not brought about the end of racism. This is 
because neither multiculturalism nor its updated version- interculturalism- questions the very reason for the 
focus on culture (Lentin 2005: 394).  
 
As I understand her, an open and dynamic understanding of culture does not do the 
trick but makes us repeat the same mistakes. Why? Because the prerequisite for 
diversity and its ethical consequence is a kind of conservation of identity and origin. 
As I see it, the notion of difference is linked to this thinking. What is interesting to 
me and what, as we shall see throughout the dissertation, makes dialectical thinking 
so relevant is not just the understanding of difference, but what kind of concept of 
difference we use. One thing I want to look at is how dialectical thinking can 
question how we may be able to think beginning without mistaking it for origin.  
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 In this sense I agree and disagree with Lentin’s critique of the concept of the 
intercultural. For if we take interculture to be a “solution” to the question of 
ethnocentrism (as Levi-Strauss does), then it is difficult not to repeat the thinking of 
origin. Since cultural diversity is the precondition for interculturalism, this 
nevertheless takes us back into an origin where cultures are separated. But if we take 
the intercultural as a reconstructive concept then the intercultural is a way of showing 
that the relational and dialectical aspects are more fundamental than separation. In 
other words, the critique of the intercultural oversees the relational aspect in the 
constitution of culture. Whereas Lentin sees it as a teleological concept, I see it as a 
reconstructive concept. Furthermore, this is pivotal to how we perceive culture. It 
might take us back to an origin, but on the other hand it might be seen as an outcome 
of a more fundamental relational exchange. In other words, I am not sure if it is the 
concept of “culture” itself that is the problem, or rather the concepts and intellectual 
operations with which it is related: identity, origin, abstractions, comparison.  
 Now, how does this resonate within the Norwegian context? Do we find 
cultural differentialism and racism here? One the one hand every case and context is 
similar and different at the same time. We may perhaps not “find” cultural 
differentialism in a purified form anywhere, and maybe not in Norway. On the other 
hand this new take on racism has also led to new research here. But just to give a hint 
I quote an example expressed by representatives from the right wing party FRP. It has 
always been easy to attack this party for holding a negative attitude towards 
immigrants. As a result of the increasing number of refugees entering Europe and in 
the aftermath of 11th of September 2001, the rhetoric has hardened and the idea of 
multicultural society has come under pressure. The argument is here as elsewhere not 
skin colour or biology, but culture. A much debated and criticised article written in 
2010 by two central members of FRP-Oslo, Kent Andersen and Christian Tybring- 
Gjedde, expresses some of these notions (2010). The authors insist on the concept of 
Norwegian culture: “what is wrong with Norwegian culture, since you [the 
government] are determined to replace it with multiculture? What is the aim of 
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stabbing our own culture in the back?” Further, this multiculture is threatening to 
“tear our country to pieces.” This article does not directly evoke a cultural 
differentialism. It does, however, draw on a nationalist aspect of culture where what 
is perceived as alien is a threat. What is Norwegian is based on an implicit idea of 
generalised kinship or a kinship beyond the bloodline of an individual. Plurality is not 
something positive, but subversive and destructive to an evolved yet original national 
identity. This kind of conceptualisation of cultural identity marks a clear cut 
distinction to what is different. I.e. all that is different is potentially subversive to the 
identity. 
 Returning to the more academic contributions, one of the few anthropologists 
to work on the theme of racism in Norway is the late Marianne Gullestad. She draws 
on ground-breaking works on racism (Barker, Stolcke, Balibar and Wallerstein, 
Taguieff, Wievorka etc.). Two articles from her hand are particularly interesting to 
our discussion of “culture” and “difference”. In “Invisible fences: Egalitarianism, 
nationalism and racism” (Gullestad 2002) she takes on the relation between 
egalitarianism and racism in Norway. She states that “I see the egalitarian logic as 
one of the reasons why the perception of incompatible cultural differences has so 
quickly entered the general common sense” (Ibid: 60). Gullestad perceives 
Norwegian egalitarianism (that we are all equals in terms of worth and rights) as a 
concealed (and imagined) sameness (that we feel that we are the same or identical) 
and the other way around. This feeling of being the same that she describes is linked 
to the “imagined” and refers to the historian Benedict Anderson’s ground-breaking 
study of nationalism (Anderson 2006). Anderson included the imagination as an 
analytical tool for rendering account of how it is possible that a large amount of 
people that have never met and who are geographically spread out on an enormous 
territory have a feeling of belonging together. Now Gullestad utilises Anderson’s 
reflections on the function of the imagination to shed some light on mechanisms of 
inclusion and exclusion. Referring to Alexis de Toqueville she writes that “people 
have to feel that they are more or less the same in order to be equal of value” (Ibid: 
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46). Gullestad’s point is, as far as I understand it, that even though egalitarianism is 
an ideological value, we do not leave the play of exclusion and inclusion which is 
based on origin. Even though equality is supposed to be a universal and individual 
value, equality is nevertheless linked to a common culture, ancestry, and origin. And 
this “”culture” is somehow regarded as completed” (Ibid: 53). 
 This is interesting to us in the sense that identity (as sameness) and difference 
are not seen together but as separate. Linking culture to identity (as sameness) and 
origin makes it impenetrable from the inside and the outside. Or differently put, a 
clear cut distinction between outside and inside is thus made. And as long as this 
cultural sameness is equivalent with society it makes it impossible for new citizens to 
enter the society and to co-constitute our societies. But must this be so? A 
philosophical deconstruction of the binary opposition between identity and difference 
might lead us in another direction. My claim is that this is an example of the link to 
origin and identity (as the same) that generate an understanding of culture as static 
and closed. Even though the Norwegian context is not identical to the French, the 
British, or any other, it has nevertheless inherited its thinking from somewhere. And 
it is this historical path that I want to retrace in the following chapters.  
 In the second part of reconstructing a political discourse I have been looking at 
a particular variant of new racism which does not focus on race or hierarchy, but 
which is nevertheless concerned with origin. Culture is the new concept of race 
which is used to reintroduce distinctions between human beings and which controls 
the play of inclusion and exclusion. The sameness that Gullestad describes as 
imagined I interpret as a cultural sameness. Secondly, sameness can also be 
interpreted as a synonym for identity. In other words, we see here that identity 
reappears but here as an imagined entity.    
 
2.2.3. Why is culture linked to identity? 
What I have tried to do in this chapter is to localise culture in a political rhetoric or 
political discourse, and show that culture is conceived of as something static and 
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closed. As I have tried to show, what constitutes this view of culture- and ultimately 
makes it legitimate to understand the concept of culture as a challenge- is that it is 
linked to identity. The point has so far been to give some examples from political 
discourse of how identity and culture are linked and to show how the link to identity 
is what first and foremost constitutes culture as a closed entity. The fixing of cultural 
identities in the claim for cultural minorities’ rights, the culturalisation of human 
beings in both politics of recognition and in a new racism, and the debates on national 
cultural identity are all tendencies of this. Abstraction constitutes cultural identities 
and is constituted by identity (they are in other words correlated). Abstraction and 
identity are thus the main components in the epistemological obstacle to 
understanding culture. And I have already indicated how I intend to exceed it. 
However, in trying to describe the obstacle we have only passed through phase one. 
We have seen how culture and identity have been linked in the political discourse and 
the public debates. But we have not looked at why they are linked. Culture seems to 
both explicitly draw on the concept of identity and implicitly on some kind of 
identity-thinking. But are these two connected elsewhere than in the political 
discourse? Is there a link between identity and the social science that has dealt most 
with culture, anthropology? The questions when and how these two terms did come 
together take us into the genealogy of culture and phase two in describing the 
epistemological obstacle.   
Why is it important to understand the historical circumstances for the concept 
of culture? In order to undo the entanglement of culture, identity and origin, and 
reflect on other ways of seeing culture as something more open, we must first of all 
understand how deep the link goes. This takes us almost inevitably into a critical 
discussion of identity. I am not sure if it is possible to detach culture and identity, but 
it is possible to question the way we think identity. Secondly we must thus 
understand how our understanding of cultural identity is marked by a certain 
understanding of identity. This implicates a historical and critical approach to both 
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culture and identity which takes the historical constitution of the concept of culture 
into account. These are the questions I will discuss in the next two chapters. 
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3. Genealogy9 of culture.  
 
Introduction 
In chapter 2 I tried to show how culture is presented as a political problem and that it, 
in this presentation, is linked to identity. In this chapter I am tightening the noose as I 
try to come closer to the answer why and how the view that culture is something 
static is being repeated. In order to do this I will look at the entanglement of culture, 
nation, race, and identity. The discussion of culture takes us inevitably into the 
history of anthropology. There is and has been a debate within anthropology on 
whether culture is a good analytical concept or describes anything real (Fischer 
2006). Does culture exist, and does it render account of anything? Culture has been 
denaturalised or de-essentialised by anthropologists for a long time (Barth 1994). 
And many anthropologists do not use the concept at all. What I am looking for here, 
however, is not so much to enter into an anthropological discussion as it is to trace 
culture within the history of anthropology. By tracing the genealogy of culture 
through the lexical definitions we see that cultural anthropology inherited a certain 
idea of culture from the 18th century. In the tradition from Herder, Kultur was meant 
to substitute Cultura by offering a less ethnocentric and more divers understanding of 
human beings. But in doing so it also lost the active aspect imbedded in Cultura.   
Another aspect which concerns the genealogical relation between culture and 
identity is raciology. The abstract gaze of raciology claiming to find and compare 
races is not far from the early 20th century anthropologist’s gaze comparing cultures. 
And the question is if the comparison of cultures in the political discourse when 
talking of cultural diversity draws on this aspect in anthropology. How far is the way 
one previously thought races from the way we think culture in political discourse? 
                                              
9 When I call this chapter “Genealogy of culture” this is very loosely built on a genealogy à la Foucault who again draws 
on Nietzsche. Having said that, it draws just as much on the French epistemological tradition of analysing the history of 
scientific concepts. When I call this genealogical it is to draw attention both to the other concepts to which it is linked as 
well as the institutional circumstances that were part of the consitution of this concept.   
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The play of cultural identities and differences is within the same logic of identity as 
the discussion of different races in raciology. They both treat their object of study as 
a thing which draws on a certain notion of identity.  
   
3.1 Culture, nation, and raciology 
I want to make two points in this part. The first emphasises the “internal” 
developments of culture as idea and as concept. The second traces the logic of culture 
to raciology. In the first part of this reconstruction of how the concept of culture is 
viewed as static and closed, I want the reader to keep in mind what Marianne 
Gullestad discusses and the context of the so-called new racism in which culture is 
the new concept of race. What I want to show is how culture is related to versions of 
raciological thinking and to the concept of nation emerging in the 19th century. If we 
follow Amselle’s account, this displacement that Gullestad, Taguieff, and others 
discuss does not become so surprising after all.   
 
3.2 The concept of culture 
In order to reflect critically on the concept of culture, we must look into its 
genealogical emergence. For in order to understand how the concept of culture is 
problematic, we also have to understand the other ideas with which it is connoted. 
There is of course not enough space and time to give an exhaustive account of all 
these aspects ranging from linguistic over institutional to philosophical and scientific 
aspects here. Furthermore, culture has a different meaning in the humanities, in the 
social sciences, or in the more general sense. The word culture comes from the Latin 
Cultura (past participle of cultus) which has a double significance as both cultivating 
the soil related to agriculture, and to develop the faculties of the spirit. Cicero used 
the cultivation of the soil as a metaphor for spiritual education in “cultura animi”. In 
this sense culture is an activity, a process, a development. Culture acquired, however, 
a new meaning in the 18th century with the German Kultur meaning the set of values, 
symbols, ideas, beliefs, and behavior patterns of a social group. This new definition 
was intended as a correction of what was thought of as an ethnocentric Universalist 
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understanding of human beings: There is not only one way to develop the human 
spirit, but many, depending on historical context. And it is this latter meaning that has 
been transported into ethnology, sociology, and cultural anthropology. As far as I can 
see a part of the problem lies in this opposition between the humanist and the social 
scientific concept of culture. For by negating the cultivation of the spirit as an 
untenable ethnocentric universalism, one also lost the dynamic and active element in 
the concept. By going through some of the lexical definitions I will try to show how 
this opposition corresponds with the two views of culture as an activity and as fixed.  
 Even though both meanings are nouns they both describe, contrary to the 
current use in debates on cultural diversity, activities or actions. Le Petit Robert has 
two main uses where the second contains both a dynamic and a static notion. Culture 
is: the action to cultivate the soil and the range of operations for taking vegetables 
from the ground. Secondly it is the development of the faculties of the spirit, and “the 
unity of the intellectual aspects belonging to a civilization, a nation” (Le Robert, 
2000).  
 When it comes to the first definition, both the agricultural and the spiritual 
cultivation are activities. Whereas the second, which is the definition commonly used 
in the conceptualisation of culture in the notion of multicultural, is static. To cultivate 
the soil or one’s spirit implies a process where the crops growing in that field or the 
spiritual capacity are the results of that process. The “unity of the intellectual aspects” 
goes on the other hand in the direction of something given which is not procedural.   
 Raymond Williams, in his article on culture in Keywords (1983), ends up 
distinguishing three active categories of use: “(i) the independent and abstract noun 
which describes a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development, 
from C18; (ii) the independent noun, whether used generally or specifically, which 
indicates a particular way of life, whether of a people, a period, a group, or humanity 
in general, from Herder and Klemm…(iii) the independent and abstract noun which 
describes the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity” 
(Williams 1983: 90). Now, even though the first category is a kind of historical 
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background for the second, it is the second category which is pivotal for our 
epistemological reflections on culture. Culture as “a way of life” might take us further 
in the direction of practice. However, a “particular way of life” renders it less 
dynamic and refers to a certain people, period or group.  
 In Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Deutschen, “Kultur” is described as: „the 
state of spiritual-social development as well as the unity of acquisitions 
(Errungenschaften) on an artistic and humanistic level as well as on the level of 
society (often linked to an ethnical unity in a historical limited time-space)“ 
(Akademie, 1989). What is interesting here is that, with the common use of the 
notion, state of development (Entwicklungsstand) based on or associated with an 
ethnical unity (etnische Einheit), is included in the definition of culture. This is 
perhaps more in accordance with a common use than an etymological root, but the 
connotation with ethnicity renders it more substantial and static. Furthermore, 
Entwicklungsstand indicates something frozen in time. A Stand or state is not a 
process. Or, the process that led to it is not included in the definition.  
 If we go to Brockhaus Wahrig Deutsches Wörterbuch, „Kultur“is defined as: 
„The unity of the spiritual…and…material forms of humanity’s life-expressions of 
[and to] a certain people in a certain time“(Brokhaus, 1982). Lebensäusserungen 
might take us in an expressivist direction. On the other hand bestimmten Volkes and 
bestimmte Zeit de-temporalises and substantialises culture. It is this people and this 
time, which are different from another people and another time.  
 In all the definitions of culture we find the active element. To cultivate 
something is not just to develop what is already there (human faculties) but also 
involves a process of production (Pflege, Errungtschaft, cultiver). Multiculturalism, 
cultural diversity, and cultural pluralism on the other hand are exempt from this 
initially dynamic element in the concept.10 So It must be derived from the 
                                              
10E. Ortigues writes in his article on Culturalisme that: “what makes the use of the word « culture » is that it institutes a 
relation between the state of a tradition, or a social aquisition, and the process of an individual intellectual and moral 
aquisition. ”(PUF, 2004: 188)  
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substantialist notion widely accepted in the definitions: Ensemble des aspects 
intellectuelle, Entwicklungsstand, bestimmtes Volkes. A culture is given as a positive 
fact, or so we are lead to believe, that can be discussed as a substance we can have a 
positive or negative view of. On the other hand there are those who claim that culture 
is dynamic. As I see it, the interesting point does not lie in making this latter claim, 
which anyone can make, but rather in questioning why it is that we continue to think 
culture as something closed. And if culture is dynamic how should we describe it?  
 M. Izard writes in the article Culture in Dictionnaire de l’ethnologie et de 
l’anthropologie (PUF, 2004) that culture has mainly two kinds of meaning, the two 
are nevertheless linked: Culture in general and the forms of collective cultures 
thought and experienced in history. This last form gives a plurality to the concept. 
Regarding the first some hallmarks are vital. First of all, culture was separated from 
nature. The turn from nature towards the cultivation of the spirit (cultura animi) was 
regarded as a universal trait for human beings, as something that separates us from 
animals. The distinction between nature and culture is interesting but will not be 
further discussed in the thesis. Another more relevant point is the transmission of 
culture through time. Is the transmission of cultural traits, practices, customs, etc. the 
transmission of the same? Here we touch upon the problem of temporality which is 
one of the main problems with the notion of culture. Is the temporal flux a potential 
threat to the concept of culture or not? Is the permanence of the same a condition for 
talking about culture? 
 The second main meaning of culture is the diversity of cultures. But even 
though diversity is a fact, what it is that separates cultures, in order to make them 
diverse, becomes more difficult to define. Now what goes through the definitions 
which are important for us is culture as a metaphor taken from agriculture to describe 
a spiritual activity. This spiritual activity was sedimented into the western cultural 
tradition. However, as we shall see, the problem articulated by Herder and others was 
that different people at different times also deserved the status of culture, so the 
concept had to be plural. Now, my point is that this plurality does not take us out of 
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abstract thinking. That plurality takes cultures out of their historical processes where 
the boundaries of identity and difference are not so clear.   
 I will sum this up by making two remarks. First there is an internal ambiguity 
in how the notion is understood in the dictionaries where the one leans towards an 
activity and the other towards a fixed spatio-temporal entity. Secondly, what this 
second meaning draws on is an unthematised understanding of identity. How so? 
What I claim to see through the lexical definitions of culture is that it is described 
through closed entities such as “a people”, “a group”, “etnische Einheit”, “in einem 
begrentzten Zeitraum”, “bestimtes Volkes”,“bestimtes Zeit”. This is perhaps not a 
surprise.  However, it stands in contrast to the dynamic aspect of the first group of 
definitions. I find the link between cultural and ethnic unity particularly interesting 
because it underlines both the link to the nation and to race. The general problem that 
I seek to shed some light on is why a view of culture as static is repeated. As far as I 
can see this must be due to the way we think and that our thinking has problems with 
capturing that which is not clearly discernible but dynamic. But even though we can 
make some interesting observations regarding the etymology we must go broader in 
order to reconstruct culture.    
 
3.3 Ideas on culture 
Ideas on culture make up a large field, and all aspects cannot be included here. I 
therefore rely on some primary and some secondary sources. Regarding the latter I 
build on Adam Kuper’s book Culture: The anthropologist account (1999) and 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen and Alf Sivert Nielsen’s A history of anthropology (2001). 
 The roman politician Cicero was one of the first to use the term culture from 
the domain of agriculture on the domain of spiritual matters. In Tusculanae 
Disputationes Cicero speaks of cultura animi or the cultivation of the spirit. As we 
saw in the lexical definition the human mind or spirit can be cultivated like the soil 
can be cultivated into a cornfield. However, if we make a jump in time to an 
understanding relevant to both the political and the anthropological concept of 
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culture, it was in the 18th and 19th century that the concept Kultur came into use in the 
German tradition. It was implemented in the German language around 1700, and 
Herder established the modern understanding of the concept. According to Herder 
culture is an autonomous unity related to a specific nation or people and must be 
understood on its own terms, a precursory idea to the anthropological principle of 
cultural relativism. Herder argues against the idea of history of the Enlightenment 
thinkers as these came to understand it as the realisation of a universal reason. It was 
Voltaire and Kant and their representation of history as the progression of humanity 
that provoked Herder. The contempt that the Enlightenment nurtured toward previous 
centuries led Herder to propose that every epoch as well as the culture by which it is 
characterised cannot be compared to any other, let alone be judged as a level of 
progress (Alain Renault 2000). It is in his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der 
Menscheit and Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit 
that he argues that every culture must be understood on its own premises. In other 
words, Herder pluralises the notion of culture against the arrogance in the concept of 
culture in the Enlightenment.  Raymond Williams writes, quoting Herder, that 
nothing is:  
 
more indeterminate than this word, and nothing more deceptive than its application to all nations and 
periods”. He attacked the assumption of the universal histories that “civilization” or “culture”-this 
historical self-development of humanity- was what we would now call a unilinear process…It is then 
necessary, he argued, in a decisive innovation, to speak of “cultures” in the plural (Williams 1983: 89).  
 
As we have already touched upon and will return to later, the pluralisation of cultures 
in modern times is an operation that tries to escape the evolutionist understanding of 
humankind. The rejection of universalism (that humans are part of one and the same 
history) in the shape of evolution (that this history has different steps placing 
different peoples on different hierarchical levels) led to a fragmentation and 
separation of humankind which in modern times underpins racist thinking. In other 
words, the rejection of a racism based on evolution, and the distinction between the 
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civilised and the barbarians, led to another kind of racism based on cultural 
differences. More on this later, but for now it suffices to mention that the idea of a 
cultural diversity was born with Herder’s ideas. The point is that the emphasis on 
cultural diversity as a counter-racist strategy has parallels to Herder’s critique of the 
Enlightenment.   
 Hegel is often mentioned as a proponent of the idea that each period of history 
has a spirit not reducible to another. Still there seems to be a difference between 
Hegel and Herder in that Herder does not hierarchise the different epochs or spirits. If 
one reads Hegel’s Vorelesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte he hierarchise 
the different peoples according to the step on which they belong in the development 
of the universal spirit (Geist), and some people are not even worthy of entering 
history. For Hegel, as for many others in his time, the development of a state and the 
development of writing and poetry integrate peoples into world history. The Africans 
do not have writing or a state so they cannot enter world history. The Indians have 
writing, but no state, so they cannot enter either. It is interesting to see how Hegel and 
Herder thus have shaped our way of thinking cultural difference. Whereas Hegel 
deems some people or cultures to be outside of universal history, the history of 
progress, Herder refutes this judgment by defending other people’s irreducibility. 
They both confirm, in one way or the other, the notion that there is heterogeneity (in 
history) between cultures.  
 There is a long debate on the difference between the concept of culture and the 
concept of civilisation. E. Ortigues writes in his article on Culturalisme that “it is true 
that the Greek civilization does no longer exist, however the Greek culture can 
always be transmitted (peut toujours se transmettre)” (PUF, 2004). According to this 
definition culture is something transferable through time, whereas civilisation is not. 
This distinction takes us into the difference between the French and German 
traditions. Whereas the Germans utilise the concept of culture, French scholars 
emphasise civilisation. E.B. Tylor’s book Primitive culture was, for instance, 
 47 
 
 
translated into Civilisation Primitive in the French edition. But the question is 
whether the concepts refer to different objects as well.  
 As the Annales-historian Lucien Febvre notes in a conference talk on 
civilisation, this concept contains the same kind of ambivalence as culture: It is both 
the set of characteristics that an observer might record studying a human group, and it 
connotes civilisation as a distinction to that which is not civilised. Progress is also 
vital to the latter sense. In the account of Norbert Elias, however civilisation and 
culture are linked to the distinction between the French and the German tradition 
where civilisation for the Germans did not contain authenticity but mere form. 
Civilisation transcended national boundaries whereas culture was related to identity 
and the self-consciousness of a nation and thus preferred (Kuper 1999). 
 Another branch in the genealogy of culture which also took its point of 
departure from the debate between the French and the German traditions is the social 
science of Talcott Parsons. He tried to establish a kind of synthesis between 
positivism and idealism in his account of human action. On the one hand he agreed 
with the utilitarian positivists that human action is rational, on the other hand he also 
recognised that this same action is part of an organic whole and related to ideas and 
values that make up the motives for human action (Kuper 1999: 49). This latter 
aspect became one of the three systems which, according to Parson, govern human 
action. In addition to the social and physical system, the cultural system dealt with 
ideas and values entangled in action: “Cultural objects are symbolic elements of the 
cultural tradition, ideas or beliefs, expressive symbols or value patterns” (Parson in 
Kuper 1999: 53). For our part it is interesting to note that the representation of culture 
as ideas and values is precisely what takes us out of the concrete practices and into 
abstraction. This understanding of culture haunts us still, as it is the values and ideas 
of a culture that is debated in multicultural societies. But through such a 
representation culture becomes ahistorical and abstracted from its practice and 
process of constitution. As I will try to point out throughout the dissertation, this 
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process of constitution is relational in the sense that distinctions are not clear cut 
between cultures.    
 E.B. Tylor is said to be the first to define an anthropological concept of culture 
when he in 1871 defined culture in the book Primitive culture as “that complex whole 
which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities 
and habits acquired by man as a member of a society” (Ibid: 56). According to Alfred 
Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn (Culture: a critical review of concepts and definitions 
1952), it is unsatisfactory that Tylor did not distinguish between social and cultural 
organisation. Having in mind that Kluckhohn had collaborated with Parson this is 
perhaps no surprise, as he too emphasised this division. Anyway, the vital aspect of 
modern understanding of culture was the relativisation made by Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn of these values. This leads us again to the point which is the abstractionist 
account of culture. A relativisation of values does take us out of ethnocentrism- and 
the view that the western culture is the only thing we can call culture- and the 
evolutionism imbedded in this. It does not, however, take us out of the problem of 
culture as static: on the contrary, it takes us deeper into it.  
 Until now we have barely touched upon the distinction between a humanist 
and scientific understanding of culture. The opposition had its point of departure in 
the more general debate between the natural sciences and the humanities, where the 
humanists claimed that the realm of human spirit could not be treated as things in 
nature and required specific methods. The consequence for the understanding of 
culture was that it could not be analysed through universal explanatory laws, as the 
social scientists in the late 19th and early 20th century were looking for, but had to be 
understood through interpretation. A second trait that separated the scientific and the 
humanist approach was that the social scientist in the school of Talcot Parson 
separated the cultural and the social.  
 Now, one of Parson’s Students, Clifford Geertz, came out to take a middle 
position between the humanist and the anthropological view on culture. Geertz 
introduced an interpretative symbolic anthropology which drew on philosophy and 
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literary theory. It is particularly interesting to note the implementation of Paul 
Ricoeur’s thinking. Ricoeur’s idea that human actions convey meaning rendered them 
possible to read in a similar manner as written texts. Symbols not only express a 
worldview but structure action as well. Geertz states in The interpretation of cultures 
that “an exact understanding of what it means…to say that our formulations of other 
people’s symbol systems must be actor-oriented” (Geertz 2000: 14). The analysis of 
culture thus had to be in line with Max Weber’s methodological individualism:  
 
Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has 
spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science 
in search of law but an interpretative one in search for meaning (Ibid: 5).  
 
Following the trail of Parson culture was still distinguished from the social as a 
system that structured human action. Kuper writes that in the end culture came to 
mean for Geertz: “the epitome of the values that rule in a society, embodied most 
perfectly in the religious rituals and the high art of the elite” (Kuper 1999: 120). 
Following Kuper’s account, when turning culture into values we detach ourselves 
from practice. Geertz’s view of culture is thus idealistic and contains the same 
problem of abstraction that I question. What is sympathetic and interesting about 
Geertz and his interpretative approach is that he tries to understand and not explain, 
and thus does not arrange “abstracted entities into unified patterns”. Having said that, 
what he tries to understand is what is nevertheless attempted abstracted from action. 
He proposes that “The essential task of theory building here is not to codify abstract 
regularities but make thick description possible, not to generalize across cases but to 
generalize within them” (Geertz 2000: 20). The question is, however, to what extent 
the “inside of cases” here sediments a non-dialectical and atemporal understanding of 
culture. If the point is not to generalize across cases, the problem of generalisation 
remains as generalisation disregards processes.  
 A name that cannot be bypassed and whose influence has been great is of 
course Claude Levi-Strauss. With him as with everyone else it is not possible to cover 
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all implications of his thinking. What is interesting with Levi-Strauss is the tension 
between a universalistic and particularistic view of man. On the one hand there is a 
Levi-Strauss represented in Race et histoire. Even though Levi-Strauss here 
underlines the fact that almost no culture is isolated, his focus on the dangers of 
ethnocentrism takes him in the direction of a non-universalist attitude. The 
ethnocentric and racist distinction between the cultivated and the savage refuses to 
see the cultural diversity (Levi-Strauss 1996: 383). The alternative to a racist attitude, 
according to Levi-Strauss, is not to ascribe to all humans an abstract equality. This is, 
as Levi-Strauss writes, something deceiving to the spirit because it neglects the fact 
of diversity (Ibid: 385). On the other hand there is a structuralist Levi-Strauss that, 
despite observable differences, focuses on discerning a formal social organisation 
shared by all humans that is understandable from a notion of the brain as binary 
structured. Levi-Strauss’s comparison of different alliance systems leads to a 
conclusion that gains status as a universal insight.11 Amselle remarks on Levi-Strauss: 
“in his study of “kinship atoms,” “kinship structures,” or “mythemes” [Levi-Strauss] 
took the side of universalism; by contrast, in Race et histoire, he adopts a culturalist 
position“(Amselle 1998: IX). In the first case the cultural variation is meant to 
illustrate a universalistic point (that all myths have at deep level a dichotomous 
structure, and that all kinship relations in the end are regulated by the prohibition of 
incest), in the second cultural variation illustrates an anti-ethnocentric point. 
However, in both cases, culture, whether it expresses a diversity or universality 
culture, “is seen exclusively in terms of the world of rules” (Ibid: 20).  
The evolutionary tradition in anthropology maintained a separation between 
culture and nature in the sense of a theory where not all human beings had left the 
state of nature. This goes against the universalist claim of for instance Claude Levi-
Strauss that culture is a distinctive attribute to man. In this sense a notion of diversity 
                                              
11Lévi-Strauss writes that the structure of parenthood results from a universal fact that in all human societies, in order for a 
man to find a wife she is lost by another man who has the relation to her as a father or brother (Ibid: 104). 
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of cultures was necessary to question the idea that some people were underdeveloped 
and thus could be subjected to violence. To pluralise the notion of culture could from 
this perspective be seen as necessary to universalise the nature-culture distinction to 
all human beings. The question is, however, if the right way to do this was to focus 
on a unity called culture, and not on the individuals. Claude Levi-Strauss’s promotion 
of cultural diversity against a racism of the One (occidental) culture towards the 
primitives living in nature may unintentionally have provided the differentialist or 
cultural racism with an argument.      
Our understanding of culture does not come from an internal historical and 
linguistic development alone, but from relations to other disciplines, ideologies, 
practices, and historical circumstances. In this sense a genealogy of the concept of 
culture is perhaps preferable to a history of culture as it enables us to see the impure 
genesis of its concept and phenomenon and not just an “internal” development of it. 
But perhaps the anthropological tradition that has dealt most explicitly with culture is 
cultural anthropology. 
 
3.4 Cultural anthropology 
Vital to the understanding of anthropology is of course the division into different 
schools, traditions, themes. Central to the concept of culture is the distinction 
between social anthropology, with a strong base in Great Britain, and cultural 
anthropology, widespread in American anthropology (Hylland Eriksen and Nielsen 
2001: 39). Pivotal to the development of the American cultural anthropology was the 
German-American anthropologist Franz Boas. As Hylland Eriksen and Nielsen write, 
Boas was as a German immigrant influenced by the German tradition from Herder in 
the 18th century to Adolf Bastian in the 20th, and subscribed to the principle of 
historical particularism which took into account that each culture contained its own 
values and history (Ibid: 40). This tradition goes as mentioned back to Herder in 
particular. In the 19th and 20th century this opposed the evolutionary tradition in 
anthropology which reduced all human cultures into one evolutionary scheme. But 
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like Herder, Boas was skeptical to attempts to reduce the cultural diversity. He saw it 
as problematic to establish similarities between societies that were, according to him, 
fundamentally different. It is thus interesting to note that the concept of cultural 
relativism, a common term today, was coined by Boas. Vital to the tradition that Boas 
was part of was diffusionism which saw cultures as developed and spreading from the 
same origin and source. This countered the evolutionist view that history was “a 
unilineal movement through well-defined stages” (Ibid: 27). Boas heavily influenced 
the next generation of great anthropologists like Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. 
They looked at the relationship between psychological factors and culture and 
worked on the boasian assumption that human mental characteristics were acquired 
rather than inborn (Ibid: 61). 
 An example of a contemporary anthropologist who still finds the notion of 
culture relevant is Marshall Sahlins. Still he warns us against a simplistic 
representation of diffusionist anthropology. He writes in the article “Two or three 
things that I know about culture” that “The American anthropological codgers who 
spent a good part of their lives studying historical diffusion hardly believed that 
cultures were unchanging and rigidly bounded” (Sahlins 1999: 305). And in a 
footnote on Boas, Sahlins rephrases Boas stating that “a commitment to tradition 
entails some consciousness; a consciousness of tradition entails some invention; an 
invention of tradition entails some tradition” (Ibid: 417). 
 Now what is interesting with drawing this particular line in the development of 
cultural anthropology is to understand how culture can become something closed. 
The principle of historical particularism which underpins the cultural relativism of 
Boas and of today, and which seems to have been inspired by the ideas of Herder, 
gives us some clues. Central to the genesis of culture is, as will be discussed a bit 
later, that Herder, or a certain Wirkungsgeschichte emanating from him, is a 
precursor to both the nation and to cultural relativism. If anthropology has had 
something to do with shaping our view of culture as closed, then the development of 
cultural anthropology from Boas is vital. Having Sahlins’ words in mind and without 
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claiming to have located the big bad wolf: the boasian principles of cultural 
relativism and historical particularism are, as far as I can see, what we find a remnant 
of in parts of the political discourse that we looked at in the previous chapter. The 
discussion of cultural minority rights by Charles Taylor draws on the same source as 
cultural anthropology: Herder.     
 However, I do not think that culture could have become a political issue in the 
way that is has without its link to the concept of identity. This point is affirmed by 
Vincent Descombes (2011, 2013) who traces the genealogy of identity to the works 
of psychoanalyst Erik Erikson: “The link between (American) cultural anthropology 
and the theory of Erikson is decisive” (Descombes 2013: 34). Erikson joins, 
according to Descombes, the psychoanalysis of Freud and American cultural 
anthropology with the backdrop of Bildung (Descombes 2011: 7). Descombes 
mentions Erikson’s meeting with Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Gregory 
Bateson- and their works on the relation between psychology and culture (“culture et 
personnalité”) - as “having an important consequence for his conception of 
personality” (Descombes 2013: 28). As I understand it, Erikson was influenced by 
studies that tried to show culture’s effect on personality. Then what Erikson does is to 
substitute personality with identity. Descombes writes that ““Identity” is [from now 
on] often a word which takes the place terms like “character” (caractère), 
“personality” (personnalitè), or in English “Self” used to take“(Ibid: 29). In other 
words Erikson is influenced by cultural anthropology’s view of the link between 
culture and personality, but influenced in his turn this relation as he substituted 
personality with identity. In this way culture and identity became conceptually be 
linked.    
 Even though not exhaustive, I have so far tried to bring together a lexical 
account of culture, alongside a brief history of the ideas of culture culminating with 
cultural anthropology. With cultural anthropology we touch for the first time upon 
identity which I will discuss in the next chapter. So far this has been a history of 
culture, merely seeing culture from the inside. In the next section of this first part I 
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will present a more genealogical take on culture by looking at its outside and how 
culture is shaped also by the notion of race.  
 
3.5 Raciology and culture 
Raciology is the study of races. And even though this discourse might draw on prior 
ideas, notions, and attitudes, its commencement is first and foremost related to the 
European discovery of the non-European world. Torgeir Skorgen denominates in his 
book Rasenes oppfinnelse (The invention of the races) Francois Bernier (1625-1688) 
as the author of the first attempt to give a classification of all peoples of the world. 
These early classifications of humans into races seem to have gone hand in hand with 
the wider classificatory logic, the logic that Foucault analyses in Les mots et les 
choses with the concept of episteme (Foucault 2003), in natural history. One of the 
founding fathers of 17th century botanical classification, Carl von Linné (1707-1778), 
was also a kind of proto ethnologist doing field studies among the Sami people in the 
north of Scandinavia. He delivers the first hierarchical classification of races based on 
morphological traits (Skorgen 2002: 55).  
 Later, the implication for the young European social sciences in the late 19th 
and early 20th century was a division of labor. Sociology and political studies 
(Statswissenschaft) were to study modern, western societies organised in states, 
whereas anthropology was to study the non-modern stateless societies. Modern 
anthropology has turned this study of different life forms into its ethos by striving to 
describe the humans studied, not through the judgmental eyes of the West, but as 
equal to the Western way of life. Modern anthropology has rejected the normative 
distinction cultivated or civilised-primitive and elevated all people to the level of 
civilised but added a diversity of cultures. It has thus conserved the notion of 
difference in the original opposition. Anthropology has maintained the distinction 
between cultures, but was nevertheless forced to operate within the logic of 
difference (between races, cultures, peoples etc.) fixed by the opposition modern-
primitive and by the comparison of species and races. The question, which is our 
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main hypothesis, is whether there under this concept of difference lurks another 
notion, that of origin. To multiply the origin by rendering it plural is not, however, to 
question origin. However, the challenge today is increasingly how to account of 
change and dynamics.  
 The development of the notions of race can be reconstructed through a history 
of ideas the way Skorgen does. In addition to this, history attempts to trace the 
development of the ideas which culminated in the genocides during the Second 
World War. A vital trait in this understanding of races is the hierarchy of races. 
Firstly, for our part a mere history of ideas is not sufficient as this is linked to 
political and historical happenings in European and, in particular, in French history. 
The colonial history imbedded in French history developed another branch of 
raciological thinking which not merely took its foundation from an idea of races, but 
also from the intertwining of institutional and political problems in the aftermath of 
the French revolution. In the books Vers un multiculturalisme francais (1996) and 
Branchements (2001) Amselle addresses modern raciological thinking, its relation to 
the constitution of anthropology and to the French revolution.  Secondly, in this 
context it is not merely the hierarchical racism that is the problem, but also the 
opposition between what is pure and what is mixed. In other words, what kind of 
concept of difference does this opposition allow for?  Amselle here draws up the 
historical lines of what he calls the French multiculturalism. Going back to the 18th 
century this period was permeated by the idea of society’s “second birth”. Arthur 
Joseph Gobineau (1816-1882) was one of the most important adherers to the idea of a 
regeneration of the French nation. However, the theories of regeneration drew on the 
ideas of the historian Comte Henri de Boulainvilliers (1658-1722), who claimed that 
the French nobility descended from a different, a German, race than the Gallo-roman 
peasants. Gobineau’s claim was that the mixture of the German and the Gallo-roman 
races was to blame for the degenerated state of the nation (Skorgen 2002: 124-125). 
Now, not only was it vital to change the political institutions of society, it was also 
paramount to find the men that could live there. As the man living in l`ancien régime 
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with its feudal institutions had become a morally and physically degenerated kind of 
being, society had to be regenerated by finding a man not infected by the feudal 
institutions and its despotism.12 Such men, untouched and pure, le bon sauvage, was 
to be found in the outskirts of the French soil and in different parts of the world. 
However, as these people did not know feudal law, neither did they know natural 
law. So primitive man, contrary to the man of l’ancien regime, had a potential but 
was not yet enlightened. In theory at least this goes against Gobineau who according 
to Skorgen had a “pessimistic view on the chance for the Europeans to civilize the 
lower races” (Ibid: 131).What is interesting in the French colonial context is that 
enlightenment and raciology actually go hand in hand. Gobineau on the other hand 
seems to have found adherers in German anti-semitism.13   
Now, enlightenment as a mission became the legitimation of the colonial 
expeditions to Egypt, Algeria, and Senegal. But in order to find the non-corrupted 
people one needed to establish a knowledge of who were pure and who were mixed 
or impure. Amselle writes that:  
 
The first colonial enterprise prior to the Enlightenment and the French revolution was the Egyptian 
expedition that constituted a true laboratory for the French expansion in the 19th century. It is 
exemplary in the sense that it rests on three contradictory logics which nevertheless were closely 
depending on each other: the regeneration, natural right, and the raciological and linguistic 
classifications. One can observe the presence of these logics throughout the French colonialisation 
(Amselle 1996: 55).   
 
This is a quite significant quote for the problematic in this dissertation because it 
indicates the problems that the two main terms in the dissertation, branchements and 
translation, are dealing with. Whereas branchements is a way of escaping the hold 
                                              
12Another French anthropologist, Bruno Latour, elaborates on this problem of regeneration in relation to physical health in 
19th century France (Latour 2001). 
13 Claude Levi-Strauss places Gobineau too in the problematic of the pure and the mixed. The problem was more the 
mixing of races rather than the superiority of one pure race over others (Levi Strauss 2003: 17). 
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that raciology still seems to have, translation is an alternative way of understanding 
language. In other words raciology and its certain logic of identity and difference on 
the one hand, and linguistic classifications on the other are central for how we think 
culture. In this dissertation it is first and foremost the connection between raciology 
and branchements that I have developed, whereas translation is thought more in the 
direction of an analogy to culture. I hope to return to the effect of linguistic 
classification and translation more thoroughly in a future work.     
This entanglement of regeneration, natural right, raciology, and linguistic 
classification was the institutional, political, and ideological legitimation of raciology 
in the French context. Not initially a hierarchy of strength between the pure races (as 
is more the development of the Nazi ideology), but a hierarchy of the most original 
and pure people. The point is not to say that these two branches of racism are not 
related, but merely to underline that at least on the surface it was possible to argue 
that the source of man was not in the West. In other words, Napoleon thus found a 
quasi-rational reason for his expeditions to Egypt. Napoleon found the foundation in 
the thinking of Count Volney (1757-1820): “Bonaparte and his army rests on the 
knowledge accumulated by Volney during his voyage to the Orient in order to 
formulate their conquest and administrative project in Egypt” (Ibid: 60).   
 So, the problem is that people in l’Ancien règime were degenerated in a wide 
sense. An explanation was found in the mixing of races (which as we have seen was 
supported by among others Gobineau).  The solution to this problem of degeneration 
was the regeneration founded in a new and pure man. But in order to find something 
pure one needs a principle or a discipline that can separate the pure from the impure 
or mixed. Raciology thus becomes a sort of supportive science that at the same time 
could establish a knowledge of races and a distinction between the pure from the 
impure or mixed.  
 An interesting and vital aspect of raciology is the affirmation of the pure and 
original which, following our working hypothesis, in its turn also affects our notion 
of culture. Amselle writes that:  
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Raciological thinking has this interesting point that it takes up related concepts such as race, nation or 
ethinicity and by closing them gives them an additional vigour which confer them the quality of 
substance. When these substances have been constituted is it necessary to unite them through two kinds 
of problems; on the one hand comparativism and the systems of oppositions on the other. (Amselle 
2001: 91).  
 
Both the system of opposition and the method of comparison produce the idea of a 
mutual heterogeneity from one racial or cultural unity to another. Or rather, it takes 
the difference as a point of departure and not as the result of an analysis. Thus 
comparativism assumes what it is meant to elaborate on. Amselle’s point is, as I 
understand it, that this is a dehistorisation, a de-dialecticalisation of something 
historical and dialectical. However, this dialectic is a dialectic without the absorption 
of the Other into the Same. It is rather a dialectic without the assumption of an initial 
opposition and separation of the Other and the Same. So, there is no radical 
Otherness to this dialectics. On the other hand the movements of this dialectics, and 
communications, create variations where it becomes clear that there is no such thing 
as the Same.  
 A thinking akin to the logic of pure-mixed in raciology is what is called 
differentialism. A precursor to such thinking is Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s nationalism. 
For Fichte human beings are social. Thus society, the state, and the nation represent 
stages in a development of the collective that constitutes human beings. For Fichte 
this took, in his late thinking, a truly nationalist turn. In the text Reden an die 
Deutsche Nation, Fichte claims that the Germans in order to become humans must 
seize their common spiritual origin which is still in the German language unspoiled 
by interaction with other languages. The German language is conserved identical to 
itself through time through being independent of other languages and does not have a 
dialectical relation with its speakers. As Gilbert Vincent writes: “There is no trace of 
dialectics between the spoken language and the language system… Nothing that 
resembles the dialectics of the rule and the use” (Vincent 2009: 60).   
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 Besides the unacceptable idea of a division of all human beings into a 
hierarchy of races comes the idea of difference. The question is what kind of concept 
of difference supports our notion of culture. For it might be possible to be a 
proponent of a kind of apartheid, where for instance Muslims and Christians cannot 
live together, without claiming one culture to be superior to another in a hierarchy.  
The problem is, however, still the notion of cultural difference as framed within a 
language of purity. The African raciology was for instance in part promoted by 
Africans as a negation of a western raciology. The works of the American-Liberian 
politician and writer William Blyden is, according to Amselle, the first in the 
contemporary period to give a systematic foundation to raciology(Amselle 2001: 85). 
Blyden’s thinking seeks an origin of the black people refusing the white and 
occidental view of the black man, but accepting the logic of racial origin. Blyden 
branches, Amselle writes, the black people on the Hebrew lineage.       
 In his work on the concept of culture anthropologist Adam Kuper writes that 
central to the modern idea of culture is that it is not derived from race and that it is 
learned, “not carried in our genes” (Kuper 1999: 227).Thus few claim any link 
between biology and culture anymore. We cannot understand a certain culture with 
reference to a certain biological nature to which culture corresponds. My point is that 
the link between culture and race should continue to be questioned. The danger, 
however, does not lie in a claim of correspondence between race and culture, but in 
the logics of language. If we are to establish another understanding and language of 
culture, we must question the language with which the prior understanding was 
shaped. And the traditional language of culture was immersed in the language of race. 
Kuper pinpoints this too: 
 
Contemporary American anthropologists repudiate the popular ideas that differences are natural, and 
that cultural identity must be grounded in a primordial, biological identity, but a rhetoric that places 
great emphasis on difference and identity is not best placed to counter these views. On the contrary, the 
insistence that radical difference can be observed between peoples serves to sustain them (Ibid: 239).  
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A biological notion of human beings and the distinction between identity and 
difference are intertwined so that they constitute each other. Our task is thus to 
question both in order to understand the concept of culture. The hypothesis of the 
dissertation is that branchements and translation are concepts which allow us to 
question biology and a clear cut distinction between identity and difference as a point 
of departure for understanding culture.  
 The impact of and the problem with raciological and differentialist thinking 
must be underlined because they colour our understanding of difference. Difference 
in this sense is a substantialised and non-dialectical difference. This is not merely a 
theoretical point, but an idea that supports our imagination of whether cohabitation in 
a pluricultural society is possible or not. The democratic unity of a nation, polis, 
cannot be founded on the idea of cultural difference as given, pure, original, or non-
historical, i.e. non-communicating. In this sense it does not help to add diversity to 
culture, since diversity is still within the logic of origin and abstraction. However, a 
concept of difference outside of the opposition pure/identical-mixed might help.     
 Another problem which makes the link between race and culture relevant in 
another way is the so called “new racism” which no longer emphasises biological 
traits but cultural. Michel Wieviorka refers to Martin Barker as the first to discern a 
new racism: “From now on the racist way of arguing is no longer mixed up with with 
hierarchy but with “difference”, no longer with natural attributes ascribed to a group 
which is racialised but with culture, language and religion” (Wieviorka 1998: 32). 
Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein were, with their book from 1988 Race, 
nation, classe. Les identities ambiguës, pioneers in the research on racism. Again it is 
not the hierarchical superiority of one group over another, but the insistence on an 
irreducible cultural difference that is an issue. Balibar writes that this is a racism that 
does not concern biological inheritance but the irreducibility of cultural differences 
by underlining the incompatibility of traditions and ways of life (Balibar 1997: 33).  
Superiority and biology are no longer the arguments, but rather the 
incompatibility between cultures. According to this discourse, racism, in the form of 
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violence, is a phenomenon that emerges out of the mélange of cultures. This is 
consistent with, as Levi-Strauss points out, Gobineau’s idea that the problem of the 
races arises when they are mixed in a wrong way. The discourse itself is not racist, 
but natural. Here the concept of races seems to have been altogether replaced by 
culture. So by ridding oneself of the concept of races it makes the argument cleaner 
so to speak. This makes it even more paramount to question the concept of culture. 
The problem is that this kind of racism nurtures itself on a certain kind of difference 
which in its turn is supported by a notion of heterogeneous origin. Origin is no longer 
one but plural, but it is still an origin. The concept of culture has inherited some of 
the ideas of classical racism, which it becomes vital to address.   
 
3.6 Biology and anthropology 
Even though cultural racism has replaced biological racism, the concept of culture in 
anthropology has nevertheless been forged within a biological or quasi-biological 
language. Levi-Strauss comments in his text Race et l’histoire that the original sin of 
anthropology was the confusion of a biological notion of race and the sociological 
and psychological products of the human cultures (Levi-Strauss 1996: 378). As seen 
above the classification of races based on morphological traits was an adaptation to a 
broader structuration of knowledge in natural history. The object of study thus 
became an object of nature. With the establishment of social and cultural 
anthropology, race was replaced by culture but the classificatory logic remained. The 
concept of cultural diversity, which still is to be found in documents from UNESCO, 
borrowed its language from the diversity in nature.  
 Today this classificatory understanding is partly abandoned in biology as it has 
become more difficult to defend a clear distinguishable identity. “Looking at recent 
works by biologists…these works leave aside morphological classification [and] 
biochemical classification, which characterize bacteria in terms of their capacity for 
decay or for generation” (Amselle 1998: xi). The rise of the field of immunology also 
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draws similar conclusions. But should a philosophical and anthropological 
understanding of man be based on biology at all, no matter how radical it is?    
 Instead of speaking about cultures within the logic of identity, many have 
abandoned this in favour of concepts with emphasis on a mix of identities or collapse 
of boundaries between them. Hybridity is one such notion which according to 
Thomas Hylland Eriksen is a: “synthesis of cultural forms or fragments of different 
origin. It stands in opposition to pluralism by emphasizing flux and mixing rather 
than demarcation” (Hylland Eriksen 2010: 197). One problem with this is that one is 
still within the logic of identity of the same which will be discussed in later chapters. 
Hybridity is still marked by origin. Another is the origin of the notion itself. The 
notion of the hybrid stems from pre-genetic biology. Amselle writes that: one cannot 
mix that which exists already (Amselle 1996: x). As far as I understand, the problem 
is that hybridity is a biological concept for the mixing of two animal or plant species. 
As seen above, and as Skorgen points out, racism was partly founded on a blurring of 
boundaries between race and species. There is no scientific foundation for speaking 
about different human races like there is different species in nature. There are no 
genetic differences that make it possible to speak about different human races. Thus 
the concept of hybridity, taken from the mixing of species, cannot be used to analyse 
different human beings as belonging to different races. Now, even though it is to a 
lesser degree acceptable to speak of biological races, the question is whether we 
nevertheless should continue to shape our imagination in a language of raciology. 
Amselle warns us against the relationship between the life-sciences and 
anthropology: “We must abandon the language of medicine and biology if we want to 
think mixing and go to literary or philosophical metaphors“(Ibid). The question is 
thus if it is fruitful or even dangerous to relate the development of anthropological 
language to biology, be it ideological or scientific, and whether an analogy between 
the domain of nature and the domain of human interaction should be avoided 
alltogether. The language of hybridity does still constitute a notion of the origin and 
the original separation of human beings. Abandoning biology in favour of culture 
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does not make it any less actual. It is still a biological thinking applied to a non-
biological domain which tends to continue to essentialise our thinking. Hybridisation 
or mixing of cultures, even though one might be positive to such phenomena, 
nevertheless supports a notion that cultures are separated.   
 Another notion that is evoked to comprehend culture, but which lays emphasis 
on its plurality, is diversity. Here the point is not that of mixing, but that the cultural 
diversity as a fact requires openness and respect. But here, as elsewhere, Amselle 
writes in Branchements that even though we add diversity to culture we do not escape 
the imagination of origin: “Thinking in terms of origin, whether it is one or multiple, 
has the effect that it essentialises the elements that it attempts to relativise or 
deconstruct” (Amselle 2001: 82).  
However, we should here distinguish between diversity as norm and fact. This 
is perhaps also the problem with the term multicultural which at the same time 
describes a certain politics of a government and an empirical description of a society.   
 To summarise the aspects of race and culture, it seems that, when following 
Amselle’s account, the logic for understanding culture is the same as the one 
constructing and comparing races and that this way of reasoning goes deep into the 
western imagination: that of (diversity of) origin.  Even the language that is meant to 
challenge the idea of purity and origin (hybridity) is caught in the same language that 
it tries to escape. Is it possible to reflect on and discuss culture in any other way, in a 
non-essentialist, purist way? If this is possible it seems that a change of language is 
necessary to substitute the language of biology with notions from other domains. But 
this will be discussed in the next part.  
 
3.7 People, nation, and culture 
A theme or concept that until now has only been touched upon, but which is central 
to how we understand culture, race, and identity in Europe, is the nation. As indicated 
in the previous chapter the nation is what can constitute a political discourse that 
joins the question of culture, of race, and of identity. As I will discuss in part two of 
this chapter, the link to identity is what constitutes and reproduces the view that 
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culture is closed. What holds culture and identity together, and constitutes the 
political discourse despite globalisation, is the nation. The nation is furthermore 
connected to other concepts such as spirit and people. And all seems to be historically 
linked to Herder’s ideas.  
 Without taking a stand on the question of whether Johann G. Herder was a 
precursor to modern nationalism, one might say that Herder was important for the 
development of the concepts of nation and people. Herder’s thinking takes its point of 
departure from his travels and experiences of different cultural customs on the one 
hand and from the critique of the French based Enlightenment thinking on the other.  
Even though he was an adherer to the Enlightenment he was critical to an 
enlightenment that saw tradition as something backwards and undermined the human 
diversity of cultural expression (Lægreid and Skorgen 2006: 56). Thomas Hylland 
Eriksen and Finn Sivert Nielsen write in their book History of anthropology about the 
confused link between the politicised concept of people in the tradition from Herder 
and Fichte and the academic concept of culture: “Herder’s concept of the Volk was 
refined and politicized by later philosophers, including Fichte…But the same concept 
also entered academia, where it reappeared…as the doctrine of cultural relativism”14 
(Hylland Eriksen and Nielsen: 13). It seems like the politisation of culture and 
cultural relativism go hand in hand when it comes to constituting culture as a closed 
notion.   
 Opposing the Enlightenment Herder developed a thinking that put the 
individuality of cultures and nations at the centre.  Torgeir Skorgen writes about 
Herder that “the development of the national collective subject is thought analogous 
to the development of the human individual” (Lægreid and Skorgen 2006: 64). 
Herder uses, as the historian Reinhardt Koselleck writes, people and nation 
                                              
14If we look at Fichte it is important to notice that his Reden and die deutsche nation seems directed at the German nation 
and not at a general conception of nation. Leaving that aside what he proposes is that the nation must cultivate itself and 
connect with its own source: the people. The people which is something first and original is an original people (Urvolk). 
There is in other words a continuity from the original people carried on through the generations to the present (Fichte in 
Koselleck 2004: 332). 
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interchangeably and as synonyms and thus lifts the word people up from its 
connotation to a social class. 15 Culture in its turn is not only something that each 
people have but the essential property of the people or the nation. This version of the 
nation spread throughout Europe and is also found in the Norwegian context. A 
representative for such a view is the Norwegian linguistic and creator of the „New 
norwegian“ language Ivar Aasen.16 The philosopher J. Peter Burgess writes in his 
book about Aasen that Aasen insists „that culture is not simply one „posession“ 
among others, but rather an essential possession, the fundamental property. It is what 
makes the people a people“(Burgess 2005: 51). I find this an interesting and highly 
relevant remark for a more general discussion of culture because it emphasises the 
link between nation, people, and culture. But what is more it stresses the Norwegian 
tradition for thinking nation and culture going back to Aasen. Aasen defends the view 
that the Norwegian people is a people. And in order to do this he has to prove that it 
has a culture, the hallmark of being a people. Burgess writes about Aasen that: 
 
Aasen insists both on (1) the foreignness or exteriority of “culture” and (2) its complete interiority. The 
Norwegian people- supposing there is one- consists, like any other people, of the double movement of 
the internal and the outside (Ibid). 
 
Why do I emphasise this? I think this is interesting from a general discussion of the 
nation and culture in Europe in general and Norway in particular. What is important 
to us is to see how different peoples and nations are thought of as distinguishable 
from each other and how this affects our understanding of culture. For if culture is 
related to people in this way it becomes something that has a clear cut inside and 
                                              
15Reinhart Koselleck writes in his article “Volk, nation” that for Herder: „ „People“ signifies no longer a social group- or 
below the nation, but rather the nation itself; both concepts were used as synonyms“(Koselleck 2004: 318). 
16Aasen claimed to have rediscovered the old but lost Norwegian language in the Norwegian dialects. Through the 
collection of dialects all over Norway in the mid 19th century, Aasen provided a New Norwegian grammar which in ist 
turn was a proof of the Norwegian nations modern character. By acquiring a written language it could be included in the 
European modernity (Burgess 2005).    
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outside. Regardless of whether this is representative for other cultures it is part of the 
grid for understanding cultural diversity. My point throughout the dissertation is to 
critically examine our perception of culture. And what reproduces the view that 
culture is closed is, as mentioned, the link to identity.  
 But why is culture linked to a question of identity? And what does culture and 
identity have to do with the nation? It seems like the way culture and the nation 
become a question of identity is through the nation’s connotation to individuality. 
The same way as a person has an identity, the nation receives an identity. Herder 
writes that nature has distinguished people from each other through language first and 
foremost and thus received its character (Herder in Koselleck 2004: 318). And 
character is in its turn a hallmark of an individual person. So what distinguishes the 
different nations from each other is their individuality. From the perspective of 
German 18th and 19th century thinking which includes concepts such as Spirit and 
People, nations receive hallmarks similar to that of an individual person. Here the 
reflections of Louis Dumont are interesting because they can explain the nation’s 
closing of culture (as we saw with for instance Ivar Aasen) from the perspective of 
modern individualism. For Dumont, Herder and Fichte take individuality as a way of 
understanding that which is collective. The nation thus becomes a collective 
individual (la nation comme individu collectif) (Dumont 1983: 151). For Dumont this 
underlines the paradox that the nation is a version of a modern individualist ideology 
(where all nations, like persons, are equals) which in its turn reintroduces hierarchy 
(that some nations are greater than others). What is vital for our part is however that 
the nation as a collective takes the form of an individual. This individual on the other 
hand is hallmarked by being undividable and standing in an oppositional relation to 
other individuals.     
 Even though the link between identity and culture on a conceptual level does 
not come about until the mid-20th century with Erik Erikson- the concept of identity 
does not until then have such a widespread use- one could hold that identity is a 
concern in the different romantic movements. In order to articulate the problem of 
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identity of a nation where the central identity property is culture, as we saw with Ivar 
Aasen who develops ideas from the German tradition, the collective that one tries to 
define and defend takes on characteristics that are associated with an individual. In 
other words, when it comes to determining the identity of a nation or people it must 
have a distinguishable culture. And in order to be described as distinguishable one 
needa a criterion or image. This image was the individual person. As far as I can see 
it is when the nation and culture are linked to an individual that the nation can receive 
an identity. 
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4. Culture between identity and «identity»: a critical 
account 

Introduction 
In this chapter I will return to the question of identity. But whereas I in the second 
chapter locate and describe the link between identity and culture, and in the third 
chapter show how they are genealogically linked, I will here go into a more critical 
discussion of the term itself. Identity is present in the discussion of culture, both 
implicitly and explicitly. As already seen in the previous chapter, identity-thinking is 
implicit to the project of raciology and the nation without necessarily being 
articulated explicitly. Here I want to take on both the implicit and the explicit kind of 
identity and give a critical examination. Even though I will develop the critical aspect 
further in the next part of the dissertation, I will commence my critical approach to 
identity here.  
Identity could be examined on at least three different levels that are all relevant 
to the notion of culture: Identity is a problem that concerns how to decide what 
something is: How should we classify something as part of a larger class of things? 
How do we know that different experiences of an object are of the same object and 
not of different objects? As an example of this I will show how the comparison of 
cultures- which was once part of ethnological and anthropological reasoning and now 
is reintroduced into political discourse as a way of discussing cultural diversity - 
draws on a certain identity-thinking which is unfortunate when it comes to 
understanding human beings. When it comes to persons it is not a question of what 
but of who: when it comes to persons one asks “who am I?” and “who are we?” The 
confusion between the question what and the question who is central to the critical 
reflection on identity and cultural identity. A second level is the notion or concept of 
“identity” itself. Why do we use “identity” when we want to understand culture? 
Does “identity” mean anything, does it describe something given? A third level is 
that of modernity and the historical development. A hallmark of modern society since 
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the collapse of the feudal order, its cosmology, and the establishment of industrial 
and urban society is that the identity of the individual and its place in the world, as 
well as the identity of society itself, have been problematic. But here we are at the 
core of the challenge with this notion: it is and has in itself been problematic from the 
start, or as Zygmunt Bauman writes: “since at no time did identity “become” a 
problem; it was a “problem” from its birth” (Bauman 1996). Now, even though all 
these aspects are different they are at the same time related. As I will try to show, the 
understanding of culture inherits the problems that hinges with the theme of identity. 
The critique of culture thus becomes a critique of identity.          
 
4.1 “Identity”: some questions 
What we have discussed so far is a link between culture, identity, and race as within a 
kind of entanglement. It seems as if a kind of non-articulated identity is at play in the 
conceptualisation of race and culture. And it is this implicit understanding of identity 
that I will question later with the aid of Heidegger and Ricoeur. However, this 
question concerns the more ontological problem of differentiation between things and 
persons, perhaps with an extension to collective entities like cultures and societies. 
We will return to these questions. But for now I will pause at the word “identity”. As 
we saw in chapter 2, “identity” is widely used, also in relation to culture. Some say 
that people need an identity and a sense of belonging which in their turn depend on 
the identity of the society or the culture (Andersen and Tybring-Gjedde 2010). In 
France there has been a debate going for years about national identity. But why is it 
that we articulate the problem of culture as a question of “identity”? Why do we use 
the word, term, or concept “identity” when it is difficult to determine what it is? Or, 
as Philip Gleason puts it:  
 
Its very obviousness seems to defy elucidation: identity is what a thing is! How is one supposed to go 
beyond that in explaining it? But adding a modifier complicates matters, for how are we to understand 
identity in such expressions as "ethnic identity," "Jewish identity," or "American identity"? (Gleason 
1983: 910).  
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As the historian Lutz Niethammer points out, “identity” is, despite its success, 
without content (Niethammer 2000). That does not, however, render it any less 
interesting. Identity is, according to him, a plastic word (Plastikworte) which has an 
extensive use comprising psychology and social entities: Everything and everyone 
must have an identity. Identity is also weak in content since it reduces all differences 
in something which is the same. This is clearly problematic when the various aspects 
of a person are overlooked and when only the aspects shared with other persons 
belonging to a certain group are emphasised. This is part of the problem of 
comparison that I will discuss at the end of this chapter. But the point is that this is a 
reductionist way of thinking and a paradox for those who want to understand 
difference: Difference is reduced to the same. Thirdly, it is positively connoted in the 
sense that it is something that defines persons and something we want more of. 
Niethammer writes that a crisis or loss of identity is by no means a stigma, on the 
contrary it gives an appetite for more identity: “The concept comes prior to the need 
it creates” (Niethammer 2000: 36).  It is perhaps a paradox, but the lack, the search, 
and the crisis of identity are all meaningful ways to describe human existence: it is 
what gives life meaning.17   
  In a paper presented at Société française de philosophie, published with the 
title Réflexions sur les questions d’idéntité (2011), Vincent Descomes gives some 
interesting reflections on the theme of identity. “Identity” covers, Descombes here 
states, a double meaning which draws on two different logics. At the same time they 
are connected with the use of proper names: On the one hand we have the common 
way of thinking identity which we use to determine which object we are talking 
                                              
17 There are, as far as I can see, a number of examples of this. One is the already mentioned discussion on national and 
cultural identity. This is the collective identity. Another example is the proliferation of TV-programmes focusing on the 
identity and origin of persons. “Who do you think you are?” is a television-show going in several countries where a famous 
person traces his or her genealogy by going back in his or her family history. Other examples are programmes where 
people, often adopted, search for their biological family. The answer often given to the question why these persons are 
participating in these shows is that “it is a question of knowing who you are.”   
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about. Are we talking about one and the same object, or two distinct objects? This is 
identity as identical (identique).  On the other hand there is a new meaning, 
psychologically related, that is connoted to feelings. Identity is when someone says 
that: “to speak this language, to do this work, to declare this membership, this is part 
of my identity” (Descombes 2011: 6). This is identity as identifying (identitaire). 
Whereas being identical is a matter of yes and no, to identify oneself with this and 
that community or group is a matter of degree. Descombes’ question is whether we 
really know how to use this latter meaning of identity. Do we know what identity (as 
identitaire) means?  
What is particularly interesting with Descombes’ reflections in relation to our 
own topic is his critical examination of plural identity or plural belonging. For if 
plurality or complexity is the most tenable way to render account of identity, how 
should we separate identity from its attributes? Keep in mind what minister Gahr 
Støre wrote in his article: “our belonging is complex. One type of identity does not 
exclude another…Our identity is complex” (Støre 2008). This is a mainstream 
statement; however, it is not clear to me what it means. If someone declares himself 
or herself white, Russian, homosexual, Christian, or a parent when can we elevate 
one of these attributes to the rank of identity of this subject? By speaking the way 
Støre does, we are, according to Descombes, led into a dilemma: If we say that one of 
these attributes constitutes identity, “we seem to be saying that the attribute defining 
the individual in question is sufficient for defining him” (Ibid:13). But such an 
implication is undesirable since the other properties or attributes are equally defining. 
If we, on the other hand, give a plural response, then we weaken the force that is 
attached to the word identity. He draws up the dilemma of attributes and identity: 
 
If the multiple attributes of a thing are compatible with each other, one cannot present them as identities 
[then they are just attributes]; but if they all are going to have a value as identity (une valeur identitaire), 
they have to be mutually exclusive. In both cases, the idiom identity (idiome identitaire) seems to 
condemn us to either insignificance or incoherence (Descombes 2011: 29). 
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In other words, we have to choose one attribute as identity which does not account 
for plurality, or decide that all attributes should count as identities but then the very 
term “identity” loses its force (which in reality means that they remain attributes).18 Is 
this merely a theoretical point that Descombes is making? Even though his reasoning 
is technical and theoretically brilliant, I find it also highly relevant for practical 
questions: The question of how we are going to live together depends partly on the 
premises for this question. Whether we think of cultural identity as singular or 
whether we think of it as something plural we are led into this dilemma that 
Descombes has presented us with.19     
Now, as we shall see in the second part of the dissertation, the question of 
identity is discussed by Paul Ricoeur in Temps et récits and Soi-même comme un 
autre on the one hand and by Jean-Loup Amselle on the other in ways that reflect 
some of the challenges given by Descombes. Amselle’s metaphor branchements and 
Ricoeur’s concept narrative identity are, as I see it, meant to question this logic of 
unity and diversity (plurality) that lies beneath this dilemma. For now I will go 
further into the idea of identity.     
 
4.2 From personal to collective identity 
Identity comes from the Latin “idem” and means the same. In the Oxford English 
dictionary it is defined as:  
 
the sameness of a person or thing at all times or in all circumstances; the condition or fact that a person 
or thing is itself and not something else; individuality, personality. Personal identity (in Psychology), 
the condition or fact of remaining the same person throughout the various phases of existence; 
continuity of the personality (Oxford English dictionary quoted in Gleason: 911). 
                                              
18 I cannot go further into this here, but for solving this we need a principle for a composed identity (identité composée), 
Descombes writes. And this is partly to be found in the concepts of will and decision: “What the moral psychology of 
identities pinpoints (ce qui relève d’une psychologie morale des identités) is not as much identity as it is the will to have 
one in first person” (Ibid:29). The identity in question in the pronoun “we” rests on a will and a decision of a person to 
express a unity and that this unity includes other persons.     
19 I do think it is possible to say both yes and no to the question of whether we can live together from both these 
“positions”. The point is rather to show the dilemma.  
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One of the founding texts on personal identity is found in John Locke’s book An 
essay concerning human understanding. In the chapter “Of identity and diversity” 
Locke commences a reflection on how we ascribe identity to our ideas about 
substances. In addition to God we have ideas of two other substances: finite 
intelligences and bodies. Whereas the latter are simpler substances, the former are 
compounds. A plant is a compound substance where the identity of the plant, what 
makes it the same plant, is determined by “that continued organization, which is fit to 
convey that common life to all the parts so united” (Locke 1997: 298). So, all the 
parts of the plant are united through the continued organization and common life. 
This is the identity of the plant’s substance.  
But when it comes to human beings and the identity of man this is not the 
identity of a substance but of a person20: “’Tis not therefore unity of substance that 
comprehends all sorts of identity…but to conceive, and judge of it aright, we must 
consider what idea the word it is applied to, stands for ”(Ibid. 299-300). Substance, 
man, and person are three different ideas to which correspond different ideas of 
identity. Rationality is not sufficient for being a man, otherwise a rational animal 
could be a man; he or she needs a human body. Concerning the person the soul 
cannot make the identity of a person. If this was so, how could we then say that 
people living in different times is not the same man, Locke asks. So, what is it that 
makes a person the same person? Whereas a man may modify his substance by losing 
a limb, the personal identity does not change over time. The personal identity is not 
dependent upon a substance but on consciousness. Personal identity is defined by 
Locke as “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can 
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it 
does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking” (Ibid: 302). 
                                              
20 Locke takes the concept of person from law referring to moral and legal responsibility: “It is a forensic term 
appropriating actions and their merit” (Locke 1997: 312). 
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Personal identity is by Locke distinguished from identical substance. Since we might 
lose memory or forget, “doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing”, 
but this does not concern personal identity at all (Ibid: 303). Personal identity 
concerns consciousness which is the relation to oneself. Even though consciousness 
of past actions is important it is not reducible to memory. Furthermore, for Locke 
memory is an active process playing a part in the person’s relation to him- or herself. 
The sameness of a person is dependent upon a kind of continuity through time, but 
this is the result of the person’s active relation to herself. Locke thus establishes 
personal identity as a relation of self to self where the primary event is that the person 
is no longer defined as a substance à la Descartes, but precisely as relation. By doing 
this he also empties or de-substantialises the interiority. In Locke the Self, or personal 
identity, is not defined by a particular content or quality. So, having the quote from 
Oxford English dictionary and Locke’s relational definition of personal identity in 
mind, it seems to me that the way sameness is described in the dictionary looks like a 
substance-definition and not a relational definition à la Locke. The reason for this is 
perhaps that persons and things are described in equivalent terms, and does thus not 
account for the active element in Locke’s definition of personal identity.  
It is interesting to compare Locke’s account with David Hume’s account. In 
Hume’s A treatise of Human Nature the empirical approach is even more radical. 
Hume states in the chapter “Of personal identity” that the idea of self is not derived 
from any impressions and can thus not have an identity. But since he does not 
distinguish between personal identity and substance, like Locke does, he cannot give 
identity any other content than the”idea of an object, that remains invariable and 
uninterrupted thro’ a suppos’d variation of time” (Hume 2000: 165). His definition of 
personal identity is, accordingly, the continuation of an impression through the whole 
course of our lives (Ibid: 164). And since there are no such impressions, then there is 
no self or personal identity. Even though Locke would agree with Hume that the Self 
is not a substance, Locke does not define personal identity according to a definition 
of identity like the one given by Hume: “a distinct idea of an object, that remains 
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invariable and uninterrupted thro’a suppos’ variation of time” (Ibid: 165). Since 
Locke gives consciousness an active characteristic, he does not have to accept that the 
general definition of identity, given by Hume, is transposed to persons. Locke does 
not accept the idea of the person as something uninterrupted, but will still claim that 
there is something called personal identity. Hume, on the other hand, could answer to 
this that this activity of the person’s relation to him or herself is nothing but the result 
of our passions and “the concern we take for ourselves” which might make us believe 
that there is something called personal identity. Anyway, what is interesting is to 
question identity, and the definition of identity as sameness, since it seems to 
continue to be part of how we think identity.  
 Now, to understand its modern significance we must make a jump to the 
1950ies and the merging of social science and psychology. Identity in its extensive 
use, transported from logic to psychology and social sciences, owes much of its 
success to Erik Erikson. As Gleason shows, the breakthrough of Eriksonian 
psychology is what stands between the absence of the term identity in the dictionaries 
in the thirties and its extensive use from the sixties and onwards (Gleason 1983). In 
the 20th century and with the establishment of psychology, identity has become a 
scientific question. Identity and Self are notions that have been developed in a fusion 
of psychology and American social science with the likes of Erik Erikson and George 
Herbert Mead. Erikson developed the notion of identity in the direction of describing 
different stages and coined the transition between the stages as “identity crisis” in the 
development of a person’s life: “An identity crisis is a climactic turning point in this 
process” (Gleason 1983: 914). For him identity was deeply seated in the individual, 
whereas the sociological use of the term saw identity as constituted by society and 
potentially shifting in accordance with society and social life. Gleason writes that:  
 
Sociological traditions of usage in role theory, reference-group theory, and symbolic interactionism 
constituted important feeder streams supplementing the principal source of popularisation, Eriksonian 
psychology (Ibid: 918). 
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But it was a somewhat confused constitution and the term was bent in two different 
directions: those who saw identity as continuous and primordial (as Erikson himself 
did) on the one hand and those who saw it as discontinuous and a result of interaction 
with the surroundings on the other. What is particularly interesting for us is the link 
between Eriksonian psychology and the social scientist who saw ethnicity as 
something primordial. Here we touch upon a central point in understanding the link 
between culture and identity which underpins the politics of recognition that we 
touched upon in the previous chapter. Gleason confirms this:  
 
The linkage [between Eriksonian psychology and primordialists] has important implications from the 
viewpoint of advocacy, for the intimate association thus established between personal identity and 
ethnic heritage makes plausible the argument that ethnic cultures require some sort of official 
recognition if the self-esteem of individuals is not to suffer damage. The respect for the dignity of the 
individual demanded by the democratic ideology is thereby extended to cover ethnic cultures that 
sustain the sense of personal self-worth (Ibid: 921).   
 
This is very interesting considering Taylor’s reasoning from the second chapter. 
Gleason’s article is also written before some of the most important works on 
multiculturalism. But there is yet another stage in the development of identity in the 
social sciences which is relevant to our discussion and which merits attention: the 
connection between Erikson and the students of Franz Boas, Margaret Mead and 
Ruth Benedict. Mead was central in the studies of the so-called “national character”, 
and she and Erikson influenced each other when working with these questions.21 And 
it is in the reworking of his book Childhood and Society that Erikson uses (American) 
identity as an equivalent to (American) character.    
 It is this leap in the significance of the term identity which is interesting to us 
when we reconstruct the genealogy of culture. This takes identity from being limited 
                                              
21 Gleason writes that “American-character studies dealt directly with the relationship of the individual and society and 
explored the problem of whether, to what extent, or how the individual’s personality, character, or “identity” was shaped by 
the culture in which he or she was a participant” (Gleason:925). 
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to an individual to comprising communitites. Hence a society can be analysed as an 
individual with an I-consciousness. It is the identity which gives a society its 
individuality. However, this second definition did not emerge until after the war 
when notions such as identity crisis and identity problems came into wider use. So it 
is not until the latest decades that is has been possible to use the concept identity of a 
collective. That being said, concepts related to personal or individual identity became 
key notions in the founding of sociology already at the turn of the 20th century. This 
brings us into the early French sociology of Émile Durkheim. 
As we recall, Locke was one of the first to reflect critically on the notion of 
personal identity. He found that personal identity was not a substance but 
consciousness (which is reason, reflection, and self-consideration), and yet this was 
described as “the same thinking thing”. Now consciousness reemerged within the 
sociology of Émile Durkheim through De la division du travail social (2004) with the 
introduction of the notion conscience collective.  There is not just one consciousness 
in us, Durkheim states, but two: there is one private which states are personal and one 
which states can be understood by others and which are common to the whole 
society. This latter consciousness is coined collective by Durkheim and is “the totality 
of beliefs and sentiments common to the average member of a society” (Durkheim 
2004: 46), and this has taken on a life of its own. In other words, it is independent of 
the particular conditions that the individuals are situated in. Further, this collective 
consciousness represents a personality of a collective kind (type collective) (Ibid: 74). 
When one speaks about social identity it is not merely that there is something shared, 
the social, by individuals, but also that the social has a life of its own. 
It is important to be precise and acknowledge that Durkheim does not speak 
about culture, but about society. And the main concern of the dissertation is to 
question the link between identity and culture, not society. However, I do not claim to 
give a full account of Durkheim’s thinking here, only to pinpoint the use of concepts. 
What is central and what I find interesting is the transportation from the language 
used in the reflections on individual identity to reflections on collective entities. Is it 
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possible to describe a collective in an analogous way to an individual person? And 
secondly, if- following the tradition of Locke-(personal) identity is “the same 
thinking thing”, should sameness then also be a characteristic of collective identities 
as well? It seems to me that the definition of identity as sameness does not take into 
account the dialectical aspect of identity. And since identity is linked to culture in the 
political discourse it seems difficult to shake the idea that cultures are static and the 
same throughout time, but more on this later.      
 The idea that communitites, like societies, have an identity seems widespread. 
Following the definition from the Norwegian language council, identity is the sum of 
elements which constitute individuality, and individuality is something that both 
individuals and societies have.22 This brings in another element that complicates the 
matter further: when we talk about the identity of a nation, culture, or community we 
describe the individuality of this entity. Does this mean that what justifies the use of 
the notion “identity” on collective entities is that such entities are already thought of 
as having“individuality”? I do not wish to complicate matters further by also 
discussing individuality. However, this concerns both questions posed in the last 
paragraph: is it possible to describe communitites as analogous to individual persons? 
And, does the link to individuality (as that which cannot be divided in time or space) 
ensure the view of identity as the same? As Louis Dumont points out, it is a paradox 
that the unity of individuals, a collective, can be presented in the same way as an 
individual. What we need to ask is what we mean when we say that Norwegian 
culture has an identity. Do we mean this in a descriptive and abstract way with 
reference to values and customs comparable to other countries and cultures, do we 
mean analogous to a person, as with Locke, where the cultural identity of Norway 
thinks or is self-conscious?   
                                              
22 Identity is: “the sum of elements that give an individual, a society etc. individuality; i.e. I-consciousness” (the Norwegian 
language council) 
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  To sum up the reflections on identity: we see from all this that if the way we 
think culture stems from its link to identity, and as we have seen, the theme of 
identity has a number of difficulties of its own, it is necessary to also present a 
critique of the concept of identity. But before I go there I will return to a theme 
touched upon in chapter two concerning comparison and abstraction in the 
constitution of identity.   
 
4.3 Comparison and the abstraction of identities  
I will here open up a reflection in the continuation from the theme of identity which 
brings the epistemological reflections further and which prepares the discussion in the 
forthcoming chapters: a reflection on comparison. Or, might I add, a certain notion of 
comparison as there seems to be more than one way of seeing this (Detienne 2009). 
But for now I will leave this unproblematised. Both the philosopher Paul Ricoeur and 
the social anthropologist Jean-Loup Amselle draw much the same conclusions with 
regard to the problem of understanding identity in philosophy and anthropology: A 
certain kind of identity is given through the intellectual and scientific operation of 
comparison. Comparison is an intellectual operation that produces or reproduces a 
notion that identities are separated, but at the same time graspable in such a manner 
that they can be seen together, either as same or as different. Could this method of 
comparison, as a technique for producing knowledge, at the same time be regarded as 
an epistemological obstacle and hindrance to develop the understandings of identity?  
 Locke links identity and comparison by stating that the ideas of identity and 
diversity are formed “when we consider anything as existing at any determined time 
and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time” (Locke 1997: 296). A 
similar logic follows the comparison in other fields and domains. The operation of 
comparativism as a designation of groups of people has roots that take us deeper than 
anthropology. For instance, in The Politics Aristotle uses the notion ethnos to 
designate the peoples who were not organised in villages in contrast to the 
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organisation of the Greek city-state polis.23 In the early modern period comparativism 
was used from the point of view of the enlightened to compare the level of progress 
of all historical peoples in order to discover the route of political improvement. The 
reaction to this reductionism which was developed in the name of the 
Enlightenment’s universalism was found in German romantic philosophy which 
claimed respect for the diversity of the historical and cultural expressions of human 
beings. Herder, for instance, reacted to how Kant “measured” the degree of 
enlightenement of different historical peoples by looking at what kind of political 
constitution each people had. Comparison was hence the measurement of level of 
enlightenment. Herder denounces, as Alain Renaut writes, comparativism in the name 
of a respect for the diversity of historical-cultural expressions of humanity (Renault 
2000: 12-13). Herder thus becomes one of the first cultural relativists to propose that 
every historical period and culture express humanity in their own manner. What is 
interesting, however, is that this diversity that Herder speaks of does not escape the 
universal comparativism he wants to get rid of.        
 Entering the history of ethnology and social-anthropology, comparativism is 
an important method or notion. Edmund Leach’s article in the International 
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences states that cross-cultural comparison is an 
essential element in “inductive reconstruction of long term cultural history and the 
development of general propositions about culturally regulated human behavior” 
(Crowell Collier and MacMillan, 1968). Historically the comparative method in the 
social sciences was undertaken in order to produce knowledge of general laws that 
regulated human conduct regardless of cultural variation. Sociology and 
anthropology thus tried to unite mankind. Behind the series of chaotic cultural 
variation, one assumed there to be rules that could be exposed through comparing 
societies. For instance, when Emile Durkheim compares the catholic, protestant, and 
Jewish societies with respect to suicide-rate, it is not the suicide itself, nor, perhaps, 
                                              
23See (Amselle 2009:17). 
 81 
 
 
the different societies that interest him. It is rather the discovery of a law of collective 
force that the different communities have in common. Durkheim writes that: 
 
The conclusion from all these facts is that the social suicide-rate can be explained only sociologically. 
At any given moment the moral constitution of society establishes the contingent of voluntary deaths. 
There is, therefore, for each people a collective force of a definite amount of energy, impelling men to 
self-destruction. The victim’s acts which at first seem to express only his personal temperament are 
really the supplement and prolongation of a social condition which they express externally” (Durkheim 
1951: 299). 
 
This is the explicitly universal tendency in anthropology. Underneath all apparent 
differences there is universality in the foundation. Comparativism in this way 
produced knowledge of the universal. Each singular case has thus an interest as long 
as it unveils broader and more universal traits of human existence. To compare in this 
sense is to reduce the singularity of a particular culture or extract certain features vital 
to the finding of universal laws.   
 On the other hand comparativism produced knowledge of contrasts between 
societies that rather showed a variety of what the human spirit could do. Or 
differently put, comparativism produced knowledge of difference. This leads in its 
extreme to non- reducibility in that the recognition of differences renders the 
universal reduction and finding of universal laws impossible. As we saw with Herder, 
the idea is here that the different peoples and cultures are heterogeneous in relation to 
each other and must be studied separately, on their own premises, and not on the 
premises of a universal reason. Respect for difference and the renouncing of universal 
truth and reason necessitate a primordial separation of the different ethnic identities 
or cultural diversity.   
 Social-anthropology has had a tendency to fluctuate between these two 
strands- universalism/unity vs. culturalism/relativism/diversity- and both may be 
found in the works of a singular writer. According to Jean-Loup Amselle, both these 
tendencies can be seen in the writings of Claude Levi-Strauss. On the one hand there 
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is a culturalist Levi-Strauss represented in Race et histoire. Even though Levi-Strauss 
here underlines the fact that almost no culture is isolated, his focus on the dangers of 
ethnocentrism takes him in the direction of a non-universalist attitude. The alternative 
to a racist attitude, according to Levi-Strauss, is not to ascribe to all humans an 
abstract equality. This would, according to him, be something deceptive for the spirit 
since it would ignore the diversity given in observation (Ibid: 385). On the other hand 
there is a structuralist Levi-Strauss that, despite observable differences, focuses on 
discerning a formal social organisation shared by all humans that is understandable 
from a notion of the brain as binary structure. Levi-Strauss’ comparison of different 
alliance systems leads to a conclusion that gains status as a universal insight.    
 These two tendencies are linked to an inductive and a deductive method 
(Amselle 1996). The inductive method consists in gathering information of customs. 
The anthropologist has an inductive or empirical approach, founding her knowledge 
on experience alone without reducing and reconstructing complexity. Each custom 
receives hence its own value and remains non-reducible to a universal principle. The 
deductive method, however, consists in the reduction of reality to simple elements 
and then a reconstruction of the material through synthesis. This is the approach 
which the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss undertakes in order to understand kinship and 
alliance systems. Observable surface variations between societies are regulated by 
deeper universal structures such as kinship.  
And in this fluctuation lies the problem of understanding cultural identity. If 
we want to investigate the possibility of escaping a clear cut distinction between 
understanding cultural identity as either subsumable under deeper universal traits or 
as something really heterogeneous and different, we must understand what principle 
constitutes this distinction. Comparison may be a part of the problem here. The 
enterprise of discovering universal laws may be more or less abandoned by social 
science today, but a comparison in order to find similarities and differences is alive 
and well when we speak of cultural diversities. Another thing is that cultural 
relativism or an insistence on the heterogeneity of cultures is also a current tendency. 
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In order to say that two things are subsumable under the same principle (universal 
humanity) or different (the different and heterogeneous expressions of humanity) 
have we not treated them as equals, and secondly as always already separated?  
Now, this draws as far as I can see on a principle of identity which is linked to 
abstraction. As long as we compare in this manner, the entities that we compare must 
be ordered in such a way that the entities are either the same or different. But the 
question is when this becomes a principle or a way of thinking through which we 
understand the relation between human beings in a society. If the question is how we 
should understand culture and how we are going to live together, then I would 
express this philosophically as an epistemological obstacle. Because, if people are 
perceived first and foremost through their cultural identity and this appears to us 
through this kind of comparison, then we cannot form relations with each other. But 
what is an epistemological obstacle?   
 
4.4 Comparison as epistemological obstacle?  
It is Gaston Bachelard who introduces the notion of obstacle épistemologique in La 
formation de l`ésprit scientifique (Bachelard 2004). An epistemological obstacle is a 
hindrance that makes it impossible for the scientific spirit to develop further, to 
produce further solutions and to contemplate new problems. Such an obstacle may 
emerge as a result of, I think, two elements. First of all there is an obstacle in the 
experience itself. We do not know what we see. In order to understand we must make 
theories of what we see in order to overcome this obstacle. However, in a second 
stage these theories, supposed to be solutions, might become hindrances for 
understanding the phenomena we want to understand or for developing new ideas and 
theories. So in order to develop a scientific understanding, one must overcome the 
first theories. This is where an epistemological break or rupture might take place. If 
we manage to overcome the obstacle in the old theory, then new objects, theories, and 
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even sciences might emerge that would be incomprehensible within the framework of 
the old theory.24  
Further, this obstacle épistemologique is what the philosopher, according to 
Bachelard, should make science aware of. That does not mean that philosophy knows 
what good science is, but neither does the scientist. Since the scientist’s self-
understanding is informed by a certain silent philosophy, we cannot trust philosophy 
or science in the attempt to understand scientific activity. But it has a role in, so to 
speak, psychoanalysing the sciences for the blockings that exist inside it. 
Epistemology or philosophy hence has the role, according to Bachelard, of purging 
or making science aware of its own obstacles and prejudices whicht keep it from 
developing. So, in Bachelard's thinking there is still an element of scientific realism. 
Science achieves truths in the end. The study of the history of science is, according to 
Bachelard, the study of how the sciences rid themselves of these blockings 
historically. By learning from history we can get a better understanding of 
contemporary science. 
 Returning to the initial problem, how then is this relevant for understanding 
cultural identity? As Bachelard gives the philosopher the task of reflecting on what 
hinders a science from developing further, or an idea to become a science, the same 
could be said in relation to other domains or themes. This is, I think, what Paul 
Ricoeur does in his book Oneself as another (Soi-même comme un autre) concerning 
the function of comparison in philosophy’s ability to reflect on identity. Here Ricoeur 
tries to displace the understanding of identity from an identity understood as idem or 
the same to an identity understood as ipse. We will not touch upon this distinction 
here, but only note that a certain understanding of identity is connected to a certain 
                                              
24 As an example Pasteur launched theories on microorganisms as cause of putrefaction and contagious diseases. But in 
order to do this he had to overcome the obstacles in the medical philosophy of Claude Bernard. For Bernard a disease had 
to be understood as a lack or as an excess, and thus rendered any notion of disease as caused by organisms external to the 
body impossible (Canguilhem 2000). 
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kind of operation. The cause for understanding identity as idem is in the act of 
comparison: 
 
As long as one remains within the circle of sameness-identity, the otherness of the other than self offers 
nothing original : as has been noted in passing, “ other“ appears in the list of antonyms of “same” 
alongside “contrary”, ”distinct”, ”diverse”, and so on. It is quite different when one pairs together 
otherness and selfhood. A kind of otherness that is not (or not merely) the result of comparison is 
suggested by our title, otherness of a kind that can be constitutive of self-hood as such (Ricoeur 1992: 
3).   
 
Comparison is thus what makes the difference, according to Ricoeur, between an 
identity where other, contrary, distinct, diverse do not offer something original, and 
an identity where they do. In bachelardian terms comparison is thus an obstacle that 
hinders us from seeing or which leaves anomalies in the empirical field. As we saw in 
the second chapter this was part of Wieviorka's critique: that philosophers fix 
identities. And he proposed hybridity as an alternative way of understanding 
identities in order to escape this opposition between identity and difference. But as I 
will try to show, with Amselle, this does not avoid the obstacle after all.     
If we turn to the social sciences and social-anthropology, the same picture is 
discerned. Jean-Loup Amselle underlines the problem of comparativism as 
methodological point of departure in anthropology when he states that comparativism 
assumes diversity, and thereby guarantees that diversity will be found (Amselle 1998: 
x). Even though Amselle here speaks of diversity he makes the same point as 
Ricoeur. Comparativism guarantees a diversity that is nothing but a series of static 
and closed identities. As long as comparativism is not removed or at least 
problematised, the development of concepts, frameworks for understanding, is 
difficult.  
Jean-Loup Amselle on the other hand reflects on the notion of comparativism 
from the point of view of difference in his book Logiques métisses. For what about a 
comparative approach that does not focus on equality, but rather search differences? 
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Amselle investigates the notion of identity as an anthropologist, but at the same time 
remains critical to the philosophy or epistemology operative in anthropology. In 
bachelardian terms he tries to clean himself from the philosophy that informs the 
anthropologist. Amselle writes that: 
  
It is thus not the notion of society that founds comparativism but the reverse: because I need to draw up 
classifications and typologies, I must have elements to classify, and if I can legitimately extract them 
from their context, it is because I have denied beforehand that these elements are political units situated 
in a sociocultural continuum (Amselle 1998: 10). 
 
It is pretty clear that Amselle regards this as a prejudice describing it as something 
that is denied beforehand. Compared with the quote from Ricoeur that described the 
character of otherness in ipse-identity as “a kind of otherness that is not (or not 
merely) the result of comparison”, Amselle also emphasises the constitutive role of 
comparison. A certain way of thinking collective and/or individual identity is founded 
or resulting from comparison. At the same time as comparison gives insight by taking 
the empirical into account, it must be seen as a technique or as something that 
produces a certain kind of empirical data. What is the result of this?  
 First of all a certain knowledge is produced. Entities that were separated could 
be classified like species were classified in other sciences. Anthropology could then 
follow the Linnaean epistemology in the life sciences that claimed and claims that 
nature is dividable into a series of distinct species.25 One consequence was that 
anthropology could gain status as science and be accepted.  
 Amselle's problem is relevant to a political philosophy that will try to get out 
of fixing identities. Given that ethnology and social-anthropology are supplying us 
with knowledge of human beings and that comparison and typologies of different 
kinds of human beings have been the sources of this knowledge, this is what had to or 
                                              
25The impact of the tableau as the organising principle for the”collection de papillon” was much due to the work of 
Swedish 17-century scientist Carl von Linnée.  
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have to be removed. By postulating that all peoples always already are separated, it is 
difficult to practically and theoretically grasp that which is between two or several 
identities or the process where these identities are constituted. The obstacle is thus 
here that comparativism either exaggerates difference into a differentialism, or 
reduces variation to the same. However, as I see it, the relational is primordial to 
identity. 
 
4.5 Obstacle removed: from compared to non-compared identity  
Now, what is the relation between philosophy and anthropology, or perhaps, what 
can they learn from each other? One relation between a philosophy of cultural 
identity and social-anthropology consists in taking historical/contemporary theory 
and empirical examples into account and at the same time develop new 
understandings. As Bachelard shows us, philosophy has no privileged point of view 
from where it can criticise. I think it is the same in relation to social-anthropology. It 
is not easy to say where anthropology begins and philosophy ends, but philosophy 
has a potential in its tradition for reflecting on concepts that might be fruitful here. At 
the same time a philosophy of cultural identity cannot do without anthropology. 
There is thus a mutual process of theory and practice where the one cannot do 
without the other.  
 What happens if the obstacle of comparison is removed? In anthropology some 
new phenomena are spotted or cease to be anomalies. At the same time this allows for 
new reflections on old phenomena and new phenomena. But it also renders it possible 
to develop new theoretical frameworks that do not necessarily fit with a specific 
material. There is still room for generality in philosophy. We will just indicate some 
directions here. Concerning identity both Ricoeur and Amselle have interesting 
alternatives to compared identity, but they nevertheless keep the notion of identity. 
Ricoeur proposes to substitute the compared identity, or identity as idem, with the 
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notions of ipsé identity and narrative identity.26 Amselle proposes the metaphor 
branchements as a new understanding of cultural identity and genesis. These matters 
will be scrutinised later. The point is that the procedure of comparison in 
anthropology, regardless of whether it takes a universalistic or particularistic 
direction, abstracts the cultures from their concrete historical processes. This amounts 
to not only a stage in the history of social-anthropology but reveals, as Ricoeur 
shows, an understanding of identity as the same (idem, mêmeté). But could it be 
otherwise? Without postulating the answer or an alternative to an abstract 
understanding of cultural identity, Ricoeur and Amselle give us some tools for a more 
“concrete” understanding.  
 
4.6 A critique of identity  
If it is true as Louis Dumont says, drawing on the ideas of Herder and others, that 
cultures are like persons and individuals- and that persons and individuals in their 
turn are linked to identity, it becomes vital to look critically into the notion of 
personal identity. And in order to understand Ricoeur's elaboration on the question of 
identity in the next part it is vital to look into the thinkers that initially opened up the 
reflection in the first place. More precisely I want to look at the thinker that broke 
with “sameness” as a criterion for thinking identity. Locke’s definition of identity is 
for instance sameness, whereas in the thinking of Martin Heidegger there is another 
way of critically analysing identity. Briefly, a vital mistake made in western 
philosophy is, according to Heidegger, that the questioning itself has a generalised 
character that imports prejudices towards the phenomena under scrutiny. One primary 
prejudice is that all phenomena can be questioned in the same way without taking 
into consideration that we are investigating totally different domains. This is evident 
when we for instance ask what a human being is. The questioning implicates an 
                                              
26Once again we see that what is new and innovative in philosophy does not come from philosophy, but from outside it. 
Ricoeur’s reflections are certainly involved in traditional philosophy, but nurtures particularly on historiography and 
psychology. 
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investigation that treats man like a thing, like any other thing or object. Heidegger 
goes on to displace the questioning of man from what to whom. Instead of what is a 
human being? one must ask who is the human being? Heidegger sees, among other 
things, Being as characterised by being Selbst (soi-même, one self). This is of course 
rather complicated and the subject for Heidegger's work in Sein und Zeit. We will not 
go into that work here but look at a seminar held by Heidegger in 1934, Logik als die 
Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache.27 Here Heidegger also treats the question “who 
is the people?” 
 If we leave the question of whether it is possible to speak of collective entities 
in the same way that we talk about persons aside, we  can read that one of the reasons 
the question of a collective self (Selbst), like the people, cannot be asked in terms of 
what, but as who, is that it involves a decision. Who, as opposed to what, is 
hallmarked by a kind of initial emptiness which receives its content following an 
action. And prior to this action is the decision. This is of course a complicated matter 
as there are more than decisions that those which constitute our actions. The question 
“who are the people?” leads to the question of what is a decision. Heidegger then 
exemplifies a decision by looking at the conditions for the choice of a winner in a 
competition. If two competitors are equal one can throw dice in order to decide who 
is going to win, but this is not a decision. Here one only gets elimination. But if the 
score is equal and the referee decides, there is a decision. Heidegger explains the 
reason why this is so as because the elimination can only take place as long as the 
referee decides (Heidegger 2008: 89).  This is thus the explication of Selbst (one-
self): It is in this decision the referee becomes himself. Before this decision the 
referee is not him-self, but becomes himself after or in the decision. It is only in this 
moment when he decides by turning away from all his inclinations and affective 
dispositions that we can speak of an authentic decision. In any other case where other 
                                              
27Again, these reflections have had much help from following Vincent Descombes’ seminar Idéntité collective, spring 2009 
at École des hautes études en science sociale, Paris.  
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factors have played in, he has not decided anything, only eliminated. Now, 
Heidegger’s authentic Selbst is pure decision and a state we are not in most of the 
time. Secondly and most important, this understanding of identity as Selbst is a Selbst 
without content.  
 If we ask the question: what is it to be Norwegian? Or what are Norwegian 
values? the answer is often a mixture of democratic and constitutional principles on 
the one hand, and hallmarks of specific regional behaviours and practices on the 
other. Love of nature and activities and skills developed through the encounter with 
this nature are numbered as elements of what is a Norwegian value alongside social 
and gendered egalitarianism, freedom of speech (which has caused a lot of debate). 
So if we should answer the question of what constitutes Norwegian identity, or less 
theoretically, what it means to be Norwegian, these points would often be mentioned.  
   Now Ricoeur localises a deficit in Heidegger’s questioning, and this opens up 
for his own reflection on narration. These are the main themes in Temps et récit I-III 
and in Soi-même comme un autre. But they are also inspired by the works of Hanna 
Arendt. What is interesting with both Ricoeur and Arendt is that they both emphasise 
two aspects of who that is left unproblematic in Heidegger’s analysis.28 The question 
of who takes us to narration and Ricoeur. Ricoeur builds on Hanna Arendt’s 
reflections in the Human Condition when he claims that it is the function of narration 
to determine the question “who has acted?”(Ricoeur 1990: 76). Without narration 
there is no who. In order to determine the identity of who performed an act it is 
necessary to tell the story of this individual. In other words, the answer to the 
question who is a unity that does not exist without permanence in time. This 
permanence is secured through narration.  
                                              
28 First of all, there is no who without an action. Whereas Heidegger wants to investigate Being in a radical manner and 
criticises the questioning for treating it as a thing, Ricoeur wants to investigate what triggers us to ask the question who? in 
the first place. He states this already in Histoire et Vérité being is the act which precedes and constitutes the very possibility 
of questioning in the first place (Ricoeur 2001: 58). First of all we notice with interest that Ricoeur claims Being to be an 
act, and not something that exists prior to acts. Secondly, in Heidegger the reason for which we investigate Being is not 
asked. Ricoeur, however, finds this a vital question. We do not ask the question who ? without something prior which 
makes it a necessary question to ask? Prior to the question who there is an act. 
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 We have localised a problem in the Heideggerian analysis of who. Even 
though Heidegger’s genius lies in discovering the tendency in the questioning itself, 
his critique of the question what? and the displacement towards the question who? 
are still within being and do not comprise action. The first problem with the question 
who are you? is that we have already made an identification (are).  
 Another problem is that Heidegger does not give a content to the question 
who? Given Heidegger’s emphasis on authenticity it is impossible to give a content to 
the question who? Because if the question who was reducible to some properties (like 
Norwegian, black, gardener) it would turn the question into a question of what, which 
is to deprive the essential hallmark of who: the decision. Thus we could say that 
Heidegger’s notion of the Self is the dissolving of identity as such. So if we should 
transport these reflections to understand a cultural unity such as Norwegian culture, 
Norway not as being but as narrative, what would that mean? If we look at what 
Ricoeur says about identity in Temps et récit III, he states that the identity of an 
individual or a society is to answer the question who and that this answer cannot be 
but narrative (Ricoeur 1985: 242). Now could we use these general reflections on a 
concrete community like the Norwegian community? The Norwegian culture or 
community should neither be scrutinised through the question what the Norwegian is 
since this renders the entity Norwegian a thing where we are left with a clear 
identification and that action is not taken into account. Could we understand who 
without taking action as primary? How can we not end up with either an 
essensialisation of who that Heidegger has taught us to question, or an understanding 
without content, which seems to be Heidegger’s answer?    
  What is it according to Ricoeur that could justify that we are taking Norway, 
as designated by that name, as the same throughout history? This is not due to some 
telos immanent in Norwegian history from the old Vikings to today; history could 
have turned out quite differently. But at the same time there is some continuity. The 
answer is narration. To answer the question who? is to tell a story. It is not until we 
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tell the story of the Norwegians, and of Norway, that we know who they are. Outside 
of a these narrations there is no Norway, no Norwegians.  
 The process of narration in both an individual and a collective sense is, 
however, a complex one and consists of several constitutive steps. In the sphere of 
individual subjectivity Ricoeur writes that a subject recognises herself in the history 
she tells about herself to herself (Ibid: 445). The same goes for collective identity as 
the relation between all these elements are circular. If we take the Norwegian 
community we could say that its identity is derived from the reception of the texts 
that it has produced. Throughout history a number of texts have been written that in 
themselves are singular and do not have anything in common. In addition there are of 
course events, actions, and geographical topography that have a role to play.29 But the 
essential point here is that all these elements do not have any initial connectivity in 
the sense that they constitute a unity. 
 If the Norwegian identity is a narrative identity, and receives its identity at the 
same moment as its identity-constituting stories are being told, and this narrative 
identity might include change and mutability, then this means that this narrative 
identity never finds its finished form and that new changes, immutabilities, and 
stories might be incorporated into it.  In other words, we are again faced with 
Heidegger’s challenge of the emptiness of the Self. We stand as far as I can see 
before a decision, an eternal return perhaps, of who we are. The Norwegian identity is 
not a question of what, but a question of who we are. This might of course evoke 
reactive forces which cling to a mythological cultural origin. But it is this “imagined 
sameness” that can be challenged with the thinking of Heidegger and Ricoeur.  
It seems like personal and collective identity- in opposition to the identity of 
things-is related to the question of who which is something else than what. So the 
question is not to which culture we belong, but who are we who belong to a culture. 
                                              
29We notice perhaps a limitation in Ricoeur’s reflections from the fact that he stands in a protestant interpretation of logos 
as word and not for instance the catholic interpretation which is verb and hence action.  
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It is the collective identity which is at stake in the question of culture. It is not what is 
a culture, but who are we who claim to belong to a culture, which is the core 
question. What do we say and do when we say we? Regarding the question whether a 
culture exists or not, it is a question of what kind of pronoun one uses. Norwegian 
culture exists as a narrative identity,that is as someone who is asking who am I? and 
creates a unity of the practices, symbolic structures, experiences. But this entails that 
the who can never turn into a what or a thing which some attempt to do. And what 
does this really say about identity? 
 In both Amselle and Ricoeur’s notion of identity the question who is vital, 
however not in as radical a manner as with Heidegger. Whereas Heideggerian 
authenticity becomes an empty being, Ricoeur opens up for a complex genesis of the 
Self constituted through the commencement of actions, the repetition of actions, the 
reiteration of symbolic orders etc. . However, Heidegger’s distinction of who and 
what is precisely what is at stake when we speak about identity. So whereas Ricoeur 
fluctuates between a philosophical (where the self has no content, which itself cannot 
be established empirically) and an empirical approach (which can establish the 
relation between man and texts, facts about behaviour of the body, collective 
practices mediated through signs, symbols etc., but which cannot grasp the 
philosophical core of human existence), Heidegger is more of the “pure” philosopher.   
 
4.7 From the politics of cultural identity to the epistemology of 
cultural identity 
Before entering the next stage and part two of the dissertation we must make one 
more preparatory step. I located the link between culture and identity as part of a 
political discourse in the first chapter and found this link to be odd since culture and 
identity do not seem to have a historically strong link. Identity is a term that has 
relatively recent entered the political scene and the social sciences. As I have 
discussed in this second chapter my point has been to show that culture is constituted 
by identity in at least two respects. On the one hand culture is explicitly linked to the 
term identity and on the other to an implicit understanding of identity. The former is 
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exemplified in the political discourse where the two are often mentioned together in a 
pair. The latter is implicit in raciological thinking, in the heideggerian critique of the 
ordinary approach to being, and in the comparativism discussed at the end. I have 
here focused, and will continue to do so throughout the dissertation, on this second 
aspect of identity.  
 Identity is what reproduces the view of culture as something static and closed, 
or is it? What I want to do in the second part of the dissertation is to develop two 
arguments that question the oppositional logic of culture. But in order to do this we 
need analytical tools to do it with. These two arguments consist in developing these 
tools theoretically. Even though I have already commenced my critical take on 
identity as a way of understanding culture, I want to dwell in the next chapter on how 
I want to undertake this critique.  
 It has been attempted to trace a tendency- in the etymology, in philosophy, and 
within social anthropology- to understand culture as abstract.30 The various attempts 
at displacing an ethnocentric concept of culture (culture as opposed to those assumed 
to live in the state of nature) by diversifying culture into cultures only leads to the 
strengthening of the impasse. Cultural relativism with reference to cultural diversity 
is vital in order to question ethnocentrism and racism.  
 When it comes to the often accompanying notion identity, its use strengthens 
this understanding of culture. Not necessarily due to the word itself, but by a 
particular conception of it. As it is presented by Heidegger the identity of a self, be it 
individual or collective, cannot be scrutinised in the same way as the identity of a 
thing. This thing does not act or decide. However, it is precisely what has happened 
in the history of social anthropology and which continues to be the manner in which 
we understand other cultures in the political discourse. The representation of culture 
as the third person’s perspective is what renders the perspective abstract and turns it 
into a what. But the question of cultural identity is not of what, but of who. And by 
                                              
30Clearly I do not claim to give an exhaustive account of culture etymologically or historically.  
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asking the question who, a historical or temporal element can be introduced. Amselle, 
with the aid of Paul Ricoeur, continues in this line and develops an understanding of 
culture which takes it back to its genesis and gives a place to its history. This gives 
quite another take on identity.       
 At some point in the history of anthropology the concept of culture made, what 
Levi-Strauss calls the original sin of anthropology, a kind of alliance with the notion 
of race. This evokes something deep in the western imagination, that of the origin of 
man. The diversity of human expression did not lead to a questioning of this origin 
but rather to a multiplying of it in diversity. Continuity of this origin through time 
was secured by avoiding the mix of these different races, an argument that has 
returned in the shape of culture.  
 Now, the point with seeing culture, identity, and biology (or rather the quasi-
biology of raciology) together is that they together constitute a tangle I wish to undo. 
Culture is constituted in this mix of logic of identity, colonial and political history, 
ideology of race and the myth of the origin. The notion of culture borrows ideas from 
raciology of the difference and original separation of the peoples of the world. At the 
same time the notion of identity seems to be involved in a kind of double constitution 
where identity constitutes the logic of raciology and is constituted by the myth of 
origin.  
 Now, in order to escape culture as identity, alternative concepts have been 
presented. We have here touched upon two of them, hybridity and diversity. And the 
hope is that this should take us out of essentialist thinking whether it be the identity 
of a person or a community. We live in a culturally diverse society where people 
have hybrid identities. The point is that they are caught within the logic of identity. 
And, furthermore, hybridity and diversity are concepts taken from biology and the 
realm of nature, which makes this a conceptual impasse. Hybridity and diversity are 
both linked to identity as pure origin and static identity. However, these will be 
looked at in later chapters. 
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5. Epistemology as approach, structure, and theory   
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters I have tried to describe how culture is paired with identity in 
the political discourse and that this link is pivotal for reproducing a view of culture as 
static and closed. Furthermore, by looking at both culture and identity we see that 
there are some problems linked to both terms as well as to how and why they are 
joined. As indicated in the introduction and in the last chapter, this could be described 
as an epistemological obstacle. An obstacle to what? An obstacle to understanding 
human beings and the consequences this has for both social science and society. The 
aim in the dissertation is thus to overcome these obstacles. Even though few hold that 
cultures are static and closed, this view nevertheless seems to be repeated. To me this 
not only shows that it remains important to reflect on these problems, but more 
specifically that the conditions through which we reflect on these problems should be 
examined. Hence an epistemological perspective. What conditions do I refer to? The 
problems and the attempts to overcome these obstacles are here as elsewhere 
articulated in and through language. The obstacles are located in language, and the 
overcoming of these obstacles must be expressed in language. And it is this language 
that I see as the role of epistemology to examine. The overall thesis is that 
branchements and translation are two notions that help us to develop a thinking that 
does not take pure origin and closure as premises. This requires, however, that we see 
them in relation to what language we normally use to discuss culture. The aim in the 
first chapters has thus been to reconstruct the framework within which we normally 
think. A historical reconstruction teaches us not to repeat the same mistakes as well 
as shows us that what we take to be natural (for instance the link between culture and 
identity) has its history and point of constitution.  
 Even though I also argue against the view that culture is something closed and 
rather see it as open, this point is not the main concern in the dissertation. What I find 
more interesting are the ways this openness could be thought. What kinds of obstacles 
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are necessary to overcome? Is it possible to overcome these obstacles in the social 
sciences and the humanitites? What does it mean to develop a thinking that reflects 
openness rather than closure? How do we do it?  
 We have, in the previous chapters, looked at some reasons why and how the 
static view of culture is repeated. Now we turn to the question of how we can 
overcome this obstacle. The dissertation seeks to explore the notions branchements 
and translation as the development of another kind of thinking which reflects 
openness rather than closure. But before going there I want to dwell on this transition 
from localising an obstacle to the attempt at overcoming it. This transition is a 
movement in thinking which is materialised in language: It is through examining how 
concepts, terms, metaphors, words, notions are historically linked and constitute 
obstacles, and how the substitution of this language with another enables the 
overcoming of these obstacles, that we can understand this process. A reflection on 
this process is therefore required.  
 One way to articulate the thesis of the dissertation is that branchements and 
translation in different ways question a view of culture as closed and help us develop 
a thinking of openness. But doing this, do we develop theory? Is it a theory of culture 
or of openness that I want to establish? My claim is in this chapter that it- at least to a 
certain extent- is fruitful to distinguish between theoretical reflections and the 
construction of theory.  
 In order to do this I situate my work within the French tradition of philosophy 
of science, in particular Georges Canguilhem (2000, 2002). Even though 
Canguilhem’s objects of study (the history of the life sciences) differ from my own, 
his understanding of theory is fruitful and relevant to other contexts as well. 
Canguilhem does at least two interesting things. First of all he emphasises the 
problematical aspects in the history of a science and not its solutions. Secondly, he 
focuses on how the problematical and historical character of science is articulated in 
language. In other words, he reflects critically on the language through which 
scientific problems are articulated and solved. By no means is his thinking bent on 
 99 
 
 
solving any problems. Accordingly, my proposition is that a fruitful way to elaborate 
the notions translation and branchements in the multicultural context is not as 
theories or parts of theories (of culture and language for instance), but as tools which 
help us to ask questions and to reflect. Even though the motive is related to the 
question of living together in a culturally diverse society, neither my aim nor my 
approach is to find a theoretical answer or solution.   
 How shall we proceed? Before giving a presentation of French epistemology 
as a way of thinking, I will give a brief outline of branchements and translation in 
relation to the question of culture. Then I will demonstrate how epistemological 
reflection, represented by Canguilhem, is applicable to branchements and translation. 
This is meant to shed some light on how Ricoeur and Amselle proceed, but primarily 
on what I myself make of it. In other words, the explication of approach is meant to 
explain what I want to do in the dissertation and why I do it this way. I will then open 
up a reflection on the difference between theoretical and theory. Even though the 
reflection upon branchements, translation, and culture is theoretical, I try to abstain 
from constructing a theory but try to remain in a problem oriented perspective.  
 
5.1 Between identity and language: the epistemological obstacle in 
culture 
Throughout the whole dissertation I am approaching the question of culture from an 
epistemological angle. The way I examine culture as a challenge, a problem, or an 
obstacle on the one hand, and the way I look at how to develop reflections to 
overcome these obstacles on the other, are all seen from an epistemological 
perspective. But why is this specific perspective so important?   
 It seems to me that even though one has attempted to develop non-essentialist 
theories of culture, an essentialist and pure notion of culture and human origin is still 
present in our reasoning. On the level of public discourse we fall back into notions of 
cultural origin, cultural identity, and ethnicity which make it possible to revitalise 
racism even though we have abandoned the term race (Gullestad 2002, Taguieff 
2010). Intentionally or not, a notion of (pure) origin and essence underpins notions 
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such as cultural identity, ethnic (majority and minority), and immigrant: they 
emphasise origin. On the other hand, the theories meant to supplant ideas of origin 
and identity seem to be more or less dependent upon a notion of pure origin 
(hybdridity, mestizo, creolization, and syncretism).31 I am not at all claiming that no 
one else sees this problem: on the contrary, most want to break with an essentialist 
and static view of culture. Still, the fact that it seems difficult to find a language 
which is not essentialist underlines the fact that this thinking has a strong hold on us.   
 Does this mean that I think I can solve these problems through introducing 
epistemology as an alternative approach? My claim is not that I can solve the 
problems in the sense that we once and for all can rid ourselves of the language of 
purity, closure, and origin. However, it seems like the conditions through which we 
reason - which basically is a question of what kind of language we use- have not been 
taken sufficiently into account. For instance, it was an interesting discovery to find 
that the link between culture and identity, which seems so natural in the political 
discussions, is of such a recent date. I think that shedding some light on these 
conditions is crucial in order to develop another kind of thinking. Or differently put, 
it is by taking the epistemological conditions into account that another kind of 
thinking can be developed. In other words, we cannot just develop new theory 
without taking the historical into account.     
 However, it is not enough to take the condition into account. When I introduce 
branchements and translation as two ways of articulating another kind of thinking, it 
is because we, with them, can take the epistemological conditions and obstacles into 
account at the same time as we are not limited to just pointing out these obstacles. 
Branchements and translation are another way of articulating the problematic of 
culture which does not work on essentialist premises. That being said, the 
essentialism plays out a bit differently in the two. They can both be related to culture 
                                              
31 The discussion between Jonathan Friedman (1999) and Jan Nederved Pieterse (2009) regarding the status of the term 
hybrid makes this clear. I will discuss the term hybrid in chapter 8.       
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in the sense that they intervene in constituting aspects of culture and they deal with 
much of the same problem. But the themes and the approaches are not identical.  
To make this a bit clearer, we can return to what we saw regarding the 
genealogy of culture and how this is connected to the colonial background of 
anthropology. As Amselle wrote, one can see in the early colonial enterprise prior to 
the Enlightenment and the French revolution that:  
 
it rests on three contradictory logics which nevertheless were closely dependent on each other: the 
regeneration, natural right, and the raciological and linguistic classifications. One can observe the 
presence of these logics throughout the French colonialisation (Amselle 1996: 55).   
 
In particular, two points in this quote are important for our part: the impact of 
raciological thinking and linguistic classification. This is where the epistemological 
obstacle to thinking culture lies and where branchements and translation intervene. 
As far as raciology is concerned, it draws on a principle of origin which, when 
articulated in terms of culture and not race, still closes and essentialises. It matters not 
whether it is expressed in a simple form (identity as sameness) or a complex form 
(hybrid identity). Raciology uses a certain kind of identity-thinking where the 
epistemological precondition is “a system of oppositions”. Branchements is an 
intervention into this oppositional logic based on an idea of pure origin.  
When it comes to the relation between language and culture, the diversity of 
human societies and cultures was, according to Amselle in the quote above, thought 
of in a similar way as one thought of the diversity of languages.32 As far as I 
understand Amselle the point is that the determination of a society corresponded 
                                              
32 Michel Foucault shows in Les mots et les choses that the classification within the domain of plants and animals in the 
17th century can be articulated as the Classical episteme (which is a specific relation between things and words) where the 
classification of things are based on principles of similarity and difference (Foucault 2003). Note that Foucault himself 
makes a quite different point when discussing the linguistic classification in the same period. So it seems like Amselle has 
something closer to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in mind. According to the strong version of this latter theory, language 
proposes that there is a connection between language and the world-view of a group of people, and that language by 
determining our thoughts makes inter-linguistic communication impossible.    
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with, and even depended on, the linguists’ determination of language. In this sense 
culture is determined by the specific language spoken by a group of people. 
Secondly, the view of culture as distinguishable borrowed the logic of classification 
which, as Amselle writes, was based on a system of oppositions. In other words, 
linguistics guided the anthropological reasoning from the outset, and this still affects 
our view of culture. So, going into translation as a way of seeing a parallel to culture 
is not farfetched but is in fact an intervention into an understanding of culture that has 
haunted it from the outset and which has been transformed into a political and social 
way of thinking. 
 It now becomes clearer what kind of problem branchements and translation are 
facing and how they deal with different sides of the same problem or obstacle. They 
both relate to constitution of culture and how culture becomes something static and 
closed, but in two different ways. Whereas branchements intervenes in identity or the 
oppositional logic, translation intervenes in language. If we can develop another way 
of thinking identity and language than through the oppositional thinking of identity 
and difference and linguistic classification, then we can perhaps develop another kind 
of understanding of culture. I will here maintain the intention of limiting these 
reflections to an epistemological perspective because what I want to reflect on is still 
the conditions for thinking. And the question is whether these conditions can be 
challenged or questioned by a change of language. But before continuing the 
reflection on epistemology we will look at what branchements and translation are.     
 
5.2 Branchements and translation 
I will present this more thoroughly in the subsequent chapters and just give an outline 
of branchements for the time being. Branchements is a metaphor taken from 
electronics and informatics used by Jean-Loup Amselle in his study of West African 
societies and processes of identity constitution (Amselle 2001). In electronics 
branchements (Eng. connections) signifies the web of electronic circuits and 
networks. An electronic network is an interconnection of electric elements such as 
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resistor, voltage source, current source, and switches. An element in an electronic 
circuit does not work unless it is connected to the circuit, and the circuit does not 
work if there are no elements for electricity to pass through. One thus calls the 
interconnection between the different elements branching. But whereas an electronic 
circuit is closed, branchements describes a web of such networks. In informatics 
branching marks the point where the sequence in the enfolding of a programme is 
ruptured (Le Robert, 2000). Branchements in electronics and informatics thus refers 
to the web of connections and ruptures where the web and that which is connected 
and ruptured cannot be separated from each other. This articulates a fundamental 
openness in the sense that every element is connected to the electric network or to a 
programme of information. But it also renders the system or web itself open to 
ruptures in the way that every connection produces modifications. Now the main 
point is to see this as a metaphor or an analogy to culture and cultural identity in the 
sense that the articulation of any culture and/or identity is always already related or 
connected to a system or web. In other words, connectivity expresses an initial 
openness both of that which is being connected and the web itself.  
 For Amselle branchements is linked to a certain case, that of the N’ko, which 
is situated in a transnational west-African context and comprise of whole range of 
fields such as medicine, language, history etc. Central to N’ko is the Guinean 
philosopher, theologian, linguist, and historian Soleyman Kanté. Through his 
numerous works Kanté constructs the basis for N’ko identity in opposition to the 
former French and Arab colonial powers. N’ko is related to branchements as a case 
that demands an alternative conceptual or theoretical framework. Since Amselle’s 
point is to avoid the epistemological obstacle of thinking culture as closed, he sees it 
as necessary to abandon metaphors and concepts such as mestizo and hybridisation 
which draw on notions of purity and closure. These metaphors are still captured by 
the epistemological obstacle described above. Hybridisation is marked by the 
raciological thinking which is premised on the diversity of pure origins. Now, 
Amselle is an anthropologist and is primarily focused on his empirical material. So in 
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order to develop a more philosophical reflection on branchements, I draw on Hegel 
and Ricoeur to explicate what I take to be dialectical aspects of branchements. But 
these matters will be thoroughly discussed in the next chapter so I will not go into 
these elaborations here. What I want to do here is to reflect on what kind of reasoning 
this change of language is. And should branchements thus to be considered a new 
theory?   
 Before answering these questions I will introduce the second notion that I use 
in the dissertation: translation. Translation is also thematised by Amselle as a way of 
articulating the processes of branching. However, it is with Ricoeur’s reflections on 
translation in Sur la traduction that we can elaborate these matters further (Ricoeur 
2004a). Ricoeur’s reflections on the epistemology of translation stress that translation 
must be comprehended as a practice and not seen from a theoretical point of view: 
translation does not work with the problem of whether translation is possible or not, 
but with the problem of balancing faithfulness towards two languages. In other words 
a translator works on this balance. Now if this is the epistemological problem in 
translation, this says something interesting about language: In order for a translation 
to be a translation, the languages must somehow open themselves to each other.    
 This immediately subverts the emphasis on either a formal universality 
rendering all languages the same, or a linguistic relativity underlining the rupture 
between languages and ultimately of humankind. The question of whether it is 
possible to translate disregards the practical aspects of translations: translations are 
done regardless of their theoretical possibility or impossibility. Continuity and 
rupture must thus be seen from the perspective of practice and not of theory. Or, 
differently put, the practice of translation is in search of a theoretical reflection that 
takes its proper practice into account. And this practice is the faithfulness to the two 
languages. A case central to Ricoeur and anyone interested in the philosophy and 
history of translation is Luther’s translation of the Bible to German. Luther 
demonstrated through the translation both continuity and rupture with the original 
Hebrew and Greek text on the one hand, and with the German vulgate language on 
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the other. It was vital to him that the Bible could be read by the man in the street in 
his own language, but at the time there were many German languages or dialects. 
Anyway, from the perspective of practice translation is, according to Ricoeur, “the 
creation of an equivalent without identity”. In the case of Luther German was lifted 
out of its particularity as oral language and acquired status as equal without breaking 
completely with its particularity. In other words, German could express the meaning 
in the original texts equally well without being identical to the Greek and Hebrew. 
They all remain different languages.   
 From this, another vital aspect of translation can be deduced. For if the same 
(as equivalent) can be expressed in more than one way this testifies to a reflexive 
dimension in translation. In other words, translation is not merely the transportation 
of words and meaning from one language to another, but an immanent dimension of 
one language. Translation is thus «to say the same in another way». When we 
misunderstand and must rephrase ourselves we translate ourselves: translation 
articulates reflexivity.  
   
5.3 French epistemology as style of reasoning 
How do we analyse branchements and translation, and to what end? One way to 
structure the questioning of branchements and translation is as an epistemological 
enquiry. Even though the purpose of questioning our understanding of culture might 
also be ethical and political- the dissertation is meant to give insights into the 
practical questions of how we are going to live together, the very structure and way 
of questioning is epistemological. In other words, it is a matter of reflecting critically 
upon what we mean when we discuss culture, the conditions for discussing it, and 
what branchements and translation imply in the questioning of culture. As we have 
seen in the previous paragraph, a problem that concerns them both is openness. So 
the question then becomes how openness can be scrutinised from an epistemological 
perspective. But first, what do I mean by epistemology? Epistemology might mean 
several things depending upon what tradition one stands in. In the French tradition it 
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is closely related to a field or science and consequently means different things 
depending on the nature of the field or science. For our part, the epistemological 
problems, the problems of translation and branchements, are linked to raciology, a 
psychological notion of identity, and linguistic classification. What kind of 
epistemological tradition is this?  
Central to the French epistemological tradition, and to whom I relate my 
reflections, is George Canguilhem. Two lines of thought which partly overlap are 
central to his thinking. On the one hand he is occupied with the question of life as an 
irresolvable problem in the life sciences. Life as such here represents a perpetual 
obstacle which is non-reducible to quantifications such as statistics on the one hand 
and to a metaphysical life force à la Bergson on the other. On the other hand he 
studies the history of the life sciences’ attempts at approaching living organisms. 
Central to the historical study is the analysis of the establishment of scientific 
concepts and their relation to specific contextual problems (Canguilhem 2000, 2002).  
By following the way problems formulated through concepts within one context are 
transferred into another context, he destabilises science’s own auto-perception 
without lapsing into relativism. To say that science borrows, imports metaphors and 
concepts, from outside science, or that science changes content over time, is not the 
same as claiming irrationality. He studies the processes where concepts, in the history 
of the life sciences, become operational as scientific concepts. And it is Canguilhem’s 
reflection upon the language of science and the way language shapes scientific 
problems and solutions that I find pertinent to my own investigation. Even though 
Canguilhem is working with concepts in the life sciences, two features in the thinking 
of Canguilhem are relatable and relevant to developing branchements and translation. 
First of all, philosophy is a problem-oriented and reflective activity and not 
necessarily directed at finding solutions. This has consequences for how Canguilhem 
thinks theory. Secondly, his study of the history and philosophy of science is centred 
around concepts and language in science. And it is Canguilhem’s understanding of 
theory and concepts that I think might shed some light on my reasoning in the 
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following chapters of the dissertation. Or, to be a bit more precise, the relevant traits 
of Canguilhem’s style of reasoning in this dissertation are: a) the historical 
localisation of obstacles and hindrances, b) the study of how scientific problems and 
solutions are articulated historically through language, c) how the overcoming of 
obstacles might depend on a change of language, d) and how the focus on concepts 
rather than theories gives us insight into scientific problems rather than solutions.   
 Looking at a) and b) one could say that I have already commenced an 
epistemological approach in the first chapters by localising the link between culture 
and identity. Immediately this link might seem obvious, but going into the genealogy 
of culture it is the certain historical circumstances that constitute the connection to 
identity. So the obstacle of the closed culture is historically constituted in a link to 
identity. It also seems as if the way Amselle describes the comparative method could 
be perceived as an epistemological obstacle in the understanding of culture and that 
this enforces the view of culture as static and closed. The question is then of course 
how to go from localising an obstacle to developing another way of thinking, which 
takes us to the next part of the dissertation and the c) aspect in Canguilhem’s 
thinking. The development of translation and branchements could, in different ways, 
be characterised as the development of another kind of language that tries to break 
with the culture-identity obstacle.    
 And this takes us to a vital point for Canguilhem, d), and for this dissertation. 
For in breaking with this obstacle and developing another kind of language or another 
kind of thinking, does this mean that I develop a theory? The same way Canguilhem 
sees the development of concepts in the history of science, I want to ask if it is 
possible to scrutinise language in a similar manner in the domain of cultural science. 
A vital quality of concepts in this respect is the articulation of problems. The idea is 
not to find a solution or to establish a theoretical foundation; it is rather a new way of 
establishing a reflection and critical attitude. This reflection entails an elaboration of 
new ideas, however, without leaving the original problematic. It is by no means a 
new position, but remains in the problematic the concept seeks to illuminate. In order 
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to do this we must look at how Canguilhem distinguishes between theory and 
concepts. But before going into this we will try to bring the epistemological approach 
and the theme closer together. 
 
5.4 Branchements and translation: why do we need them both? 
To sum up the reflections in this chapter so far we have stated that branchements and 
translation stand at the core of the dissertation. They have some vital aspects in 
common at the same time as they say different things. And both answer the question 
of why bringing them both into the thesis is interesting. Methodically or as 
approaches they are both concerned with practices. In social-anthropological field 
work the point of departure is not whether it is possible to mix traits from different 
cultural traditions. Likewise, a condition for translation is not that we have to find a 
solution to the problem of whether or not translation is possible before we translate. 
Now there is a difference between translation and branchements regarding the 
relation of theoretical elaboration and practice. Whereas translation is a practice 
which more or less only can be examined through the word translation, the practice of 
cultural mixing, of cultural exchange, can be discussed through different kinds of 
metaphors such as mixing, hybridisation, mestizo, melting pot etc.  
 A second point they have in common- which is linked to the first- is the 
problem of closure and openness. For, by taking practice into account, interaction and 
exchange do not take the (theoretical) opposition between sameness (cultural and 
linguistic exchange is possible due to an underlying sameness) and difference 
(cultural and linguistic exchange is not possible due to an insurmountable difference) 
as their point of departure. Branchements and translation thus catch that which is 
between two places- neither the absolute same nor the absolute different- and not 
from the perspective of the one or the other of the poles. And this is the very point of 
the thesis. Instead of understanding culture as closed, pure, or original and remaining 
the same throughout time, culture and cultural expressions should be examined from 
the perspective of practice where it is constantly modulated. And it is here that 
Ricoeur and Amselle articulate different levels of openness. Whereas Ricoeur 
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describes the openness in translation as a paradigm, Amselle describes the metaphor 
branchements as an articulation of the openness between cultures. Before returning to 
openness I will introduce the perspective through which I will present the discussions 
in the dissertation which are related to the French tradition of philosophy of science.  
As I will explain later, branchements is a kind of metaphor whereas translation 
could be called a paradigm which is not limited to the question of culture. 
Branchements goes directly into the concept of culture, whereas culture is one of 
many domains with parallels to translation. I will not go into the distinction between 
metaphor and paradigm here, but concentrate on the different levels on which they 
work in this dissertation. One way of articulating the difference would be to think 
branchements more as directly linked to the deconstruction of cultural purity. 
Translation, on the other hand, is something broader in the sense of being a paradigm 
and can work not only in a deconstruction, but also in a construction. After all, in 
addition to being a theoretical concept, translation is a practice, the result of an act. 
When it comes to overcoming the obstacle of cultural purity, translation shows how 
the purity of language can be overcome by constructing transitions between 
languages. This takes us, as far as I can see, into not just a deconstructive or 
reconstructive mode, but into a constructive mode: translation says something about 
the future. In the light of the idea that translation is a paradigm, translation points 
perhaps further than branchements when it comes to the construction of an 
intercultural thinking and intercultural society. Since translation is a conscious 
process it might be better suited to articulate a thinking that is not based on 
essentialist premises.    
 Branchements is, on the one hand, an analytical tool that analyses (past) acts. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to say that Kanté knew that he was branching. 
Whereas translation implies consciousness of translation, branchements is an 
interpretation of acts. Translation, on the other hand, does not go so efficiently and 
deeply into the particular domain of anthropology and culture as branchements does. 
Amselle’s change of language from mestizo or hybridity to branchements is an 
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extremely interesting intellectual movement that intervenes directly in the perception 
of culture.    
 Having said this it still seems to be one aspect in particular that connects them 
and which still makes it relevant to include both. As we saw in chapter 3 and repeated 
earlier in this chapter, what unites branchements and translation is that they intervene 
in two aspects that are constitutive for how we think culture as something closed and 
static. On the one hand the link to identity, on the other the link to linguistic 
classification. Language and identity are topics to which culture is connected and 
which govern how we see culture. So the epistemological problems with identity and 
language are transposed into culture. By thus taking translation and branchements as 
points of departure we have analytical tools for seeing two aspects of the same 
problem as well as two ways to articulate an alternative. But when I say alternative, is 
this the same as saying that translation and branchements are solutions to these 
problems? This is the question I will now go on to discuss.    
 
5.5 About problems and theories 
Philosopher Pierre Macherey has written an interesting text about Canguilhem’s 
epistemology and the latter’s distinction between theories and concepts. Macherey 
underlines again and again the relation between concepts and problems: “It is 
about…recognizing the true sense of a notion, which supposes that it is put in its 
proper place and not in its simple retrospective theoretical context, but in its 
problematic” (Macherey 2009: 54). What does he mean by distinguishing the 
retrospective theoretical context of a notion and its problematic? Due to 
Canguilhem’s rigorous method of comparing scientific texts from different periods, 
he manages to reveal that concepts that we imagine are shaped within a specific 
scientific discipline come from another scientific discipline or does not come from 
science at all. It is a kind of conceptual genealogy à la Nietzsche where the concepts 
we thought belonged to a certain domain originally belonged to another domain, 
another context or time. It is thus Canguilhem analyses the concept of reflex. Even 
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though the phenomena of reflex movement is understood within a mechanistic 
theoretical frame and the origin of the concept is accordingly ascribed to Descartes, it 
is by the vitalist Willis that the concept is articulated for the first time (de Cuzzani 
2003).  However, from the perspective of vitalism the phenomenon of reflex and its 
concept were incomprehensible, so it was not until it found a place within the 
theoretical frame of mechanist thinking that the concept could become operational. 
The problem arises when we reconstruct the history of science from theories and not 
from concepts because theories obscure our understanding of the non-linear and 
troublesome path of science. History of science, as a history of the concepts’ strange 
wanderings, could thus be a critique of our own understanding of scientific 
rationality: it is not as homogenous or accumulative as we might think. This brings us 
to the distinction between concepts and theories. Macherey writes that “If concepts 
are at the side of questions, theory is at the side of answers “(Macherey 2009: 55). 
What does this mean? As far as I understand it, it means that at least when 
reconstructing the history of science from the theory in which a concept belongs 
today, we risk losing sight of the problem which it was originally meant to solve. 
Even though scientific answers might be understood as rational, that does not mean 
that we would see the link between problems and solutions as equally rational. As 
Canguilhem teaches us, problems which often come from the non- scientific or 
ideological, and scientific answers do not always correspond. Canguilhem writes, for 
instance, that Herbert Spencer tries to use Darwin’s theory of evolution as a 
justification for the interest of industrial society against the theological and socialist 
understanding of human beings (Canguilhem 2000: 43). The point is that this 
problem is not the one evolutionary theory responds to, but a non-scientific or 
ideological problem. Another example could be the one we already have looked at: 
race. The problem raciology attempted to solve was, as Amselle shows, political.33By 
                                              
33 Central to understanding the French society in the 18th and 18th century stands the concept of regeneration. Regeneration 
is a problem that commenced as a problem in the wake of the French revolution. The society needed to be regenerated 
(Amselle 1996). This problem could, however, also be transferred into a moral and physiological problem in the context of 
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studying science from the point of view of answers and theories the (sometimes 
uncomfortable) relation science has to non-science disappears. Any scientific attempt 
today of proving the genetic existence of races has to be confronted with the 
ideological, and not scientific, origin of this problem.           
 Even though he is not concerned with epistemological questions in the same 
way as Canguilhem, it is within such a tradition that I see the work of Michel 
Foucault and the concept of problematisation. Foucault’s historical approach to 
knowledge and power and the focus on discontinuities and ruptures are learned from 
Bachelard and Canguilhem (Foucault 2003). The concept of problematisation is also 
closely related to this tradition. Foucault-scholar Judith Revel writes in her book 
Foucault: une pensée du discontinue (2010) that the term problematisation implicates 
the consequences that: 
 
The true critical exercise of thinking opposes the idea of a methodical search for the “solution”: the task 
of philosophy is not to resolve- understood in the sense of substituting one solution for another- but to 
establish a critical distance, to help liberate (faire jouer la “déprise”), to rediscover the problems (Revel 
2010: 58).  
 
Even though this might seem evident to some, it is interesting to see how close this is 
to the thinking of Canguilhem and Macherey. My point is that Foucault here 
articulates a similar distinction between methodical solutions and problematisations 
to Canguilhem’s distinction between theories and problems. It is within such a 
tradition that I situate my own reflections. But what is so special about this, is not all 
philosophy oriented towards problems? Yes and no. The problem is that philosophy 
as theory too easily becomes foundation in the sense of a position or point of view 
from where one can perceive “how things truly are“. Theory in this sense closes the 
                                                                                                                                           
Louis Pasteur 100 years later (Latour 2001). So a vague articulation of a problem could be turned into a wide range of 
solutions like raciology and bacteriology which have nothing in common. The point is that what we see as rational is linked 
to something we do not see as rational.  
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question, whereas a problem remains a problem even after an elaboration. Another 
reason for pointing this out is that this kind of approach loses ground every day in a 
society that becomes more and more instrumentally inclined. What provocation it is 
to reflect without giving a solution or answer!  
 To develop theories and methods is to think answers and solutions (by either 
saying how reality is or how we should approach something), and this is not, as I see 
it, the role of the philosopher or epistemologist. So if what branchements and 
translation have in common is a reflection on openness and closure, I think it is 
important to maintain the problem oriented approach. It means that I should be 
critical to branchements and translation. But secondly it also means that translation 
and branchements should and could be read as ways of reflecting rather than as 
theories. So when we are faced with the question of how branchements and 
translation contribute to the discussion of culture in a multicultural society, they can 
help us reflect theoretically on openness. To use these notions could be described as a 
change of language which aims at overcoming the obstacle of the closed culture. 
However, unlike scientific concepts- or perhaps precisely like concepts in the history 
of science that aim at becoming scientific - the problems that translation and 
branchements are meant to articulate cannot be overcome in the same way as 
scientific problems are overcome. This lesson learned from Canguilhem is, as I see it, 
one of the main reasons why I do not want to describe this dissertation as a 
development of theory. Besides the philosopher’s commitment to problems, the 
problems in multicultural society cannot be overcome in the same manner as 
scientific problems. Hence should the approach be equally open: even though we 
might develop our reasoning with a higher refinement and find the reflections of 
branchements and translation interesting, relevant, and more fruitful, this does not 
mean that we have solved anything or that the problem has disappeared. But that does 
not mean that we cannot localise a similar kind of procedure in the field of science 
and in political-ethical thinking. By a change of language and of notions, translation 
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and branchements help us in different ways to ask what openness is and how we 
know what it is. But in order to do that we must go into what openness could mean. 
  
5.6 The obstacle of closing and the problem of openness 
Now that we have looked at both the theoretical tools that I want to develop and the 
way I want to develop them, it is time to see how this is intended to be played out. 
Even though branchements and translation operate, as we shall see, on different 
levels, they both deal with the obstacle of the closing of culture and the problem of 
openness. The obstacle that we are dealing with is, as already repeated many times, 
the view that culture is closed. I think that we have also located the historical aspects 
that constituted this view. As long as culture is linked to identity or a certain notion of 
identity and to a certain degree to language, it is difficult not to close culture. I have 
said that both translation and branchements are dealing with the pair closure-
openness.  
  How is branchements problem-oriented and not a theory? What is particularly 
interesting is the emphasis on the philosophical task of remaining on the side of 
problems rather than solutions. Branchements is in this respect not a theory of 
cultural identity, but a theoretical way of questioning what cultural identity is and 
how problematic it is, without refuting the term altogether. Since the thinking of 
branchements does not presuppose an initial purity or closing of culture, the 
distinction between what is inside and what is outside a culture becomes blurred. 
Branchements is, as I see it, a problematising of boundaries. And when this is taken 
as a reflection on cultural identity, it has critical potential in the sense that it questions 
the implicit closure in identity politics which assumes boundaries. The reason, 
however, why this is not the solution to the boundary- and closing of culture-
problem, is that it cannot be solved the way scientific theories can solve problems. 
Importing a metaphor from electronics and informatics might help us think, broaden 
the reflection, and problematise how we think culture and identity. But it does not 
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exclude other approaches to the same theme nor is it in any way absolute in the sense 
of being complete or finished.               
 Concerning translation, the idea is that it can be thought more or less in the 
same line. Central to the problematic of translation is openness, but on perhaps 
several levels. In his account of Ricoeur’s philosophy of translation Domenico 
Jervolino presents the hiatus between language (singular) and languages (plural) as 
the problematic of translation (Jervolino 2007: 75). And following Ricoeur and 
George Steiner translation goes between different languages as well as within one 
language. Translation thus mediates the diversity of languages as well as the diversity 
of voices within one language. This renders account of openness on two levels. 
Translation as balancing faithfulness to two languages presupposes an openness 
which the two languages must have in order to let the other language enter one’s own 
language. As long as translation is necessary, a linguistic unity cannot be thought in a 
purified manner. It is a unity, but it is plural, not homogeneous. A linguistic 
classification is, on the other hand, based on such a purity where different cultures or 
societies correspond to different langauges. A transition between languages is in a 
system of opposites either possible due to some common origin or impossible due to 
the insurmountable difference in languages. The second level is the internal openness 
due to the immanent plurality. It is perfectly possible to misunderstand and/or to 
interpret differently the same thing despite the fact that one shares a language. 
Another kind of openness is the one given by the fact that the perfect correspondence 
between the source language and target language (Ladmiral 1994) can never erase the 
potential for criticism through an alternative translation. It is evident that translation, 
due to the impossibility of the perfect translation, can never really come to rest. 
Criticism is always potentially present. And how is translation problem-oriented? In 
order to strengthen this aspect and see how Ricoeur is a problem-oriented thinker, I 
think it might be fruitful to open up a short parenthesis with reflections on Ricoeur’s 
dialectical thinking. After all, Ricoeur is the main theoretical source in the 
dissertation and we should spend some time elaborating on the way he reasons.    
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5.7 Problematic and production in Ricoeur 
In the book Du texte à l’action (1986) Ricoeur writes in the text La function 
herméneutique de la distanciation about the hermeneutical tradition ending with 
Gadamer. As an underlying alternative in Gadamer’s Warheit und Methode we have 
to choose between ontology of understanding and the scientific objectivity of the 
social sciences (sciences humaines).  In order to be scientific we must distance 
ourselves from what we study. But then we distance ourselves from the primordial 
relation which makes us participate in the historical reality (Ricoeur 1986: 113). 
According to Gadamer we have to choose between an alienating distance or 
belonging. But Ricoeur wants to see this in another way and states that: “My own 
reflection stems from a rejection of this alternative and an attempt to overcome it “ 
(Ricoeur 2008: 72).The philosophical reflection does not seek an answer among the 
two alternatives either, but seeks to overcome the opposition itself. However, this is 
not a synthesis in the sense of a simple incorporation of both alternatives: “The first 
expression of this attempt consists in the choice of a dominant problematic that seems 
to me to escape from the alternative between alienating distanciation and 
participatory belonging” (Ibid). I will make two points out of this. In line with the 
focus on problems rather than theories the point is that the antinomy that stems from 
Gadamer is the presentation of a problematic. For Ricoeur this problematic is the text, 
which is something we can explain objectively and also understand through an 
engagement with it as readers. My point is that this fluctuation between the two sides 
of this problematic never comes to a halt in a synthesis, nor can any of the sides 
“win”. Consistent with the epistemological tradition that is linked to Canguilhem the 
problem cannot find a solution to make the problem disappear because both the 
objectifying and the engaging approach continue to be relevant. Neither of them 
could be given an exhaustive account either. In other words we are always thrown 
back into the problem.    
 My second point, which is linked to both translation and the problem of 
openness, is that Ricoeur here anticipates the main point from Soi-même comme un 
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autre which takes its point of departure from this problematic. There is no self, 
without the other and/or an outside. If there is a self, this means that there is already 
another and/or outside to this self. If there is another, then that means that the self has 
already understood itself. There is, however, two different kinds of mediation of 
one’s self. The problematic of Soi-même comme un autre is more a question of the 
mediation between self and others, whereas here Ricoeur focuses more on mediation 
through cultural signs:   
 
In contrast to the tradition of the cogito and to the pretension of the subject to know itself by immediate 
intuition, it must be said that we understand ourselves only by the long detour of the signs of humanity 
deposited in cultural works (Ricoeur 1992: 84). 
 
On the one hand, the fundamental hermeneutics, for which a scientific distance loses 
the primordial connection one has to an object, becomes an empty or non-dialectical 
hermeneutics. Interpretation is meaningless without the prior alienation that texts 
produce. On the other hand this alienation is overcome (but not completely) through 
interpretation. It is through this alienation that understanding is already achieved. As 
I see it, the choice of the word problematic indicates how this process of self and 
other than self, distanciation and belonging, is a never ending story. The mediation 
never finds rest in an absolute synthesis.  
 The point is here that translation functions in the same way. As we will see 
through Luther’s translation of the Bible to German, translation is a practice. 
However, it becomes conceptualised through the concept of translation. Just like the 
concept of text questions the opposition between participation (understanding) and 
distance (explanation), translation articulates what Jervolino calls the problem of the 
unity and plurality, identity and difference: “Translation actually confronts us with 
the problems of identity and otherness (alterité)” (Jervolino 2002: 42). I interpret 
Jervolino in the direction of seeing translation of languages as an analogy to how a 
person acquires his or her identity: in order to express myself I must “translate” my 
expressions into a language which is not mine. Thus I am letting something alien or 
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other (alterité) (another language, other signs) live in and with me. As far as I can see, 
this problem of identity and otherness is the problem of openness. And the same way 
as for branchements I think it is pertinent not to call translation a theory of openness. 
This helps us to reflect on openness between concrete languages or, more 
analogically, between identity and otherness. But it does not solve the problem of 
identity.     
 Now, the problematic of the text and the problematic of translation are both 
deduced from a concept of production. In Du texte à l’action Ricoeur writes, 
concerning the dilemma that we have seen between distanciation and participation, 
that “The dominant problematic is that of the text, which reintroduces a positive and, 
if I may say so, productive notion of distanciation “(Ricoeur 2008: 72).And in Sur la 
traduction : “In actual fact, the cultural kinship hides the true nature of equivalence, 
which is produced by translation rather than presupposed by it” (Ricoeur 2006: 35). 
The text and the translation produce a mediation (between author and reader or 
between author and translator), which simultaneously takes its point of departure 
from a problem (that of misunderstanding or lack of understanding), which in the 
same act is being articulated. My point is that the mediation (between author and 
reader/translator) as something produced articulates a problematic and that this 
problematic is linked to practice. Since translation-as the construction of an 
equivalent without identity- is a practice, a production, the problem never finds a 
final solution. This articulates another kind of openness than the one of letting the 
two languages live inside each other: a translation is never complete and always open 
to criticism.        
 But I want to return to the distinction between problem and theory. My point is 
to emphasise the problem-oriented aspect in Ricoeur’s thinking. The point is here not 
to claim a direct heritage from Canguilhem to Ricoeur or to say that they are the only 
philosophers who think in problems. However, Ricoeur is often associated with 
phenomenology and hermeneutics, thought of as a position or a certain approach. But 
what I find interesting is this problem oriented aspect in Ricoeur’s thinking where 
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epistemology is reintroduced into hermeneutical thinking. If understanding is a 
hallmark of the human, this can nevertheless not be the point of departure. Alienation 
is at the core of human existence. It all commences with obstacles, ruptures, 
problems, confusion, and not with reason. That is why translation is necessary, but 
also why it persists: there is no absolute criterion or truth to which our understanding 
can correspond so we have to continue to translate.     
 I will try to given an example of this in relation to Ricoeur’s concept of 
narrative identity which I think could be read in the light of what Judith Revel wrote 
about Foucault. If it is as she, with Foucault, says, that the true critical exercise of 
thinking opposes the idea of a methodical search for the “solution” and that the task 
of philosophy is not to substitute one solution for another, but to establish a critical 
distance, to help liberate, and rediscover the problems, then this is a relevant 
challenge to how Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity is read. Narrative identity for 
Ricoeur is a concept that enables us to reflect on what personal identity is. I will 
discuss this in detail in the second part of the thesis, but for now it suffices to say that 
a person is “the same” throughout his or her life at the same time as he or she is 
changing. How is this possible? And this is where narrative identity reflects on how 
we as human beings express our self-conscioussness through narration: The way I am 
self- conscious is as a historical and changing being that consciously and 
unconsciously creates a narrative that reconstructs the events as events in the life of 
the same person: namely me. Now, as I see it, narrative identity is, however, not a 
theory in the sense that it solves problems. It gives us some interesting thoughts on 
identity and may help us rediscover problems, but it is not a scientific answer or 
solution to the question of identity.  
 However, Ricoeur’s thinking is reproduced as a theory in a scientific sense. 
This happen when researchers- with a sympathetic attitude, I must add- try to “use” 
and “find” examples of his “theory”. For instance, the historian Gérard Noiriel does 
this in his book À qoui sert “l’identité nationale”, which draws on Ricoeur’s thinking 
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in the discussion of the“mobilisation of the German unity” in the 18th and 19th 
century. They present: 
 
Criteria for sameness (critères de “mêmeté”) (example: the German nation exists because all the 
members speak the same language) and criteria for selfhood (ipséité) (example: the German nation 
exists because it possesses a collective memory and specific traditions) (Noiriel 2007: 15-16).           
 
First of all, this reduction of selfhood to memory has not taken into account the full 
scope of what selfhood is. Memory is necessary for self-consciousness, but not 
exhaustive for its meaning. And secondly, the reason for this mistake seems to be that 
selfhood is not a positively given entitity that can be “found” but is itself 
problematical. Noriel has here found a language that can explain two dimensions in 
German national-romantic thinking. But as I see it, narrative identity (as more than 
just memory) as the synthesising of sameness and change is not just descriptive. It 
also shows that this identity is a construction and that self-consciousness might be 
deceptive, that memory is selective etc. The point is not to “get” Noiriel but to reflect 
on how we think theory.  
 
5.8 Summary 
If we try to summarise what has been said here the aim in this chapter has been to 
bridge the dissertation’s two parts. Epistemology as the overall perspective in the 
dissertation comprises both a reflection on the conditions for understanding culture 
and a way of structuring the dissertation itself. Branchements and translation are two 
approaches to the same problem of closing culture. By intervening in the identity-
thinking present in raciology on the one hand and in the linguistic classification on 
the other, branchements and translation reveal the obstacle and articulate an 
alternative at the same time. The structure of the dissertation as two parts corresponds 
to the two sides of what Bachelard calls an epistemological obstacle. In the first part 
the obstacle has been described going from political discourse where culture and 
identity are linked to tracing these concepts and their union historically. In the second 
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part, which we will get to in a moment, I will try to elaborate on in what way 
translation and branchements could be seen as alternatives to how we think culture. 
In the last part of this chapter I have also commenced a reflection on what theory 
means. When I talk about overcoming the obstacle by looking at new theoretical 
ways to reflect on culture, that does not mean that the obstacle can be overcome in 
the same way as scientific problems can be overcome by presenting new scientific 
theories and making them operational with an empirical material. Theories, as 
Canguilhem points out, close the problem, whereas the question of human beings 
cannot, as far as I can see, be closed. Branchements and translation are thus 
philosophical in a similar way to what Foucault states about the task of philosophy:  
they establish a critical distance and rediscover problems.   
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Part 2: Branchements and translation as 
problematisation   
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6. Epistemology of branchements  
 
Introduction 
We have in the previous chapters localised an obstacle in the conceptualisation of 
culture which may be analysed epistemologically (the logic of oppositional thinking), 
institutionally (raciology and the nation-state), and genealogically (the unity of 
identity and culture). The result of this obstacle is the closing of culture. Now the task 
is to develop a thinking that can overcome this obstacle and articulate openness in 
relation to culture. And one such development is the metaphor branchements 
developed by Jean-Loup Amselle. This takes us back to Canguilhem and 
epistemology. In a famous text called “L’object de l’histoire des sciences” (the object 
of the history of sciences), Canguilhem reflects on who, why, and how one should do 
history of science from an epistemological perspective. In order for epistemology to 
be something more than a repetition of scienctific results he sees it as a critical 
reflection “on the present methods of a knowledge that is adequate to its object” 
(Canguilhem 2002: 11, Cuzzani 2003: 82). I think this resonates at least to some 
degree with what I want to do in this chapter. Amselle’s change of language or 
metaphor and ultimately a change of theoretical frame from speaking about hybrids 
to speaking about branchements could be read and examined from an epistemological 
angle which might shed some light on a parallel between the natural sciences and the 
social sciences. To paraphrase Canguilhem: how is the metaphor branchements more 
adequate to its object than the metaphor hybdrid? This takes us at the end to a 
reflection about the metaphor in general and what kind of metaphor this is.   
 
6.1 The problem of origin 
Amselle refutes the idea that there is any such thing as a pure culture. However, the 
idea of pure origin or origins is at the core of the western imagination and not so easy 
to challenge. Amselle traces one root in the genealogy of pure cultures back to an 
idea emanating from the late 18th century raciological thinking within the context of 
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the French Revolution. In the aftermath of the revolution it was not sufficient to 
replace the feudal and religious institutions with secular rule and rights for the 
individual. The post-revolutionary society also needed a human being which was not 
corrupted by the feudal institutions. This human had to be sought elsewhere. 
Napoleon’s expeditions to Egypt could be read as the search for such a man (Amselle 
1996). Raciology aimed at distinguishing the morally and physically degenererated 
(i.e. mixed) races, beyond salvation, from the pure races, who were not yet 
enlightened but had the potential of becoming the “new man” in post-revolutionary 
French society. Society must be regenerated. The idea seems to be a correspondence 
between the physical and moral constitution of man. The pure man was the human 
being who was not mixed with other races and who was not morally corrupted by 
despotic institutions such as l’ancien regime. I understand Amselle here to claim that 
it is this tension between natural right and raciology that marks the French republican 
thinking. 
 So, it is in the framework of the French Revolution that Amselle places the 
early colonial expeditions and the quest for the new man. In order to regenerate 
society, a new humankind was needed. But in order to get this new humankind, 
“knowledge” of the new man was needed. How could one separate the regenerated 
from the degenerated? Thus, at its beginning, the theory of the races was not so much 
focused on proving the superiority of the white man, but was nevertheless a theory of 
man based on a notion of origin. And this idea continues to haunt us. As discussed in 
chapter 3, it is the notion of origin that lurks behind cultural racism and 
differentialism. This is where the understanding of pure culture comes from (Amselle 
1996). Now, this is the idea I aim to question but which seems difficult to shake. 
What happens to the perception of ourselves and others if the idea of a pure origin 
falls? I will not discuss this here, but it seems evident that the obsession with identity 
and origin reflects an underlying existential agony for both the individual and for 
society. As I will try to show, identity is a problem rather than, as many seem to 
think, an answer.  
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 There is an alternative to the understanding of cultures as pure or closed which 
perceives cultures as mixed. Amselle takes this position in Logique métisses (Amselle 
1998). Here he takes on the question of cultural identity which he sees as an 
“syncretisme originaire“. However, this alternative is insufficient since the expression 
“syncretisme originaire“tends to reproduce the notion of the pure as a mix which is 
composed of something pure. As a result of this Amselle dissociates himself 
altogether from the notion of mixture and continues the search for a more fruitful 
term for understanding culture and cultural identity. And what he finds is the 
metaphor branchements. Now we will turn to another part of the contextualisation of 
culture, the post-colonial.   
 
6.2 Soleyman Kanté and the N`ko movement 
The context for the metaphor branchements and the book Branchements is field 
studies in West Africa. Even though the African continent has been influenced by 
western, Arabic and local traditions, it has struggled to find an identity of its own. 
The African continent needs an identity, Amselle writes. However, this may take 
different directions. One way is to embrace western thinking, language, practice, and 
rationality. Another is to construct African identity by finding its roots, its origin so 
to speak, prior to colonial rule. Central to this tension between ethnocentric and 
western universalism one the one hand, and traditional and African cultural 
particularism one the other, is that of language and literacy. Historian Dianne White 
Oyler points out in her book The history of the N’ko alphabet and its role in Mande 
transnational identity (2007) that political independence in the aftermath of 
colonisation has not given the African nations the ability to return to their African 
languages. Most people in the West African region still speak a version of French or 
English. That is what makes the making of the N’ko alphabet so interesting.  
 As a social-anthropologist, Jean-Loup Amselle has done field work in N’ko, a 
cultural domain and language in West-Africa (mainly Mali, Ghana and the Ivory 
Coast but stretches from Mauritania to Nigeria). In the Mande language N’ko means 
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“I say” (White Oyler 2007: 39). N’ko is first and foremost an alphabet invented and 
completed April 14 1949 by linguist, philosopher, theologian (and prophet!) 
Soleyman Kanté. The purpose for the invention of the N’ko alphabet was to provide 
an indigenous written form for Mande languages. Versions of Mande are spoken in 
the area from Mauritania to Nigeria and its heartland is on the border between Mali 
and Guinea. Mande is furthermore a complex of history, language, and culture. The 
centre of cultural continuity of Mande corresponds with that of the Mali Empire 
founded by Sundiata in 1235. Even though Islam was present since the eighth 
century, Sundiata was the first ruler to accept Islamic religion. Sundiata thus brings 
continuity to the faith of the majority in the region.  
 When it comes to language N’ko intervenes in a multi-layered context and 
history. In the pre-colonial era the Mande language was, besides being the mother 
tongue of a large number of people in the region, used as a language of trade for 
Mande and non-Mande speakers. With the dispersion of Islam, Arabic scripture 
acquired religious as well as administrative power. However, as White Oyler points 
out, Arabic also changed the Mande cultural identity: “it altered the Muslim, Mande 
speakers’ conceptualisation of time and space. The Muslims’ fixed calendar and their 
division of the day into prayer times regularised time, and new graphic techniques 
altered the approach of spatial relationships.’” Furthermore: “For those possessing a 
first language…communication in a second language [like Arabic] at times resulted 
in the alteration of their indigenously constructed thought processes” (Ibid: 35). With 
the introduction of French colonial rule at the turn of the century, French substituted 
Arabic as the language of politics and administration. This makes the linguistic 
situation rather multilevelled.    
 Now, what is striking is the recognition of the value of literacy among Mande 
intellectuals. In a post-colonial context this is interesting as the rejection of literacy 
and the celebration of oral traditions are often used as strategies for escaping the 
colonial grasp (Amselle 2001, 2008). However, even though attempts were made at 
transcribing Mande, the Latin and Arabic languages and phonetics were not 
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sufficient. So another way was sought and the N’ko was constructed. N’ko is 
complex both in its origin and in its composition. It is first of all the written language 
of the Mande oral language. It is read, as is Arabic, from right to left. Its letters are as 
in Latin divided into vowels and consonants. However, in order to transcribe the 
fonetics of the local mandingian orals, Egyptian hieroglyphs are used.  
 We could, from one perspective, say that N’ko as cultural domain and as a 
language consists of heterogeneous elements. However, from the point of view of 
Kanté and the N’ko movement, N’ko language is a rediscovery of the lost African 
language. Now, the task is to find an analytical language through which this can be 
comprehended. Even though the N’ko alphabet is constructed within a certain 
cultural context, the mandingean oral tradition, there is, as in Latin, a universal 
pretention behind N’ko. As White Oyler states: “N’ko has been promoted as the 
universal written expression of all Mande languages” (White Oyler 2007: 39).   
 Why and how did the N`ko movement come about? An important first point of 
departure is when Kanté read an article by the Lebanese journalist Kamal Marwa who 
wrote about what he saw as the inferiority of the African languages in their being 
without grammar and useless for any intellectual articulation. Allegedly this 
provoked Kanté to initiate his work on the N’ko alphabet. Amselle writes that if N’ko 
is to be understood within an anti-colonialist context, it is not primarily directed 
against the occidental, but the Arab discourse. However, we do not have to leave 
European history in order to see the importance of language as a political instrument 
for power. The role of writing is thus central in anti- and post-colonial problematic. 
For example, a strategy chosen by some post-colonialists is to refute writing as a 
western colonial artefact altogether and embrace an “original” oral tradition in order 
to escape colonialism (Guha 2001). This sentiment is not absent in the N’ko tradition. 
But Kanté has a strategy which offers an alternative to the return to a pre-colonial 
origin without literacy. Writing is problematic in the former colonies as writing is the 
means by which a culture demonstrates its civilised character. But this is an 
occidental and colonial discourse. So the problem is whether one should embrace 
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western rationality or claim a rationality of one’s own, rooted in pre-colonial times 
(Amselle 2008). Now, on the background of the myth that the Arabs or the Europeans 
have stolen writing from the Africans, Soleyman Kantés is interpreted as having 
rediscovered language. When creating the N’ko alphabet Kanté makes it possible to 
connect to the western discourses such as medicine and political philosophy without 
becoming western. N’ko-language is, in the light of Kantés acts, comprehended as a 
search for a lost meaning. A meaning lost through the western theft of writing. In 
other words, the creation of the N’ko language is not a copy or reflection of non-
African civilisations, but a rediscovery of an original meaning. This imitation has, as 
Amselle points out, an ambivalent signifiance. As Aristotle explicates in his Poetics, 
the poet imitates human action, but the imitation is not the human action itself. This 
renders the mimetical act ambiguous, on the one hand linked to the material it 
imitates and on the other autonomous and not reducible to the material. As I 
understand it, it is within such an ambiguity that Kanté is situated.  
 Besides the reference to a mythical past of Mande, the re-appropriation of 
literacy has a huge significance on other levels of life. White Oyler writes that:  
 
One accepted idea is that Kanté designed his alphabet to reclaim knowledge from those special interest 
groups [those literate in Arabic or French] and place knowledge in the hands of the general Mande-
speaking population; this was a form of social liberation (White Oyler 2007: 14).     
 
Knowledge is power they say. And literacy represents a vital aspect of knowledge. 
This is, however, not merely important in order to present local knowledge in a 
written form but also to acquire foreign knowledge. Central are the translations by 
Kanté of political, technological, and scientific materials into N’ko. What is 
particularily interesting is that N’ko and Mande are not thought in an opposition to 
foreign politics and technology. On the other hand Kanté advised Mande speakers to 
learn N’ko “for a purer understanding of what they possessed imperfectly in non-
maternal languages and literacies” (Ibid: 15).  
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Concerning the relation between local and universal knowledge Amselle 
writes that “one can notice the demand for equivalence between the traditional 
African techniques and the modern western techniques” (Amselle 2001: 119). The 
demand for equivalence is, as will be pointed out later, what is at stake in practices of 
translation. For now, however, it is vital to understand the urge for the N’ko to be 
connected to universalistic traditions. As Amselle points out, a hallmark of N’ko is, 
instead of a refutation of western thinking, a demand for being equal with it. 
Equivalence is, on the one hand, not homogenisation in the sense of an abandonment 
of for instance the traditional medicine, but it is, on the other hand, not a refutation of 
western science. Or put differently, it is not merely a demand for recognition of 
cultural particularity but for equality. Amselle writes about this that “This demand for 
equivalence and equal diginity between the two cultural domains constitutes one of 
the principal characteristics of N’ko” (Ibid). By this we see another way of thinking 
cultural adherence which does not take refuge in a cultural particularism which 
rejects what is universal. The adherers of N’ko acknowledge universality but not the 
ethnocentric western version of it. As White Oyler also stresses, Kanté initiated the 
Mande Enlightenment which is universal and particular (my expression) at the same 
time. She writes: 
 
While accepting the necessity that speakers of Mande languages learn knowledge in their maternal 
language, he also encouraged them to learn foreign languages. That Kanté recommends the latter is in 
itself a testimony to his own spirit of toleration (White Oyler: 85).   
 
This linking of the local or the particular and the universal is affirmed by Amselle, 
and as I understand Amselle, this is what makes Kanté and N’ko interesting. N`ko 
proves that the mandingean culture is capable of having a rational discourse that is 
neither heterogeneous from, nor reducible to, the western and Arabic discourses. 
Amselle`s interpretation of all this is that N`ko is the result of, on the one hand, a 
complex of problems (political, linguistic, religious, and cultural), and, on the other, 
that Kanté handles these problems in a special way. For instance, Amselle claims that 
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Kanté’s use of Latin vowel-consonant system, on the one hand, is to establish a 
distance to Arabic language and culture, and his use of Egyptian hieroglyphs, on the 
other hand, is to establish a distance to occidental culture. However, and most 
importantly, through N`ko, Kanté is able to make the Mande language express its 
singularity through the use of what Amselle calls universals like Latin and Arabic. 
N`ko makes the transcription of the Mande oral language into written language 
possible by combining elements from already existing languages, but without 
reducing Mande to any of them. So, the Mande culture thus forges a foundation of its 
own, using traits from other cultures without being absorbed by these and without 
seeking refuge in a notion of purity. This process Amselle calls branchements and I 
will soon begin to explicate this. 
 An interesting aspect with N’ko is that the adherents of Mande have many 
different ethnical identities but are united through N’ko. Many of the N’ko leaders 
“belonging to peripheric ethnicities in Mali (dogon, etc.), confirmed their Malien and 
Mandé identity at the same time” (Amselle 2001: 115). In other words, N’ko is 
multinational. What is more, it underlines what is at stake in the concept of 
branchements: that of articulating how elements which appear to be in conflict with 
each other (in this case Mande and dogon), are not. Or, perhaps even more radically, 
to question the very idea of identities as a diversity of origins. 
 The point has so far been to lay out the context both for the main topic in the 
dissertation of cultural purity and origin, and the specific background for Amselle’s 
work. In the following we will leave the African, post-colonial context and the N’ko 
case, and concentrate on the metaphor branchements. For at the same time as 
branchements is an interpretative tool for analysing an empirical material and for 
understanding a political context, it contains interesting points as a tool for thinking. 
Or differently put: the metaphor branchements has an analytical value of its own, 
regardless of the N’ko case. So, I will now focus on the theoretical conceptualisation 
which Amselle gained from this case study. Based on what we have seen through 
Kanté and the N`ko movement, how can this be explicated and developed 
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theoretically? Amselle here links his interpretation of N’ko to the metaphor 
branchements which we will now go on to discuss. Despite being well developed in 
relation to the case of N’ko, there are several theoretical aspects concerning 
branchements which are not elaborated further by Amselle but which I think deserve 
to be pointed out. And these general traits are interesting to us. In the following we 
will take a look at branchements theoretically in different steps. As explained earlier, 
we will reflect on what Amselle does from an epistemological point of view when he 
transports a language from electronics to social-anthropology. Branchements could 
be understood as following a certain rationality procedure close to the kind that 
Canguilhem sees in the history of science.  
 
6.3 Branchements from electronics and informatics to social-
anthropology 
There is a long tradition for transporting and translating terms from other sciences to 
the social sciences and the humanities, but also vice versa. Amselle used hybrid and 
métissage, both derived from genetics, in Logique métissé. In the book Branchements 
he wants to avoid the link to biology and genetics. However, it is not clear whether 
the problem for Amselle here is the biological association itself or the fact that a 
hybrid assumes two already separated entities. The biological link is relatively well 
presented in Logique métissé where he on the one hand draws on then recent works in 
biology where morphological classifications and biochemical classifications are 
abandoned. He also refers to immunology as a foundation for rethinking the relation 
between self (identity) and non-self (not-identity) (Amselle 1998: xi). In the end it 
seems as if the biological link, no matter how radical, represents a problem and an 
epistemological obstacle. It might be possible to present the hybrid as something 
positive, but the question is whether it is sufficient to question the idea of origin. As 
Amselle states in an interview with Nicolas Journet in Science humaines, the 
metaphor mestizo refers to an idea of cultural purity (Amselle 2000) and is linked to 
the theory of polygenism which is the doctrine according to which humankind comes 
from many distinct sources (Taguieff 2010). However, this we will discuss later. For 
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now let us just notice that the problems linked to biological classification hinges on 
an idea of purity which renders it an obstacle for someone who wants to present an 
alternative understanding of human beings. So Amselle continues to occupy himself 
with metaphors from other harder sciences. And in his book Branchements he turns 
to electronics which gives another approach to the genesis and constitution of 
identity. So what is branchements according to Amselle? He writes in an early 
paragraph that with the theme branchements he wants to:  
 
distance myself from the theme of the “mestizo” which represented our previous problematic, and which today 
seems to us too marked by biology. By having recourse to the metaphor branchements taken from electronics 
or informatics-that is the derivation of signifers in relation to a web of planetary siginified (meanings), one 
succeeds in distancing oneself from the approach that consists in seeing our globalised world as the product of 
a mixing of cultures which themselves are seen as separated universes- one puts the idea of a triangulation at 
the centre for the reflection, i.e. having recourse to a third element in order to constitute one’s own identity 
(Amselle 2001:7). 
 
This is how Amselle describes the theoretical approach for analysing N’ko and the 
work of Soleyman Kanté. As a reflection upon this case, the book Branchements is 
very exciting. And I think that the work rests on how he is interpreting this case. But 
as an understanding of the methaphor branchements, he does not give us too much to 
go on. I think there is more to be said about this, theoretically speaking, which may 
perhaps be fruitful for further use both in a social scientific way and as a critical tool 
for approaching how culture is understood in political debates. It is interesting to note 
a comment given by Éloi Ficquet in a review of the book. Ficquet writes that:  
 
The technological image of branchements is referred to (est ainsi sollicitée) in order to designate the capacity 
of every society to connect themselves to channels of diffusion of goods and ideas…One may, however, regret 
that the connections and accomplishments (les tenants et aboutissants) of the metaphor are too quickly 
considered. The concept of network and its numerous corollaries (linked to the inflation of the contemporary 
terminology of informatics) are to be found at the heart of such a problematic, but Amselle does not dwell on 
measuring the heuristic significance or to signal the works that have tried to formalise them for the use in 
social sciences. The proposed tools are thus presented without an explicit manual (mode d’emploi) (Ficquet 
2002: 92). 
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I find this an interesting remark which renders my thesis even more relevant. And 
even though I will not claim to present a manual for the use branchements, my aim is 
to elaborate some, but not all, of the theoretical elements. 
There are three aspects of branchements that I see as important to emphasise: 
a) branchements as connection, b) branchements as reconnection, and c) 
branchements as system. A) In Le Petit Robert branchement is derived from branche 
which at its base comes from the Latin branca (the paw of an animal). The 
substantive branche is “the ramification or division (of an organ or an apparatus) 
which goes from an axis or a centre. “ Another way of describing branchement in Le 
Petit Robert is by the use of a telephone. In order to use the telephone it must be 
connected with an electronic circuit (brancher le téléphone). But I do not think it is 
this kind of connectivity that Amselle has in mind. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter an electronic network is an interconnection of electronical elements. For any 
element to work it must be connected to the circuit, and the circuit does not work if 
there are no elements for electricity to pass through. One thus calls the 
interconnection between the different elements branching. Connection is central to 
how branchements is thought by Amselle and how he interprets the N’ko movement. 
The point is here, as I understand it, that the way the connection one sees in 
electronics is primordial to the elements that are connected, the connections between 
people are primordial to what we call cultures. Now, this connecting aspect of 
branchements claims that the basis for identity is the relation between two or more 
poles. Or rather, that these poles come into being through this relation. 
B) But this does not quite cover the way Amselle uses branchements. In 
informatics branching also marks the point where “the sequence in the enfolding of a 
programme is ruptured” (Le Robert, 2000). Branchements in this meaning of the term 
includes reconnection which is an additional but different movement than connection. 
Something is ruptured and not only connected. This is also a central hallmark of the 
way Amselle uses branchements. Kanté not only connects Mande language and 
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culture to the Arab and western cultures, but ruptures this connection in a specific 
(Mande) way. In a simple way this is what happens when we use language. It is not 
possible to have a private language. We learn to express ourselves through an already 
existing language by connecting ourselves to this language. Or differently put, it is 
through this connection that we become ourselves. But as users of this language we 
can at the same time make modifications to this language. The use of a language is 
never a repetition but a modification of it. Connections immediately lead to 
reconnections either by combining words in new ways or by importing foreign 
words.   
However, I want to add to this that Amselle seems to think branchements as 
describing a conscious and voluntary movement which perhaps draws on the 
definition given in Larousse. Here we can read that branchements is: “the choice 
between a number of possible instructions which allow, through the execution of a 
programme, for the selection of one or the other of its parts after having run a test” 
(Larousse). When studying N’ko, through the metaphor branchements, Amselle gives 
a lot of the credit to the person Soleyman Kanté. And, as the definition of 
branchements in Larousse emphasises, Kanté does make choices of what way to go 
after having tried and failed. The N’ko alphabet is constructed with vowels and 
consonants and Egyptian hieroglyphs because he fails in transcribing the Mande oral 
language with Latin letters. My point is that Amselle’s use of the metaphor is 
decisionist and conscious: branchements is the result of choices and processes of 
attempts and failures.          
C) The two previous points are connected to a third level. Branchements 
stands throughout the work of Amselle in plural form which indicates that it is the 
plurality of connections and reconnections he is after. In electronics branchements 
signifies the web of electronic circuits and networks. But whereas an electronic 
circuit is closed, branchements describes a web of such networks. Branchements thus 
refers to the web of connections and ruptures where the web and that which is 
connected and ruptured cannot be separated from each other. As far as I can see this 
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makes branchements a kind of system that at the same time is composed of all the 
elements that constitute it and at the same time is something more than the sum of the 
parts. But at this point it seems more fruitful to describe branchements as a metaphor 
from informatics rather than from electronics. Information is closer to language and 
culture than electricity. However, branchements as a system articulates a fundamental 
openness in the sense that every element is connected to the electrical network or to a 
programme of information. But it also renders the system or web itself open to 
ruptures in the way that every connection produces modifications. Now the main 
point is to see this as a metaphor or an analogy to culture and cultural identity in the 
sense that the articulation of any culture and/or identity is always already related or 
connected to a system or web. In other words connectivity expresses an initial 
openness both of that which is being connected and the web itself.  
 
6.4 Change of language as an overcoming of obstacles 
We saw that the scrutinising of concepts stands at the fore in the epistemological 
analysis of George Canguilhem. My point is that this can also be a fruitful approach 
to branchements. Now, there is more to be said about the change of language by the 
importation of words, concepts, and metaphors from other domains. In the text “Le 
concept et la vie”, Canguilhem claims, in a passage concerning Wattson and Crick’s 
discovery of the double helix constitutive of our DNA, that in order to understand 
their discovery they changed their language from a mechanical, physical, and 
geometrical language to a language of communication and theory of language 
(Canguilhem 2002). Furthermore, this has had consequences for biological language 
in general. Biology has:  
 
Ceased to use the language and concepts of mechanics, physics and classical chemistry: language which 
has as its base concepts that are more or less directly formed after geometrical models. It now uses the 
language of theory of language and theory of communication. Message, information, program, code, 
instruction, decoding, these are the new concepts of the knowledge of life (connaissance de la vie) 
(Canguilehem 2002: 360) 
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For Canguilhem this import of concepts and metaphors from one domain to another 
does not undermine the rationality of the discipline at hand. On the contrary, it is the 
change of language that might make a science able to overcome the obstacle it faced 
in the old language. Canguilhem’s understanding of scientific rationality is thus 
dynamic in the sense that an unforeseen change of language, the import of concepts 
foreign to the traditional discipline, might solve problems and eventually transform 
the science itself. Thus the genesis of scientific rationality does not necessarily start 
from inside science or this specific branch of science. In the same manner we could 
analyse branchements. What is interesting is that Amselle, in order to find a language 
that is better suited to grasp the empirical findings in his field studies, imports a 
language that is foreign to social-anthropology just as Crick and Watson had to 
import a language that was foreign to the biology of the period. In the tradition of 
Canguilhem this is, as I have said, not the opposite of rationality but might even be a 
presupposition for it. It is the import of language from electronics to social-
anthropology that enables him to articulate the empirical findings.  
Now, Canguilhem’s examples are always taken from the life sciences, so in 
order to come closer to the social sciences and the humanitites we need examples 
from this domain. Such an example could be found in the field of historiography. One 
of the grand masters of French history, Jacques Le Goff, has written an interesting 
text about the notion of mentality.34 Le Goff writes about the notion of mentality that 
"its function, as a concept, is to satisfy the historian's desire to go further" (Le Goff 
1985: 167). We see here an example of a type of reasoning in the humanities that 
resembles what Canguilhem says about the life sciences. Le Goff finds that the 
concept of mentality originally comes from English 17th century philosophy 
“referring to the collective psychology, the ways of thinking and feeling which are 
                                              
34 Le Goff is part of the third generation within the French historical school École des Annales. History of mentality is 
linked in particular to Philippe Ariès who followed in the footsteps of the first generation and founders Lucien Fevre and 
Marc Bloch.    
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peculiar” (Ibid: 171). This “desire to go further” is not necessarily without problems 
and obstacles. However, this is a commencement of a reasoning that develops its own 
methodology as we go, and not a methodology which is finished prior to our 
investigation.35 The historian André Burgiere writes in the book The Annales School. 
An intellectual history, about the founders of the Annales School and the developers 
of the notion mentality, Lucien Fevre and Marc Bloch, that “In their eyes, it was not 
the sources that provided the historians with a new point of view but the questions 
asked of them” (Burguiere 2006:16). Concerning the question of theory I find this 
relevant. The concept of mentality equipped the historian with a tool that made him 
able to ask questions in new ways. Thus, with the concept of mentality, the historian 
can go further, but as Burgiere says, in asking questions and not in finding mentalities 
as a positivist reality. With branchements we can, as I see it, go further in thinking 
culture because it questions pure origin and allows us to interpret phenomena in new 
ways. But it does not show us a reality beyond interpretation.     
I interpret Burgier and Le Goff here as saying that mentality is not a theory but 
a way of asking questions and developing humanist reasoning. Mentality thus 
becomes a concept with which one asks new questions or which can shed light on 
anomalies or problems in an empirical material. In following such an interpretation 
we do not gain a theory or an instrument for finding answers but something to help us 
to reflect in a new way (on the same material or to find a new material).36 Now I want 
to dwell on the relation between the change of language and what Burguiere says 
about “questions asked” because this is relevant to the analysis of Amselle and the 
interpretation I give of him. My point is that I find what Canguilhem sees in new 
concepts and Le Goff’s “desire to go further” to be a relevant description. To go 
                                              
35 This dynamic understanding of theory and practice could be found in the epistemological tradition going back to August 
Comte. According to Dominique Lecourt, Comte “does not explain the genesis of knowledge from sensual data (données 
des sens): what is primary is, according to him, the “speculation” on the the causes…In order to know one must of course 
observe; but in order to observe one must be put into motion by “some theory or another” ”(Lecourt: 93). 
36 For an excellent discussion of the relation between the theoretical and the empirical see Glynos and Howarth’s book 
Logics of critical explanation in political and social theory (2007). 
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further than what, one may ask. And it is here that the problem of the metaphor of the 
hybrid comes in. What about the problem with the metaphor mestizo or hybrid? This 
change of language is necessary for Amselle due to the insufficiency in the language 
of (cultural) hybridisation. As I see it, this could be read as a kind of obstacle that 
forces the thinking of cultural dynamics to repeat an origin.   
My point is to show that there is a correspondence between the 
epistemological obstacles and the change of language in the writing of Amselle and 
the epistemological obstacle in the political discourse. My contribution to what 
Amselle is writing is thus both to analyse this change of language or metaphors in 
order to surpass a hindrance from an epistemological perspective and to show how 
this reflects the epistemological problem in the political discoure. This is due to 
Amselle’s own intellectual style of intervening in internal problems of anthropology 
as well as using his reflections in the public debate. But it is also a result of my own 
approach where I want to reflect philosophically on the parallels between 
anthropology and politics.   
 I want, however, to emphasise one thing which marks an important distinction 
between the way Canguilhem reads the history of science and the change of 
language, and the way I read Amselle and the use of the metaphor branchements. 
Even though science may be involved in the use of metaphors the metaphors do not 
stay metaphors, but become, if they are succesfull, operational. This means that the 
new concepts are able to produce new empirically based knowledge and end further 
theoretical speculation. As I see it, branchements does not do this. The overcoming of 
obstacle means here something a bit different. Political-philosophically, it helps us to 
think in new ways, to develop our reflection on how we think culture in a plural 
society. Concerning the epistemology of social science it is close to what the 
historians of mentality described as the satisfaction “to go further” and to “ask new 
questions of the sources”. But, as far as I am concerned, branchements does not end 
further theoretical speculation: it is not a solution and it does not correspond perfectly 
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with an empirical reality: It remains a metaphor. This takes us to the next question 
which is what a metaphor is.      
 
6.5 Branchements as metaphor? 
Branchements is, following Amselle’s own words, a metaphor taken from the fields 
of electronics and informatics and applied to his anthropological fieldwork. But what 
is a metaphor, and what does a metaphor do? And even more precisely: what does it 
mean that branchements is a metaphor? For it does not seem entirely clear that 
branchements is a metaphor. That it is involved in something metaphorical is one 
thing, but since branchements is not derived from a discourse but from an image I am 
uncertain as to whether one could call it a metaphor. I find it pertinent to draw on 
Ricoeur’s work on the metaphor, La metaphor vive (1975), which is one of the most 
extensive elaborations on the metaphor that exists and which strengthens the 
ricoeurian approach in the dissertation.   
 
6.6 What is a metaphor?  
Even though the metaphor as such is not our main theme- and one could have written 
a whole dissertation on the metaphor- we must pay at least some attention to it in 
order to understand what it means that branchements is a metaphor. Ricoeur’s work 
on the metaphor, La métaphore vive, discusses some issues that are relevant for 
understanding metaphors in general and serves as a guide in our own discussion of 
branchements.    
 First of all, metaphor (lat. metaphora) comes from ancient Greek ȝİĲĮĳȠȡȐ 
(metaphorà) and the verb ȝİĲĮĳȑȡȦ (metapherǀ, “transfer”), composed of ȝİįȐ 
(metà, “beyond”) and the verb ĳȑȡȦ (pherò, bring, bear, carry). In Latin “metaphora” 
is a rhetorical figure by which a word is transported from one meaning to another that 
has some analogies with it (Oxford English Dictionary, 2013). In the sentence 
“Achilles is a lion”, “Achilles” is the unfamiliar, or that which we want to 
understand, whereas “a lion” is the familiar. So even though Achilles and a lion are 
very different, the metaphor draws our attention to their resemblance or that which 
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they have in common. Furthermore, whereas a simile compares that which we want 
to describe with something else (Achilles is like a lion), the metaphor is a matter of 
substituting that which we want to describe with something else (Kunnskapsforlaget, 
1997: 154).  
The most canonical thinker treating the metaphor is of course Aristotle who in 
his Poetics states that “Metaphor consists in giving the thing a name that belongs to 
something else” (Aristotle in Ricoeur 2009: 13). Now, from this definition a long 
tradition (classical tropology) for understanding the metaphor was established and 
constituted a number of assumptions about it: 1) A differentiation between proper 
(ordinary language) and improper meaning (figurative language). 2) The lack of a 
proper word leads to the borrowing of an alien term where the borrowed term 
substitutes the proper meaning. 3) The real meaning of the borrowed term is 
abandoned in favour of the proper meaning. 4) Resemblance is what controls the 
substitution of the absent term with the borrowed term. From all this follows that the 
metaphor does not constitute any meaning of its own. Now this tradition, which 
focuses on the word, the substitutions of words, and the distinction between a proper 
and an improper meaning, has been named substitutionalist. And this again draws on 
a tradition of designative understanding of language where words stand for things in 
the world.  
 But does not the metaphor express new meanings and redescribe reality, 
Ricoeur asks. And if it does, it is incomprehensible from the point of view of the 
substitutionalist theory of the metaphor based on designation of words. So, Ricoeur 
relates himself to the second tradition of theory of metaphor called interactionist. By 
drawing on the works of I.A. Richards and Max Black, Ricoeur sees the metaphor as 
an interaction between the different components in a sentence. For interactionists a 
metaphor is first of all a syntagm composed of tenor/focus (which is the word 
expressed metaphorically) and vehicle/frame (which is the rest of the phrase). In the 
phrase “The chairmain plowed through the discussion” the word plowed is focus, 
whereas the rest of the phrase is meant literally and is the frame. And it is the 
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interaction between focus and frame that constitutes the metaphor. Secondly, a 
metaphor creates a meaning that implies a loss of meaning. And thirdly, the focus-
word does not refer to its lexical meaning, but to the “system of associated 
commonplaces”. In the metaphor “Man is a wolf”, some details are suppressed and 
others emphasised- in short it “organizes our view of man” (Black in Jensen 1998: 
24). But it seems like Black has still not got rid of the idea that there is an original 
meaning which genesis is not accounted for and which cannot comprehend literary 
creativity and redescriptions of reality. And even though Monroe Beardsley, 
according to Ricoeur, is closing in on it by claiming that a metaphor implicates a new 
meaning, it is still derived from a primary meaning. Ricoeur writes that:  
 
Beardsley’s theory of metaphor takes us a step further in the investigation of the new metaphor. But it 
too in turn is caught short by the question that asks where the secondary meanings in metaphorical 
attribution come from. Perhaps the question itself (From where do we get…?) is wrong-headed 
(Ricoeur 2009: 113).      
 
What Ricoeur is onto here is, as I see it, a problem of genesis. When can we say that 
something begins and is not just taken from somewhere else? How can we account 
for what is new, and how can we avoid an eternal regress where one meaning always 
refers to a prior meaning? To say that a new metaphor is not taken from anywhere is 
to recognise it for what it is, namely a creation of language, a semantic innovation, 
Ricoeur writes. And when he wants to articulate what constitutes this semantic 
innovation he turns to the reader or hearer, stating that “one must adopt the point of 
view of the hearer or reader.” The reading of a metaphor constitutes the metaphor as a 
semantic event which “takes place at the point where several semantic fields 
intersect” (Ibid: 114). I think this gives us a new approach to the interactionist view 
because the semantic fields (the interaction of focus and frame to put it in the words 
of Max Black) do not intersect without something or rather someone to unite them. 
Julio Hans C. Jensen writes that it is from the context the metaphor is interpreted 
within, that new meaning is created: “Context must be understood as the interpreter’s 
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cultural, historical, personal, and situational context” (Jensen 1998: 26). However, to 
me Jensen risks reducing the reader to his or her context, and ultimately to a given 
meaning. The reader and the context of the reader are not identical. And was not this 
the point: to avoid a regress to an original meaning? Semantic fields intersect all 
right, but the result of reading cannot be reduced to the sum of the two contexts or 
semantic fields. My point is that by introducing context as the background for the 
reader, the reader becomes reduced to his or her background. And then we lose the 
creative aspect once more. The reader and his or her context must also be understood 
as a dialectical relation.       
 Ricoeur separates living from dead metaphors. Contrary to dead metaphors, 
which have gone into the ordinary use of language, living metaphors capture the 
emerging and innovative aspects of language. However, the living metaphor is not 
just a pure language game but concerns reality and is a reference to the world: it 
redescribes reality. This makes it particularly suitable for our reflections on 
branchements and the operative dimension of both anthropology and critical 
thinking.  
Ricoeur writes that:  
 
Metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse unleashes the power that certain fictions have to 
redescribe reality…From this conjunction of fiction and redescription I conclude that the “place” of 
metaphor, its most intimate and ultimate abode, is neither the name, nor the sentence, nor even 
discourse, but the copula of the verb to be. The metaphorical “is” at once signifies both “is not” and “is 
like” (Ricoeur 2009: 5).  
 
This quote from the introduction underlines, as I see it, two points that are 
particularly interesting for the discussion of branchements. First of all, the question 
of whether the metaphor redescribes reality is vital to understanding branchements in 
the sense that it intervenes into the correlation between imagination (fiction) and 
reality. The view that cultures are abstract and closed entities is challenged with 
branchements. Secondly, branching in the domain of informatics and electronic on 
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the one hand and in the anthropological domain on the other is a tension that 
constitutes the creation of new meaning.    
 The metaphorical “is” that both signifies “is not” and “is like” takes us into the 
sixth study of La métaphore vive which discusses resemblance. As Abel and Poirée 
write in Le vocabulaire de Ricoeur, the metaphor is not so much about a semantic 
substitution as it is a “tension between heterogeneous semantic domains (aires)” 
(Abel and Porée: 81). And resemblance is precisely this dialectic between “is not” 
and “is like” which comes into being when two heterogeneous semantic domains 
intersect. In classical rhetoric and tropology the resembling aspect (being like) 
between the absent term and the borrowed word controlled the substitution. In fact 
metaphor is the trope of resemblance par excellence and draws on a reversion of the 
relation that Aristotle saw between metaphor and simile: “simile is no longer a sort of 
metaphor, but metaphor is a sort of simile, namely an abbreviated simile” (Ricoeur 
2009: 205). For Ricoeur this is somewhat modified because resemblance is 
constituted by the reader or interpreter of a metaphor. And this constitution is 
composed of something verbal and something non-verbal. This non-verbal aspect 
Ricoeur calls, with Wittgenstein, “seeing as”, or as Jensen expresses it: “to “see as” is 
an act of consciousness which is released in the reception of the metaphor and is the 
imaginary’s process of realization”(Jensen 1998: 28).        
 
6.7 Branchements as metaphor 
Now, from what we have seen regarding the metaphor from the analysis of Paul 
Ricoeur we can now make some remarks on branchements. The metaphor contains 
the verb to be, according to Ricoeur, and comprises a tension between “is not” and “is 
like”. The metaphor draws a resemblance between some things and keeps them at the 
same time apart. In order to say that something is like something else and that a new 
aspect of something might be expressed, the literary sense of the word must be 
suspended and a new sense must be displayed. This involves interpretation:  
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If it is true that literal sense and metaphorical sense are distinguished and articulated within an 
interpretation, so too it is within an interpretation that a second-level reference, which is properly the 
metaphorical reference, is set free by means of the suspension of the first-level reference (Ricoeur 2009: 
261). 
 
If this holds true of branchements then the identification of branchements in 
informatics and electronics as a first-level reference should be suspended. The 
question is if branchements requires an interpretation and the first level reference 
could be suspended in favor of a second level reference. Does it suffer a loss of 
meaning and/or does it create new meanings when it leaves the field of electricity and 
informatics and encounters the domain of culture? I do not have the answer since I 
am not doing my own fieldwork and cannot really put branchements to the test. My 
role, at least within the frames of this dissertation, is to present some critical 
questions regarding the interventionist potential of branchements as a metaphor. 
However, I think it is possible to say something of the transition from first to second 
level reference.    
 First of all we have to ask the question of whether branchements is a 
metaphor. Amselle writes that relating his thinking to branchements is having 
recourse to a metaphor from electronics or informatics (Amselle 2001: 7). But 
branchements does not seem like an obvious metaphor since it is not an expression of 
language. At least it is important to look into what we mean when we say that 
something is a metaphor. Following the second part of Ricoeur’s definition of the 
metaphor as the unleashing of “the power that certain fictions have to redescribe 
reality”, branchements might perhaps be called a metaphor. Importing a concept from 
informatics and electronics into the cultural domain unleashes the power that the “old 
fictions” of hybridity, identity, and difference have of thinking culture. We want to 
describe processes of cultural exchange, interpenetration, and openness without 
falling back into the “old fictions”. Reality in this sense can be said to have been 
redescribed. Having said that, it is, from what Amselle writes himself, difficult to see 
it in accordance with the first part of Ricoeur’s definition as a “rhetorical process” 
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which unleashes the power fictions have to redescribe reality. It is not, as far as I can 
see, the words and the definition of informatics and electronics that unleash 
something and it is certainly not a poetic language. So from this point of view 
branchements does not seem like a metaphor. As seen above, Fiquet- that calls for an 
elaboration on what the metaphorical here entails- calls branchements an image. And 
the metaphor is, as Ricoeur states, “half thought and half experience”. So to what 
degree is branchements reducible to an experience or a first level reference, or to 
what degree is it an activation of the imagination so that a new aspect of reality can 
be revealed?    
 Now, we must ask what this importation really means. What do we get from 
this comparison? Abel and Porée write that the metaphor is not so much about 
substitution but about “tension between heterogeneous semantic domains” (Abel and 
Porée 2009: 124). Is there a tension between the domain of culture and the domain of 
informatics? Does branchements contain a sufficient amount of ambiguity that makes 
it interesting? A problem with branchements is perhaps that it does not sufficiently 
allow for (a conflict of) interpretation, but that informatics steers the interpretation in 
a univocal direction. And this is perhaps due to the fact that branchements is not 
primarily elaborated through a discourse but through an image. On the other hand, I 
think that it is possible to say that the first-level reference of branchements 
(electronics and informatics) is suspended and a second level reference is deployed 
(N’ko culture and language), because N’ko, electricity, and informatics are not 
identitcal. Branchements as a metaphor thus helps us, through Amselle’s 
interpretation, to redescribe reality.  
  Is the question of whether or not branchements is a metaphor interesting or 
pivotal to the dissertation? Yes and no. It matters not whether or not branchements 
formally could be called a metaphor. But Ricoeur’s reflection on the distinction 
between the proper and metaphorical meaning might give us an indication as to what 
degree branchements can help us to develop new thinking. The question is what kind 
of thinking branchements can develop. For if branchements in its metaphorical use 
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only refers back to its proper meaning in electronics and informatics, the question is 
whether it gives us a sufficiently open perspective to allow us to shed light on new 
cases and help us to continue to ask questions.   
 
6.8 Metaphor as problematisation 
What I find extremely interesting with Ricoeur’s philosophy of metaphor- and which 
is close to the French epistemological tradition through which I want to read 
branchements- is the emphasis he puts on tension and resistance. I read branchements 
as a way of problematising a certain way of understanding culture and do not see it as 
a theory through which I claim to know what reality is like. That does not mean that 
it is exempt from trying to intervene in reality. But it is this non-instrumental way of 
thinking tension between resemblance and resistance that I find to be pivotal also for 
problematisation. As we discussed with Canguilhem’s distinction between 
theories/solutions and concepts/problems in the previous chapter, central to the task 
of epistemology is to reflect on how and why scientific problems are articulated, 
answered, and sometimes remain unsolved and open. When we enter the domain of 
the humanitites it is even more difficult to answer and close the questions asked. So 
when we talk about the localisation of obstacle and the attempts at overcoming these 
obstacles through the use of metaphors, it is almost impossible to make these 
metaphors operational in an instrumental sense. The application of branchements can, 
as I see it, develop our thinking. We can for instance learn something about the 
resemblance between processes in informatics and processes of culture, but I also 
think there always will be a resistance in any material that deals with what is human. 
Since every context and case is new, the resemblance and thus the relevance of the 
metaphor will vary from case to case.     
 Anthropologist Philippe Chanson writes, in the introduction to his book 
Variations métises Dix metaphors pour penser le métissage, that the use of metaphors 
in the anthropological field of mestizo concerns the problem of the “intellectual 
equipment that permits us to think” (Chanson 2010: 32). In other words the 
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metaphors help us to think something that we cannot think without metaphors. But 
this does not implicate a solution in the sense of a transgression of the problem and 
the presentation of an exact description or definition. The metaphor cannot do 
without interpretation because the metaphor “gives us an indirect kind of knowledge” 
(Ibid: 33). It is precisely because it “reorganises reality…that [the metaphor] is a 
major epistemological tool for thinking the complex, moving… reality of the 
mestizo” (Ibid). 
 
6.9 Summary 
Before proceeding to the second step in the explication of branchements I 
recapitulate the main points so far. We first looked at the context of branchements. 
This consists, on the one hand, of the practice of anthropology and the study of 
identity in post-colonial Africa. Amselle’s case study N’ko and Soleyman Kanté 
present an alternative path to post-colonial thinking based on either primitive origin 
or the embracing of colonial thinking. On the other hand is the search for a suitable 
analytical language that is not trapped within origin. Here I have tried to indicate the 
problems linked to the metaphor hybridisation which can be characterised as a kind 
of epistemological obstacles to constructing non-essentialist anthropology. 
Furthermore, my point has been to see this change of language from hybrid to 
branchements as a kind of procedure of rationality similar to that of other sciences. In 
accordance with Georges Canguilhem, a change of language is necessary in order to 
overcome epistemological obstacles. The point is that the epistemological obstacle 
that Amselle is dealing with, and the reason why he abandons the hybrid as metaphor, 
is related to the one that we find in the political discoursce. We will return to the 
question of language later. In the following paragraph I will go from discussing 
language and epistemology to elaborating on what I see as the dialectical aspects of 
branchements. 
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7. Branchements as dialectic 
 
Introduction 
The aim in this chapter is to explicate what I see as the dialectical aspect in 
branchements in particular and in Amselle’s thinking in general. By doing so I want 
to say something about the way Amselle reasons as well as show how this kind of 
reasoning is fruitful as a critical approach to the way culture is discussed in the 
political discourse. The findings of branchements might ultimately lead to other kinds 
of reasoning concerning cultural belonging. Is it possible to develop a thinking that 
does not take cultural homogeneity as premise for both cohabitation and participation 
in a democratic society (Süssmuth 2006)? The concern is still the conditions for 
thinking culture and the relevance of branchements and Amselle’s thinking, but here 
we explore more theoretically the philosophical aspects of this. As I have previously 
discussed, identity is what constitutes culture as something static and closed. But, as I 
have touched upon, this leads us into a critical discussion of identity. What Amselle 
does is criticise the way we understand culture and how it is linked to identity by 
examining other ways to conceptualise identity. And in doing this he draws on Paul 
Ricoeur’s reflections in Soi-même comme un autre. A discussion of Ricoeur’s 
thinking is thus pivotal in articulating Amselle’s ideas.   
 A second objective, which nevertheless is linked to the discussion of Ricoeur, 
is how branchements intervenes into the identity-obstacle by being a dialectical 
thinking. Whereas origin and identity are concepts belonging to abstract reasoning 
(like comparison) where the result is that cultures are seen as closed worlds, 
branchements introduces the relation or mediation as the central aspect in identity-
constitution. To show this I will draw on some elements in Hegel’s thinking. In other 
words, the themes of branchements, identity, and dialectics are linked together. 
However, by including dialectics we are pulled into deep problems of how to 
understand dialectics. It is not entirely clear what kind of dialectics is at stake in 
Amselle’s thinking. It seems to me that branchements shares dialectical aspects found 
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in Plato’s writings (which Ricoeur draws on in Soi-même comme un autre), Hegel, 
and Spinoza.      
 
7.1 Some dialectical aspects in Amselle’s thinking: Mediation, third 
element, and relation 
In the following I will attempt to give an interpretation of branchements by linking it 
to dialectics. In light of the overall problematics as well as internally in Amselle’s 
thinking, dialectics is central. Three quotes from Amselle serve as an entry. First of 
all he states, as we have seen, that he wants to think cultural identity with “the idea of 
triangulation, that is, having recourse to a third element in order to constitute one’s 
own identity” (Amselle 2001: 7). Secondly, he claims that “contrary to what those 
obsessed with the purity of origin think, the shortest path to “authenticity” is 
mediation” (Ibid: 14). A third excerpt is from Mestizo logics where he relates his 
work to that of Paul Ricoeur. Amselle writes that:  
 
In this book I have attempted to conceptualize identity in terms of originary syncretism. I believe, in 
fact, that mixture is originary. One of the most recent books by Paul Ricoeur substantiates this notion. 
In Soi-même comme un autre, Ricoeur distinguishes between two aspects of identity, which are found at 
the level both of the individual and of the collectivities. He highlights the necessity of contrasting the 
identity of “sameness, to the identity of “selfhood”… “selfhood” is constructed in a permanent relation 
with alterity” (Amselle 1998: x).     
  
With these three excerpts we have three key concepts that somehow articulate 
something dialectical but which nevertheless do not take us in quite the same 
direction: Mediation, triangulation (or third element), and relation. The two first take 
us in the direction of Hegel whereas the last leads us to Plato’s writings and certainly 
to Paul Ricoeur. In the following I will look at the link to Hegel and then return to 
Ricoeur’s thinking. The problem that guides my reflections is whether branchements 
is dialectical, and if so, what kind of dialectics?   
 When evoking a mediating principle in the constitution of cultural identity, 
Amselle draws upon Hegelian reflections. At the same time I do not think that 
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Hegelian philosophy can exhaustively account for Amselle’s thinking because 
Hegel’s dialectical thinking is idealistic and finished whereas the cultural 
branchements seems to me to be open and unfinished. Some aspects thus resemble 
more the kind of dialectics that could be found in the writings of Plato or Spinoza, 
whereas others seem to be Hegelian. So in order to understand how branchements is 
dialectical we must look into different ways of articulating it.  
   
7.2 Hegelian dialectics 
What does it mean to say that a culture or a cultural identity is constituted through 
mediation and a third? Even though the perspective on philosophy has changed since 
Hegel-from comprehending the whole world, the totality of reality, the absolute etc- 
there is still a lot to learn from his thinking. And as far as I can see, Amselle draws on 
Hegelian reasoning when questioning our understanding of culture. When using 
concepts such as mediation, third element or triangulation, and relation these are 
related to the Hegelian concept-constellation of abstract-concrete, reconstruction, and 
mediation. There are many ways of entering the work of Hegel and this is neither an 
attempt at understanding his thinking to a full extent nor to give a reading of Hegel 
which is chronologically consistent. Having said that, some background knowledge 
of the problems that Hegel was facing guides us in the understanding of our own. I 
mainly want to emphasise three points which are relevant to our reading of Amselle 
and the way he criticises the understanding of culture: a) abstract-concrete, b) 
reconstruction, c) mediation.   
A) The discussion of culture and identity has led us into an examination of 
identity. And identitity, difference, unity, and separation are at the center of Hegelian 
thinking. These concepts were early on a central problem for Hegel and a theme for 
his first published work Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der 
Philosophie. The relation between parts and whole serves as an attempt at explicating 
the problem of identity. If we take a series of numbers (exemplifying parts) which we 
can sum up (1+2+3=6), the sum of the parts does not, according to Hegel, constitute 
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what we call the whole. The whole, which is something other than the sum, must be 
that which holds the parts together so that we can have a sum. In order to have 
mathematical equations we need an initial conscious act that holds the equation 
together. The sum too is just a part. The whole is something else than, on the one 
hand, the parts, and on the other hand the sum of the parts. We have, however, an 
inclination to abstract: When we separate the whole and its parts we also treat the 
whole like another part. So an additional problem emerges when the whole, which is 
not the sum itself, is taken as something autonomous or abstracted from the other 
parts. When the whole is separated from the parts, the whole itself becomes a part of 
the whole. This is, in Hegelian terms, an abstract notion of the whole.  
 Now the challenge is that we can also think the whole and its parts concretely. 
This requires, however, that the whole must be thought on different levels at the same 
time. On the one hand, the whole is concrete when it is not reduced (or abstracted) to 
a part. On the other, the whole is abstract when it is thought of as independent of the 
other parts. Examples of an abstract understanding of the whole might be the human 
soul or the German people when these are thought of as independent of the body or 
the multitude of Germans. The identity of a nation could thus be presented in an 
abstract and a concrete manner. An abstract part would on the other hand be like 
comprehending a limb of the body or an individual in isolation: they are nothing 
without without the whole that constitutes them. The concrete whole is the unity of 
the abstract whole (the soul, the German people understood independently) and the 
parts (the organs of the body, the singular beings of the people). As I understand it, 
this is close to what Hegel calls “die spekulative Grundfigur” which is “the highest 
form of knowing” (die höchste dem Menschen mögliche Erkenntinsweise) 
(Schnädelbach: 18). In his first critique, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Kant tried to end 
the metaphysical speculation about how things are in themselves and to locate the 
limits for possible knowledge. The problem was, according to Hegel, that Kant`s 
analysis was undertaken abstracted from the concrete mediating processes through 
which all knowledge is related. For Hegel the highest kind of Erkentnissweise, the 
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speculation, is “identity of the identity and notidentity” (Identität der Identität und 
Nichtidentität).  
 It is this speculative Grundfigur that I lean on when I explicate Amselle. It is a 
Hegelian way of thinking identity- as “the identity of the identical and the not-
identical”- in which Amselle questions a notion of separation and non-
communication between cultures. The idea is that the same way the German people is 
abstracted from the concrete periods and individuals through which it was forged, 
culture must be thought as concrete as well. N`ko shows that no cultural identity can 
be abstracted since this would be an empty identity. Furthermore, this has 
consequences for how we think cultural identity in a multicultural society.  
 B) If we return to our mathematical equation (1+2+3=6) as an example, it is 
not possible to account for the two numbers and their unity through the function + 
until after we have completed the equation. In other words, philosophical 
understanding is always reconstructions of reality as it already is. In other words, a 
temporal aspect is introduced into speculative thinking. Philosophy is thus not able to 
“go further” as it can only explicate the achieved reality. This point is vital for the 
further understanding of Hegelian dialectics. Because of this end point, the achieved 
reality of the Absolute becomes the point of departure for perceiving dialectics as a 
process. What does a dialectical process contain? Essential to any dialectical thinking 
is the etymological root itself. Dialectic is derived from the Greek dialegein 
composed of legein which means to speak and dia which means exchange (Macherey 
and Balibar: 359). An exchange of discourses means that there is more than one 
discourse. Paramount to Hegelian dialectic is that this exchange is laid out in time. 
The driving force in this development is the negative. In dialectics as exchange of 
discourses point of view A is understood when it is countered by a view negating A 
(not-A). And the exchange of discourses does not break down but continues this 
tension between A and not-A and leads to a view B. In this view B, both A and the 
negation of A is conserved (Aufhebung). But B leads to a new contradiction not-B 
which leads to a new point of view C etc.     
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 On the one hand the exchange itself is what unites and separates the different 
discourses. From this perspective the exchange is not a part of the exchanges but that 
which makes the exchanges possible. On the other hand, without a plurality of 
discourses an exchange would not be possible. From this perspective the exchange is 
dependent on the participants or the different discourses. So neither the different 
discourses (the parts) nor the exchange (the whole) itself can be taken out or 
abstracted from the process of mediation. Consequently both the parts and the whole 
must be seen within the concrete whole. Now since dialectics is a perpetual 
movement from one place to another, this makes it in a way impossible to grasp from 
a first person perspective. When I am involved in a discussion I do not know the 
points of view of the others, nor do I fully understand my own, prior to the 
discussion. It is always a reconstruction. However, if we reconstruct this historically 
from the present we can account for all the prior movements that led to the point 
where we are today.  
 This end point, from which Hegel reconstructs the dialectical movements in 
history, or rather History’s movement itself, is the perspective of what Hegel in 
Phenomenologie des Geistes calls the Absolute. This is vital for understanding 
Hegelian dialectics and for the reflection on dialectics in Amselle and Ricoeur. For, 
when the contradiction between two terms (A and non-A) is surpassed in a third term 
B, this implicates that the negative is the negative of the positive and not a “true” 
negative. Since dialectics is philosophically speaking a reconstruction from an end 
point in time, the direction and result of the dialectical movement become in a way 
inevitable. What is perceived as a contradiction (A vs. non-A) is thus constituted 
from the perspective of the term of surpassing (B). Or differently put, only the 
negation that leads to B (the third term) is a real contradiction from the perspective of 
Hegelian dialectics. As Macherey and Balibar states, this joins the beginning and the 
end of the process and thus closes the dialectical process.   
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 I have now found two dialectical aspects in the thinking of Hegel that are 
relevant for understanding Amselle’s thinking: abstract/concrete and reconstruction. 
The third is mediation which I now will go on to look at. 
 
7.3 Mediation in branchements 
Introducing Hegel`s thinking on mediation as a theoretical key to question the notion 
of culture as closed does not entail thinking through Hegel`s own system. We must 
think with Hegel beyond Hegel, which means mediations without an end, and do as 
Ricoeur put it: renounce the notion of “total mediation” (the Absolute). Hegel`s 
critique of abstract thinking remains relevant to our thinking. As seen in the opening 
chapter, abstraction (in the sense of taking something out of its context and process of 
constitution) is a highly relevant operation. An example of this is cultural 
differentialism and cultural racism where cultures are seen as abstracted and in 
isolation. As I will discuss later, abstract thinking is what is questionable with regard 
to the metaphor hybrydisation and mestizo.  
 Mediation or the mediate in Hegel’s thinking follows from die Spekulative 
Grundfigur and is contrasted with the immediate. In Hegel`s thinking this could be 
explicated through some problems in Cartesian philosophy. In the Cartesian tradition 
knowledge is understood through the subject who tries to acquire knowledge. This 
subject is opposed to the object of which it tries go gain knowledge. For Descartes 
the knowledge of the world of objects goes through the immediate intuition that the 
Reason has of itself. Cogito ergo sum is Reason’s direct access to itself. For Hegel 
this leads into a dead end: the subject at hand is either an empty concept, a tabula 
rasa, or it is already constituted and the analysis is too late. The Hegelian 
consciousness is on the other hand linked to what it is conscious of (Schnädelbach 
2007). The consciousness is connected with what is is different from. According to 
Hegel, the difference between the so called reflective and speculative reason is that 
reflective reason separates what is one, whereas the speculative reason manages to 
express unity. Could this not also be applicable to cultures? The Mande cultural 
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domain, like the whole African continent, is different from the Christian and Muslim 
cultural domains, but not separated from them. An interesting hallmark of N’ko is its 
universal aspect. For instance, Aristotelian philosophy - from the perspective of N’ko 
representatives- is thought of as compatible with N’ko thinking and not perceived as 
a specific western kind of reasoning. For Kanté and his followers N’ko does not 
express a complete rupture with the western and Muslim world, neither is it the same. 
One way to read this is that N’ko is always already mediated through its contact with 
Muslim and western thinking. Like the Cartesian cogito, there is no immediate 
consciousness of N’ko-identity. Consciousness of N’ko was possible through the 
mediation of Mande traditions, the influence from the French colonial power, and the 
Muslim religion. The same way the Cartesian cogito is an empty consciousness, an 
isolated culture must be a culture without content or where no one is conscious of 
belonging to this culture. If we draw on the insights from the above critique of 
abstract thinking, a culture in its genesis does not have an “inside” but must use the 
resources from the “outside”, and continues to do so. The point is that the idea of an 
immediate access to a culture (for Norwegians to have immediate knowledge of 
themselves) is only possible when we abstract. And it is only possible to abstract in 
retrospect when the process of constitution is finished.  
 Branchements is in this manner close to designating mediation and that 
mediation is vital to the processes of identity and to consciousness of this identity. At 
least, if we follow a Hegelian line of thought, it is impossible to be self-conscious 
without mediation, without going through something else. Branchements draws, as 
far as I understand, on this. Mediation questions the notion of the non-mediated 
identity. N’ko holds together its different parts or influences and is thus separate from 
them, but can on the other hand not be grasped separately from its parts. We are thus 
led into what seems like an aporia: one the one hand N’ko is distinguished from other 
cultures and thus has an inside and an outside. On the other hand, when seen from the 
perspective of its parts, the outside and inside become blurred since the impulses are 
many. What I mean by this is that N’ko identity is the result of among other things 
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Kanté narrative. And from this perspective (of the whole), N’ko is distinguishable 
from  Arab and western (French) colonisation. But when one looks at the different 
aspects that this narrative is composed of we see that it is influenced by the Arabs and 
western colonialism both. At certain points in the Mande history one had for instance 
three languages at the same time: a bureaucratic French language, a religious Arabic 
language, and trade done through Mande dialects. This is by Kanté attempted 
substituted by one, Mande, through the N’ko-alphabet. However, the influence from 
the French and the Arabs is still there.     
So we can now to a certain degree relate the concept of mediation to 
branchements. When Amselle writes that the expression of an identity supposes the 
conversion of universal signs in order to manifest its identity, I read this as the 
description of a mediating process (Amselle 2001: 59). In order to articulate an 
identity this articulation itself is done through a medium that itself does not come 
from this identity. The medium supersedes, so to speak, identity. What we see here is 
similar to the Hegelian critique of the Cartesian cogito.  
  Emphasising mediation we have problematised the abstract view of culture. 
But what about the second notion, triangulation or third element, that reveals the 
dialectical thinking of Amselle?  
 
7.4 The third 
When Amselle says that branchements is to have recourse to a third element, this is 
perhaps the aspect of branchements where the Hegelian influence is the clearest. We 
have already touced upon it: if two persons who disagree are going to debate, this 
depends on something that makes it possible for the persons to both disagree and 
potentially agree. There is something that unites and separates the two at the same 
time. And when it comes to mediation, it has been said that a point of view in a 
discussion, the consciousness of being oneself, or belonging to a certain culture is 
inconceivable without a partner in discussion, another consciousness or other 
cultures. What holds the one and the other together and separate at the same time, is 
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the third. We discussed this earlier regarding the whole and the parts. The whole is 
something more than the sum of the parts and yet it does not exist without its parts. 
There are, for instance, rules that govern how the participants might use their 
language. In breaking these rules the discussion might collaps. When it comes to 
expression of (cultural) identity this is taken in a deeper sense since it does not only 
concern conscious acts. When I become a human being who belongs to this or that 
culture and I begin to express myself, this implicates that there is always already 
something that constitutes my expression. In order to be comprehended and in order 
to be comprehensible to myself, I use signs, symbols, language that is already there. 
My expression is mediated using, so to speak, a medium which is not mine, but 
which becomes mine. This is Amselle’s point regarding N’ko also. N’ko is a 
mediated or connected cultural identity.   
 When Amselle describes branchements as triangulation or third element, this 
means, in Hegelian terms, that something holds all the different elements together and 
allows for mediating movements. As we saw in the previous chapter, branchements 
has a plural form meaning the plurality of connections. But if branchements is a third 
element this means, as far as I can see, that it is something more than the sum of 
connections: it is what allows for the different mediations to take place in the first 
place. Following a Hegelian reasoning it would be what unites and separates cultures 
at the same time. Branchements in the plural form thus resembles some kind of 
structure or system through which all expressions, in order to make sense, must be 
mediated.              
  To sum up the Hegelian dialectics, what was the motive for introducing a 
dialectical element into the understanding of culture? The aim here as elsewhere in 
the dissertation is to establish a reasoning that enables us to question a notion of 
cultures as abstract and original because this kind of reasoning is lurking behind the 
new racist and cultural differentialism. Hegel is, perhaps, the thinker par excellence 
who has tried to articulate a critique of this kind of reasoning. What his socalled 
speculative thinking wants to achieve is to see joined what previously has been 
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separated and seen apart. Even though Hegel’s main concern-at least in order to break 
with Kant-is theory of knowledge, my aim has been to take this reasoning and apply 
it to my own problem of culture and of interpreting branchements. Branchements 
reintroduces a mediating element in its articulation of cultures, which has led us to 
the question of what mediation is.  
 Three points which are vital to Hegel’s philosophy and central to my 
elaborations have been abstract/concrete, mediate/immediate, and reconstruction. 
First, in order to understand the role of mediation in the constitution of (cultural) 
identity, a central conceptual pair in Hegelian thinking is abstract and concrete. 
Something is abstract when it is taken out of the whole to which it belongs. 
Branchements as a concept contains this as it emphasises that a cultural identity, in 
order to express its singularity, must convert universal (and external) signs into its 
own language. The problem here is to see whether this means that universal signs 
must be converted into the language of a particular culture and where the particular 
language somehow already exists, or if it is by converting universal signs that the 
particular language of a culture comes into being. Secondly, when something is seen 
as concrete it is grasped through mediation. Opposite to the concrete and mediation is 
abstraction and immediate. How is this latter pair problematic? I have here tried to 
see a parallel between the solipsism of the subject, which is under attack from Hegel, 
and a kind of”cultural solipsism”, which Amselle is attacking with branchements. In 
the solipsistic reasoning of a subject the problem is how do I know that the things that 
I know correspond to an external reality. This problem is false since the fact that I 
already have knowledge of the world implicates that I am not separated from the 
external reality. In fact, the whole distinction of external and internal is questionable. 
It is premised on the abstraction and separation of the external and internal, subject 
and object. Likewise, the isolation of cultures is false since the fact that the identity or 
self-consciousness of a cultural group or persons belonging to a group can only be 
acquired indirectly. 
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We have so far looked at mediation and the third as aspects that reveal a 
Hegelian kind of dialectics. However, in Mestizo logics Amselle refers to how Paul 
Ricoeur in Soi-même comme un autre examines the relation of selfhood and 
otherness. This comes from another kind of dialectics or is a kind of mix of Hegelian 
dialectics and dialectics which one can find in Plato’s writing. This dialectics takes us 
in a different direction than that of Hegel.   
 
7.5 Dialectics from Plato’s Sophist to Ricoeur 
As we we have seen, Amselle draws up an argument in Mestizo logics where he 
proposes to “conceptualise identity in terms of originary syncretism”. In addition to 
Anne-Marie Moulin’s work in the history of medicine, Amselle gives credit to 
philosopher Paul Ricoeur for substantiating this notion of originary syncretism. 
Amselle writes concerning Ricoeurs book Soi-même comme un autre and the latter’s 
distinction between the two Latin notions of identity (idem and ipse) that he 
 
highlights the necessity of contrasting the identity of “sameness” to the identity of 
“selfhood.“Sameness” manifests itself in stability of character and behaviour, whereas “selfhood” is 
constructed in a permanent relation with otherness (alterité) (Amselle 1998: x). 
 
I find this to be an interesting and, with some reservations, a pertinent (self-) 
interpretation which still stands even when Amselle abandons the metaphor mestizo 
for the benefit of branchements. At the core of our problematic lies this selfhood’s 
“relation with otherness”. The point is to theoretically render account of a relational 
conceptualisation of identity. And here Amselle draws an analogy: Like the identity 
of a person, the identity of a collective (culture) is related to what is other or different. 
 If we turn to Ricoeur’s text Soi-même comme un autre we can read that it has 
three aims which all concerns dialectical aspects. It is an attempt at highlighting a 
reflective mediation immanent in the grammar of personal pronouns. Secondly, it 
seeks to elaborate two significations of identity (the identity of selfhood and 
sameness) and their dialectical relation, and thirdly it aims to scrutinise the dialectics 
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of self and other than self. As far as I am concerned, it is in particular this third aim 
which Amselle has in mind when he relates his anthropology to Ricoeur. Ricoeur 
explains the title of the book (Oneself as another) as that being oneself as another 
means that “one cannot be thought of without the other, that the self instead passes 
into the other” (Ricoeur 1990: 3). And it is this “one passes into the other” which we 
must explicate in order to understand Amselle. Mind you that to be a self is not to be 
similar to another. That would be to say that the two selves are analogically linked 
but do not affect each other. To say that the self passes into the other, and that to be 
oneself is to be another than oneself, implicates that there is some kind of continuity 
between the self and other than self. Furthermore, this relation between self and other 
than self (being oneself in as much as being other) is described by Ricoeur as a kind 
of dialectics. But what kind? Turning to Plato’s writings we find that  
 
“The dialectics in which these two terms [between selfhood and otherness] oppose one another and are 
related to one another belongs to a second-order discourse, recalling that of Plato in the Theatetus, the 
Sophist, the Philebus, and the Parmenides; this discourse places on stage metacategories, the “great 
kinds” akin to the Platonic Same and Other, which transcend the first order discourse to which belong 
the categories or existentials such as persons and things…” (Ricoeur 1992: 298). 
 
We do not have the time to examine Plato thoroughly here. Still it seems vital for 
comprehending the kind of dialectics that Ricoeur wants to articulate. So I have to 
say something about it. There are three kinds of dialectics in the writings of Plato, 
where the third kind is the one Ricoeur is referring to.37 In the four late dialogues, the 
Theaetetus, the Sophist, the Philebus, and the Parmenides, the concepts of being, 
identity, difference, and diversity are treated. If we here limit ourselves to the 
Sophist, Plato here outlines an understanding of dialectics, proposed by one of the 
                                              
37 The first is the hypothetical which deduces consequences of an hypothesis (Phaidon, Parmenides), the second shows the 
contradictions in the belief of opponents (Elenchus). And the third is about the dialectics of similarities/identity and the 
relation between forms (Sophist, Statesman). I am indebted to Erlend Breidal for helping me to understand the Sophist and 
for allowing me to read parts of his doctoral thesis on Plato on which I base parts of my account.     
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participants in the dialogue called the Stranger, that has led some to regard it as a 
“technique of relation” (Balibar and Macherey: 360). An overall theme in the 
dialogue is to determine who is philosopher and who is a sophist. Anyway, central for 
us is that the discussion eventually turns to the question of which of the five “great 
classes” or kinds (movement, rest, being, the same, and the other) can be combined 
and which cannot. Motion and rest are different kinds which cannot be combined, 
and yet they are both joined by being. Both motion and rest are, but being is neither 
in motion nor at rest. So the two kinds, motion and rest, are separated as beings on 
the one hand, and united through being on the other. Being, as that which unites 
motion and rest, is, however, neither motion nor rest. This goes for same and other as 
well. On the one hand none of the kinds are the same. On the the other, other 
permeates all the forms or kinds since each is other than the remaining ones. They are 
thus separated, by being different, but united, by the kind other. All the kinds are the 
same in the sense of being identical to themselves, but the sameness is shared with 
what is other. When Ricoeur distinguishes between a first order and a second order 
discourse it seems to me that he sees how something which is separated on one level 
can be related on another level. Self and other than self are separated on one level, but 
combined and related on another. Or differently put, a person is separable from 
another person when one counts them by having different numerical identity, but on 
the level where they interact their identity and difference are not necessarily clear.        
In the Sophist (Plato 2007) dialectics is defined as the science of knowing and 
determining how and whether for each of the five “great kinds” something can and 
cannot be related to or combined with other things. And eventually we find the 
expression we are looking for. In 257b the Stranger, when discussing non-being, 
makes a distinction between opposition and other than. When speaking about non-
being it is not something contrary to being but other than being (Plato 2007: 257b). 
Accordingly negation means other than and not the opposite. The distinction, and this 
is extremely interesting, is thus between opposition and other than. Transposed to our 
problem of selfhood and otherness, and the two levels of discourse, this means that 
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when identity (as selfhood) and difference are opposed they cannot be seen together, 
but when difference is comprehended as other than they can be thought relationally. 
Or differently put, a pure negation cannot have relation to anything else.  
 This is pivotal to our search for a relational understanding of identity and 
difference. The same and the other are different but not opposites and may be both 
related and separated depending on what perspective we are speaking from: 
 
For we’ve not spoken in a similar way whenever we say it’s the same and not the same; but whenever 
we say it’s the same, we speak thus on account of its participation in the same in relation to itself, but 
whenever we say it’s not the same, it’s on account of its sharing, in turn, in the other, on account of 
which it gets to be apart from the same and has become not that but another, and hence once more it is 
said correctly that it’s not the same (Ibid: 256b). 
  
Having Amselle and Ricoeur in mind this harmonises with the identity of a person (or 
a collective) and explains why Ricoeur turns to this dialectic. In what Ricoeur calls 
the first order discourse the classes are separated but in the second order discourse 
they are related. What is central is how negation is not thought in a pure manner, but 
relationally. Identity or the same and the other can thus be united or are already 
united.  
 So we have gone from a Hegelian dialectics based upon separation and unity 
through something third, to a relational dialectics as it is found in Ricoeur/Plato. 
Consistent with the emphasis in the thesis in general on Ricoeur and the link between 
Amselle and Ricoeur I want to go deeper into Ricoeur’s work on the dialectics of 
personal identity. 
 
7.6 Ricoeur’s dialectics from the long route to being to oneself as 
another 
In order to get a grasp of Ricoeur’s conception of dialectic we commence by turning 
to the introductory essay in Conflict des interpretations called “Hermeneutic et 
existence”. Here he proposes a synthesis of hermeneutics and existentialist 
phenomenology, or rather: “the graft of the hermeneutic problem onto the 
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phenomenological method”(Ricoeur 2004b: 3). This grafting requires, however, that 
we take the “long” rather than the “short route”. The short route is after the manner of 
Heidegger which he calls an ontology of understanding, for “breaking with any 
discussion of method, it carries itself directly to the level of an ontology of finite 
being in order there to recover understanding, no longer as a mode of knowledge, but 
rather as a mode of being”(Ibid: 6). Instead of a hermeneutic à la Gadamer, which is 
close to Heidegger, where the question is a choice between truth or method, or 
between a traditional regional hermeneutic aiming for the comprehension of texts 
within specific areas (theology, philology, and law) or an existential hermeneutics, 
Ricoeur elaborates a third way which attempts to mediate the two. Neither being as 
self-interpretative nor the different kinds of hermeneutic methods can be abstracted or 
separated from each other.  
 This indirect, long route or mediating thinking makes Ricoeur interesting for 
those disciplines who want a dialogue with philosophy or for philosophers who want 
a dialogue with other disciplines. Having the long route in mind, interdisciplinary 
dialogue is more than a mere cliché; it refers to a fundamental aspect of his thinking. 
Besides Amselle’s explicit “use” of Ricoeur in Mestizo Logics, it is thus not difficult 
to see why Ricoeur’s thinking might be fruitful to him. This reflection on being 
through mediation presented in Conflict des interpretations is continued in Soi-même 
comme un autre but in the latter it takes a more ontological turn with the question of 
the Self as epicentre for the investigation. The same way as there was no direct way 
to being in Conflict des interpretations there is no direct way to oneself in Soi-même 
comme un autre. As far as I can see, this gives Ricoeur’s dialectical thinking a rather 
clear Hegelian stamp. The critique of the “short route to being“is similar to Hegel’s 
critique of the Cartesian cogito: the Cartesian Cogito is according to Hegel either an 
empty consciousness or it is completed and the analysis is “too late“. In the same way 
the being which we go directly to is an empty being, whereas the long way requires 
us to reconstruct an already achieved human existence. But what about Plato to 
whom we have ascribed the relational kind of dialectics that Ricoeur discusses and 
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Amselle refers to when describing the dialectics of selfhood and otherness? It is here 
that we touch upon a concept in Ricoeur’s thinking that brings together Heidegger’s 
distinction between what and whom, the Hegelian themes of mediation and 
reconstruction, and the relational dialectics of selfhood and otherness: narrative 
identity.      
   
7.7 Narrative identity and the permanence of time 
Before going into the reflection on idem and ipse elaborated in Soi-même comme un 
autre, we must go in via Temps et récit III. Though the problem of temporality is 
central to Soi-même comme un autre, it is even more so to Temps et récit I-III. In the 
latter Ricoeur elaborates on the complex relation between time and narrative. How 
does human time come about? Spurred by St. Augustine’s contemplation on time, 
Ricoeur looks to how the experience of time is related to the transformation of time in 
history and fiction. As discussed earlier, it is essential to have his “long route to 
being” from le Conflict des interpretations in mind in order to understand the 
mediation of time and narrative. There is only an indirect way to being and there is 
only an indirect way to time: neither time nor being is given immediately.38 Ricoeur 
suggests in Temps et récit that human time is constituted through the union of fiction 
and history, which are both aspects of narration. Why do we narrate? We narrate in 
order to shape time- in its chaotic and raw form- into an order which becomes the 
basis for human existence and identity. Man is a time-transforming or time-shaping 
being. But what does this have to do with identity?  
 Even though identity was part of the reflection from Temps et récit, Ricoeur 
did not occupy himself with this question until Soi-même comme un autre. This 
unthematised question of identity becomes the centre of his reflection in the latter 
work. Pivotal to this problematic is the already mentioned distinction between who 
                                              
38 This is something that joins Ricoeur to Canguilhem and Foucault in opposition to the likes of Heidegger and Deleuze 
(who is influenced by Bergson). Whereas the first group only admits that time and events can be given in retrospect 
through history, the second group tries to think time and events as such (Revel 2008:50-151).  
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and what. Through the different kinds of questioning Ricoeur is able to distinguish 
two different notions of identity, for persons and for things. But Ricoeur does not just 
include Heidegger’s radical questioning. He also develops his argument in dialogue 
with Hanna Arendt’s reflections on action and human identity. Paraphrasing Arendt, 
Ricoeur proposes that to identify an individual or a community is to answer the 
question of who has acted (Ricoeur 1985: 442). In other words, the analysis of 
narrative identity commences with an action or practice which leads to the question 
of identification: Who has done it? The way we ask the question is imbedded in 
language. The identification of the cause behind actions and practices is not 
questionable in the form of what. We cannot ask what acted if we are going to take 
what it means to act seriously. The question “who?” opens up a temporal dimension 
that is not ascribable to “what?” With actions comes responsibility, but this 
responsibility cannot be established without permanence in time. When I take 
responsibility for a past act, I acknowledge that it was me who acted regardless of 
whether or not I have continued to act in a similar way. This renders the 
responsibility and the acknowledgment constitutive for this permanence in time. In 
other words, the relation between acts and the reflection on these acts are circular. 
But it is this circular relation to myself that constitutes my identity.   
So when we try to identify who did it, we do not identify a thing but a self. 
One of the central aspects that distinguishes the self from a thing is the peculiar kind 
of temporality. Whereas the temporal identity of a thing is the same throughout time 
(it is the permanence in time that makes it the same or identical to itself), the identity 
of a self is a constant tension between being the same and being oneself. Here the 
concept of narrative identity is reintroduced as the synthesising activity of the 
sameness and the selfhood of a person. On the one hand there is a relation (I reflect 
on who I am), and on the other there is sameness (I am the same as I was an hour 
ago).  
 Narrative identity is a question of continuity and unity of a life from the 
commencing act to question and answer. The answer might be both simple and 
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complex. It might be easy to say “it was him”, but this is possible only through a 
series of processes sedimenting the unity of a life.39 These processes consist in the 
interconnectivity of history and fiction. Ricoeur writes that narrative identity is the 
outcome or the offspring (rejeton) of the union of history and fiction (Ricoeur 1985: 
442). In other words, identity is an outcome of a process and not a point of departure. 
Fiction is not here the opposite of reality but the mimetical aspect of storytelling and 
synthesising. History is not possible without the configuration of facts and events 
within a fictional structure. And the fictional structure is an empty form without 
historical facts and events. This goes for both the personal micro-level and the macro-
level of a society: the scientific approach to past events that we call writing history is 
linked to the existential dimension of narration. And central to narration is to unify all 
the events. This unifying of events does not come from the events themselves but 
depends on a logic that gives the events an order. This order is what makes it possible 
for these events to be imitated and rendered intelligible as historical facts.         
 A central point then becomes that the way there is no being without time, there 
is no being without narration. It is not possible to say who the agent of an act is if 
there is no synthesis of time through narration. Hence it is, as I understand it, the 
narrative itself that constitutes permanence in time. Or differently put; it is only 
through narratives that the problem of the possibility of identity in time can be 
solved. Without narration the problem of personal identity is locked in an antinomy 
without solution. In this antinomy one must either hold that the subject is identical to 
itself through its different states of mind or that the subject is a substantialist illusion 
and that only the diversity of cognitive and emotional states exists as Hume and 
Nietzsche claim. This dilemma, Ricoeur writes, disappears if one substitutes the idea 
of identity as the same (idem) with a view of identity as narrative (Ibid: 443).  
                                              
39 Is not this the issue when one in court discusses a person’s accountability for her acts? Can we from a third person 
perspective decide who can be made accountable for her acts and who does not? In order for a legal system to work the 
way we know it it depends on persons being able to acknowledge being the same person throughout time.  
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 How does the distinction between idem and ipse come into the discussion of 
narrative identity? And how does this relate to the relation between selfhood and 
otherness and the dialectics of relation that we discussed earlier? Before I return to 
the relational dialectics of selfhood and otherness, I will pause for a moment and look 
into the other aspect of narrative identity.  
 
7.8 Between permanence in time and de-substantialising identity 
What Amselle has in mind when stressing the contrast between “sameness” and “selfhood” 
is Ricoeur’s somewhat phenomenologically informed distinction between the two Latin 
words for identity: idem and ipse. Whereas identitas in Latin is a noun, idem and ipse are 
pronouns. Idem refers to the same, and ipse to self. Idem is the identity of something that 
remains while the appearances or "accidents” change. The philosophical model has been, 
since ancient times, the substance. The ipse-identity on the other hand accounts for a non-
substantial identity. In the Latin sentence “Aristoteles ipse dixit” ipse refers to Aristotle and 
means “Aristotle himself said it”. In “idem ille populus” idem refers to this people which is 
the same. As seen previously, Ricoeur’s point is to explore selfhood in line with Heidegger 
as another way of posing questions. The identity of a human, of a self, is the response to 
another question than that of a substance. As Abel and Porée write, it is more accurate to say 
that the identity of a person is to be him- or her-self rather than saying that he or she is the 
same (Abel and Porée 2009:60). The identity of a person, the Self, thus corresponds with the 
Latin ipse. But even though Ricoeur has learned a lot from Heidegger, Ricoeur introduces 
another element that takes him away from Heidegger. With the concept of narrative identity 
from the conclusion in Temps et récit III Ricoeur includes a dialectical dimension to his 
thinking of human identity.     
In Temps et récit the permanence in time was central to Ricoeur. And the 
distinction between idem and ipse corresponded to the opposition between a formal 
and a narrative identity. As far as I can see, this changes slightly in Soi-même comme 
un autre. Here he is more concerned with a substantialist view of identity and with 
the problem of how to link selfhood to otherness. Whereas the dialectics of idem and 
ipse in Temps et récit is concerned with the problem of consistency in time, the 
dialectics of ipse or selfhood and otherness is what is at stake. Despite the fact that 
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there seems to be a consistency through time and that it is the narrative that secures 
the unity of the person, the unity itself consists of parts that have no immediate 
internal link. In other words, the moments in the ipse-identity are initially 
heterogeneous. Even though Ricoeur wants to avoid the conclusion given by, for 
instance, Hume and Nietzsche that there is only a diversity of cognitions and 
emotions, the problem posed by these thinkers remains highly appropriate. The 
notion of ipse is meant to make some important distinctions in relation to an idem-
identity. My point is that whereas the conclusion in Temps et récit focuses on the 
synthesising activity of narration, the reflection on identity as ipse opens up to the 
question of heterogeneity present in identity. And this is paramount to our general 
reflection on culture and identity. The contribution of ipse compared to that of idem 
is in this sense that identity as sameness is conceived of as non-relational whereas the 
identity of a self is relational. Contrary to the synthesising aspect of narrative identity, 
ipse-identity accounts for the relation between identity and otherness. So in ipse-
identity the emphasis is on what does not initially “belong together”. This is 
consistent but confusing. With narrative identity Ricoeur writes against temporal 
fragmentation, with ipse-identity he writes against substantialisation.  
   
7.9 The relation between selfhood and otherness 
Even though ipse-identity is graspable from the problematics of time, it seems to have 
a less developed but equally interesting value applied to the problem of cultural 
identity. This is of course related to our frame of reflections concerning the concept 
of culture. In the last chapter of the latter work Ricoeur commences a reflection on 
the ontology of selfhood where the relation between selfhood and otherness is laid 
out: “I suggest as a working hypothesis what could be called the triad of passivity 
and, hence, of otherness” (Ricoeur 1992: 318). The first aspect in this triad is one’s 
own body, the second is “the passivity implied by the relation of the self to the 
foreign, in the precise sense of the other (than) self, and so the otherness inherent in 
the relation of intersubjectivity” (Ibid). The third and the most deeply hidden 
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passivity is the relation the self has to itself. The last aspects are particularly relevant 
for our investigation. I want to underline that Ricoeur here primarily discusses the 
ontological aspects of the self of a person. Having said that, Ricoeur more than once 
indicates that his reflections on persons have parallels to collectives. An intermediate 
position is then to be preferred where both the fruitfulness and limitations of such a 
parallel can be explicated.  
 Now, this passivity fits with a phenomenological analysis taking experience as 
its point of departure. Furthermore, Ricoeur writes that “The term “otherness” is then 
reserved for speculative discourse, while passivity becomes the attestation of 
otherness” (Ibid). I take this to mean that the term otherness must stem from 
Ricoeur’s own ontological speculation. However, I find passivity also relevant for 
explicating what kind of dialectics Ricoeur has in mind, which eventually might shed 
some light on Amselle.  
A step in trying to trace this passivity is for Ricoeur to reflect critically on the 
opposite results given by philosophers within the phenomenological tradition. Like 
any good dialectical thinker he tries to establish a new way through contradictions in 
opposite positions. On the one hand, Husserl attempts to lay out the otherness of the 
other through the phenomenological reduction. On the other hand, Lévinas develops 
a philosophy of otherness in a more ontological manner than Husserl. Husserl 
remains confined within the structures of the ego and its representation of otherness, 
the other remains represented through the comparative logic of the same; the other is 
like or the same as me. And Lévinas, in breaking with a Husserlian representation, 
singularises the other. For Ricoeur this is two sides of the same coin: “Because the 
Same signifies totalization and separation, the exteriority of the Other can no longer 
be expressed in the language of relation” (Ibid: 336). Having the above quote from 
Amselle and Ricoeur’s own ambition in mind it is precisely a relational 
understanding of the same and other that we are seeking.  
 Why are we led to a non-relational understanding of the same and the other, 
or, why does the emphasis on otherness repeat the mistake of identity as sameness? 
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The problem lies, according to Ricoeur in a hyperbole of separation which on the side 
of the same “appears to me to lead to the hyperbole of exteriority, on the side of the 
other, to an impasse” (Ibid: 339). It seems to me as if what we call dichotomous or 
oppositional thinking, dividing everything into opposites (for example man/woman, 
night/day, same/other, identity/difference etc.), has such a strong hold of how we 
think that to see the different poles as relational rather than oppositional is very 
difficult. The social exclusion that some might experience when wanting to be 
integrated into a society stems thus not only from an obvious xenophobic attitude but 
is also to be found deep in our theoretical thinking. In other words: do we have 
problems with understanding relations because we think in oppositional terms?  
But what about the relational thinking we found in Plato’s dialogue the Sophist 
and which is described as a deficit in Husserl’s and Lévinas’ account of otherness? 
Ricoeur described the “relational dialectic“ in Plato’s metaphysical writings by 
distinguishing between a first-order and a second-order discourse. To me this 
distinction seems to correspond with idem and ipse on the one hand, and comparison 
and branchements on the other. According to Ricoeur, the five “great kinds“on the 
level of the first order discourse “to which belong the categories or existentials such 
as persons and things“(Ibid: 298), are not related to each other. As far as I can see, 
this is the level of classifications and categories. It is here that identity means idem 
(sameness). Both Amselle and Ricoeur have located the operation that secures this 
kind of identity thinking: comparison.  
Regarding our reflection on social-anthropology and Amselle’s notion of 
branchements it is interesting to observe that in Ricoeur’s distinction between idem 
and ipse identity, which may be a way of articulating branchements, the idem-
identity is designated as formal (Ricoeur 1985: 443). Applied to empirical 
investigations undertaken in social-anthropology and ethnology, formal has the 
meaning of out of context, or without content. Identity grasped through an 
assumption that there are stable entities like identities to be found, is an example of a 
formal identity. This operation may be characterised as abstraction and is expressed 
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in comparison. Comparison is an abstract operation which underlying logic is idem-
identity. But what about the second-order discourse?  
 
7.10 Second-order discourse: branchements? 
Returning to Amselle’s case, a vital feature for the N`ko movement is that it is always 
already involved in what is “external”. To articulate the local mandingean language 
in a written language is to take something alien (Arabic, Latin and Egyptian 
Hieroglyphs) and familiarise it. This movement is a double reversal. On the one hand 
something alien (Arabic, Latin and Egyptian Hieroglyphs) becomes familiar 
(mandingean), but then what has become familiar has at the same time become 
modified from the initial point of view. Arabic, Latin, and Egyptian Hieroglyphs are 
recognisable and unrecognisable from both the original and the new (mandingean) 
perspective. What kind of alterity then are Arabic, Latin, and Egyptian Hieroglyphs 
to mandingean? Could this be described in more general terms? Ricoeur reflects on 
the role or character of alterity in the switch from idem to ipse in Soi-même comme un 
autre by stating that alterity can be constitutive for ipse-identity (Ricoeur 1990: 13). 
This implies that on the level of ipse-identity there is no clear cut boundary between 
alterity and identity. With the notion of ipse this leads us into a problem. For, taking 
the case of N’ko, on the one hand there is a continuum from being Mande to being 
Muslim and,  on the other, there is a distinction between being Mande and being 
Arab. So Soleyman Kanté does not work without some comparison and distinction in 
mind. A certain degree of idem-identity is also present in the way he recognises 
something to be a Mande idem-identity with permanence in time. My point is that if 
ipse is to be scrutinised as a conceptualisation of branchements, in the sense that we 
want to see how identity and what is other (altérité in the above quote) are related, 
what is other may mean at least two things which are not entirely consistent with each 
other.  
 On the one hand, what is other can be taken as the opposite of identity. This is 
of course what I am trying to question with ipse or identity of self. Or differently put: 
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the oppositional logic that Amselle and Ricoeur try to get out of is reintroduced in the 
analysis of the N’ko. It seems impossible to identify and talk about something 
without assuming its difference from other things. How can what is other be 
constitutive in this sense? One way is via the negative: it is possible to define an 
identity through what it is not. Another way is through borrowing. If I borrow 
something foreign and turn it into my own in order to express myself, this assumes a 
distinction between me and that which is foreign at the same time as what is foreign 
becomes constitutive for me. But again this assumes the identity of me before the 
relation I have to others. This indicates, as I see it, how difficult it is to go into this 
sort of discussion about genesis. Where something ends and something new begins is 
not so easy to see.  
 On the other hand what is other is not taken as the opposite of identity but is in 
a kind of continuity or relation with identity. Consequently this risks dissolving the 
very idea of identity. This is why narrative identity, by its constitution of idem-
identity, is seen as vital to account for the relative stability of identity. My question is 
that if otherness is not taken as an opposition- and distinction can be questioned- does 
not this mean that everything is one? The constitutive role of what is other is here 
something else as the boundaries between identity and otherness are questioned.  
Cultures are thus not to be understood as opposing worlds, but as variations of one. 
This needs two further comments.  
 First, it seems to me as if the elaboration of branchements and the relation 
between identity and what is other fluctuate between this first interpretation and the 
second. Even though the intention is to establish a thinking that is more in accordance 
with the second, it is difficult not to fall back into the first.  
 Secondly, if branchements and ipse can be used to account for cultures as 
being in a continuum and thus that the whole world is one, it nevertheless remains to 
be asked how it is one. What does that mean? Two alternatives seem possible. On the 
one hand that all things, all cultures, are united through a kind of universal spirit 
where the connectivity between cultures are governed by something transcendent 
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outside the web of cultural connections. On the other hand that everything is one but, 
so to speak, without being united by something outside of the web of connections. Or 
differently put: is branchements the point of departure in the sense of an always 
already existing structure, or is it a result of mediating processes? And what is the 
difference between these two?  
 A «solution» to this problem of trying to articulate relations rather than 
opposition and the constant fallback to classifications and oppositions could perhaps 
be that relational thinking must itself always be in motion. In other words, it is not 
possible to be in a relational mode where all identities (as sameness) and differences 
are suspended. It seems to me that there is something like this at stake in the passages 
that we looked at in the Sophist. The great kinds that as beings are separated (motion 
and rest), are united through being, but where being is neither motion nor rest. They 
are related at the same time as they are opposed and opposed at the same time as they 
are related. If Amselle tries to make this into a theoretical way of reflecting upon an 
empirical material, then this is a difficult exercise.        
 To sum up, in the reading of Amselle through Ricoeur, I have tried to explicate 
what Amselle means by linking his thinking in Mestizo logics to Ricoeur’s discussion 
of identity in Soi-même comme un autre. What they have in common is a relational or 
dialectical understanding of identity. There is, however, more to the link between 
them than an explicit reference. First of all I have tried to show how this link extends 
further than Mestizo logics and is a relevant way to explicate the metaphor 
branchements. Secondly, in order to get out of the static opposition of identity and 
diversity, they both relate this to the operation of comparison. Comparison is what in 
philosophy and anthropology reproduces a static notion of culture and identity.   
At the same time we have faced some problems with the link between them. 
First of all, whereas Ricoeur in Soi-même comme un autre at least partly draws on 
dialectics elaborated in Plato’s Sophist, Amselle, when explicating branchements, 
draws on Hegel too. Expressing branchements as a third element risks taking with us 
the idealistic aspects of Hegel. Whereas the dialectics between identity as ipse and 
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otherness in Soi-même comme un autre are relational in the sense of a continuum 
where the distinction (between the external and the internal) is questioned, the 
introduction of a third reinstates distinction. Distinction is not a problem per se, but it 
is a problem as long as this is what reproduces the external relation between identity 
and otherness.   
 A second problem is the analogy between the identity of a person and the 
identity of a self. Does a culture have a self in the same way as a person does? If this 
is the case then it seems to me inevitable that a substantialist view of culture becomes 
reproduced. This problem exists, however, not only between Amselle and Ricoeur. 
Ricoeur makes a similar analogy when he in Temps et récits sees a parallel between 
the narrative identity of groups and persons.  
 
7.11 Spinoza, Hegel, and dialectics 
Before moving on to the next stage in my interpretation of branchements, which is 
branchements as an expressionist account of genesis, I find it pertinent to open up a 
reflection on Spinoza, Hegel, and dialectics. In addition to finding relevant thoughts 
on dialectics in Hegel’s thinking and Plato’s dialogues, branchements could be 
interpreted from a Spinozist perspective. A problem with using a Hegelian account of 
mediation as a reading of Amselle was that this might lead us into Hegel’s idealism. 
My point is that mediation is part of Amselle’s reasoning in passages such as those 
where Amselle states that the expression of an identity supposes the conversion of 
universal signs in its own language. The expression of identity is only possible in a 
mediation, that is, by going through something else. And in this case branchements is 
described as a web of meanings. But is branchements, or this web of meanings, 
which ensures a successful expression of identity, itself above the process of 
branching? For from the perspective of Hegel the process of mediation is completed. 
The risk is, as I see it, that the same problem emerges regarding branchements. To 
what degree does branchements allow for future connections and reconnections? To 
what degree is branchements open or closed, unfinished or completed? We have also 
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seen this in the light of Plato, Ricoeur, and a kind of relational dialectics. The way the 
great kinds in the first-order discourse are separated, cultures can be separated and 
compared. But the mixing of kinds is on the other hand inevitable and must be treated 
also in a second-order discourse. Another way of articulating this is Spinoza’s 
thinking.           
 This is not the time or place to look thoroughly into Spinoza himself. Hence 
the point is not to make a scholarly remark on Spinoza or the difference between 
Hegel and Spinoza, but rather to see what this may entail regarding our understanding 
of branchements.  So, for a scholarly account I rely on first and foremost on Pierre 
Macherey who is one of the leading French experts on the philosophy of Spinoza. 
And for Macherey, Hegel’s own reading of Spinoza can teach us about dialectics. In 
his book Hegel ou Spinoza Macherey discusses many topics in the Hegel-Spinoza 
relation by taking Hegel’s reading of Spinoza as the point of departure. Macherey 
claims that Spinoza has superseded Hegel by presenting dialectic without teleology. 
Even though Spinoza’s philosophy remains an open question to Macherey it indicates 
another way of thinking contradiction and negation in dialectics. Macherey’s point is 
that despite their different approaches and irreconcilable tension, Hegel and Spinoza 
have a common ground (Macherey 1980: 13). The epicentre of this common ground 
and tension is dialectics where Spinoza according to Macherey represents “the denial 
(la dénégation) of this [Hegelian] dialectics which briefly could be called a dialectics 
without teleology …“(Ibid). Even though this is rather difficult to understand, and 
without discussing whether this is a correct interpretation of Spinoza, I will try to 
give a summary of what Macherey means by this.  
 In the last part of his book Macherey commences a long discussion of 
dialectics by looking at Hegel’s interpretation of Spinoza’s proposition “omnis 
determinatio est negatio” written in a letter to Jarigh Jelles in 1674. For Hegel the 
phrase was crucial to his own thinking; it does, however, also demonstrate Hegel’s 
misunderstanding of Spinoza’s thinking. According to Hegel the thinking of Spinoza 
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is not as fully developed as his own. Hence Spinoza has not appreciated the full 
meaning of the phrase.      
 The limitation in Spinoza’s thinking is, according to Hegel, that he 
understands negativity in an abstract manner, detached from relations. Pivotal to 
Spinoza’s philosophy is substance. In rejecting the dualism of Descartes, Spinoza 
introduces the idea that there are not two substances but one. Furthermore this 
substance is not given in itself, but only through its attributes. Since Hegel interprets 
Spinoza’s conception of substance as deprived of positive determination, he [Hegel’s 
Spinoza] sees the attributes and thus negativity as the only way to determination. The 
only way to learn about the substance is through what it is not, through its attributes 
or modes. But, and this is Hegel’s criticism, this negativity does not get us in touch 
with what is positive. Spinoza remains stuck with the negative without seeing it in 
relation to what is positive. What Hegel does here, Macherey writes, is to separate the 
substance from its attributes. This means that the substance and the attributes are 
external to each other (Ibid: 145). And since the substance is given only through its 
attributes, this means that the substance has an external relation to itself. Hegel finds 
this abhorrant. Externality, as long as it is not related to what is internal, remains an 
abstract or detached understanding of externality, whereas for Hegel all externality 
must be related to internality. In other words, the failure of Spinoza is relative to 
Hegel’s thinking but not, as we will see, an interpretation on Spinoza’s own premises.  
 According to Macherey, Hegel for his part understands the phrase “omnis 
determinatio est negatio” consistently with his own thinking in the sense that in every 
negation there is determination. In other words, in negation there is something 
positive (a determination) which pushes forward. Forward, towards what? Towards 
the realisation of an absolute spirit. The negation is already contained in the positivity 
of this absolute, the end point of history, from which all processes are reconstructed. 
Something is a negative because we reconstruct it from an end point. The negative 
thus loses its negativity in the sense that it is resolved through the teleology of the 
absolute. Or rather, the negative in order to be a negative must be determined by the 
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positive. And this positive is given from the end point of history. The determination 
is the end point in history from where the philosopher reflects.  
 Now, if we, still with Macherey, see this from Spinoza’s side of things, he 
illustrates the theme of determination with the problem of part and whole. Whether 
something is in opposition or adapted to other things depends on our perspective. 
Macherey writes that: 
 
To perceive a figure is to conceive of a thing as it is limited by another which is opposed to it: it is 
therefore…to distinguish it from other things that do not belong to this configuration. But if one takes a 
different point of view, according to which it [the figure] on the contrary is adapted to another point of 
view ... it looks like a part in relation to a whole that proceeds from another determination (Macherey 
1980: 159). 
 
Spinoza thus tries to think determination and negation from another point of view 
than Hegel’s end point in history. Something is finite or determined from a certain 
perspective taken by the intellect, but the number of potential determination is 
infinite. So what is perceived as contradiction and opposition is dependent upon the 
modulation of the intellect. We here touch upon a theme that has pervaded our 
discussion on dialectics, namely negation. 
 Macherey takes up an interesting topic, discussed by Spinoza, which is 
relevant to our own problematic. In a letter to Louis Meyer, Spinoza ridicules the 
Cartesian notion that the material substance is divided into different and distinctive 
parts. The division of the substance is due not to the substance itself but to our 
imagination. The reason that we think there are things of a different nature (like spirit 
and matter) is because the imagination is too limited in its understanding of infinity. 
Macherey comments: 
 
The way the imagination proceeds is here evident: in order to apprehend extent the imagination 
determines or divides it, and then attempts to reconstitute and generate it from the achieved elements. 
But this «genesis» can only be fictive: it expresses nothing else than the impotence of the imagination to 
present infinity as divided (Ibid: 162).   
 178 
 
 
 
Now, this is interesting as it reflects the still relevant limitations in our thinking. The 
problems located by Spinoza of determination, division, and imagination are, as far as 
I can see, operative in the epistemology of culture. Instead of an infinite continuum 
where people with different cultural backgrounds meet, interact, and make exchanges 
and where different cultural expressions all could be seen as a variety of humanity, 
these cultural expressions are seen as expressions of different “substances” called 
cultures. I am not saying that discussing metaphysics and cultural diversity is the 
same. However, Spinoza is on to a logic which is present in our thinking in general. 
The question is to what degree the imagination limits and determines what is to be a 
contradiction and what is to be divided and separated. The two latter quotes are 
interesting because they say something of the epistemological role of the imagination. 
As far as I can see, Amselle challenges the comparative imagination, which divides 
different cultures and societies, and the use of the hybrid as metaphor, which refers 
back to a notion of origin. Comparison and hybridity, from this perspective, entail not 
seeing the relational aspect in the constitution of identity. By using the metaphor 
branchements the division of people into cultures is suspended in favour of a 
relational account of human beings.  
 Macherey writes that Hegel’s misunderstanding of Spinoza, and hence 
ultimately his dialectics, consist in the separation of substance, attributes, and modes 
into different orders. But this is not Spinoza’s own point of view:  
 
For Spinoza it is one and the same order, not the abstact order of the imagination but the concrete and 
physical reality of the substance which expresses itself simultaneously and identically as absolute and 
relative, and which is known by the understanding and imagination as contradictions (Ibid: 175).  
 
As I understand it the problem is that the Spinozist substance is immanent whereas 
the Hegelian Spirit is transcendent, and Hegel attacks the former from the point of 
view of the latter. “Omnis determinatio est negatio” thus turns out quite differently 
and becomes the decisive source to Hegel’s misreading. Three interpretative levels 
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are then discernible in Macerhey’s book: Hegel’s misunderstanding of Spinoza, 
Hegel’s own point of view, and Spinoza’s point of view according to Maherey. 1) 
The negative is [to Hegel’s Spinoza] the indirect way to an unknowable substance 
(similar to negative theology?). This is to Hegel’s mind limited as Spinoza does not 
attain the positive. 2) To Hegel, on the other hand, negation is the negation of the 
positive due to the realisation of the Absolute Spirit. 3) From Spinoza’s perspective, 
however, since the substance is immanent but expressed through its attributes and 
cannot be separated from them, every determination is dependent upon the negations 
the imagination represents to the intellect. Something is determined in opposition to 
something else, but this opposition is determined by the limitations in the intellect’s 
ability to imagine. In other words, the nature of the contradiction can be questioned.  
 At the end of the book Macherey states that Spinoza rejects the Hegelian 
dialectics, but asks if this means that he rejects dialectics altogether. No, it is the non-
dialectical elements that he rejects, i.e. the idealism of dialectics, that dialectics is 
governed by the teleology of the absolute. But a materialist dialectics à la Spinoza 
does not have any guarantees, orientations, or promises for a resolution of all 
contradictions. In the same spirit Macherey understands the dialectics of Marx. 
Together with Étienne Balibar, Macherey has also written an article on dialectics in 
Encyclopedia Universalis. Vital for Macherey and Balibar then becomes to break 
with a dialectics of continuity. This materialst dialectics “must think difference (and 
not identity) in its determination” (Macherey and Balibar: 362). However, from what 
we have seen in Ricoeur’s reflection on idem and ipse, he has really deconstructed 
the concept of identity itself. So the problem might not lie in identity as such but in a 
certain conception of it as idem or sameness. But in the light of what we have seen in 
Macherey’s book on Hegel and Spinoza, the Spinozist difference is not a substantial 
difference but a mode or variation on the same immanent plane. The contradictions in 
this dialectics, “une contradiction réelle”, can be conjugated with other contradictions 
which are not contained within the concept of the same.      
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 What do I mean by this? Central to any reflection on dialectics, including my 
own, are negation and contradiction. The question is whether the role of the former is 
guided by the latter. Balibar and Macherey write that dialectics is a complex process 
since it holds together identity and alterity, the same and the other, in the same 
movement, and because it understands the one by the other. This conflict can 
furthermore be presented in two opposing ways: 1) Identity and alterity could be 
understood as a contradiction from the point of view of an already given unity where 
the other is determined on the basis of the same. 2) Or identity and alterity could be 
understood as a difference which recognises the identity in the alterity itself.  This 
question is thus paramount when scrutinising the dialectical aspects of branchements. 
Again the question of unity emerges as the fundamental problem in dialectics. As I 
read Balibar and Macherey there are two kinds of unity. If the unity is an essential 
unity already given (“unité essentielle déjà donne”) then the other is determined on 
the basis of the same. This means that the other is related to the same, but from the 
perspective of the same. This is an idealistic dialectics in which the other somewhat 
mirrors the same. Whereas if the unity is (“l’unité substantielle ou réflexive de 
l’être“) substantial, then the other is a real negative. This does not mean that they are 
not related, but that they are not joined by an already given unity. It may rather mean 
that contrary to a unity which is already given, the unity between identity and 
difference is a result of the reflexivity of being (l’unité reflexive de l’être).  
How does all this fit the interpretation of branchements? For one it is a 
question of inside and outside. If we follow Macherey, the Spinozist dialectics 
questioned precisely the distinction between the internal (identity) and external 
(difference) posed by Hegelian thinking. But Hegel too would agree that the internal 
and the external are joined. The real difference, I think, is that whereas identity and 
difference are separated and joined from a finite point of view in Hegel’s thinking, 
identity and difference are seen from an infinite point of view in Spinoza’s thinking. 
The third element that unites and separates is thus absent. It seems to me that if 
branchements and the dialectical movements are to be thought in the form of an open 
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system, this must be perceived from the perspective of infinity and not finity. 
Macherey’s discussion of the difference between Hegel and Spinoza has thus taught 
me a lot. 
 If Spinoza is right in that there is only one substance, how does this translate to 
the question of cultures and their dialectical relations? Even though I am not trying to 
reduce the substance, one could read it as an image of mankind, and as that there is 
only one humanity. Consequently cultures are not substances, but attributes or modes 
that express this substance. Or rather; they are products of the (culture-
anthropological, comparative) imagination and the construction of identities and 
oppositions between them. 
 In the above discussion of determination the point was that, following 
Spinoza, what is seen as a contradiction and what is an adaptation is a matter of 
perspective. The same is true of branchements where elements that from one 
perspective do not seem to belong together and become a contradiction, from another 
perspective do not necessarily contradict each other. In this sense it is a question of 
our imagination. The Spinozist substance has an infinite number of modifications, the 
imagination sets the limits. The idea of an “imagined sameness“ that I have discussed 
previously is interesting in relation to this because it says something about how the 
perception of something as the same and as different is not given once and for all. At 
least in the case of belonging to the same society this becomes clear. When sameness 
is seen within a binary logic, opposing sameness and difference, what counts as same 
and as different is determined in advance. When someone is perceived as different 
from me and another is perceived as the same as me, this is to a certain extent 
determined by the imagination. This becomes clear when we for instance take the 
nation as the frame for thinking society. The nation is a finite form where those who 
are thought to belong and those who are thought to be strangers are determined by 
how we imagine this opposition to be.     
In the light of what we have seen in Macherey’s book on Hegel and Spinoza, 
the Spinozist understanding of negation, and thus alterity and difference, is that it is 
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not a substance. Alterity and difference is a mode or variation on the same immanent 
plane. The contradictions in this dialectics, “une contradiction réelle”, can be 
conjugated with other contradictions which are not contained within the concept of 
the same.      
   
7.12 Concluding remarks 
Regarding dialectics I have tried to do an important philosophical task, and that is to 
discuss consequences and relations between premises and conclusion. Or differently 
put, by reflecting on three or four kinds of dialectics as possible interpretations of 
branchements, I have tried to give an outline of what kind of potential branchements 
has in questioning cultural purity. By taking Hegel, Plato, Ricoeur, and Spinoza as 
different ways of conceptualising dialectics, I have tried to indicate different ways to 
interpret branchements. This still concerns the epistemological question of what 
conditions, what language, we use to discuss culture. As far as I can see, Amselle 
himself uses Hegelian concepts (mediation, third element) in describing 
branchements. But when he discusses syncretisme originaire in Mestizo logics he 
turns to the relational understanding of self and otherness in Paul Ricoeur’s 
philosophy. Ricoeur for his part draws on Plato when articulating the relational 
dialectics. So I have tried to reflect on what kind of dialectical thinking Amselle 
actually bases his thinking.  
 But I have at the same time tried to be critical in the sense of asking what kind 
of dialectical thinking is preferable for interpreting branchements. Is branchements 
an open or closed system of connections? This depends on what kind of dialectics we 
take as our point of departure. Even though I think Hegel is highly relevant for 
questioning abstraction, there are some problems concerning the idealist aspect in 
Hegel. Hegel’s dialectics and the account of mediation are, after all, reconstructions. 
And reconstructions are made from a point where (or should I say when) the 
mediations have ended. The third element, which both separates and unites elements, 
is linked to this endpoint outside history. Plato and perhaps in particular Spinoza 
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represent alternatives to a dialectics based on a third element. The relational aspect 
that I find so interesting and so potent as a means for questioning identity, plays out 
differently when turning to Plato/Ricoeur and Spinoza. A thinking which is based on 
relation (Sophist) and the infinity of such relations (Spinoza) gives a more open 
understanding of dialectics, and ultimately branchements, than one where the 
relations are determined in advance as composed of identities and differences. 
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8. Genesis and hybridity  
 
Introduction 
In the two preceding chapters I have examined the epistemological aspects of 
branchements and scrutinised the concept’s theoretical content through a variety of 
dialectics. I will now try to go beyond an exegetical approach and discuss the 
strengths and limitations of branchements. I have divided this chapter into two main 
parts. In the first I will discuss genesis, a problem which is present in dialectics but 
which can be thought in other ways. A limitation in the dialectical thinking of both 
Hegel and Ricoeur, when we try to understand the genesis of cultural identity, is that 
they think genesis as reconstruction. For Hegelian thinking the reconstruction is done 
from the perspective of a Spirit and the end of history. For Ricoeur there is a relative 
endpoint, the present, and from this all narratives are synthesised. What is at stake in 
branchements is that the various elements, such as norms, symbols, practices etc., 
which from one perspective are seen as originating from different cultures, from the 
perspective of branchements are seen without purity or origin. Furthermore, 
dialectics has been one way to account for branchements as a critique of origin and 
identity. But there is a problem of synthesis here. When we reconstruct how different 
elements are synthesised, it seems inevitable that we have already located the 
elements. But was it not the assumption of distinguishable identities that 
branchements was meant to problematise? Maybe reconstruction and synthesis are 
the only intelligible ways to think dialectics. But I think it is fruitful to contrast this 
with other kinds of thinking as well. Spinoza through Macherey and Plato through 
Ricoeur gave us at least a hint at another way of thinking dialectics. Here I want to 
continue the discussion of genesis by drawing on the works of Charles Taylor, Gilles 
Deleuze, and George Canguilhem.  
In the second part of the chapter I will contrast branchements with the way the 
hybrid is thought both practically and theoretically. It seems to me that the essential 
deficit of hybridity, which makes it different from branchements, is dialectical 
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thinking. Having said that, I think that hybridity might be more suitable for analysing 
processes of becoming whereas branchements problematises origin.     
 
8.1 Genesis between mediation and expressivism 
We have seen that mediation questions (cultural) purity and pure origin. In order to 
think mediation in its most radical form, we had to detach it from identity as 
sameness and difference as the negation of this sameness. Identity and difference 
come about through mediation. Mediation is thus not a movement from identity and 
difference as already established entities, but mediation without identity. How can 
one render account of this? The problem is that once the mediation no longer 
mediates between some fixed things, we have no point of departure from where we 
can organise an analysis or reconstruction. Or differently put, it is because we have 
questioned the reconstruction as a point of departure that we have been able to 
question purity of origin. But once we have rid ourselves of the pure origin, we are 
still left with the problem of beginning. Is it possible to speak about beginning 
without being taken back into origin? This question is one of the motives for 
introducing the theme of expressivism. For, one way of accounting for the temporal 
aspect and the genealogy of culture is to see it as expressive in an immanentist sense 
of the word. The continuum behind the distinctions of identity and difference is 
immanent expression.   
 Now, as a point of departure we take the statement from Amselle previsously 
used that the expression of an identity supposes the conversion of universal signs in 
its own language or the conversion of its own signs within the web of meanings 
(Amselle 2001: 59). The choice of words is interesting as identity becomes something 
to be expressed and this expression is relational. It thus marks a connection between 
dialectics of mediation and expression. To express an identity is to make it real so to 
speak. Or differently put: to realise an identity it must be expressed. And this 
expression is situated in a relation. But does that mean that the relation is fixed prior 
to the expression or that the expression constitutes the relation?  
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8.2 Herder and expressivism 
The question of the beginning (of a culture) leads us to a reflection on expressivism. 
And central to the expressivist movement is Herder. According to Charles Taylor, 
Herder is in his Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache (Treatise on the Origin 
of Language) the first to have grasped that the condition for, and constitution of, 
consciousness are both immanent in the articulation of that consciousness (Taylor 
1995: 94). Taylor writes in the text The importance of Herder that “My (perhaps 
overdramatic) claim is that Herder is the hinge figure who originates a fundamentally 
different way of thinking about language and meaning” (Ibid: 79). This “way of 
thinking” is Herder’s expressivist theory of language which Herder as a critique of 
Condillac`s theory of the origin of language developed in Essai sur l`origine des 
connaissances humaines. In Taylor’s account of Herders`s critique, Condillac 
explains how language arose by telling a story of two children uttering cries and 
gestures. These he calls “natural” signs of feeling. Each child, seeing and hearing the 
other, “would come to see the cry as a sign of something (the cause of the distress). 
Then the child would be able to take the step of using the sign to refer to the cause of 
the distress. The first sign would have been instituted” (Ibid: 80). The rest of the 
language is thus built term by term. Taylors`s point is that this theory of origin 
presupposes what it tries to explain; i.e. the origin of language. ”That words can stand 
for things is taken as something immediately comprehensible” (Ibid: 82). Vital to this 
so called designative theory of language (that words stand for things) is the 
understanding of ideas as predating language. In other words ideas and language are 
separated. With expressionism this view is challenged. 
 It is the reflexivity of language that Herder wants to understand and which is 
present in what Taylor calls “rightness” in the use of language. The point is that 
neither reflection nor rightness is possible without expression. In explaining 
expressivism Taylor goes back to Herder’s anthropology which must be seen as a 
reaction to the French Enlightenment and its view of human beings. Herder 
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rehabilitates some basic Aristotelian concepts of life as realisation of form, but in a 
modern sense with the subject as the point of departure: “each individual (and in 
Herder’s application, each people) has its own way of being human”. Taylor 
mentions two traits which distinguish Herder from Aristotle’s realisation of form: an 
inner form or inner power imposes itself on external reality as well as maintains its 
own shape and it is posterior to the realisation of the form that the form itself is 
determined (Taylor 2005: 15-16).  And further: “Man comes to know himself by 
expressing and hence clarifying what he is and recognizing himself in this expression. 
The specific property of human life is to culminate in self-awarness through 
expression” (Ibid: 17). When it comes to language, in order to find out whether I am 
using a word right, I must express it in the context I believe to be appropriate:  
 
Speech is the expression of thought. But it isn’t simply outer clothing for what could exist 
independently. It is constitutive of reflective (linguistic) thought, of thought which deals with its objects 
in the linguistic dimension. In its origin it is close to and interwoven with gesture” (Taylor 1995: 92). 
 
This notion of “what could exist independently” is what expressionism questions. Is 
there a language (or a culture) before the attempt to articulate this language (or 
culture)? Even though to render language and culture equivalent is problematic, 
Taylor’s reflection sheds some light on our question of culture. Taking Amselle’s 
statement about the expression of cultural identity, I see the parallel to Taylor and 
Herder in the sense that all three call “the independent” into question.  However, as 
far as branchements is concerned, this also becomes a challenge. Does Amselle, in 
his account of branchements as the “conversion of signs necessary to express any 
identity”, and the explication of this through N’ko, assume that prior to the 
expression and conversion there is something that “exists independently”: Mande 
culture and language? Or does he claim that it is in the expression itself that identity 
is constituted? From this latter perspective we could get an expressionist reading of 
branchements. On the other hand, is it possible to express oneself without some 
already existing language? And if so, does this reintroduce the boundary or 
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distinction we tried to question? To realise oneself is to realise oneself through an 
expression. But this expression is relational in the sense that it is directed at someone. 
From this perspective it is the relation which constitutes the expression. Or differently 
put, it is the “language game” of the relation which determines what is possible to 
express. In other words, the relation is both the condition for and the result of an 
exchange of expressions.40 If thought is dependent on mediation and communication 
and communication itself is constituted through expression, this means that ultimately 
there are no clear ideas and thoughts prior to their articulation (Taylor 2005: 43-44). 
Or differently put, we are close to a view that regards thinking as immanence.  
Even though I am impressed with Taylor, and keeping in mind that he 
discusses expressionism in connection with persons, there seems to be a limitation to 
his expressionism when it is applied on our problem of culture. I will not go into a 
discussion on Taylor here, but as we recall from chapter 2 on culture and identity in 
the political discourse, as well as from chapter 7 on dialectics, Taylor’s thinking is 
centred on identity and dialectics of recognition.41 And it is this focus on identity that 
I want to question. His thoughts on expression seem to be within this frame. The 
consequence is, I fear, that expressionism is seen from the point of view of a process 
that is finished. One thing is to reconstruct a process of expression as a process of 
self-understanding, but what about future expressions? If the request for recognition 
of one’s identity is what is at stake, then this means that the identity in question is 
already constituted.  
The second problem, which perhaps is not so much Taylor’s problem, is how, 
when it comes to understanding culture,  we can think unity and diversity without 
                                              
40 It is here appropriate to make the reader recall what Amselle wrote about the close relation between language and the 
concept of culture. Language is often seen as the essence of culture or its most important hallmark. Informed by linguists 
language shaped, as Amselle writes, the anthroplogists’ understanding of culture. An example close at hand is the 
anthropology of Levi-Strauss informed by structural linguistics. Consequently the view of language shapes the view of 
culture. Taylor’s emphasis on expression is hence highly relevant and serves us well in the criticism of the abstract view of 
culture. 
41 I cannot go into this here but the recognition of one’s cultural identity is what matters in Politics of recognition (1992a) 
and The ethics of authenticity (1992b).  
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either assuming a closed unity or a given (and then closed set of) diversity? One of 
the difficulties branchements is designed to articulate is the dialectics between 
humankind as one humankind and the variations within humankind. As previously 
discussed, I find the unification based on an abstract principle of Spirit to be an 
impasse because this leads us into a position outside of history. In other words, I am 
seeking a notion of the dialectics of branchements to give an account of unity and 
diversity of cultural expression that is not idealistic. Could it be more comprehensible 
through a concept similar to Spinoza’s substance and its relation to expression? 
Expressionism as it is presented by Taylor does not, as far as I can see, to a full extent 
reflect on the relation between the different levels in expression. In order to gain an 
understanding of how deeply this goes into the genesis of cultural constitution, and in 
order to think this in a radical but rigorous manner, we turn again to Spinoza - this 
time in the interpretation of Gilles Deleuze and his book Spinoza et le problème de 
l`expression.  
 
8.3 Expression as triad  
First of all, the point here is not to scrutinise Spinoza. It is rather an attempt at 
grasping the notion of expression in a way that can illuminate our problem. Deleuze 
takes the 6th definition in Spinoza`s Ethics as a point of departure for his examination 
of the notion of expression: “By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, that is, 
a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an 
eternal and infinite essence” (Spinoza in Deleuze 1992: 13). And somewhere else: 
“Whatever exists expresses the nature or essence of God in a certain and determinate 
way“(Ibid). From this Deleuze tries to give a reading of Spinoza stating that the idea 
of expression sums up all the difficulties concerning the unity of the substance and 
the diversity of attributes (Ibid). For our part, as we are also trying to elaborate on the 
difficulties of unity and diversity in relation to the question of culture, it seems to be a 
relevant approach.  
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  One is immediately struck by the intuitive difficulties that arise as one tries to 
enter this thinking. A first problem that faces the reader of both Spinoza and 
Deleuzewhen wanting to address the problem of expression is the relation between 
thinking and what the thinking is thinking about. Deleuze tries to explicate this to us: 
 
The range of the notion of expression is not merely ontological; its implications are also 
epistemological…knowledge becomes a sort of expression. The knowledge of things bears the same 
relation to the knowledge of God as the things themselves to God (Ibid: 14).   
 
Knowledge is on the same plane as what the knowledge is about because nothing can 
be, nor being conceived, without God. All our ideas are nothing but a reproduction of 
nature, and thus express nothing which is not the expression of nature. Knowledge is 
not “some operation on an object that remained outside it, but a reflection, an 
expression, of an object in the mind” (Ibid: 15). This is, according to Deleuze, the 
historical pre-modern understanding of explanation. To explain something was to let 
the thing express itself. Thus it is the expression that constitutes the intellect and not 
vice versa. We are already at this point touching not only upon a historical difficulty, 
but also a difficulty in thinking alternatives to our own thinking. The introspection of 
the Cartesian tradition separates the thinking from what the thinking is about, so that 
the things are no longer explained by themselves, but are only accessible through the 
analysis of the intellect.     
 Deleuze goes on to distinguish between two levels of expression in Spinoza`s 
philosophy. On the first level the substance expresses itself in the attributes. This 
level must, Deleuze writes, be understood as a constitution. On the second level the 
attributes express themselves. This second level must be understood as a production 
of things. The problem is how to think these two levels in the analysis without 
separating them. A constitution is often thought of as being prior to production. The 
constitution of a subject’s identity comes first, and then the subject produces 
something. The same is true with the notion of God as a first principle. Even though 
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Deleuze/Spinoza write about a chronological difference between them, constitution 
and production are closely connected: 
 
Expression is not of itself production, but becomes such on its second level, as attributes in their turn 
expresses themselves. Conversely, expression as production is grounded in a prior expression. God 
expresses himself in himself “before” expressing himself in his effects (Ibid: 14).       
 
In order to understand the word express it is, however, important to look at the 
correlative concepts envelope and explicate. The same problem as one runs into with 
constitution and production appears here as well; the terms seem contradictory but are 
not. Deleuze writes: 
 
Expression is on the one hand an explication, an unfolding of what expresses itself, the One manifesting 
itself in the Many (substance manifesting itself in its attributes, and these attributes manifesting 
themselves in their modes). Its multiple expressions, on the other hand, involve Unity. The One remains 
involved in what expresses it, imprinted in what unfolds it, immanent in whatever manifests it (Ibid: 
16). 
 
Intuitively it is reasonable to think that development and envelopment go in different 
directions. What is developed cannot at the same time be enveloped? Deleuze 
acknowledges the difficulties by referring to André Darbon`s Spinoza study. In 
Darbon’s attempt at explicating the expression he ends up in contradictions:  
 
In the first place, what is expressed ought to be different from what expresses itself...» And Darbon 
concludes that «Each attribute expresses the eternal and infinite essence of God, again we cannot 
distinguish between what is expressed and what it expresses » (Ibid: 19).  
 
What is interesting here is not that Darbon contradicts himself but the resistance in 
Spinoza’s thinking in general and in expression in particular. Having these 
difficulties in mind, Deleuze reveals his approach or his solution to these problems:  
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Expression presents us with a triad. In it we must distinguish substance, attributes, and essence. 
Substance expresses itself, attributes are expressions, and essence is expressed...The originality of the 
concept of expression shows itself here; essence, insofar as it has existence, has no existence outside the 
attribute in which it is expressed; and yet, as essence, it relates only to substance (Ibid: 21) . 
 
It is doubtful whether Amselle as an anthropologist would approve of these 
metaphysical reflections. However, as far as thinking is concerned it is the approach I 
find fruitful. If we try to understand this as a manner of understanding branchements, 
the point is that branchements is not external to its expressions. An expression thus 
has no other origin than itself because the substance which expresses itself exists 
through its attributes. The argument is to draw the following parallel: The same ways 
as every essence for Spinoza exists through the attribute that expresses this essence, 
cultures do not exist outside their expressions. And the same way the essence is 
related to nothing but the substance, a culture is related to the web or continuum of 
cultures which constitute humanity. The same way as Deleuze places the substance, 
the attributes, and essences on the same level, all joined analytically through 
expressivity, the continuum or interconnectivity of cultures, the cultural practices, 
and the cultures are also on the same level. Keeping this in mind, what does 
expressivism do to our perception of culture? If there is nothing prior to expression-or 
at least if this something has no clear form or content- then this also has serious 
consequences for how we approach a cultural identity. This does not entail that 
cultures are fictions, but does, on the other hand, neither lead to conclusions like 
those of Charles Taylor in Politics of recognition and the Ethics of authenticity where 
cultures can be recognised, or to politics where cultures can be compared. Briefly, 
what these latter representations of culture do would be similar to abstracting and 
detaching one level (the essence) of the triad of expression from the other levels. But 
then we lose the level that unites all the essences. The “diversity of cultures” should 
thus be understood as variations or the plural cultural expressions of the same level.   
 Spinoza’s thinking of expression thus helps us to reflect on two aspects that 
are central to branchements. The first is that the same way there is no origin as point 
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of departure, nor an end point to the substance, there is no origin or end point to 
branchements. Both the substance (as expression of substance) and branchements (as 
cultural expression of humankind) go towards infinity. The second aspect is that unity 
and diversity do not stand in opposition to each other. All variation (diversity) is an 
expression of the same unity (substance or humankind) because this unity only exists 
as the variety of expression.    
 
8.4 Branchements as commencement 
In the light of what we have discussed concerning expressionism, another thinker that 
may come to our aid in our attempt at understanding beginning without origin, is 
again Georges Canguilhem. Now, if mediation is prior to or simultaneous to both 
identity and difference, and a pure origin cannot be detected, there is nevertheless a 
commencement. Canguilhem, in his elaboration of scientific concepts in the history 
of science, distinguishes between commencement and origin. They are both 
concerned with a beginning but in completely different ways. Everything has a 
commencement, but an origin is the ideal reconstruction of the point of departure and 
turns out to be something other than the real commencement. In the book De 
Canguilhem à Foucault, la force des norms (2009), Pierre Macherey writes about an 
unpublished paper on the scientific origin of psychology by Canguilhem which draws 
on this distinction. Origin comes from the Latin origo or orior, which means to outgo 
from (sortir de), whereas commencement comes from cum-initiare, which means to 
enter into. “The concepts commencing and origin: origo, from orior, signifies exit 
from (sortir de), cum-initiare...means something altogether different: to enter into, to 
make a path” (Macherey 2009:53). This amounts to two different understandings. In 
origin the beginning is a point from which other things emanate. Commencement on 
the other hand is the act in which something begins.  
 Canguilhem himself uses this in a slightly different context. His point is that 
when working with the history of science, origin is mistaken for commencement and 
the real beginning of a science is misplaced. An example is the origin of psychology. 
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The science of psychology commences in the 19th century but find its origin in the 
writings of Locke and Lebniz (Ibid: 53).  Here the real startingpoint is after Locke 
and Leibinz, whereas the origin (from where one imagines that psychology begins) is 
found in them. Another example is the concept of reflex which origin is ascribed to 
Descartes, but which originated from the vitalist Willis. 
 Now, the idea is to take commencement as a notion for understanding cultural 
genesis. When Amselle writes that when branchements, by showing that every 
culture is mixed by elements which themselves are mixed, rejects the idea of an 
originary purity, it nevertheless lacks an understanding of genesis alternative to 
origin. Amselle writes that in order to escape for good the notion of the pure we must 
perceive the mixing of cultures as consisting of already mixed cultures. With 
commencement the genesis has a point of departure. How can commencement as 
another understanding of beginning be proven? In the history of science it is possible 
to detect new concepts that have not been seen before. These concepts could be said 
to commence something, they create ideas or captures things in new ways. However, 
in the context of the dissertation we stand the risk of transforming commencement 
into metaphysics, and this is not the point. Again, the point is rather to problematise a 
notion of beginning as origin. Commencement gives another account of beginning 
which makes it possible to question why a pure origin is necessary.  
 Now what has been the point of introducing expression and origin? Having the 
overall problematic in mind the point is to see branchements as a way of accounting 
for genesis. With Hegel and Ricoeur we came a long way in explicating a range of 
different conceptualisations of dialectics. Common to them all is that everything 
stands in a relation to something else and cannot be taken out of this relation without 
losing it. This put the relation itself at the centre for the constitution of identity. 
Speaking more specifically of human beings, to realise oneself (to become real so to 
speak) is to express oneself in a relation to another. But this led us into the problem 
of whether this relation and these expressions are already determined by a third. 
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Mediation functions as a way of deconstructing abstraction or isolation: I cannot 
express myself in isolation.  
  
8.5 Branchements or hybridity? 
As already mentioned, Amselle substituted the notion of culture as métissage, 
mestizo, or hybridity with branchements. But what does the difference consist in? If 
we want to look at hybridity and mestizo, it is instructive to begin with how they are 
defined. According to The Oxford dictionary of biology (Oxford, 2004), a hybrid is: 
“the offspring of a mating in which the parents differ in at least one characteristic. 
The term is usually used of offspring of widely different parents, e.g. different 
varieties or species.” The link between racism and culture has been discussed 
throughout the dissertation as a genealogical connection. When it comes to the term 
hybrid the link to racial thinking is even tighter since the hybrid was a way to 
conceptualise the ideological problem of degenerated races.42    
However, throughout the history of racial thinking the hybrid has not been 
thought in an unambiguous way. Robert Young draws, in the book Colonial desire 
(1995), up a typology of different takes on the hybrid ranging from polygenism 
which denies that different races can mix at all, through more moderate positions 
where the ability to interbreed is possible for one generation or if two races are 
proximate to each other, to the amalgamation thesis where all humans can interbreed 
in an unlimited way and can create new races. In addition there is the normative 
evaluation of amalgamation in the sense that miscegenation produces a mongrel 
group that forms a “raceless chaos”. Arthur Gobineau, for instance, was of such an 
opinion (Young 1995: 18). 
  Now, the hybrid has been invoked as a metaphor for understanding culture in a 
more dynamic and open way. It has been transferred from this ideological pre-
                                              
42 As discussed in chapter 3 Gobineau saw the mixing, or hybridisation, of the German and Gallo-Roman races as the cause 
for the decay of the French nation (Skorgen 2002), and, as Amselle (1996) and Bruno Latour (2001) stress, the 18th century 
French society was obsessed with regeneration.   
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scientific genetics to cultural criticism. For instance, the post-colonial thinker Homi 
Bhabha sees the hybrid as a third space which destroys polarity between the 
oppressor and the oppressed (Bhabha 2008). Instead of engaging in a battle for 
recognition of one’s oppressed identity which is negatively defined, Bhabha sees 
hybridity as a space of negotiation where “the discourse of colonial authority loses its 
univocal grip on meaning.” Here hybridisation is invoked as part of agency; 
hybridisation is something which should, could and is being produced. 
 For Amselle the central problem with hybridity and/or mestizo is that it is too 
closely connoted to a quasi-biological notion of races which again is linked to the 
ideological theory of polygenism which is the assumption that humankind has an 
initial plurality of sources. This, however, draws once more on the idea of a plurality 
of races within human kind. What I want to examine is to what degree hybrid 
thinking is dialectical. Or differently put, dialectics is way of reflecting critically 
upon the metaphors mestizo and hybrid. 
 As mentioned earlier the level of intervention for the dissertation at large is the 
language through which we use to describe the human being. With regard to what 
kind of approach I attempt (Burke 2010) in the dissertation it concerns first and 
foremost hybridity and branchements as concepts and language. What language, 
concepts, and metaphors are suitable for grasping the unity and diversity of 
humankind, which ones risk taking us back into essentialism?  
In Globalization and culture Jan Nederveen Pieterse establishes a typology of 
three theoretical frames or paradigms for understanding cultural difference (Pieterse 
2009). In the first, cultural differences are regarded as immutable and as generators of 
conflict. This cultural differentialism exists in historical and modern forms. Samuel 
Huntington’s book, Clash of civilizations (2003), is emblematic for the modern 
version of this paradigm. The second framework for understanding cultural difference 
is the eradication of differences in the light of globalisation as the world becomes 
more and more culturally homogeneous. A third way is that of cultural hybridisation 
where elements traditionally held separate become mixed.  
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 Now, one aspect that Pieterse underlines is that both differentialism and 
homogenisation have undermined the experiences in between. “Hybridization reflects 
a postmodern sensibility of cut’n’mix, transgression, subversion…it foregrounds 
those effects and experiences which modern cosmologies, whether rationalist or 
romantic, would not tolerate” (Pieterse 2009: 55). I suppose Pieterse is right in 
distinguishing modern cosmologies and a postmodern sensibility for “cut’n’mix, 
transgression etc.” Having in mind, for instance, Gobineau’s fear of racial 
degeneration through hybridisation, it is at least a historically pertinent critique. 
However, what I oppose is the discourse that sensibility for these kinds of phenomena 
is postmodern if we by this understand practices and experiences incapable of being 
expressed rationally. In other words, the opposition between rationality and the 
sensibility for what is in between is questionable. I insist on the possibility of being 
both sensible to such phenomena and experiences and at the same be a rationalist. If 
we by this should read phenomena that are in between as an indirect critique of 
rationality- as impossible to be thought without introducing essentialistic categories- 
as opposed to postmodernism, then to me this represents an insufficient and static 
conception of rationality. I suppose this is consistent with Pieterse’s own view, given 
that he tries to convey the concept and idea of hybridity in an academic book. I 
understand Pieterse’s and Bhabha’s motivation for breaking with the classificatory 
reasoning inherited from colonial thinking. But where does the rejection of 
rationalism leave us? In wanting to break with rationalism we risk losing the critical 
potential in reason. As far as I can see, this is what Amselle tries to do with the 
metaphor branchements and the reason why I think an epistemological reading of it is 
pertinent. Branchements is, as far as I am concerned, not just another theory of 
culture, but a way of reflecting critically on other theories that are based on purist 
premises.        
 Now, is it possible even in branchements to avoid differentialism and 
convergence or homogenisation? The attempt to present hybridity as an alternative is 
not as easy as one might think. Hence Pieterse presents a yardstick of kinds of 
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hybridities: “on the one end, an assimilationist hybridity that leans over towards the 
centre, adopts the canon and mimics hegemony and, at the other end, a destabilizing 
hybridity that blurs the canon, reverses the current, subverts the centre” (Pieterse 
2009: 79). So, the domain of in between is more nuanced than first assumed. Where 
is branchements situated on such a scale?  
 As pointed out earlier, branchements is an attempt at escaping the idea of 
purity still lurking in the concept of métissage. In order to mix something one needs 
something not mixed. Pieterse presents a similar challenge to the notion of hybrid: 
“the mixing of cultures and not their separateness is emphasized. At the same time, 
the underlying assumption about culture is that of culture/place. Cultural forms are 
called hybrid/syncretic/mixed/creolized because the elements in the mix derive from 
different cultural contexts” (Ibid: 86). In other words, when conceptualising hybridity 
it takes a form which force the thinking into a purist track that emphasise an initial 
distincion. The reason why it is difficult to discuss this is, according to Pieterse, that 
two concepts of culture are being used indiscriminately: A territorial notion presents 
culture as inward looking, whereas translocal culture is outward looking. The inward 
looking perspective is static and the outward looking perspective is fluid.  
 He seems to be on to something. However, I wonder if it is something more 
than once again locating the problem, that the language in which we want to 
articulate practices of boundary crossing is essentialist and pure,  that our thinking is 
more concerned with how element A and B are different and/or similar, than with the 
process and point where A and B meet. My point is here that branchements helps us 
to enter the analysis at the right time. Or, more precicely, the point is not only where 
A and B meet, but that they already have met. The way I see it, branchements 
introduces a temporal dimension in its way of questioning. Whereas a synthesis, like 
the hybrid, supposes an origin of the elements brought together in the synthesis, a 
radical interpretation of branchements would be that there are no pure elements that a 
synthesis could be composed of.       
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 If we take the notions discussed above of mediation, translation, expression, 
and commencement as interpretation of branchements, they are, as far as I can see, 
keys to articulating the processes which do not take pure poles of identity as points of 
departure. To cross a cultural boundary presupposes a distinction (between two 
identites, cultures etc.) prior to the crossing. For example, in order to communicate, 
we assume that the persons involved must be distinguishable from each other. They 
transgress the distinction through communication by persuading each other with 
arguments. But, before they communicate, how do they gain access to themselves? 
Does not communication of a content or point of view assume a prior communication 
from where we learn to articulate? Communication is not posterior to their 
distinctiveness and hence what saves them from solipsism. Communication is the 
proof that solipsism is impossible. It is on the constitutional level, and not merely on 
a post-constitutional level, that branchements functions. It might be true that we live 
in “an age of boundary-crossing” (Pieterse 2009: 88), but the lesson from 
branchements is that this is a human condition equally true of the past: “If every 
culture talks a foreign language it is because the language it talks is already foreign” 
(Amselle 2001: 13).  
 Pieterse takes on some of the most important objections to the notion of 
hybridity. I will here discuss some of the objections relevant to branchements as well. 
Interestingly enough, most of the arguments are related to anthropologist Jonathan 
Friedman and opposed by Pieterse. One claim, proposed by Friedman, is that 
hybridity is a political and not an empirical concept. “I discovered that a certain way 
of representing reality, as hybridity, was not a mere intellectual interpretation of the 
state of contemporary reality, but a politicized position” (Friedman 1999: 229). 
Whether or not this holds true for hybridity, the question for our part is whether it is 
appropriate for understanding branchements. As I see it, branchements is first and 
foremost an epistemological and not an ontological, normative, or political concept. 
True, the political and ethical motivation is linked with the epistemological level. 
But, if branchements does not succeed in destabilising the notion of culture as closed, 
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pure, or abstract on an empirical level, then it cannot sufficiently succeed on a 
political and ethical level either. Here I do not find Pieterse’s answer to Friedman’s 
critique sufficiently satisfactory. Against Friedman’s claim that hybridity is a 
normative and political concept, Pieterse answers: “Indeed, but so of course is 
essentialism and boundary fetishism” (Pieterse 2009: 102). Even though this is true 
does this not entail that notions such as hybridity and branchements have to have an 
empirical ground in order to be able to problematise purity? From what point of view 
can purity be questioned? Is it only an ethical or political critique? Does not hybridity 
or branchements have an effect if they are capable of rendering account of 
phenomena in new ways? 
 A second main objection, also forwarded by Friedman, is that hybridity is a 
dependent notion. That is, in order to hybridise something two or more pure elements 
are presupposed. If not, then hybridisation as a notion is meaningless. Friedman 
concludes that “In the struggle against racism of purity, hybridism invokes the 
dependent, not converse, notion of the mongrel. Instead of combating essentialism, it 
merely hybridizes it” (Friedman 1999: 236). Pieterse responds that this is correct, but 
that this is a question of ethical revalorising of the hybrid instead of a devaluation of 
it in the name of purity. From a normative point of view this might seem just. As I see 
it, branchements goes in an epistemological direction, which renders it more potent 
as a criticism of origin. Instead of launching some normative or political defence of 
the hybrid, branchements questions the notion of origin. This is, as Friedman points 
out, not sufficiently done in hybridisation. And from this point of view hybridity is 
epistemologically weak since it cannot challenge the point of departure for discussing 
culture. Liberated from any biological thinking, branchements gives us an advantage. 
Does that mean that branchements is a non-dependent notion? As seen through 
mediation (Hegel and Ricoeur), branchements refutes the idea that there is something 
absolutely non-dependent. Everything depends on something else, meaning 
everything is related to something else. But these dependent elements can not be 
abstracted from the process that makes them dependent. In this perspective nothing 
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stands alone. Purity and hybridisation are abstractions in the sense that they assume 
that there is something that stands alone, whereas branchement is an explication of 
the concrete processes in which nothing stands alone. But branchements is not 
dependent in the sense that it depends on pure elements. These elements are 
themselves dependent. In the end branchements is the network of relations.   
 I just want to mention briefly that there are other terms, like syncretism and 
creolisation, which also are used to describe different kinds of processes of cultural 
exchange. I will not elaborate one these terms further. The literature on them is 
extensive, and I do not claim that hybridity, syncretism and creolisation are 
equivalent (Hylland Eriksen 2010: 195-224). However, the aim in this dissertation is 
to question origin. So, one reason for limiting the discussion to hybridity and 
branchements is that even though syncretism and creolisation might be suited to 
describe specific processes of cultural exchange, they are, as terms, not better suited 
to question origin. Syncretism is an “attempted union or reconciliation of diverse or 
opposite tenets or practices, esp. in philosophy or religion” and “the merging of two 
or more inflectional categories”. Creolizations is “the action or process of taking on 
any of various characteristics or aspects of Creole people, their culture, etc.; esp. the 
assimilation of aspects of another culture or cultures; hybridization of cultures” and 
“the fact or process of assimilating or converting a language, dialect, etc., into a 
creole, by contact with one or more other languages and the acquisition of native 
speakers” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2013). Even though there is a difference in 
how one thinks synthesis they are, like hybridization, marked by the idea of an initial 
difference. Another reason is that hybridity is the term which most clearly is involved 
with identity, origin and raciological thinking.   
  
8.6 A Norwegian case of hybridity 
Among the contributions to the research on cultural complexity in Norway 
(CULCOM) that ended in 2010, the fieldwork of the Norwegian social-
anthropologist Viggo Vestel in a dormitory town in Oslo is particularly interesting 
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(Vestel 2003, 2007). Vestel undertakes to analyse the “elementary presuppositions 
for community in face to face relations within a multicultural context” by analysing a 
multicultural youth club in Oslo (Vestel 2007: 134). The dormitory town concerned, 
“Rudenga”, consists of 45 % with immigrant background distributed on 80 different 
nationalities. Rudenga has earlier been stigmatised and associated with crime, social 
problems, and conflict between generations. What is particularily interesting with 
Vestel’s case and his analysis is the challenge of analysing positive aspects. In media 
cultural minorities are often associated with something negative and the language of 
negative analysis is well established. One thing is articulating what does not work. 
Quite another is to say what actually does work and how and why it works. Vestels 
asks:  
 
While studying social life in an area where the actors who associate themselves with several different 
cultural traditions are living in the same neighbourhood, and especially while studying youth in such 
contexts, one of the core questions is, of course: if and how do people in such areas build social 
relations to each other? (Vestel 2003: 52).  
 
Vestel mentions seven characteristic of this club: a ritual of greetings, a hybrid use of 
language (kebab-norwegian), a practice of clothing, music preferences, friendship 
and loverelations, loyalty to the club, and the fact that there was a male domination. 
His analytical challenges consisted, according to him, in “how to interpret the 
handling of cultural boundaries” (Vestel 2007: 137); especially in the light of the fact 
that the members of the youth club develop a “mutual acceptance”. So the question of 
how social relations are established is linked to the handling of cultural boundaries. 
 Central to his research in the youth club is the relation between Omar (with 
Iraqi background) and Ola (with Norwegian background) and one particular incident 
involving them both. One evening Vestel observes the two boys exchanging music 
lines on a guitar. They both send musical statements in the form of phrases on their 
guitars “back and forth, partly repeating, partly recreating the phrase the other sends 
out, and partly creating new ones, as a kind of communication” (Ibid: 146).Omar then 
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gives Ola a line built on an Arab scale which he strives to repeat and finally succeeds 
in repeating. Ola even incorporates this line into the music of his rock band. This 
introduction of the Arab scale is interesting to Vestel because it shows openness from 
Ola and a willingness to take a chance from Omar. Vestel writes that:  
 
When Ola hints at rock’n’roll, it is not the musical genres that are known to be the most open to non-
western influences…So why this openness on Ola’s part. And how come Omar is taking the chance of 
exposing such strangeness, presumably knowing very well that such tones are usually both considered 
and acted upon as matter out of place (Vestel 2003: 54-55). 
 
Now, the question is how to interpret this. Marcel Mauss and the Gift, Pieterse and 
the hybrid, Unni Wikan’s concept of resonance, and Charles S. Pierce’s semiotics are 
all invoked in the attempt to scrutinise the case. Ola’s acceptance of Omar’s otherness 
could be related to Marcel Mauss’ essay on the Gift. The line is a Gift which marks a 
difference and is accepted and returned. However, this is not sufficient and it brings 
up another question; how is it possible to accept and receive a (cultural) difference? 
Vestel opens in his article up a discussion of Sartre and Levinas, concluding that they 
both have too absolute an understanding of the other. Either the other must become 
like me (the same), or the other must remain in her singularity (difference). But in 
order to articulate the “cunning” aspect of the social practices, as Vestel puts it, he 
needs another theoretical elaboration. 
 In addition to the works of Pierce and Wikan, Vestel draws on Pieterse’s 
reflections on the hybrid. Vestel tries to approach the question of how cultural 
boundaries and the crossing of them are handled (Pieterse 2009). Pieterse establishes, 
as we already have seen, three competitive paradigms for an understanding of cultural 
difference: Cultural differentialism promotes the view that cultures are immutable 
and generate conflict (the clash of civilizations). Cultural emergence implicates an 
increasing cultural assimilation (MacDonalization). A third alternative is cultural 
hybridisation which is a mix of cultures and cultural differences. Vestel writes that 
even though there are processes of differentialism and homogenisation in the youth 
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club, it is hybridisation that  best can account for most of the examples. This is 
interesting as the language of hybridisation suffers (though to a lesser degree) from 
the same intellectual obstacles as differentialism. However, Vestels asks: 
 
What is the hallmark of the processes where different cultural traits are experienced, generated, and 
practiced as if they belonged to each other in a “mix”? How are initially not-associated elements 
brought together as to eventually constitute a unity or a foundation for community? (Vestel 2007: 144)   
 
The thesis of Vestel is that hybridisation, Wikan’s notion of resonance, and Pierce’s 
semiotics together articulate similarity: “Central for the experience of resonance is the 
ability to let similarities from the horizons of the interlocutors work as points 
(bridges) for contact” (Vestel 2003: 57). Wikan, on her part, states that: “Where 
cultures separate, resonance bridges” (Wikan in Vestel 2003: 57). And this is 
followed up by Vestel:  
 
A central challenge which the processes of hybridisation in a culturally plural society (det flerkulturelle) 
confront us with is the exploration of what kind of role the experience and the generation of similarity 
(likhet) plays in the constitution of social relations between two or more cultural axes of orientation” 
(Ibid: 150).   
 
In his doctoral thesis, A community of differences (2003), Vestel takes the theme of 
hybridisation further by discussing Jonathan Friedman’s critical approach to it. Vestel 
shows that the youth in Rundenga are most certainly giving a hybrid account of 
themselves. They do not, contrary to what Friedman states, homogenise, and do not 
seem to focus on origin at all. “The practices of the youngsters all question the 
assumption of the neat and the tidy boundaries of identity” (Vestel 2003: 539). If we 
look at the question in Vestel’s article, the one we already have looked at, of “how 
initially non-associated elements are brought together so as to eventually constitute a 
unity or a foundation for community”, it is on the basis of an assumed similarity that 
this is taking place. The everyday lives of the youth at Rudenga, Vestel writes, directs 
the attention “to something rarely mentioned in the literature on hybridity, namely the 
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role confirmation and generation of similarity plays in the construction of hybrid 
communities” (Vestel 2007: 145). 
 Vestel refers to Friedman’s critique of hybridity as: the presupposition of the 
existence of identifiable identitites characterised by fixed boundaries. Hybridity is 
thus, according to Friedman, not suited to capture the flux and changes in the 
phenomenon of identity. Friedman writes in the article “The hybridization of roots 
and the abhorrence of the bush” that:  
 
I have argued that hybridity harbours no critique of essentialism because it is a derivative of 
essentialism. Arguing that cultures are creole merely pushes the essence back in some mytho-historical 
time frame when things were pure. This is inherent in the concept itself (Friedman 1999: 254). 
 
Friedman criticises the notion hybridity for being both not empirical but political, and 
for being trapped within the logic of essentialism. Vestel responds by subscribing to 
Pieterse’s view that “the importance of hybridity is that it problematizes boundaries” 
(Pieterse in Vestel 2003: 516). I am sympathetic to the notion of problematisation. 
However, I am tempted to agree with Friedman that hybridity as a concept does not 
capture the flux and change, and that the term is closed within purist logic. The 
question is whether it is sufficient to say, as Pieterse and Vestel do, that boundaries 
are problematised when they are crossed (hybridisation), or if what we really need is 
to problematise the thinking of boundaries (branchements).    
 If we try to bring together some of the elements in Vestel’s argument he tries 
to answer the questions of how “initially non-associated elements are brought 
together as to eventually constitute a unity or a foundation for community”, and why 
the two friends playing guitar are open to each other: “why this openness on Ola’s 
part”, Vestel asks. One answer lies, for him, in some kind of fundamental similarity: 
“similarities from the horizons of the interlocutors work as (bridges) for contact. But 
have we not seen this kind of reasoning before? It seems to me that we are back to a 
version of the problem of the third previously discussed in relation to Hegel’s 
philosophy. In the kind of dialectical thinking that hybridity is based upon, the 
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differences (between the two boys) are guided by similarity.  It is what constitutes the 
unity or foundation for community. Similarity is, however, not part of the exchange 
itself, but a guiding principle for it. And is not the way we think boundaries and 
differences also the result of some principle that separates and unites at the same 
time? As I see it, branchements can open up another interpretation that also 
emphasises something Vestel mentions: openness. But to be open does not, as I see it, 
assume similarity or something third. There might be similarity, but being open is not 
reducible to it, nor is it a prerequisite for it: I can also be open to what is different. Or 
differently put, if we are all similar in the end, does not this render it superfluous to 
speak about openness? As far as I can see, branchements is onto such an openness. 
What branchements and openness have in common is that unity (as similarity or 
something third) and boundaries are not the point of departure.  On the other hand, 
openness does not deny the fact that we as human beings have different backgrounds. 
Furthermore, if we take openness as a point of departure, and not similarity, this 
opens up foranother interpretation of the unity Vestel is trying to figure out: if we are 
open to each other we could perhaps create or produce this unity together. And 
Vestel himself is onto it when he discusses the role “the generation of similarity plays 
in the constitution of social relations”.43 The question is if similarity is assumed or 
generated.     
 
8.7 Remarks on the analogy between persons and cultures: can a 
culture have a self?  
A problem that I have encountered during the reflections on culture is the analogy 
that Amselle and Ricoeur draw between personal and collective, or cultural, 
identitites. Ricoeur states that a subject or an individual does not have direct access to 
his or her identity but must articulate and interpret his or her being-in-the-world 
                                              
43 Similarity is here confusing since Vestel uses the Norwegian word likhet which means similarity, in the sense of 
ressembling, and equality, which has a constitutional meaning. And it is perhaps in this latter sense that this should be 
interpreted. 
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through an externalisation of his or herself. Or differently put, to be in the world is 
always already to be externalised. If we follow this idea, a pure singularity is not 
imaginable, at least not as a creature in possession of language. In other words, to 
articulate an identity is to connect oneself to what already exists, such as other 
languages, ideas, practices. But then one is at the same time other than one self, hence 
the title Oneself as another (Soi-même comme un autre). Now this kind of reasoning 
is what is at stake in Ricoeur’s concept of narrative identity. I receive my identity 
through the perpetual self-interpretation of my proper actions, and the external events 
through which my life is intervowen. This acquisition is done through narration 
which synthesises actions, events, symbols, norms etc. Without this synthesis actions 
and events have no coherence, but remain heterogenous. Now, Ricoeur states that this 
narrative identity goes for collectives as well as persons and he uses the 
psychological identity of a person and the identity of the Jewish people as parallel 
cases. 
 The connectivity to what is other than oneself in the thinking of Paul Ricoeur 
is explicit in Mestizo logics, and, to a certain degree, implicit in branchements. 
Branchements is another way of describing the connectivity between what Ricoeur 
calls the dialectics of ipse-identity and alterity, between oneself and another. And 
thus, in Amselle too, culture receives the status as analogous to an actor. This seems 
intuitively troublesome. Can a culture act, reflect, or, as Amselle writes: “express 
itself”? My point is not to say that Amselle and Ricoeur are not aware that this is 
problematic. On the contrary, the motive for introducing the metaphor branchements 
and the concept narrative identity seems to be precisely to find, not theories for 
identity but, new ways of questioning identity.      
 But going back to the problem of the analogy, as far as Ricoeur is concerned, 
one answer would be that the reflexive character of being self is a grammatical point 
relevant to all personal pronouns, plural and singular. I am myself and we are 
ourselves do not necessarily imply a difference. “We” can also act, express, and 
reflect and remain grammatically correct. But does this apply on other levels as well? 
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To say that it works like this grammatically is one thing. Another is to say that this 
holds on an epistemological level as well. Do not a person and a collective entity like 
a society, a nation, or a culture require different approaches? A vital difference 
between a person and a cultural group, a collective, is that the former has a body 
which a collective can only have in an indirect meaning of the word. We can speak of 
the state as a political body, or draw an analogy from the realm of physiology and the 
normal and pathological to social normality and pathology. But this is not a body 
which can feel and be constitutive for the self in the same way as for a person. 44 
 I therefore think that instead of describing branchements as the result of 
cultures acting and interacting, or as integrated wholes at all, branchements describes 
connections, reconnections, transfers which may or may not be intentional. Cultural 
banchements is not merely the result of individuals acting, and here Amselle and my 
own interpretation diverge somewhat, but also of descriptions of exchange processes 
with a long duration, a longue durée. Even though Kanté acts within the short time 
span of a human life, the Mande language and traditions as well as the interaction 
with the Arabs and French of which he is part, precedes him. On the other hand, 
Amselle seems to be correct in stressing the conscious and decisionistic aspect in 
branchements, with the experimental attitude in mind.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
44 Vincent Descombes discusses in his book Les embarras de l’identité (2013) the status of the analogy between a person 
and a people when it comes to the concept “identity”. Can the identity of the people be treated in an analogous manner to 
that of a person? And should we interpret such an analogy in a literal or a metaphorical sense? 
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9. Epistemology of translation  
 
Introduction 
With the theme of translation I will follow the same path as I did with branchements. 
I commence with a chapter on epistemology before elaborating on the theoretical 
aspects and their relevance to the overall problematic. And, consistent with the 
overall structure of the dissertation, translation is also related to the epistemological 
problems with culture and the attempt to articulate another way of thinking.  
 In the preceding chapters we have seen how branchements in its different 
aspects questions a notion of culture as pure and abstract. I aim at further elaborating 
these problems here. However, whereas branchements intervenes in the discourse 
that links culture to identity, origin and raciology, translation is a way of reflecting on 
the link between culture and language. The first entry into the theme of translation is 
thus how the view of language, and its function as image for culture, becomes an 
obstacle for how we view culture. What is interesting with translation is that by 
breaking with an oppositional view of languages, it can articulate another way of 
thinking culture. The second point of departure is to see this in relation to the 
problem of the “imagined sameness” discussed earlier. This expression from 
Marianne Gullestad, and interpreted by me more specifically as an “imagined cultural 
sameness”, is based upon such an oppositional logic. A third motive for introducing 
translation is the role Amselle gives it in the articulation of branchements. 
But even though Amselle touches upon translation, this theme is more widely 
elaborated by Paul Ricoeur in Sur la traduction (2004a). Ricoeur discusses here 
similar epistemological problems to those discussed by Amselle, but takes this one 
step further by also presenting translation as a paradigm. Branchements and 
translation are thus different in the sense that they treat different aspects of the same 
problem (the roles raciology, identity, oppositional logic and linguistic classification 
play in the constitution of culture). But they are also different in the sense that 
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whereas branchements is a metaphor, translation is a paradigm. I will discuss what 
that means at the end of the chapter.  
What is interesting with Ricoeur’s discussion of the epistemology of 
translation is the way he emphasises the practice of translation and not the theory. 
For it is on the level of practice that we can understand the real epistemology of 
translation, and where it breaks with oppositional thinking. In order to understand this 
further I want to dwell on a well known example from the philosophy and history of 
translation: Martin Luther’s translation of the Bible.  By presenting a complete 
translation of the Bible to German for the first time, Luther demonstrated in practice 
that it was possible to do something theoretically impossible: to read the Bible in the 
mother tongue of the people and thus break with the assumed opposition between an 
inferior oral German and the original Greek and Hebrew written texts.    
    
9.1 Entry I: Oppositional logic in linguistic classification and 
translation 
As we saw in chapter 3, Amselle writes that linguistic classification was vital for how 
colonial and early anthropology understood the human being. The way the diversity 
of humanity was thought corresponded to the way the diversity of languages was 
thought. And this diversity was in its turn thought within an oppositional logic or 
within “a system of oppositions” as Amselle writes. From the perspective of this 
language-culture connection this would entail that an intervention in the 
epistemology of language could cause changes in the epistemology of culture. And, 
as we will see, this is what Ricoeur does when he discusses translation: the 
epistemological obstacle for our understanding of translation is that languages are 
either insurmountably different, or that they have the same source either in the human 
brain or in a historical root. If the first is true, then translation is impossible. If 
translation is, on the other hand, possible, this must be because languages can in the 
end be reduced to the same. But, from the perspective of the practice of translation, 
this is not the problem in translation. If we, in accordance with Ricoeur, put this 
problem aside and see how translation is practiced, we see that the balance between 
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the reader’s and the author’s language is what is at stake. It is the openness of 
languages to one another that is revealed in translation.   
   We see thus that the themes of translation and culture come together by 
both being linked to language and the role language plays in our understanding of 
culture. Breaking with the oppositional thinking where languages are seen as 
insurmountably different, translation might question the way we see cultures too.    
 
9.2 Entry II: Translation and cultural sameness 
A motive for introducing the theme of translation, in the continuation from the 
epistemological concerns in linguistic classification, is to provide a way to critically 
reflect on an imagined cultural sameness which underpins the play of inclusion and 
exclusion. As we saw in chapter 2, Marianne Gullestad discusses how equality is 
linked to a certain notion of imagined sameness. It is not sufficient for a person to 
have a legal status equal to that of other citizens; she also has to feel that she is the 
same as those who recognise her. Now this sameness refers to cultural identity and 
cultural origin. For an immigrant, however, or rather, through the very label of being 
called an “immigrant”, inclusion into a society becomes a difficult task. An 
immigrant is someone whose identity and origin are always different and this will 
never cease to adhere to this person. An invisible hierarchy of Norwegians may then 
be established and reproduced on the basis of an assumption that there is a cultural 
difference between the original and “ethnic Norwegians” and those entering the 
community.    
 A similar idea lurks behind the more general claim that in order to live 
together in a multicultural society, everyone must subscribe to a set of norms, rules, 
and principles applicable to all, and that those who come here “must adapt to our 
ways of living” and abandon their culture and customs. Furthermore, such adaptation 
is impossible -or so one claims - without abandoning particular cultures and customs. 
In other words, the homogeneity in question here is a demand for adaptation to “our” 
values. Imbedded in this demand lies a double assumption that “we” and the “others” 
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do not have any shared values, and that the others threaten our values. In Norway this 
discourse is particularly common in the rhetoric of the right-wing populist party 
(FrP), but it is also a general tendency. The very vague term “Norwegian vaules” is 
confused with what we take to be a more general foundation for western societies 
such as democracy, rule of law, and human rights. However, from what Gullestad 
writes, this confusion makes sense since equality, in terms of rights and duties of a 
citizen in a country, is linked to the cultural sameness that “Norwegian values” are a 
part of. The demand for adaptation which is constituted by the imagined sameness 
thus reproduces the image of an inside and an outside which again shapes our 
understanding of culture. The question then becomes how to get beyond this. 
 The question of whether or not we can live together in a culturally diverse 
society nurtures itself on this logic. Whether one is a universalist, claiming that all 
humans are the same, part of the same human nature or historical origin, or whether 
one is a cultural differentialist claiming that sameness is only ascribable to those 
within the same cultural community, the problem is sameness as premise. The 
phrasing of the question of whether we can live together in a culturally diverse 
society in the terms of a hypothetical if, disregards the practices in which this is 
already happening. It disregards the practices where cohabitation is already effective 
and where the distinction between sameness and otherness is transgressed.    
 My proposition is that translation helps us to question the assumption that 
there is an inside (of culture) to which the inhabitants normally considered to be 
original have privileged access. If this is so, then Norwegian culture and values are 
untranslatable to others and everybody on the “inside”, all the “original” Norwegians, 
would have an immediate and unproblematic access to it. This would further lead to 
the conclusion that this inside has remained unchanged. My claim is that translation 
questions both the notion of imagined cultural sameness and the notion that the inside 
and outside of a culture is a premise for the perception of a mutual framework, and 
that the real problem can be formulated in the following question: Is cultural 
sameness a premise for cohabitation? In other words, the concept of translation 
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problematises the question to which cultural sameness is the answer. The problem is 
not the answer but, rather, the question. If the initial question asks whether we can 
live together, the real question would be how we already do live together. Here we 
have more to learn from translation. Taking the practice of translation into account 
gives us another take on how the opposition between unity and diversity (and the 
similarity between the unity and diversity of languages and cultures) can be 
overcome.   
 
9.3 Entry III: Translation in branchements 
The third point of entry is a continuation from the chapters on branchements. We saw 
there a way of articulating how identity is the outcome of dialectical movements or 
connections, and not a point of departure, and that in the connecting process itself 
there is no clear cut distinction between identity and not-identity. This deconstruction 
of identity and not-identity as oppositional is in its turn subversive to the outside and 
inside of culture. But how exactly are identity and not-identity internally linked?  
 Going back to Amselle’s own problematic of post-colonial West- Africa there 
is no outside to the web of connections. Every identity that wants to articulate itself 
must relate itself to a constellation of meanings or universal signs. This does not, 
however, mean that everything becomes the same or that variation is wiped out. 
Connection is also a conversion or translation of these universal signs. And this is, as 
Amselle writes in connection with cultural expression: “Translation and 
conversion...are characterised as what is immediately given in cultural expression 
(des données immédiates de l`expression culturelle)” (Amselle 2001: 59). 
With translation Amselle allows for both continuity and rupture between 
particular and universal meanings. Kanté gave Mande speakers access to the Koran 
without going through Arabic but rather through the Mande language. It became 
possible to be a Mande Muslim in the sense that there is continuity and rupture in 
both the meaning of being Mande and in the Muslim religion. Not all Muslims are 
literate in Arabic and hence not identical to each other. Muslims speak different 
 214 
 
 
languages and this ruptures the strong link between Islam and Arabic. On the other 
hand there is continuity as the Mande speakers receive the meanings of the Islamic 
faith through reading the Koran. In the same way the Mande oral language is both 
conserved and transformed. It is conserved in that Kanté shows consideration towards 
the Mande oral language and it finds an expression it has never had before through 
alphabetisation.     
 Translation could be described as an aspect of branchements. In the African 
context the (re)discovery of writing is related to prophecy and the prophet is defined 
as both “the translator of the divine message in the language of his people and as the 
one who allows for the particular to access the universal” (Ibid: 61). Amselle`s point 
is that the opposition between the universal and the particular is fictive and that 
singularity and universality are complementary. The N’ko tradition articulates a 
certain understanding of the universal in a religious sense of Islam as translatable into 
local tradition. It expresses a “will to dissociate the Arab language from the Muslim 
religion in order to “mandinguiser” the latter” (Ibid: 136).   
 Translation is a conversion of signs. However, in order for the translations and 
conversions to be legitimate, they must remain faithful to some original meaning or 
reality. With regard to Kanté, I understand this reality to mean the reality of the 
Mande tradition. His enterprise and the creation of the N`ko alphabet are a kind of 
“Platonic project where the invention of an alphabet as well as the translation and 
editing of a whole series of works aim to assure a faithful reproduction of reality…” 
(Ibid: 157-158). In Kanté’s case this reality is the Mande tradition. When analysing 
Kanté’s fidelity to reality, Amselle draws on the Arisotelian notion of mimesis:”the 
problem of the invention or the reinvention of writing is inseparable from an 
approach that puts mimesis, understood as a copy or scan of reality, before 
everything” (Ibid).  In other words, Amselle is using the old principle developed by 
Aristotle in the Poetics, of representation. This means that every translation, 
invention, or rediscovery is committed to something. There is a limit to how foreign 
the elements can be, to how creative one can be.  
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 Translation, in the sense of articulating a balance between continuity and 
rupture of both particular and universal meaning, here draws, as far as I can see, on 
the double movement in branchements between connection and reconnection. For, 
even though the connection to the web is necessary, this does not mean that the 
connection may be bent in new and different directions. 
 
9.4 What is translation?  
Translation comes from Classical Latin translatus, past participle of transfero, from 
trans- “across” + latus, "borne", "carried", irregular perfect passive participle of the 
verb fero, ferre “to bear”. In English traduce (To malign a person), coming from the 
Latin traducere (or transducere: trans., beyond, across + duco, ducere: to conduct) I 
lead, bring, transport, or conduct across or over something (Oxford English 
dictionary, 2013). Translation is, however, related to hermeneutics and expression 
through the Greek hermeneuein.  
 The French translation scholar Jean-René Ladmiral writes that “Translation 
passes a message from the language of departure or the source language to the 
language of arrival or the target language” (Ladmiral 1994: 11). The translation 
carries something over from one place to another. This may perhaps be illustrated as 
two banks of a river which are separated from each other. A transport of something 
from one side to the other is difficult until something, for instance a bridge, is 
constructed. The two banks are no longer separated. However, the river is still there 
and the bridge may be fragile. 
 An outline for a philosophy of translation may be found in the principle of 
analogy in Aristotle and later in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Thomas sought 
to develop a rational discourse on God and God’s nature without God being an 
empirically accessible entity. Since we have to build our knowledge and language 
from sense-perception of creatures, how then can we understand something which is 
beyond sense-perception? By establishing a comparison between the human world 
and language and God, Thomas created a negative notion of God’s nature. God is not 
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an accident; he is not corporeal, not imperfect etc. The point is that the comparable 
creates knowledge from what we already know (from sense-perception of creatures) 
to what we do not know (Gods nature). The Thomas scholar Frederick Copleston 
writes, in his thorough presentation of Thomas in A history of philosophy, that “We 
cannot form an adequate idea of the divine simplicity as it is in itself…we know 
however, that it is at the opposite pole, so to speak, from simplicity or comparative 
simplicity in creatures” (Copleston 1993: 349). The comparison is, however, 
ambiguous in that similar attributes of God and man in human language are not 
univocal nor purely equivocal:  
 
When we say that a man is wise and that God is wise, the predicate “wise” is not to be understood in an 
univocal sense, that is, precisely the same sense…On the other hand, the names we apply to God are not 
purely equivocal, that is to say, they are not completely different in meaning from the meaning they bear 
when applied to creatures (Ibid: 352).  
 
Now, according to Thomas, this tension between the univocal and the equivocal is 
balanced by the analogy. Thomas writes in Summa contra Gentiles that what is said 
of God is neither said in a equivocal nor univocal way, but in an analogical way 
(Thomas 2000: 227). Returning to translation as a kind of analogy, what the analogy 
does is to bridge a gap that theoretically cannot be bridged. It is on this historical and 
epistemological background that we can derive the philosophical elements of 
translation later achieved by its practices. As will be seen in the definition of 
translation given by Ricoeur, Martin Luther’s translation of the Bible, as the creation 
of a comparable, bridges a gap regardless of whether it was theoretically possible or 
not. And is not the problem in translation as well as in negative theology that there is 
no certainty as to whether the translation or analogy corresponds to the original?  
 The historical importance of, and examples of, translation is not difficult to 
find. The contact between the West and the Arabic world led in the 12th century to 
vital developments for the West as it rediscovered its Greek source and foundation. 
For instance, Hippocrates, Galen, and Aristotle were all translated by Wilhem of 
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Moerbekes (Störig: xi). However, despite a widespread practice of translation, a 
theoretical study of translations was not undertaken until much later. Even though a 
scientific approach to translation emerged in the 15th century with the Italian 
humanist Leonardi Bruni’s work, De Interpretatione Recta (1420), it is first and 
foremost from the 19th century onwards that a theoretical approach to translation is 
developed. Ricoeur refers in many places to the work of Antoine Berman and his 
book L’epreuve de l’étranger. In this book Berman discusses two German traditions 
of translation. On the one hand there are the likes of Novalis and Schlegel who 
subscribed to what Berman called a speculative theory of translation. This speculative 
theory of translation was furthermore linked to what Novalis and Schlegel conceived 
of as critique (Berman 1995: 167). To them translation was a way of improving the 
potential in the original. This led to the conclusion that for instance Shakespeare was 
better in German than in the original English (Ibid: 172). On the other hand, among 
others, Humboldt and Schleiermacher try to conceive of, for the first time, that which 
is alien or strange in a text. According to Berman, what is different in them compared 
to Novalis and Schlegel is that understanding is introduced as a problem. To 
understand a text is to understand “an expressive product of a subject” and a 
phenomenon of objective language defined by history and culture. And this history 
and culture are different from the readers, interpreters, or the translators (Ibid: 227).  
Thirdly, language is not just an instrument, but the place where man lives. Language 
defines who a human being is. Through these three points one becomes aware of the 
differences of languages and the importance of them.  
 What is interesting with Schleiermacher in particular is how closely he links 
understanding, interpretation, and translation. In fact, whereas interpretation concerns 
itself with ordinary expressions, translation handles science and art. But how should 
this relation between the author’s and the reader’s language be balanced by the 
translator? And it is here that Schleiermacher criticises the idea that one should 
translate as if the author wrote in the language of the reader (Ibid: 235). For what is 
very important to acknowledge for a translator, is the author’s relation to his mother 
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tongue.  Schleiermacher argues that in order to recognise one’s own mother tongue 
and having one’s own mother tongue recognised, it must be able to receive what is 
different. As far as I can understand, this means that what is strange and different has 
a constitutive role for the status of equality. By being able to express something from 
a different language in one’s own language, the cultivated character of one’s own 
language is demonstrated (Ibid: 236). 
 We thus see that translation has a role to play in the intersubjective 
constitution of languages. Translations can, by approaching the reader’s language, 
demonstrate to the author the equal value of the author’s language. What is the most 
interesting for us, is the role of the strange here. It is only by showing that the 
reader’s mother tongue is as rich as the author’s, that it can receive a status as equal.  
 
9.5 Why translation? 
Now, from what we have seen in these entries, what do they have in common to link 
them to translation? What joins them? Linguistic classification, the post-colonial 
problematic of N’ko, and the introduction of new languages into the world of written 
culture, and the problem of cultural sameness, all concern purity. Cultural sameness 
is based on an assumption that there is an outside and inside to cultures and that 
humans stem from either this or that pure cultural origin. Cultural identities thus stand 
in an oppositional relation to each other which makes a notion of inside and outside 
tenable. The opposition between universal and particular (cultural) meanings has a 
similar kind of dynamic. Universal is thought of as purified from any particular 
culture, whereas a particular cultural expression is thought of as non-communicative 
and auto-generative.  
 Translation can be seen both as an articulation of a problem and as a solution 
to this problem. Translation is the practice of overcoming obstacles of 
communication. On the other hand, translation as a practice shows how these 
obstacles are already overcome and that the theoretical obstacles through which one 
perceives translation are too abstract. As previously discussed, the perspective of the 
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dissertation is to see branchements and translation as ways of problematising the 
view of culture as pure. I will, to some extent, elaborate translation as a kind of 
solution, but I will mainly focus on problematisation.   
What level exactly do I aim at when I want to include translation? As 
discussed by Peter Burke, cultural hybridity can be examined on different levels, one 
of them being the level of concepts and terminology. And here Burke mentions 
translation as accounting for processes of cultural hybridisation. As he stresses, 
translation is one of the least ambiguous notions and one that has already been used 
for a long time. Anthropologists such as Malinowski and Evans-Pritchard saw the 
analogy between language and culture which, to some, rendered anthropology “an art 
of translation” (Burke 2010: 56). The point is to see a certain parallel between the 
questions concerning purity of culture and the inside and outside of culture, and the 
questions concerning purity of language and the inside and outside of language. This 
is why translation has become a specific metaphor for describing processes of cultural 
hybridisation. In other words, I do not claim to be the first to use translation as an 
approach to culture, this has been done for quite some time.45 However, I have 
neither seen anyone discuss translation as a paradigm the way Ricoeur does, nor have 
I seen translation analysed epistemologically the way I do it. My point is to see the 
idea of translation as a paradigm together with my epistemological reflections on 
culture. It is because culture is indirectly and directly linked to language in the first 
place that translation is interesting. As I see it, it is by offering another view of 
language that translation can have an effect on how we see culture.    
 However, as the Italian philosopher Domenico Jervolino (2007) states, there 
are four different levels through which translation can be studied. Translation is of 
course first and foremost a transition between languages. Secondly it reveals a 
cultural political question. As we will see, Luther’s translation of the Bible reflects 
                                              
45 In addition to being used in the cultural history and anthropology (Burke 2010), translation has become a huge field 
opening up perspectives in for instance post-colonialism and political theory (Bhabha 2008, Buden 2008). 
 220 
 
 
indirectly what it is to be German. Kanté’s creation of N’ko and the translation of the 
Koran are other examples. A third level is represented by the ethics imbedded in 
translation. In order to translate, one must be open to letting what is foreign in 
another language enter one’s own language. This openness is vital to what Ricoeur 
calls the paradigm of translation. A fourth and last level-which is linked to the third- 
is translation as a way of reflecting on the anthropological dimension of being a Self, 
and this brings translation back to its original kinship with hermeneutics. This last 
aspect draws on the thinking from Soi-même comme un autre as discussed in the 
previous chapter. In the same way as what is other is present and constitutive for 
identity (the distinction between the two becomes blurred), translation articulates how 
the need for translation (le desire de traduire) reveals otherness at the centre of human 
existence. We do not only need to translate in order to make ourselves understood to 
others, but in order to understand ourselves. Translation is necessary because I do not 
immediately understand myself.    
 Richard Kearney writes about this that “We are at the same time dealing with 
an alterity that resides outside us and an alterity that resides within us” (Kearney 
2008: 164). The way I see it, what translation does is to question the very opposition 
between the exterior and the interior, which in its turn is suitable to our problem of 
inside and outside of culture.  
 
9.6 Translation from theory to practice 
If we now turn more specifically to Paul Ricoeur’s notion of translation, the basis for 
our reflections is a collection of three articles on translation published under the title 
Sur la traduction (Ricoeur 2004a). I shall not give a summary of the texts here other 
than the parts central to our problem.  
 Translation fluctuates between the language of the author and the language of 
the reader. Ricoeur refers to a long tradition in the theory of translation. Franz 
Rosenzweig presents translation as a paradox. It serves two masters: the author in her 
work and the reader’s desire to understand. Schleiermacher for his part describes, as 
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we have seen, translation as taking the author to the reader and the reader to the 
author. According to him, a translator in the end has to choose between the language 
of the author and the language of the reader. And in the end the translator’s ability to 
let the reader’s language receive the author’s language is the test of whether or not 
the reader’s language is equal to the author’s (Berman 1995: 226-250). Ladmiral, in 
his book Traduire: théorèmes pour la traduction, denominates this the antinomy in 
translation between a literal and literary translation (“traduction littérale ou traduction 
littéraire (dit libre)” (Ladmiral 1994: 89). 
 Now, the tension between these two poles has led to both a linguistic and a 
philological debate, as well as to speculation on whether or not translation is in fact 
possible. Two kinds, or types, of response can be discerned. On the one hand, given 
that there is a multiplicity or diversity of languages to be translated, translation is 
impossible. Ladmiral writes that the predominant tendency is to conclude that 
translation is theoretically impossible (Ibid: 85). In lack of a third text the transition 
between the two languages remains blocked. On the other hand, given that 
translations actually do take place, there must be some common ground shared by the 
different languages. This is an attempt to justify translations based either in a 
common origin prior to the separation of all languages, or in a prior structure 
common to all languages. However, both strands run into obstacles: The first cannot 
explain the fact that translations do take place; the second does not succeed in 
supplying us with this common ground. And we can herealready see the point 
Amselle is making of connecting the epistemology of language and the epistemology 
of culture.  
 Ricoeur’s contribution is not a solution to these problems. His point is rather 
that this problem, whether or not translation is possible, is a theoretical problem 
imposed from the outside. He tries to understand the problem that the practice of 
translation is a response to. According to Ricoeur, the real problem in the practice of 
translation is whether to be faithful to or to betray the language of the reader and 
whether to be faithful or to betray the language of the author. The outcome of this 
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tension is “the production of equivalence without identity” (Ricoeur 2006: 63). Since 
the tension between fidelity and treason is never dissolved, it accounts for how an 
equivalent is not identical. Even though Ricoeur, to a certain point, might be right, 
the question is whether this displacement from theory to practice is too easy. As 
Ladmiral points out, the question of whether translation is possible is posed exactly 
as a result of this problem, the problem of which language to be faithful to, in the 
practice. They are part of the same antinomy. So it seems like it is difficult to get rid 
of the question of whether translation is possible due to the fact that every translation 
is faced with the question of whether it is a good translation. But, on the other hand, 
the question is of quality and not of possibility. To say that a translation is not 
satisfactory is not to say that translation as such is impossible. And in a translation 
some parts might be deemed more successful than others. That does not mean that 
less successful translations prove the impossibility of translating, only that the 
demand for faithfulness to the two languages has been difficult to comply with.    
 This problem still endures after the translator’s work itself is finished. Even 
though there is not a third text from where one can judge a translation, this does not 
mean that the translation is exempt from criticism. And the best way to criticise a 
translation is to present a better one. Critique is perhaps too vague or general to 
constitute a principle in translations, but is, however, a necessary part of the 
translator’s labour. 
 Before elaborating further on the link between translation, hermeneutics, and 
anthropology, we will look at an example that may help us picture how Ricoeur 
argues about translation: Martin Luther’s translation of the Bible into German.   
 
9.7 Between fidelity and treason: Luther’s creation of comparable 
Translation is the construction of equivalence without identity or a comparable 
between two languages. This implies a continuity and rupture of meaning at the same 
time. Where continuity is ensured in the commitment or faithfulness to both the 
author and the reader, the ruptures reveal themselves in the betrayal of them. The 
fidelity is jeopardised in favour of a creative act which, at the same time, is, as 
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Ricoeur writes, a risk: “Grandeur of translation, risk of translation: creative betrayal 
of the original, equally creative appropriation by the reception language; construction 
of the comparable” (Ricoeur 2006:37).  
What then is a comparable? An example that is close to Ricoeur’s heart is the 
Martin Luther’s translation of the Greek Bible into German in the 16th century. 
Translations of the Bible had been undertaken before both to German and other 
languages, but Luther gave the first complete translation of the Greek and Hebrew 
texts to German without going through Latin. Luther also found the earlier German 
translations of parts of the Bible too close to the Latin, and he aimed at a 
Germanisation of the Bible. We are not forgetting the Geneva Bible or the Czech 
translation by the Moravian church.  However, these are not our focus here. Before 
Luther the translation of the Greek text had been done through Latin. The Catholic 
Church had thus had a monopoly on translation and interpretation of the Bible 
through the Latin language, which only the Church was the real possessor of. If we 
read Luther’s own thoughts on Bible translation in Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen, we 
can read his antiauthoritarian statement that: 
 
We do not have to ask the literal Latin how we are to speak German… Rather we must ask the mother 
in the home, the children on the street, the common man in the marketplace. We must be guided by their 
language, by the way they speak, and do our translating accordingly. Then they will understand it and 
recognize that we are speaking German to them (Luther 2003). 
 
What is striking when reading this is the central role the translation has in Luther’s 
reformation. As Luther’s credo was that the Bible is the only authority (sola 
scriptura), he opened the way for a thinking which did not have to go through the 
tradition of the Catholic Church. In order to realise the idea that the Bible is the only 
authority, everyone must be able to read it. Sola scriptura is no good if people cannot 
read the Bible. Luther’s solution is ingenious. Instead of everyone learning Latin, the 
only accepted translation language, which up until then had been reserved for the 
few, the meaning of the Hebrew and Greek texts became accessible in the language 
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of the people. In other words, Luther’s translation is not merely the effect of the idea 
of the Reformation; it could be understood as its articulation and realisation. Or 
differently put, would sola scriptura be equally meaningful without the translation of 
the Bible? The translation thus expresses the Reformation on a concrete and symbolic 
level. The real effect was, however, not only a change in the religious perception but 
the destabilisation of power. 
 Luther wanted to germanise the Bible by translating it into good German, the 
German of the people. However, it was not clear what good German meant as the 
Germans spoke a number of dialects (Mundarten). Antoine Berman describes the 
difficult balance. Luther’s double attempt was to balance the relation between 
German (Hochdeutsch) and the Hebrew and Greek text on the one hand, and between 
German Hochdeutsch and the other German dialects (Mundarten) on the other 
(Berman 1995: 46). So, in order for the German particularity to aquire universality in 
the sense of equality with Latin, it could not remain in the “pure” particularity of the 
dialects. However, without some continuity to the dialects (Mundarten), it would 
become too strong a homogenisation.   
 Even though Luther was convinced that the word of God could be received in 
the German language, he was not exempt from the paradoxical demand in all 
translation of serving two masters, the language of the original or the language of the 
reader. Even though the principle of taking the original to the reader’s language is the 
most common for all translation, Luther finds it also necessary to practice the other 
principle of taking the reader to the original’s language. As Franz Rosenzweig writes 
in his text “Die Schrift und Luther” (1974), Luther was conscious of the necessity to 
give room for the Hebrew language in order to fully appreciate the meaning of the 
text. It was thus sometimes necessary to go beyond the German normal language, as 
he explains in his foreword to the translation of the Psalms, and “get used to” such 
words (solche Worte behalten, gewohnen). In order to conserve the Hebrew meaning, 
which is stronger, he substitutes Gefangenden erlöset (liberated the imprisoned) with 
Gefängnis gefangen (imprisoned the prison/imprisonment) as an expression of what 
 225 
 
 
Christ has done. Now, what is interesting for our part is that Luther does not import a 
foreign word to express this, but twists the German language itself so that it can 
receive the proper meaning of the original. It is still German but Luther found (in 
Gefängnis gefangen) either a not yet actualised potential in the German language or 
constructed a new German phrase.       
 Antoine Berman writes, à propos the Lutherian Bible, that what this translation 
showed is that the development of one’s own culture goes through the other (Berman 
1995: 56). And as far as I can see, it is precisely this relation between self and other 
than self which is at stake in Ricoeur’s distinction between the two conceptions of 
identity (idem and ipse), in his own understanding of translation of course, and in 
Amselle’s conception of the branching of cultures. They are all based on the 
dialectical principle that there is no immediate access for a person or a collective to 
oneself.    
 The idea of the universal (as the word, reason, or right) in European history is 
accompanied by a notion of its linguistic form (Latin, French). Latin could thus be 
opposed by particular languages, or rather languages which were oral (vulgate) and 
without grammar on the one hand, and languages that had writing and grammar on 
the other. This notion of the universal as the opposite of the particular is, however, 
something that found its way into the thinking of the Enlightenment. But, as Richard 
Kearney points out, there were obstacles:  
 
The ideal in the century of Enlightenment of a universal perfect language was confronted with the 
resistance from cultural differences that rested on linguistic disparity... most attempts at founding one 
absolute language was found to be, de facto, an imperialist and cunning manoeuvre… which aimed at 
giving privilege to one particular language...in relation to the languages of subordinate countries or 
regions (Kearney 2008: 163).   
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, in a postcolonial context this holds true, and it is 
thus interesting to see Kanté’s strategy for coping with this problem. But this could 
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also be found within the western cultural sphere. Luther’s translation reflects this 
problem and its solution.  
 According to Annelise Senger, Luther viewed translation as reviving old 
German words rather than importing foreign elements. It is thus with some 
reservations, as we will see later, that one can claim that Luther did not homogenise 
the German language. As Luther states elsewhere in Sendbrief vom Dolmetschen, the 
most important element to be conserved from the original text is the meaning of the 
text.    
 For our part, the most interesting aspect of Luther’s translation is how German 
becomes a language that the “original” text could be translated into. How can this 
balance, which Berman describes as “neither Latin, nor pure dialect, but a generalised 
popular speech (parler)”, be articulated? German was up until then incomparable to 
Latin and thus inapt as translation-language. In other words, German was not an 
equivalent to Latin when it came to receiving the word of God. God did not speak 
German until Luther translated the Bible. Luther thus changed the perception of the 
German language. Ricoeur writes that: 
 
Luther not only constructed a comparable in translating the Bible into German, in “germanizing” it, as 
he dared say, in the face of St. Jerome’s Latin, but created the German language, as comparable to 
Latin, to the Greek of the Septuagint, and to the Hebrew of the Bible (Ricoeur 2006: 37). 
 
Once again, the significance that Luther’s translation had for the enlightenment 
philosophy a century later is striking. First of all, the Church was dethroned as 
authority. However, that does not imply a rejection of the universal as such. With 
some reservations one could perhaps localise Luther’s enterprise as being somewhere 
between the French and the German Enlightenment. The first is focused on 
dethroning all authorities with reference to metaphysics, tradition etc., but 
nevertheless preserves a centralist and anti-traditional universalism. The second is 
represented by, for instance, Herder, who criticises the rationalism of the authors of 
the encyclopaedia. Louis Dumont writes in Essais sur l`individualisme à propos 
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Herder that he criticises the Enlightenment for its vulgar rationalism, its narrow 
understanding of progress, and, above all, for the hegemony of this universalist 
rationalism (Dumont 1983: 137). Despite of Luther’s and Herder’s diverging views 
on translation, Luther initiated a criticism of the universalism on which Herder 
continues. Having said that, Luther’s enterprise is not a refutation of the universal in 
general, as Dumont proposes in the case of Herder. Rendering the word of God 
accessible for everyone in their own language, he rather introduces a destabilisation 
of the notion of the universal. In translation it is possible to grasp the universal in the 
particular.  
 Returning to the dilemma of treason and fidelity, what status does this 
conversion of signs have? Since there is no third text or criteria by which one can 
measure the correctness of a translation, one is left with the dilemma of treason and 
fidelity. And as Olivier Abel and Jerome Porée write, not even a true fidelity is an 
identical repetition. However, they write that “that does not mean that translation is 
treason... it is a creative fidelity“(Abel and Porée 2009: 125). They seem to indicate 
an opposition between treason and fidelity which creativity tries to surmount. This 
seems a bit odd, particularily in the light of Ricoeur’s own description of the grandeur 
of translation as “creative betrayal of the original“. I do agree that there is some sort 
of fidelity, but is it not necessary at some level to betray in order to be creative? Or is 
not creativity a kind of treason? To say that translation is not treason seems to be an 
attempt to escape the dilemma in favour of consistency of meaning. Having said that, 
what about fidelity and the limitation of creativity? After all, translation is not a total 
relativity. Creativity thus seems to be central to the articulation of the openness in 
translation that enables the transition between two languages.   
 We are now in a better position to understand the initial amplification of the 
comparable. Theoretically speaking, the construction of a comparable means three 
things: the comparable unites two entities that before where separated or 
heterogeneous. In this case the German written language unites the spoken German 
and the Hebrew and Greek original texts. Also, a language thought of as inferior is 
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lifted up as the equal to Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. And this equality is achieved 
without abandoning the German language tradition.  
 So going back to Ricoeur’s displacement from theory to practice, the question 
is not whether it is possible to translate the Bible, but to what degree the translation 
betrays or remains faithful to the original language and the language of the reader. 
Luther created what we can call an equivalent without adequation or identity, or, in 
other words, an equivalent without homogeneity.  
 Before elaborating on the theoretical aspects of translation, I will pause for a 
moment and recapitulate the main points so far. The introduction of translation into 
our reflection draws on the overall problematic of purity and the fact that both 
Amselle and Ricoeur turn to this concept when they criticise purity. Translation is, 
however, somewhat ambiguous in the sense that it both articulates a problem- that of 
misunderstanding, lack of understanding, perpetuated communication etc.- and a 
solution- that these obstacles are overcome through the practice of translating. Even 
though a solution is provided when a translation is given, an uncertainty nevertheless 
adheres to it: is the translation a good one?    
 Through the case of Luther’s translation of the Bible, we have a European 
equivalent to Soleyman Kanté, the case used by Amselle. Luther emphasises the 
connective aspects that Amselle speaks of, in the sense that German as a language 
can only become a language of its own after or through its connection to 
constellations of meanings or universals like the Bible. By finding equivalence 
between the Hebrew and Greek languages and the German dialects, German could be 
recognised as a particular language. But if this is possible, it opens up the question of 
how it is possible. Is there some common ground historically or in human nature 
which makes it possible? On the other hand, the failure to find the perfect translation 
might lead us to the opposite conclusion, that translation is impossible. In other 
words, we see here a parallel between the problems of translation and those of 
culture. As I see it, what we are struggling with, in both cases, is the epistemological 
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obstacle that hinders us in reflecting upon openness: openness is neither sameness nor 
difference.    
Does translation need a common ground or does the absence of a common 
ground render translation impossible? Or does the fact that we already have 
translations show that this question is perhaps not the right one? The phenomenology 
or practice of translation seems to assume and destroy the inside and outside of 
language at the same time. It assumes unity and diversity of language. So, my point 
is, there are some paradoxes in translation too.   
    
9.8 The parallel of language and culture 
How is Luther’s creation of a comparable relevant for the intercultural and the 
question of homogeneity? Luther’s translation gives us an example of what kind of 
thinking we can develop. Luther serves us in developing a thought image, to borrow 
an expression from Deleuze, without which it is difficult to renew any thinking. And 
again, it is the practice which shows us a possibility that theory cannot find by itself. 
Or as Ricoeur writes, paraphrasing Donald Davidson, translation is “Theoretically 
Difficult, Hard and Practically Simple, Easy” (Ricoeur 2006: 15). Having said that, 
the practices never articulate themselves but must be explicated.  
 I find Ricoeur’s take on this very interesting. The same way the creation of a 
comparable shows that the problem “if translation is possible” is a false or theoretical 
problem, the problem “if it is possible to live together in a culturally diverse society” 
is a false problem. The hypothetical if does not take into account the cases where the 
problem has already been overcome. And perhaps it is these latter cases that we 
should focus on understanding. But since this has been analysed by Ricoeur through 
Luther as a practical enterprise, he has found that the theoretical or hypothetical 
question is not the question that the translation responds to at all. The question is 
rather the degree of faithfulness or betrayal to one of the two languages. As far as I 
can see this is an insightful approach that is transferable to the question of culture. A 
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process of integration is perhaps rather a question of how faithful or how deceitful 
one could be.    
 Homogeneity in the sense of demand for adaptation is thus a response to a 
false problem. The demand for adaptation is a response to a problem which supposes 
that other cultures represent a threat to democracy and Norwegian society, French 
society etc. I am not making an invitation to relativism or a refutation of values, 
norms, and principles in our societies. Neither am I proposing a naïve attitude. There 
are of course groups and individuals who have no interest in democracy and rule of 
law, or who do not want to live together, and there are those who aim at founding 
society on alternative laws. But in this context as elsewhere, there are but 
potentialities, no guarantees.  
 My point is rather that this hypothetical if nurture itself on the oppositional 
logic of identity and difference which is common to both language and culture. The 
theory of translation asks if translation is possible or not and premises the outcome on 
either an identity of all languages in human nature or a common origin, or on the 
differences between the languages being insurmountable. This point is similar to that 
of Gullestad when she reflects on the imagined sameness which is a common cultural 
identity and origin. This sameness has as its opposite another and different cultural 
identity and origin. Following the egalitarian logic and its link to this imagined 
sameness, co-habitation is impossible because one has no original common ground. 
The hypothetical and the imagined have in common that they disregard practices that 
show something else than what theory allows for. What Gullestad does not take into 
account, is the practices or examples of successful intergration which could be 
subversive to the imagined sameness.      
 Luther’s problem was not whether or not the translation was possible, but 
rather if he would succeed in stabilising the tension between faithfulness and treason. 
But again, the problem is not theoretical but practical. Likewise, we must investigate 
multicultural society taking the practices that are already there in order to articulate 
that which is already possible in practice. The idea of a cultural sameness and the 
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demand for adaptation to our values do not render us capable of understanding the 
intercultural practices which are already there and which transgress our imagination. 
In the way in which translation as a practice transgresses our imagination, we must 
look into transcultural and intercultural practices that also transgress our imagination.    
 Further, as a result of this preliminary “deconstruction” of the question, comes 
the more constructive solution. In Luther’s case, the creation of a comparable 
combines entities (German and Greek) that before were separate or heterogeneous. 
Thus, Luther’s practice of translation has not only showed us a false or badly worded 
question. It has also given us, more specifically, a practical example which can reflect 
on cultural diversity. Translation as a practical activity overcomes obstacles of 
understanding. The fact that people go from not understanding to understanding one 
another is only understandable from the practice and theory of translation. The risk is, 
of course, that the translation becomes focused on adaptation.  
 In addition, the equal status of German and Latin is achieved without 
abandoning the German language and tradition. If the point of Luther’s translation 
was the creation of an equivalent without identity, a comparable to Latin, it is 
important due to the fact that it was no longer an obligation to learn Latin to read and 
hear the word of God. German received the status of universal equality to Latin, but 
kept its German particularity. German, as Bible-language, was the construction of an 
equivalent to Latin without being identical to Latin. To say that German is equivalent 
or comparable to Latin is to say that German and Latin are of equal worth, that it is 
possible to say the same in both languages, and that a complete homogenisation is not 
a premise for this.     
This gives us another interesting take on the comparison between language and 
culture. As I see it, there are some analogous points between the Latin-German 
opposition and the sameness-otherness opposition in a multicultural society. What 
Luther’s translation created, was an equality which is not based on sameness. Even 
though the German language is related to Latin, Greek, or Hebrew, it is not reducible 
to them. Instead a specific German branch of Christianity saw daylight and 
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augmented the spectrum of Christian religion. Equality thus meant creative 
contribution and recognition, but not on its own terms alone. Homogenisation, total 
adaptation, or cultural sameness is not a prerequisite for co-habitation and equality. 
What generates a feeling of equality is rather that one with one’s own background 
(culturally or not) can contribute to this co-habitation and perhaps broaden the 
imagination of what it means to be Norwegian, French etc.   
 Now, this parallel between language and culture has historical roots where our 
understanding of culture is affected by the way we understand languages. From this 
perspective the analogy between translation, as an intervention in the discussion of 
language and culture is perhaps not innovative in itself: there was a link between 
culture and language from the outset. And any discussion of language might thus 
potentially have an effect on how we think culture. The openness that Ricoeur is on 
to, and which we will return to, in translation gives us another approach to language 
and might affect our understanding of culture.      
 
9.9 Translation and identity 
As discussed earlier, translation can be examined on many different levels. And even 
though concrete translations to some extent guide our reflections, it is the 
philosophical and more abstract points that I see as fruitful for shedding some light 
on our problem of culture. One of the levels that I want to focus on and which is 
related to culture, is identity. And again it is interesting to see the comparison of an 
individual micro-level and a collective macro-level. 
There is a striking resemblance between Jean-Loup Amselle and Paul Ricoeur in 
their approach to the relation between identity and translation. Amselle writes that:  
 
The identity implicates immediately a translation and a conversion of the fact that it is a being for 
others…The expression of any identity supposes the conversion of universal signs in its own language 
or, the other way around, the conversion of one’s own signs into a planetary of signs in order to 
manifest its singularity (Amselle 2001: 59).    
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Something very similar is proposed by Richard Kearney in an article on Ricoeur’s 
philosophy of translation. Kearney writes that:  
 
translation indicates the ontological act of speaking in the way of not only translating one-self (from the 
inside to the outside, from private to public, from the unconscious to the conscious) but also, and more 
explicitly, to translate one-self for the others (Kearney 2008:160).  
 
If we are going to follow Amselle’s reasoning, that identity implicates the translation 
of one’s own being for others, this means that the language through which one does 
this is not entirely one’s own. And if the language of the other is necessary for me to 
be able to express myself, then this entails that I am originally not present to myself. 
Translation is thus implicated in this problem of identity and can, for Ricoeur’s part, 
be seen in continuity from the dialectics of selfhood and otherness discussed in the 
previous chapter. Dominico Jervolino states, in his book Paul Ricoeur. Une 
herméneutique de la condition humaine, that “Actually, in translation we are 
confronted with the problems of identity and alterity” (Jervolino 2002: 42). In light of 
what Kearney and Jervolino write, the point is that in order to express myself to 
others I must use a language that is not my own or I must translate myself into the 
language of the other.  
 However, this points, as far as I can see, to a more fundamental aspect. For 
when I must represent myself to others this is not a voluntary act but part of 
becoming myself. That which is other is constitutive of identity. Or differently put, 
there is no clear distinction between identity and alterity. In this sense translation is 
not something that comes posterior to my identity but is at the center of my being. In 
order to express myself and what I am, I must translate myself through another 
language. But this reveals again that this Self, that I take to be me, is not really 
distinguishable from otherness.     
 It is of course here relevant to mention the importance of Jürgen Habermas in 
the discussion of communication and the role of dialogue in his discourse ethics 
(Habermas 2003). When I write that I, in order to express myself, must translate 
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myself, this resembles perhaps something that Habermas says. Both he and Ricoeur’s 
philosophy of translation deal with the problem of communication and 
communication as constitutive for human beings and their rationality. However, what 
I find preferable with the way this is thought in Ricoeur is that translation questions 
homogenisation and includes a reflection on variation. What I think Luther’s case 
thus reflects is a reversal of the homogenising perspective. All were not forced to 
learn Latin. And even though translation might not be a “solution” to the problem of 
power (it is still a question of who translates what), translation has built into it a 
sensitivity to openness that goes both ways. In a situation where people with different 
backgrounds meet it seems strange to presuppose that a set of rules is already binding 
the participants.    
Furthermore, what is at stake on a theoretical level in translation is that it 
manages to balance both continuity and rupture when it comes to identity. With 
translation Amselle turns upside-down the problem of how to balance discontinuity 
and rupture, and of how it is possible to import foreign elements without alienating 
oneself completely from one’s own identity. But again, there is no pure identity from 
the outset. Discontinuity, continuity, identity, and difference are fixations of fluid 
elements. It is in this dynamic that translation and conversion create the process from 
which all other elements receive their significance.  
 Only a purification of the poles in translation fixes the identitites. This is 
important since it is from fixed identitites that we elaborate the way we think about 
culture. However, translation, both as practice and as theory, does not have fixed 
identities as a premise. And this hermeneutical point is what separates translation 
from those who claim that adaptation to our values is a necessity, and those who 
claim that an individual’s cultural belonging must be recognised. They both focus on 
the static relation between individuals and cultures. However, translation takes the 
dynamic and transformative aspect into account.  
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9.10 From comparison to the creation of a comparable  
Comparativism accounts for both similarity and difference. In order to identify 
something, it must be seen in relation to other similar things and contrasted to 
different things. Thus two things belonging to different groups of things can be 
identified by their similarity and difference to other things. However, difference here 
is an identifiable difference and not an unidentifiable difference. Is this then a true 
difference? What about that which is really different and cannot be compared? My 
second question is whether this logic of opposition is fruitful when it comes to 
describing what is human.   
 Taking the last question first, when we discuss the term diversity in relation to 
cultures this assumes an initial contrast or opposition between cultures which is due 
to a comparative approach. As long as diversity is understood through comparison, 
the diversity is always already determined. Jean-Loup Amselle underlines this in his 
critique of the comparative method in anthropology: 
 
It is thus not the notion of society that founds comparativism but the reverse: because I need to draw up 
classifications and typologies, I must have elements to classify, and if I can legitimately extract them 
from their context, it is because I have denied beforehand that these elements are political units situated 
in a sociocultural continuum (Amselle 1998: 10). 
 
In other words, from the perspective of what we perhaps could call a traditional 
comparativism, diversity is an identifiable diversity. And in this diversity there is no 
continuum but a series of identities and differences which are mutually exclusive. 
Now, this is underlined by Ricoeur too. Concerning the adjective “même”, Ricoeur 
writes: 
 
”Same“(même) is used in the context of comparison; its contraries are ”other”, ”contrary”, ”distinct”, 
”diverse”, ”unequal”, ”inverse”. The weight of the comparative use of the term ”same” seems so great 
to me that I shall henceforth take sameness as synonymous with idem-identity“ (Ricoeur 1992 : 3). 
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As far as I can see, Ricoeur’s claim is the same as Amselle’s: that comparison 
reproduces a binary logic, and that this binary logic is an abstraction that takes 
something out of its context. My point is not to get rid of comparison or diversity as 
such, but to reflect critically on how specific procedures give specific results. Is it 
possible to liberate diversity from this binary thinking?    
An interesting person in all this is Wilhem von Humboldt. Humboldt takes on 
comparison, translation, and diversity as concepts and is mentioned by both Amselle 
and Ricoeur. For Ricoeur, Humboldt’s concept of diversity informs us of a radical 
heterogeneity which immediately seems to lead to the conclusion that translation is 
impossible. Amselle sees a potential in Humboldt for a new anthropology which puts 
continuity at the centre of the analysis of societies.  
 Comparativism or comparison is in this sense an abstract procedure which 
reproduces the diversity of culture, but it does not take that which is not comparable 
into account. What is interesting to notice is that Ricoeur stated in Sur la traduction 
that translation is the creation of a comparable or an equivalent without identity. This 
equivalent is not assumed but produced. So even though Ricoeur and Amselle both 
criticise comparison, the kind of comparison they criticise is not the only one. And I 
think Ricoeur, through the case of Luther, is on to another way of thinking 
comparison which does not base comparison on similarity or on the abandoning of 
comparison in the light of cultural diversity. What is comparable is not possible due 
to an assumed third element that guarantees the translation or the comparability 
between what is compared. We cannot start off from some empirical assumption that 
what we are comparing is unified on the basis of a third underlying element. 
Comparison between different elements is a construction with all its shortcomings 
and deficiencies.    
Furthermore- with reference to the Hellenist Marcel Detienne and the 
philosopher of translation Antoine Berman- Ricoeur writes that comparison and 
translation are always facing what is alien, other, what cannot be compared. But 
should this lead us to abstain from comparisons? Or seen from the perspective of 
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translation; should the fact that something just is not translatable stop us from 
translating? Are translation and comparison limited to what is similar or the same? If 
we pause for a moment and look at some of the things that Marcel Detienne writes in 
Comparer l’incomparable (2009), he writes that comparison for him is experimental 
and constructivist. The comparison of two or more phenomena over time and space is 
not the result of an empirical fact, but something which appears through a human 
effort. From this perspective both the potential and the limitation of comparison are 
important. It is through comparison that the plurality and non-reducibility emerge as 
well as the continuity of phenomena through time and space. This can, as Detienne 
shows regarding the concept of “nation”, also augment or pluralise our understanding 
of something we thought to be univocal.   If we, however, do not attempt to compare 
the incomparable, then how should we aquire knowledge of that which we do not 
understand, and indirectly; how can we experience the limitations in our own 
knowledge and ultimately of ourselves? The constructivistic aspect can, as I see it, be 
interpreted in the same direction as Ricoeur interprets translation: as a way of 
continuing human action, communication, understanding etc. This leaves comparison 
in the humanitites and to a certain extent the social sciences as part of human 
existence. It is not cultures, societies, religions, languages that want to be compared; 
it is the human beings, incarnated as anthropologist, historian, or translator and the 
community they belong to, that want to be compared.    
 As we saw previously, Ricoeur displaces his focus from theory to practice 
when he examines translation. The practice of translation shows a paradox. On the 
one hand there is no third text to guarantee that the translation corresponds with the 
original text. On the other hand, translations are given despite this absence. From a 
theoretical point of view this is difficult to comprehend as translations must either be 
possible due to some shared historical origin or brainstructure, or impossible due to 
the difference of all languages. However, from a practical point of view, this 
opposition is overcome all the time. How is it overcome? 
 238 
 
 
 Translation is the creation of an equivalent without identity or the production 
of a comparable, Ricoeur states. In this I think it is vital to underline creation and 
production because the respective equivalent or comparable does not exist 
independently of the intellectual operation of comparing. In a similar way, 
comparison does not depend on an assumed similarity, sameness, or historical origin 
to that which is compared. However, it does not give up due to incomparables.  
 How is this different from the comparativism of identities and differences? 
There are, as I see it, some vital hallmarks that separate them. First of all, the 
productions of comparables are productions in the sense that they do not exist prior to 
the comparing act itself. It does not depend on an assumption of empirical or natural 
entities. Secondly, it does not exclude that which cannot be compared from the 
comparison. Thirdly, it does not reduce that which cannot be compared to something 
that can be compared. These two last points capture the meaning of the expression 
equivalent without identity. This means that comparison does not assume an identity, 
similarity, or sameness between what is compared, nor does it assume the inside and 
outside between he or she who compares and that which is compared. He or she who 
compares similarities and differences on the other hand does not stand in a relation to 
that which they compare. From a relational perspective the non-comparable aspect is 
respected but not rendered absolute. From an oppositional perspective, on the other 
hand, the non-comparable aspect becomes absolute. However, the non-comparable 
aspect does not hinder the construction of a comparable as such. 
 As the reader might notice there is an oscillation here between an 
epistemological concern, as already indicated in the first part, with having culture as 
an object of knowledge on the one hand and culture as part of a more human and 
existential concern on the other. Or differently put, the oscillation is between an 
anthropological philosophy, an epistemology of culture, and cultural identity politics. 
Following Ricoeur’s way of thinking as a mediation and the long route to being 
between the epistemological and existential, I do not think that these approaches 
stand in opposition to each other even though they are not identical problems. My 
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point is that one way comparison in anthropology could be “rescued” from Amselle’s 
critique- that comparison is a way of abstracting cultures and societies- and thus 
treats what is human as a thing- is to see it as part of a human existential need or 
desire. By relating comparison to the anthropologist, historian, translator, or 
whomever as a human being, and not as a scientist in the natural science kind of way, 
it makes sense that the opposition is between the anthropologist and the one he or she 
interacts with and tries to understand. But it goes deeper than this too, because 
comparison from a relational perspective could be seen as the anthropologist’s or the 
anthropological community’s own self-reflection.     
 
9.11 Translation as paradigm and/or metaphor? 
We must now reflect on how translation should be thought. As far as I see it, 
translation may be understood in at least two ways or on two levels: translation may 
be interpreted as a metaphor for culture or we may take the description that Ricoeur 
gives into account and call translation a paradigm.  
Translation is related to metaphor on two levels: Translation and metaphor are 
etymologically linked through Latin. The Latin word for metaphor is translation and 
both mean to carry over. In Latin to translate is: converto (-is, converti, conversum, -
Ɵre), transfƟro (-rs, transtǎll, translƗtum, -ferre), verto, (-is, verti, versum, -Ɵre). It is 
very interesting to see that the verb “to translate” as transfƟro is composed by trans 
(“beyond”, “across”) and the latin verb fƝrǀ (bear, carry) with the same etymological 
root as the ancient Greek ĳȑȡȦ (pherò) (Oxford English dictionary, 2013). Secondly, 
translation may be seen as a metaphor for culture in the sense that one speaks of 
cultural translations (Burke 2010, Chanson 2010).  Cultural processes, where 
elements from different places are imported, exported, borrowed, and exchanged, 
could be described as cultural translations. It is thus not far-fetched to speak about 
cultural translations the way we speak about cultural branchements. This could, in 
other words, be read as a transfer of meaning from language to culture and translation 
is hence a metaphor. Having said that, translation seems to have an even larger 
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meaning as an articulation of a model for understanding the human existence. For in 
Sur la traduction, Ricoeur names one of the texts « Le paradigme de la traduction ». 
The question is if metaphor narrows the analytical and epistemological potential and 
whether we should rather see translation as Ricoeur does: as a paradigm.    
 
9.12 What does “translation as a paradigm” mean? 
Paradigm as a concept is inevitably linked to Thomas Kuhn and his Structure of 
scientific revolutions. However, its original meaning is from Ancient Greek: 
ʌĮȡȐįİȚȖȝĮ (para-deigma, model, pattern, exemplar), coming from ʌĮȡĮįİȓțȞȣȝȚ 
(paradeiknumi, I demonstrate clearly) composed by ʌĮȡȐ (para, "beside, near") + 
įİȓțȞȣȝȚ (deiknumi, "I show" “I indicate” “I point out”) (Oxford English dictionary, 
2013). 
Whereas a metaphor is a transfer of meaning from one domain to another, a 
paradigm seems to me to be something else than a metaphor as it does not take 
separate domains and put them together. When something is a paradigm it is a model 
for other things. And as far as I can see this means that what it is a model for must 
somehow be unified. The example or model is somehow unifying.    
 When Ricoeur enters this second text in Sur la traduction he marks two paths 
which give us access to the problem asked by the act of translation. The first is 
translation in the strictest sense of transferring a verbal message from one language to 
another. The second takes translation in a more general sense as a synonym for 
interpretation of everything meaningful within one linguistic community. The former 
is followed by Antoine Berman, the latter by George Steiner. As I understand it, 
Ricoeur’s point is that they articulate two aspects of the paradigm of translation. 
Berman focuses on the problem of alterity, whereas Steiner focuses on translation as 
almost synonymous with interpretation: translation to Steiner is not just a process of 
transition between two languages; it is also articulating processes within one 
language. So vital to the paradigm of translation is alterity and that alterity is “inside 
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us”. When Ricoeur in this text articulates what lies behind the notion of paradigm, he 
turns to ethics: 
 
It is here that I return to my title: the paradigm of translation. Indeed, it seems to me that translation sets us not 
only intellectual work, theoretical or practical, but also an ethical problem. Bringing the reader to the author, 
bringing the author to the reader, at the risk of serving and betraying two masters: this is to practice what I like 
to call linguistic hospitality. It is this which serves as a model for other forms of hospitality that I think 
resemble it: confessions, religions, are they not like languages that are foreign to one another, with their 
lexicon, their grammar, their rhetoric, their stylistic which we must learn in order to make our way into them 
(Ricoeur 2006: 23-24)? 
 
So, linguistic hospitality is a model or paradigm. Ricoeur asks if the confessions and 
the religions are not like languages, strangers to one another. But my question is why 
this is not a metaphor. And if it is not merely a metaphor but a paradigm, what does 
this mean? As far as I can see, it has to mean something deeper and broader, 
something that transgresses the separate domains. Even though translation comes 
from the practice of language exchange, language as such does not give us 
perspectives on translation. On the contrary, it is translation as a concept, as a model 
or paradigm, that gives perspectives on language. But language is one of several 
things that translation can give perspective on. It is not language but translation that is 
a paradigm. Paradigm thus means something that is a model for something else. 
Translation is a model for language, for ethics, for ontology, for hermeneutics, for 
culture.  
Now, a paradigm following the definition given above is that which one shows 
by giving an example. But what is it with translation that makes it a model, example, 
or paradigm for all the other domains and joins them?  
 
9.13 The paradigm of openness 
Ricoeur writes that the paradigm of translation is linguistic hospitality. This linguistic 
hospitality is to understand that which is alien in order to penetrate it. But why is this 
a paradigm and not something metaphorical? After all, he describes confessions, 
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religions as (comme) languages. It could at least be regarded as a comparison or as a 
simile. What Ricoeur must mean by calling it a paradigm is that it goes deeper and 
wider than comparison.  
 In the secondary literature on Ricoeur’s philosophy of translation, paradigm is 
mentioned many times. Richard Kearney writes in two (very similar) texts, Le 
paradigme de la traduction and Vers une hermeneutique de la traduction, about 
translation as a linguistic, ontological, anthropological, and hermeneutic paradigm. 
Kearney writes that “Ricoeur is holding the view that good translations require a 
radical openness towards the other” (Kearney 2008: 161). And further: “the 
translation exposes us to what is other (l’étranger). We are at the same time involved 
with an alterity residing outside ourselves (en dehors du chez-soi) and an alterity 
residing inside” (Ibid: 164).This point of an alterity residing inside ourselves is a 
point underlined many times by Ricoeur and originally borrowed from Georg Steiner, 
who, in his book After Babel, writes about translation internal to a cultural and 
linguistic domain. Consistent with my thesis I do not want to go much into the ethical 
aspects of translation. But can I then get to the bottom of understanding translation as 
paradigm otherwise? It seems like the epistemology of translation and the question of 
whether it is a paradigm or a metaphor are confronted with a fundamentally ethical 
question of openness. If translation and the linguistic hospitality are about openness, 
then the epistemological and the ethical problem coincide. Ricoeur’s philosophy of 
translation is a philosophy of hospitality which points to an openness. And even 
though this could easily be interpreted as an ethical statement, does it not equally 
hold as an epistemological statement about the practice of translation? This is not a 
relativist point of view. In order for a translation to be good, both languages must be 
open: otherwise it is not a translation. My point is that openness here is an 
epistemological category. Openness accounts for the silent rules which govern the 
practice of translation.  
But if we return to the concept of paradigm and see this in relation to 
openness, it points further than merely an epistemological observation. When Ricoeur 
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calls translation a paradigm- comprised of ethical, linguistic, ontological, 
anthropological, and hermeneutic aspects of human existence- this points again to the 
overall theme and problem of the dissertation of a closing of culture. If translation is a 
paradigm not only limited to an epistemological perspective, it could mean that it is a 
way of articulating intercultural thinking theoretically. 
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10. Tradition, plurality, challenges, and potentials46 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter I want to continue the reflections on translation commenced in the 
previous chapter. Language is, following Amselle, historically and epistemologically 
linked to culture through linguistic classification and a certain “system of 
oppositions”. And since translation concerns language translation is indirectly 
relevant to culture. As we saw with Ricoeur the displacement from theory to practice 
gave us a certain take on translation that made it possible to question the logic of 
opposition. And it is in this displacement that what he calls “linguistic hospitality” is 
revealed. Since the practice of translation is occupied with the question of treason and 
fidelity towards the readers and the author’s language at the same time, what is 
revealed is an openness between languages. So, when Ricoeur calls translation a 
paradigm it is this openness that he has in mind. Having said that, translation is also 
hallmarked by an obstacle: it is the obstacle in communication that spurs the 
translation in the first place. So in some way or another we are left with a kind of 
paradox of openness and hindrance in translation. This takes us into two further 
considerations regarding translations, tradition and plurality, and these will be the 
main focus in this chapter.  
 First, the theme of culture and its purity, closure, or openness is linked to other 
concepts such as tradition. As Galty and Leavit writes in Dictionnaire de l’ethnologie 
et de l’anthropologie a vital aspect in how we think culture is through transmission, 
normally illustrated with the use of words like tradition (PUF, 2004). On the other 
hand translation too is linked to tradition, etymologically as well as philosophically. 
Etymologically translation is linked to tradition in the sense that both articulate the 
                                              
46Parts of this chapter have been presented at the conference "La traduction / la transmissibilité et la 
communication transculturelle dans les sciences sociales" at École des hautes etudes en sciences sociale in 
2010. I would also like to thank Ida-Johanne Gamborg Lillebø for comments on parts of this chapter.  
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transportation of something from one time or place to another. Philosophically 
translation and tradition are joined in the problem of hermeneutics and interpretation.  
The second consideration is related to the first. The paradox of openness and 
hindrance in translation articulates how plurality and reflexivity are part of human 
existence and that this has consequences for how we think tradition and culture. From 
the perspective of translation tradition and culture are not containers that human 
beings are trapped within. Following George Steiner and Paul Ricoeur translation is 
not only mediating between different languages; they show that translation just as 
much articulates an aspect of language itself, internal to one language: translation is 
something we all do in order to make ourselves understood and in understanding 
others. Human beings must translate because we exist as plural. In other words, 
translation thus articulates an original plurality that comprise also those living within 
the same culture or tradition.     
The chapter will be divided in three parts. In the first I will join with 
hermeneutics and look at the relation between translation and tradition. In the second 
part I will look at how translation articulates plurality and reflexivity. And in the last 
part I will take up some general considerations concerning translation.    
 
10.1 The question of tradition 
We will in the following paragraphs look at tradition. There are two reasons for this.  
The first is the strong link between hermeneutics, tradition, and translation. 
Translation is, as we have indicated with Schleiermacher and Ricoeur, related to 
interpretation, and interpretation is in its turn linked to tradition. From the outset the 
German theory of translation from Luther to Schleiermacher holds recognition of the 
German culture, language, and tradition as the most important aspect. Secondly, as 
the overall problem is the notion of culture, tradition is, if not synonymously with 
culture, at least an aspect or perspective on culture. We say for instance “cultural 
tradition”. There is a temporal aspect which is perhaps not so clearly present in 
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culture. Cultural customs come from transference of something in and through time. 
A tradition thus both conserves and generates something over time.  
 In Dictionnaire de l’ethnologie et de l’anthropologie the authors behind the 
article on culture, J. Galty and J. Leavitt, state that cultural anthropologists have 
directed their attention at a fundamental characteristic of culture, that of 
transmission : “ Transmission is normally explicated or illustrated with the use of 
words or expressions such as « tradition », « custom », « cultural tradition », 
« cultural héritage »”(PUF, 2004 :190) The transmission and tradition of culture 
further testify to the temporality of culture.  Or rather, a cultural tradition is the 
transmission of something over time. The question is how to describe this process of 
transmission. Is it a ruptured or a continuous process? And does a tradition stand in a 
ruptured/continuous relation to itself, and likewise to traditions that can be considered 
as other?  
 By asking these questions we enter into a problematic of translation. However, 
before doing so we need to say something about alternative approaches to tradition. 
First, an almost naturalised conception of tradition, the perspective of “the native”. 
Secondly, those who challenge the view that traditions are natural by claiming 
traditions are constructions. A third conception is that of hermeneutics emanating 
from the German Romantic tradition. A forth one could perhaps be that of the 
Enlightenment. But we will not focus so much on this. A common trait of these 
approaches is that they, consistent with the hypothesis of the dissertation, to a 
different degree have a non-dialectical understanding of tradition. On the one hand 
tradition is thought of as the truth or as natural. On the other, tradition is thought of as 
invented and ideological.47 Translation rejects and embraces elements of both. 
 
                                              
47 There has been a lot of research in the last decades on the invention-aspect of both culture and tradition. Roy Wagner’s 
The invention of culture and Hobsbawn’s Invention of tradition are well known examples. But even though this is 
interesting, I will not discuss this topic further here.   
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10.1.1 The Enlightenment’s view of tradition and prejudgment  
As touched upon earlier in this chapter the heritage from the Enlightenment in 
today’s debates on multicultural society is that specific cultural traditions have no 
place on the public arena.48 An example of the Enlightenment’s view of tradition can 
be seen in Diderot’s article in l’Encyclopedie on the concept “eclectic “. The thinker 
who is eclectic and dares to think for himself is the one who trample on (foulant aux 
pieds) prejudgement, tradition and authority (Diderot 1986: 7). We recognise of 
course this ideal of independent thinking from Descartes to Kant. What interests us 
here, however, is that prejudice, tradition, ancienneté, and authority are used as 
synonyms for a backwards kind of thinking, something that we as enlightened beings 
should have overcome. It is this negative attitude towards tradition that Gadamer and 
Ricoeur criticises, though in different ways.  
  What interests Gadamer in the Enlightenment is the discrediting of 
prejudgements and authority. However, the demand from the Enlightenment of 
transgressing all prejudgement proves for Gadamer itself to be a prejudgment 
(Gadamer 1998: 276). To Gadamer this proves two points: that the enlightened 
subject is an illusion and that the enlightened ideal contradicts itself. As Gadamer 
claims, there is no point from where one can make judgments without calling upon a 
tradition which has not itself been questioned. A judgment has always something 
prior, a pre- (judgment). It is the importance of the adherence to a cultural tradition 
which renders recognition an ethical obligation according to for instance Charles 
Taylor. From this perspective tradition is relevant in a multicultural society. Having 
said this, it is on the other hand just as important to question the assumptions of 
homogeneity and continuity of tradition. 
 What Gadamer is trying to do is rehabilitate prejudgments by displacing the 
view that prejudgments replace proper judgments and see prejudgment as a source for 
                                              
48This does of course not correspond to reality. In Norway for instance arguments that new citizens must adapt to the 
specific Norwegian culture is mixed with more abstract and universal republican values such as democracy, rule of law, 
and freedom of expression.  
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truth.49 The authority of a prejudgment is rather constituted in the recognition of the 
authority of others. And it is here that Gadamer localises a particular kind of 
authority: tradition. Tradition is an authority that has become nameless.   
 
10.1.2 Hermeneutics and tradition between rupture and continuity 
Now, contrary to the Enlightenment’s critique of tradition and the romantic attempt to 
rehabilitate it, Gadamer sees his own project as a philosophical hermeneutics. As far 
as I understand Gadamer’s way of reasoning, a common focus for both the 
Enlightenment and Romanticism- as mirroring the Enlightenment- is the focus on 
method. Whereas the Enlightenment focused on the way or path (method) to true 
knowledge free of prejudgment, the Romantics turned this into a history of different 
kinds of prejudgments and traditions and that these had to be understood on their own 
premises. Instead of a negative evaluation of tradition the Romantics had a more 
positive approach. The point is that this led again to the search for a method of 
understanding the different periods of time. In other words, the Romantics broke with 
the Enlightenments negative view of other people and other historical periods. But 
they also continued the tradition for thinking method: the reading of authors who 
lived in another time and another context than the reader led also to the question of 
how we can understand a period and context different from our own. The Romantic 
hermeneutics is reflection on the method for understanding texts that are different.  
 This takes us back to what we saw with Schleiermacher. Following Berman, 
Schleiermacher is a kind of transitional figure in the development of a modern 
hermeneutics as he links translation and understanding for the first time.50 By linking 
subjectivity, expressivity, and language, the understanding of human beings requires 
                                              
49Gadamer writes that “The Enlightenment’s distinction between faith in authority and using one’s own reason is, in itself, 
legitimate. If the prestige of authority displaces one’s own judgement, then authority is in fact a source of prejudices. But 
this does not preclude its being a source of truth, and that is what the Enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all 
authority” (Gadamer 1998: 279).  
50Berman writes that: “one must consider him the founder of this modern hermeneutics which aims at being a theory of 
understanding” (Berman 1995: 227). 
 249 
 
 
the understanding of their particular language, which renders the question of 
translation pivotal.  The author’s cultural, historical, and linguistic difference or 
specificity becomes the object of study and places the topic of translation at the centre 
of hermeneutics. On the other hand, Schleiermacher’s hermeneutics must be seen in 
relation to his dialectical thinking (Skorgen in Lægreid and Skorgen 2006: 94). For 
the difference or specificity of the author cannot be understood in an absolute 
manner. The author does not have a privileged or direct access to or understanding of 
his own work, only an indirect or mediated (dialectical) access. And this mediated 
access is presented through interpretation.  
 What I find very interesting with this is that Schleiermacher’s thinking seems 
akin to that of Ricoeur (and the role he gives to the act of reading) and that this way 
of thinking dialectically is relevant for our overall problematic of inside and outside. 
By thus questioning the author’s access to his own work we have something to learn. 
The cultural and temporal distance that separates us is not absolute since the idea of a 
clear cut distinction between an inside or outside of ourselves is not tenable. In this 
sense Schleiermacher’s thinking contains both a thinking of rupture and continuity. 
There is a (cultural and historical) rupture between the reader and the author which 
requires that we can handle the epistemological obstacles of understanding that which 
is foreign, and there is a continuity in the sense that this rupture is not total because 
the author is not present to him- or herself. As far as I can see this opens also to 
questioning tradition, which I aim to do in the following. For the time being I find it 
noteworthy to see that Schleiermacher’s thinking helps us to do this.    
 Going back to the point of departure; so where should we place 
Schleiermacher? Is his hermeneutics a philosophy of truth or a method, to put it in 
gadamerian terms? On the one hand he recognises, as Berman underlines, the alterity 
of the other in translation, on the other hand there is a more general truth that all 
understanding is dialectical. Or, as Torgeir Skorgen points out, one finds both a focus 
on method and rules on the one hand and a recognition of more general philosophical 
insights on the other (Ibid 2006: 101).  
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10.1.3 The ontologisation of hermeneutics and tradition 
If we now join with the question of tradition, that we discussed moments ago, in 
relation to Gadamer, we saw that whereas the hermeneutical tradition was originally 
driven by the epistemological problem of understanding and accounting for the 
obstacles that we encounter when reading, Gadamer turns understanding into an 
ontological question marked by Martin Heidegger.  
 We do not have the time or place to go thoroughly into Heidegger’s thinking 
here, but pivotal to Gadamer’s elaboration of hermeneutics in the continuation of 
Heidegger is the latter’s reflections on Wirkungsgeschichte. The past concerns human 
existence (Dasein) in the sense that it shapes our relation to our future. Since one 
hallmark of existence is being interpretive and constantly attempting to seize future 
challenges, dangers, and possibilities, we draw on past experiences or rather the 
tradition we are part of and which has shaped us. In this sense we always already 
make pre-judgments and always already understand what lies ahead of us. A part of 
Heidegger’s thinking is thus to make us aware of our own pre-judgments and then 
open up to the otherness of the other’s speech or writing (Ibid 2006: 195).       
 Now this description of existence as hallmarked by a search for understanding 
is continued by Gadamer. Like Heidegger, Gadamer found the pre-judgments of 
experience to be both productive and limiting. Pre-judgments are productive in the 
sense that without them there is only chaos, on the other hand they are limiting to the 
degree that they hinder us from opening up to new experiences. But, following 
Gadamer, we cannot imagine ourselves without them because they say something 
about us as human beings trying to understand our own existence. And in order to 
understand our own existence we draw on the historical tradition we are part of. A 
vital part of the historical tradition that interests Gadamer is texts. The historical texts 
of the tradition are, however, not merely of the past but can say something about us 
as human beings here and now. And from this perspective history is more than a past 
long gone.   
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10.1.4 Gadamer and Ricoeur 
What is, however, problematic with separating truth and method is that one loses 
sight of the epistemological dimension and ability to criticise and call into question. 
But how is this possible when these questions always already must use a language 
which itself is forged through a tradition? Ricoeur establishes an argument that does 
not assume a rationality outside tradition à la the Enlightenment thinkers, but which 
on the other hand does not eclipse reason with tradition.  
 Even though translation, as will be discussed later, is the possibility of saying 
the same thing in another way and shows that any use of language is not totally fixed 
and determined, which indicates that we are not determined to think according to one 
set of norms and regulations, this does not mean that this reflexivity is detached from 
a context or tradition. As seen with Luther, the creation of a comparable makes it 
possible to not break with the German language but find in the German vulgate a 
reservoir of its own which was just as capable as Latin of expressing the Hebrew and 
Greek language.  
 Daniel Frey calls tradition a universel concret and describes it as “the unit of 
cultural discourses and practices from where thinking chooses its objects…the 
phenomena of receptivity which renders thinking possible…in all cultures” (Frey 
2009: 86). So, even though reflexion and thinking are not determined, that does not 
mean that there is no point of departure. Tradition as receptivity is this point of 
departure from and on which the reflection reflects. Translation thus has an impact on 
the imagination to such a degree that a complete liberation from tradition or a 
structuring of the world would not only be difficult, but would lead into chaos. 
Imagination opens up, but the imagination also binds and produces a relatively stable 
scheme.  
 However, there are different notions of tradition around, also within what we 
could call the hermeneutical tradition. In order to understand Ricoeur, it may be 
interesting to situate him in relation to other hermeneutics such as Hans-Georg 
Gadamer. By this I do not claim to fully do Gadamer justice, but only outline a 
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difference between him and Ricoeur in order to understand how Ricoeur thinks 
tradition. Frey underlines an important distinction between tradition as synonymous 
with truth and tradition as condition for the possibility of truthful understanding 
(“tenir-pour-vrai”). I think this is an interesting distinction. Whereas Gadamer is 
more on the side of the former, Ricoeur is more on the side of the latter. Frey writes 
that in Gadamer’s thinking there is an appeal “to recognize the authority of the 
tradition…the hermeneutic analysis of Gadamer culminates in the recognition of the 
already expressed meaning and the values already recognised in the tradition ” (Frey 
2009: 87). But, even though one has an understanding of the world from a certain 
point of view, this does not render it legitimate to draw the conclusion that one has a 
privileged access to the truth or that the Tradition is the truth.51 This plural aspect is a 
limitation of the relativistic aspect and becomes, as we will, see paramount in the 
articulation of the intercultural. It is not possible to build a society together based on 
the idea of exclusive access to the Truth through one’s proper religious or cultural 
Tradition. But that does not render cultural traditions illegitimate as foundation for 
reasoning as such.  
  Now, it seems like Gadamer and Ricoeur supply us with different conceptions 
or states of tradition which again give us two different points of departure for 
developing criticism. Frey, in his book L’interprétation et la lecture chez Ricoeur et 
Gadamer, nevertheless underlines that the difference between these two does not lie 
in the use of different concepts but in different understandings of the same concepts. 
According to Frey this must be seen on the background of the hermeneutical 
traditions of Wilhelm Diltey and Martin Heidegger. Whereas Diltey is concerned 
with the epistemology of interpretation, Heidegger questions the nature of 
understanding. For the latter understanding is a characteristic (an existential) of 
                                              
51This perspectivist thinking is criticised by Louis Dumont as part of a modern ideology. The problem with what he calls 
the modern ideology is that “the moderns” deny other people their own claim of being “the only people” with exclusive 
access to the truth.  As one can imagine this denial of hierarchy produces problems in our understanding of others. 
Secondly, it paradoxically reintroduces a hierarchy between those with and without the ability to relativise their own 
perspectives. Essais sur l`individualism, Homo hierarchicus, Homo equalis.    
 253 
 
 
Dasein, or being-in-the-world, and precedes any question of knowledge (Frey 2008: 
45). We always already (immer schon) understand the world in a pre-intellectual 
manner. The epistemological question of how do I have knowledge is thus a question 
which arrives posterior to understanding. Heidegger’s hermeneutic asks the question 
of what is this being whose mode of being is to understand. In the tradition from 
Diltey the matters are different because he seeks the specific method for the 
Geistwissenschaften as contrary to the natural sciences. With Heidegger hermeneutics 
becomes part of a philosophy of existence and turns away from method altogether. 
The question of method arrives too late so to speak.  
 Driven by the heideggerian ontology of the pre-intellectual understanding and 
the intertwining into the tradition, Gadamer defends tradition by attacking the 
approach to tradition from the Enlightenment thinkers. In Warheit und Methode he 
writes that “Reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms-i.e., it is not its 
own master but remains constantly dependent on the given circumstances in which it 
operates” (Gadamer 1998: 276). And further on in a now famous phrase: “Long 
before we understand ourselves through the process of self-examination, we 
understand ourselves in a self-evident way in the family, society, and state in which 
we live” (Ibid). A multicultural situation, with people from different cultural, 
religious, and linguistic traditions and denominations living together, shows that we 
cannot take for granted such always already pre-understanding of ourselves (in 
selbstverständliche Weise). And we could radicalise it by saying that this cannot be 
taken for granted with respect to the human condition as such, regardless of the 
singular situation. My point is that we cannot assume the clear cut distinction of 
inside and outside of tradition, or that we understand ourselves completely on the 
inside. It is perhaps more evident in a situation where we speak different languages, 
but nevertheless, translations are necessary for the human condition as such. The 
point is not so much to criticise Gadamer, but rather to ask if the notion of translation 
articulates something in relation to traditions that is not thematised by Gadamer. I 
agree with Gadamer that the individual is a problematic assumption in Enlightenment 
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thinking, but, on the other hand, so is the self-evident understanding of ourselves 
which Gadamer subscribes to: “The self-awareness of the individual is only a 
flickering in the closed circuits of historical life” (Ibid). From this perspective every 
initiative, every repetition, must be reduced to the current of history. But what 
happens when the current breaks down and is disrupted, and when new elements are 
introduced? Prejudgement developed and transferred through tradition might be 
necessary for understanding, but that does not as far as I can see make understanding 
necessary.  
 I find this an interesting insight from translation the way Ricoeur explains it 
and this makes it a fruitful input to the idea of being outside or inside a tradition. It is 
neither nor. Translation and interpretation become necessary where the understanding 
breaks down, and this might happen to someone on the “inside” as well. Translation 
shows that understanding is not necessarily our point of departure or that this 
understanding does not become total.     
 From this it seems that while Gadamer seems to claim that our way of 
reasoning and understanding is always already woven into a tradition, Ricoeur seems 
to claim that we are never completely inside it. This is what renders critique possible 
and legitimate. Ricoeur does not claim that we are outside it, but as long as 
translations are needed (and here translation is not temporary but a part of the human 
condition) it demonstrates the alienated dimension of human existence as well as the 
open dimension of human existence. While understanding is assumed in Gadamer, 
misunderstanding stands as an important part in Ricoeur’s analysis.  
 We may not, as Gadamer underlines, ever find a position outside the tradition 
we belong to and from where we can unprejudiced perceive things “as they are”. 
Here Gadamer seems to have a point against the Enlightenment thinkers when they 
wanted to establish a method that could ensure a judgement without prejudices. For, 
is not the claim dear to the Enlightenment that “every authority should be 
questioned”, a claim that itself is above questioning? In other words, it must be 
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understood within a tradition of criticism which hence is a source of truth. And an 
important source for criticism resides within the tradition.  
 However, it is not the only one. Criticism is also possible because there is a 
rupture which source is not intellectual but which is linked to the human condition. 
Even though tradition is vital to our thinking, it does not follow from this that this 
tradition is homogenous, closed, static, or that being related to it is to avoid 
misunderstanding. Gadamer claims that the critical thinking of the Enlightenment 
must be understood as being within a tradition, but this rules out a questioning which 
arises from the absence of understanding or from the experience that the tradition one 
“belongs” to just does not make sense.  
 Ricoeur, on the other hand, seems to subscribe to the view that we are related 
to a tradition, but that this tradition is not closed. Otherwise, we would not need 
translations. It is because something is open and understanding is not immediately 
given that the space of interpretation and translation is open. So, since we need 
translations, we are never completely absorbed by the tradition or traditions to which 
we belong. Misunderstanding is not merely failure to comprehend what someone says 
because it is said in a different language; it is also the absence of understanding of 
one’s own language. As George Steiner discusses translation is not just a response to 
the barrier between two different languages but also within one language. From this 
crack in the horizon of understanding doubts and errors leak out. The reason and 
source of these cracks and leaks is the absence of a standard that can measure our 
level of understanding and the ability of our translations. The translation has no 
original to which it can correspond perfectly. This is the point from where we can ask 
questions.  
 
10.1.5 Translation, hermeneutics, and tradition 
How does the concept of translation fit with hermeneutics and the concepts of 
interpretation and tradition? First of all, translation is related to hermeneutics in the 
sense that interpretation and translation both have a common root in the Greek 
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concept hermeneuein. So from the outset there is a close kinship between translation 
and interpretation. Even the art of oral translation is called interpretation and not 
translation. In other words, to be able to translate one must be fit to interpret. The link 
between translation and hermeneutics is established by many scholars. Richard 
Kearney writes that “From the moment there is language there is interpretation, 
which means translation” (Kearney 2008: 163). Whereas Domenico Jervolino 
describes, in his book Ricoeur. Herméneutique et traduction, this relation as a sort of 
division of labour:  
 
We would here just like to underline that translation is at least one of the interpretative practices which 
theoretical practice is represented by hermeneutics. Our problem consists in seeing to what point translation 
can shed some light on interpretation as such (Jervolino 2007: 72).  
 
Is it a question of practice (of translation) and theory (interpretation)? It seems 
difficult to say that the one is possible without the other. Interpretation is to a certain 
point implicit in the operation of translation; we interpret in order to translate. But on 
the other hand, we translate in order to interpret. In both cases one attempts to bridge 
a gap or surmount a barrier, and in both cases openness becomes visible to us. I am 
open to letting something (a book, another person, or a language) affect me at the 
same time as this book, person, or language is open for me to enter into.      
 I think Ricoeur’s interest in translation fits very well with his more general 
view on hermeneutics which from the outset is fundamentally conflict- and problem-
driven. By emphasising the reasons for translating and interpreting, Ricoeur 
introduces the cultural and temporal distance rather than the always already 
overcoming of this distance in understanding.  
 In one of the essays from Du texte à l’action Ricoeur takes up the opposition 
between “alienating distanciation and belonging” when discussing the debate 
between Gadamer and Habermas (Ricoeur 2008: 72). At stake here is the tension 
between a critique of ideologies and a hermeneutics of traditions. As Gadamer, 
through Heidegger, lays emphasis on prejudgment and understanding as hallmarks of 
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existence-human beings attempt to understand their own being- this activity 
sediments a tradition which acquires authority when it comes to truth. On this 
background Habermas sees it pertinent to oppose this hermeneutics of traditions with 
a critique of ideologies consistent with the criticism of the social sciences. How can 
we question the authority of the tradition, its truth, with a hermeneutics which has 
become ontological, particularly when this is driven by consensus? Is agreement 
written into our being? From Gadamer’s point of view it is, however, relevant to ask 
from where a criticism could be articulated if not from within a certain tradition 
which structures this same criticism. Ricoeur summarises: « A gulf therefore divides 
the hermeneutical project, which puts assumed tradition above judgment, and the 
critical project, which puts reflection above institutionalized constraint» (Ricoeur 
2008: 282). Now, Ricoeur abstains from trying to found these in a synthesis and 
acknowledges that they do speak of different things, but he asks if it possible that the 
one might recognise the legitimacy of the other’s challenge. This goes as follows: 
How can a philosophical hermeneutics account for criticism of ideologies, and can a 
criticism of ideologies be detached from hermeneutical presuppositions?  
 Given that the epistemological and methodological question after Heidegger is 
deemed too late compared to the always already given structures of understanding: 
how is it possible to be critical in hermeneutics, Ricoeur asks. As Gadamer is 
concerned, Ricoeur sees the main obstacle for recognising the challenge from 
Habermas to be that his hermeneutics refutes the alienating distanciation. What kind 
of openness does an ontologisation of hermeneutics allow and what kind of openness 
does a critical hermeneutics with the dialectics between belonging alienating 
distanciation allow? And here we are at the core of our question of openness (of 
culture). For if we are guided by a thinking that does not allow distance, it becomes 
impossible to break out of our own horizon and modify our own perception. As a 
possible approach Ricoeur then introduces the notion of mediation and links it with 
tradition. As we saw in a previous chapter, it is by the long way through the works, 
texts, and documents of the tradition (and perhaps through the dialogue with others) 
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that we attempt to understand our own existence. And it is in this mediation that 
Ricoeur reintroduces critique. By opening up for mediation as a fundamental aspect 
of human existence, it becomes possible to come on the outside of one’s own 
tradition. How is mediation possible, i.e. how is distance possible without the 
refutation of tradition altogether? Ricoeur thus makes the tension between alienation 
and understanding into the driving force itself of hermeneutics:  
 
My own interrogation proceeds from this observation. Would it not be appropriate to shift the initial 
focus of the hermeneutical question, to reformulate the question in such a way that a certain dialectic 
between the experience of belonging and alienating distanciation becomes the main spring, the key to 
the inner life of hermeneutics (Ibid: 289) ? 
 
Ricoeur goes on to “deconstruct” hermeneutics and criticism by showing that the one 
is contained in or presupposes the other. He builds among other things on an 
argument from Dilthey’s distinction between understanding and explanation but 
without accepting Dilthey’s division of labour between natural science and the 
humanities. It is not a question of truth or method as Gadamer claims, but of their 
dialectics. Ricoeur’s claim is that the epistemological dimension of explanation is a 
presupposition for understanding. Another vital point is that understanding through 
reading is not the projection of one-self in the text, but letting one-self be exposed:  
Reading introduces me to an imaginative variation of my ego (Ricoeur 1986: 408). 
Reading deconstructs the imagination of the ego because the work contains a variety 
of potential interpretations at the same time. The work thus challenges me by its 
openness. However, this openness is only acquired dialectically through the 
fluctuation between an engagement and distancing alienation. As far as I can see, the 
open dimension in interpretation is parallel to the one in translation that is expressed 
by Ricoeur as a paradigm.   
 Now my point is that this dialectics between alienation and understanding- and 
hence, according to Ricoeur, the driving force of hermeneutics- is, as far as I can see, 
contained in translation. Translation is, as we have seen, necessary due to, among 
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other things, the absence of understanding (i.e. alienation). The need for translation is 
thus understood from the obstacles and problems that generate it in the first place. 
Translation articulates an initial alienated distance which hallmarks the human 
condition. In the following paragraph I will go further into the problematical aspect 
as the driving force in interpretation and translation.   
 
10.1.6 Misunderstanding and conflict 
Gadamer seems to assume that understanding is a point of departure. It seems 
pertinent to ask why we need to interpret if we always already understand. Udo Tietz 
writes in his introduction to Gadamer that “our and everyone’s prejudgement are 
more or less true and coherent. And Gadamer considers this fact as a necessary 
condition for all kinds of understanding which only can be questioned in particular 
cases.” (Tietz 2005: 42). But is the formulation of a critical question the only way to 
pose a problem? Is not understanding relatively often hindered by misunderstanding 
and lack of understanding?  
 Here it is tempting to open up a reflection upon the epistemological aspect of 
misunderstanding. Translation does not merely witness the overcoming of an obstacle 
in the understanding, but also refers to the obstacle itself. The levelling of tradition 
with Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein (Dasein or being-in-the-world always 
already understands) and the ontologisation of hermeneutics disregard the 
epistemological question such as how we can be certain of our knowledge, as 
emerging too late. Since we already have a comprehension of the world, the question 
of whether our comprehension is the right one is posterior to comprehension. 
 Previously we linked Amselle’s notion of branchements with a certain 
tradition in the philosophy of science called French epistemology and the thinking of 
Georges Canguilhem. Again it seems like Canguilhem’s thinking is relevant to our 
reflections on translation. Central to this tradition is the notion that experience is an 
obstacle to and not the foundation of science. It is because we do not have an 
understanding of the experience that we establish a scientific explanation or theory. It 
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is from here on that science commences. But this explanation or theory might be 
wrong and another hypothesis must be established. Now, in the Cartesian tradition, 
the error is seen as an error of the mind, caused by its hastiness or prejudices. 
Anyway, the error or the obstacle is not attributed any value, but is only something to 
be overcome by using the correct method etc. In the hermeneutical tradition, at least 
in Gadamer’s sense, the tradition cannot be totally erroneous because it is within the 
language of the tradition that we also say that we are mistaken. The question of the 
error of tradition is itself possible only through a tradition. In other words, neither the 
Enlightenment nor the hermeneutical tradition ascribes any value to the potential of 
the error or the obstacle. The obstacle is hindrance and condition at the same time. 
For is it possible to understand without misunderstanding, without the absence of 
understanding? Must not every attempt at acquiring knowledge start with obstacles 
and errors?  
 Misunderstanding marks the transition to the second aspect of translation that I 
find highly relevant for our problematic and which stands in continuation from the 
discussion of tradition, and that is human variation and plurality. And how are we to 
account for this human variation?   
 
10.2 Translation as problematisation of diversity 
One way to express the plurality of humankind is as a cultural diversity. Cultural 
diversity was, historically speaking, a way of escaping an ethnocentric understanding 
of culture. For Claude Levi-Strauss it was an argument against a racism based on 
evolutionism and a distinction between the civilised and the savage. In place of a 
concept of culture that separated the civilised from the barbaric, culture was 
augmented to a diversity of cultures. For anthropology this is partly an 
epistemological and partly an ethical point. However, thereby new distinctions that 
substantialised cultures by giving them a heterogeneous origin were created. In order 
not to reserve culture for what is western, something that was not western and still 
equally recognisable as culture had to be located. And even though the intention was 
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good this contributed to an essentialist concept of culture. A differentialist logic 
which assumes an initial difference between us and them seems to be inevitable in 
anthropological reasoning. Part of the cultural racism (the fear of difference) and anti-
racism (the defense of the right to be different) we see today draws on this logic 
(Taguieff 2010). If we, on the other hand, can demonstrate a continuum or 
continuation between human cultures, then such logic can be challenged. 
 The connotation and the link to biodiversity are problematical. As Ricoeur 
states in the text “Quel éthos nouveau pour l’europe? “ (What new ethos for 
Europe?), communication and the biological metaphor are incompatible by the fact 
that there is no initial communication or continuity between the species. Between 
languages and cultures, on the other hand, this is possible:  
 
The languages do not constitute closed systems excluding communication. If this was the case, there 
would be the same difference between the linguistic groups as the one existing on the biological level 
among living species. If there is only one human species, it is in particularly because transfers of 
meanings are possible from one language into another, briefly because one can translate (Ricoeur 
1992b: 108). 
 
Translation thus offers us a perspective which makes it possible to draw some 
conclusions. First of all it allows for shedding some light on the terms and metaphors 
we use when we discuss culture. On the one hand it makes sense to speak of different 
languages and cultures. On the other hand, languages and cultures are not separated 
in the same way as species in nature are separated from each other. As long as the 
term diversity is linked to bio-diversity one risks reproducing a view of cultures as 
initially separated with heterogeneous origins. But the practice of translation shows 
that the idea that there are more than one human species or race is mistaken. 
Otherwise translations would be impossible.  
 Translation thus accounts for the cultural variations among men without 
turning these variations into heterogeneous origins. Translation articulates the 
continuity of humankind. Translation is possible because there is only one 
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humankind. But that does not exclude variation in humankind, a variation which is 
almost infinite.    
 With the theme and concept of translation we see the contours of a kind of 
universalism in the sense of a unity of humankind. Ricoeur writes that “In this sense I 
speak of a “universal principle of translatability” (Ibid: 108). The human world is one 
world, but this world is not homogenous. Variation in human expression might be so 
great that the distance between some of the parts might be overwhelming. On the 
other hand the practice of translation shows that what one initially thought to be 
impossible to translate due to insurmountable linguistic barriers was possible after all.  
 We have discussed how diversity and identity did not have to stand in 
opposition to one another but could be comprehended as relational. Ricoeur takes an 
approach to plurality which does not merely see plurality of languages as an obstacle 
to translation and communication but as a presupposition for it. Is there language 
without the plurality of languages, and we could add; is the culture without the 
plurality of cultures? Ricoeur’s answer is negative: «the language does not exist 
anywere else than in the languages. It does only realises its universal potentialities in 
the differentiated systems» (Ibid). As we saw in a previous chapter, this is very 
similar to what Amselle claims to be the case for cultures. Translation does not entail 
turning everything into the same. For Ricoeur this also turns into a normative point 
and he states that he does not want all to speak the same language, be it Esperanto or 
English. The danger, as he sees it, is non-communication:  
 
It is without a doubt neither the dream of giving a new chance to esperaton nor making one great cultural 
language triumphing as the unique instrument of communication that menace us the most ; it is rather the 
danger of non-communication(Ibid). 
 
What Ricoeur calls non-communication (incommunicabilité) has, as I see it, two 
sides. On the one hand there is a danger of a linguistic and cultural homogenisation 
so that when cultures and languages lose their outside, or that which they 
communicate with, the «inside», so to speak, does not evolve further. One could 
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interpret Luther’s translation of the Bible as a contributing to an evolution of the 
Christian world by turning it inside out and letting its message be communicated with 
the outside of the Latin world. On the other hand, the focus on cultural diversity is 
problematic as long as this diversity is not related to its opposite. Translation as an 
articulation of communication questions the idea of a pure inside and outside. But 
here again there is always the possibility of someone wanting to purify the inside and 
thus attempt to present an ideology of the pure inside.  
 This universalism also undermines the idea of an origin. For if translation and 
communication are at the centre of the human condition and a hallmark of what is 
human, there are no languages or cultures that are not involved in some previous 
translation or communication. In other words, translation articulates that which is in 
between two languages and cultures, and does not do this from the perspective of the 
one or the other pole. The term diversity with its derivation from biodiversity to 
cultural diversity does not however allow communication and translation to be at the 
centre. The biological concept of species or a plurality of specie thus forges the idea 
of a human origin or plurality of origins and thus turns out as an epistemological 
obstacle for understanding what the human potential is. The human potential lies thus 
in the human ability to communicate, to open up to what is alien and break out of 
isolation. The opposite is of course also a potential for those who want to purify their 
origin and not externalise themselves by including others. But this ideological 
representation of purity is posterior to communication between human beings. 
Differentialism and cultural racism emphasise the non-communicable and non-
translatable as a hallmark of culture. With translation, however, a contrary 
understanding may be articulated. 
 My point is that the negative answer to whether translation is possible or not, 
discussed by Ricoeur in Sur la traduction, is based upon a certain understanding of a 
linguistic diversity which in its turn depends on an oppositional logic between 
identity (as the same) and what is other. It is not possible to translate because 
languages are in their nature heterogeneous. This diversity is in its turn taken from 
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biodiversity and presupposes an initial separation of different species. What is more; 
languages and cultures cannot be understood as species because translation reflects an 
initial ability to communicate. The theoretical question of whether translation is 
possible or not comes after the practice of translation. The practice of translation thus 
demonstrates an initial communication between humans across assumed cultural 
boundaries.    
 This gives us, as already mentioned, an ambiguous concept, and diversity is on 
the one hand taken as an oppositional concept or as a way of describing a given 
diversity where what is diverse is mutually heterogeneous and potentially exclusive. 
From the model of a discontinuity of species (biodiversity), humanity remains 
separated. But this can turn into an ideological representation of humanity and a 
principle of non-communicability. On the other hand, diversity means a variation, 
which is a fact.  
 As I see it, translation as an articulation of what is human is linked to this 
second diversity. Whereas the first kind of diversity is on the level of language or 
culture, or the construction of a series of such entities, the second kind is what 
articulates the human. Because men are, as Arendt points out, distinct in the sense 
that each human being is distinguishable from any other. And from this original 
distinctness comes the drive to communicate. So the need for translation comes from 
the humans and not from the languages. It is a human need, predating the language 
itself. From this perspective the comparison of the diversity of languages and 
cultures, or the term diversity itself, does not touch this human condition the way 
translation does. As Ricoeur writes: “if there is only one human species it is because 
the transference of meaning is possible from one language into another, briefly 
because one can translate“(Ibid). Translation articulates a human universal: the need 
and desire for communication.  
 My point has been to question diversity and its constitution through 
comparison by contrasting diversity with translation as the creation of an equivalent 
without identity or as the construction of a comparable. This articulates a continuum 
 265 
 
 
without reducing variations to either sameness or to difference. A translation of a text 
is, on the one hand, not the same as the original or, on the other, an absolute 
difference. A translation rather articulates a level where what is same and what is 
different does not stand in opposition to each other but meet. And this meeting is 
founded in the fact that humankind is one species and not a diversity of species. 
Translation is in this sense not merely an intellectual operation performed by 
translators of texts but an aspect of an initial intercultural communication. Translation 
as a concept thus articulates, or is based on, a universal human trait: the desire to 
communicate. It is also from the perspective of the desire to communicate and to 
translate that we should understand human diversity in its most fundamental form. 
This is not an abstracted diversity which takes the perspective of cultures and 
languages as its point of departure. Languages and cultures do not desire anything for 
themselves, cultures and languages do not translate and communicate; human beings 
do. And it is this human desire that constitutes the continuity across languages and 
cultures, and creates equivalents and comparables.    
 What is more, this way of thinking comparison might reflect comparison in 
anthropology in an interesting way. First of all it takes the constructive element into 
account and not what is immediately empirically given as similarities. The creation of 
a comparable is a creation or a production of a comparable meaning and does not 
work on the assumption of a pre-existing similarity between phenomena emanating 
from a common origin. Secondly, it takes that which cannot be translated or 
compared into account without assuming that this can be reduced to an identical 
equivalent. From what has been said one is tempted to draw the conclusion that 
anthropology and the diversity confronting it could be seen from the perspective of a 
human relation, rather than merely as a detached observer of an objective reality.              
 
10.2.1 The desire to translate 
I mentioned, by referring to Hanna Arendt, in the previous paragraph that translation 
articulates a desire for communication and that this desire is related to an initial 
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human plurality. Because, what is it that triggers a translation in the first place? Why 
do we translate? Like at so many other times Ricoeur refers, in his account of 
translation, to Hanna Arendt stating that translation is something that one does (la 
chose à faire) in order for human action to continue. This la chose à faire is neither 
constraint nor utility, but a desire to translate. To understand this we will look at 
some aspects of Arendt’s thinking and more specifically her thinking on human 
action. Translation has not its root in theory, but has an existential and practical side 
as its point of departure. Ricoeur writes with reference to Arendt that “Translation is 
definitely a task, then, not in the sense of a restricting obligation, but in the sense of 
being the thing to be done so that human action can simply continue “(Ricoeur 2006: 
19). 
 In other words, there is a connection between action and translation as the 
desire to translate makes the human action continue. In the Human Condition (1998) 
Arendt analyses the three categories of human activity: labour, work, and action. 
While labour is about sustaining human biological life and the needs of consumption 
and reproduction, and work is concerned with the building and maintaining of a 
human world, action is “to disclose the identity of the agent, to affirm the reality of 
the world, and to actualize our capacity for freedom”(d`Entreves 2006). Now, action 
is hallmarked by freedom and plurality. Freedom is the capacity to begin and start 
something new: “To act, in its most general sense, means to take an initiative, to 
begin…to set something in motion” (Arendt 1998:177).  
 If we take this as a possible interpretation of translation as well, as Ricoeur 
seems to do, this does not mean that a translation repeats or reiterates an original 
meaning, but also that something is begun and put in movement. At the same time 
translation cannot be driven by beginning something alone, it is also about continuing 
something. So action and translation must from this perspective be understood as 
something between imitation and initiation. Translation imitates the languages of 
both author and reader, but initiates at the same time a new relation between them. 
This relation is communication. In a context where cultural diversity represents a 
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conflict (either ideological or real) due to insurmountable cultural differences, it is 
partly due to a notion of action as finished or as a mere repetition of cultural codes, 
norms, or symbols. If this is so, then it is also impossible to initiate a new community, 
and the options for a multicultural society turn out to be either learning to adapt to or 
imitate one culture, or live separated in one’s “original” community. But following 
Arendt’s thoughts on action it is not a repetition but an initiative. Likewise translation 
initiates something which contains at the same time something new and something 
old. I translate because I want to make myself understood.  
 The same way life corresponds to labor, worldliness to work, and plurality to 
action, we must ask what translation corresponds to or what threatens to rupture it. 
The answer is in human distinction and plurality: “If men were not distinct, each 
human being distinguished from any other who is, was, or will ever be, they would 
need neither speech nor action to make themselves understood” (Arendt 1998: 175). 
Translation is closely connected to language which again, according to Arendt, is 
connected to action. It is thus in the plurality Arendt writes about that we also must 
seek the meaning behind Ricoeur’s interpretation of translation. Plurality is both a 
condition for and a threat to translation in the sense that translations would not be 
needed if there were no distinction between humans. Translation is the step out of 
isolation and is not limited to relations between cultures. Translation is also closely 
related to all linguistic understanding as “synonymous with the interpretation of any 
meaningful whole within the same speech community” (Ricoeur 2006: 11).  In other 
words, the continuation of a meaning within the same linguistic community is also 
threatened. Ricoeur here refers indirectly to the observation of George Steiner who in 
After Babel (1998) writes about two kinds or levels of translation. There is the 
ordinary way of thinking translation as between different languages. But there is also 
a translation labour within one linguistic domain. On the first level the distance that 
makes translation necessary is a cultural and linguistic one. The barrier is the obvious 
fact that one language differs from the other. On the second level the distance is 
temporal and requires a philological elaboration of the transformation and meaning of 
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language in another time. “Here the barrier or distance between source language and 
receptor is time” (Steiner 1998: 29). Steiner thus renders translation into a more 
general feature of the human existence and almost synonymous to interpretation: 
 
Translation”, properly understood, is a special case of the arc of communication which every successful 
speech-act closes within a given language. On the intra-lingual level, translation will pose concentrated, 
visibly intractable problems; but these same problems abound, at a more covert or conventionally 
neglected level, intra-linguistically (Ibid: 49).   
 
Now, to speak of translation as something one does in order for human action to 
continue, takes us to communication. As Domenico Jervolino states: “The 
particularity and finitude of individual languages are thus not seen as an 
insurmountable obstacle but as the condition for communication between 
individuals” (Jervolino in Kearney 2008: 160). How is this connected to cultural 
diverse societies? If we take a look at the philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard, 
we can read in La formation de l`ésprit scientifique something similar to Jervolino in 
Bachelard’s attempt to understand scientific rationality (Bachelard 2004). Bachelard 
develops an understanding of scientific rationality by studying the processes, the 
corrections, and the obstacles that a science undergoes in order to become a science. 
The obstacles that the scientific rationality is facing are obstacles that block the 
scientific progression, but they are at the same time also conditions for this 
progression. Historically, in order to overcome these obstacles, a transformation in 
the scientific reasoning itself was necessary. It had to go through a paradigmatic shift, 
to put it bluntly. If the very process of overcoming these obstacles is successful, 
Bachelard claims that this sometimes establishes a new scientific rationality. Without 
claiming it to be equivalent, it is nevertheless a similar approach to rationality in 
translation and communication. Translation faces obstacles, produced by different 
languages, which test the rational activity it is to translate. It is only after the work 
with the translation that we know if it succeeded in overcoming the obstacles. The 
question with regard to translation is not whether or not translation and 
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communication between two languages are possible, but what kind of translation and 
communication we end up with. If we take communication to be part of the 
construction of rationality, this is a way of thinking which opens for a dynamic (but 
not relative) understanding of rationality. 
 I see an interesting combination of Arendt’s “existentialist” anthropology and 
Bachelard’s epistemological thinking. The distinctness of every human being that 
Arendt speaks of and the particularity of all languages become an obstacle, but at the 
same time a condition, for communication. Communication as a concept is in itself 
not sufficient to understand this process. Like life threatens to rupture labour, 
distinction threatens to rupture the human action and throw you into isolation.  
 This takes us back into the same discussion of Habermas that I mentioned in 
the previous chapter (Habermas 2003). What I find interesting with this dynamic and 
desire driven approach to communication is that it focuses on the obstacles- the lack 
of understanding, the misunderstanding- as the driving force of communication and 
not on communication as an already existing structure that forces our reasoning. 
Habermas writes about his communicative action theory that “I call interactions 
communicative when the participants coordinate their plans of action consensually, 
with the agreement reached at any point being evaluated in terms of the 
intersubjective recognition of validity claims”(Habermas 2003: 58). But what if and 
when this “intersubjective recognition of validity claims” cannot be reached? A 
reconstructive account for communication is not sufficient to handle the obstacles 
that we are facing when dealing with inter-cultural communication. This is not a 
cultural relativist critique of Habermas stating that the different world views are so 
different that communication is impossible. I am merely underlining that 
communication has been and continues to be hallmarked by obstacles and hindrances. 
Translation is a practical and temporary “solution” to some of these obstacles. But the 
“solution” of finding equivalences does not rest on an assumed shared language that 
constitutes a safe and rational transition between languages. A translation as 
equivalence without identity is produced and created.   
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10.2.2 Translation and plurality  
We are now approaching two aspects of translation extremely pivotal to our 
examination of culture: one we have already mentioned: plurality. Another is 
reflexivity. I commence with the former. We have seen that translation could be 
thought of as a comparable without identity. Translation enables one to say the same 
thing in another way. The question is if this is possible due to a potential plurality 
within a language or in the world of languages as such.   
 Now, a vital trait of Ricoeur’s concept of tradition is its plural character. This 
is pivotal to his philosophical anthropology. The story of Babel, where men were 
punished by God by being dispersed, is given a completely different interpretation by 
Ricoeur: “This is how we exist, scattered and confounded, and to what? Well…to 
translation” (Ricoeur 2006:19)! Frey writes à propos this plurality in Ricoeur’s 
thinking that “Ricoeur renouces by the way to use the concept of tradition in singular 
form” (Frey 2008: 228). As seen previously about the notion of narrative identity 
there is not a homogenous tradition, but the interconnectivity of several (into one). 
Another trait just as important is that in addition to sedimentation, tradition is also 
innovation: “The concept of tradition is here presented according to Ricoeur as a 
dynamic concept” (Ibid). Sedimentation and innovation are two immanent and 
contradictory forces within tradition where the former resists change and the latter 
ensures change. Both the plural aspect and innovation are related to translation in the 
way that translation explains the processes of transition and the problem on which it 
is founded. Translation thus articulates both problem (misunderstanding) and answer 
(the practice of translation).  
 We saw earlier with Luther that the creation of a comparable, and reflexivity 
as will be discussed later, is to say the same thing in different ways. In Luther’s case 
this is the word of God. But we could go on to ask what the word of God is without 
this plurality of expressions. Or in our context; what is a culture without the plurality 
of cultures. Translation problematises the relation between unity and plurality to such 
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a degree that the notions themselves must be questioned. Domenico Jervolino writes 
that “It is in the hiatus between language and the languages…that the practice of 
translation is inserting itself” (Jervolino 2007: 75). However, for Jervolino this hiatus 
is deduced from a more fundamental hiatus in our selves. The long way to a 
recognition and understanding of ourselves goes through the other (persons or 
cultures). He goes on to state that one translate every time one speaks: “One is 
tempted to say that there is a plurality of languages because we are originally plural“ 
(Ibid : 79). As seen above, this plurality is underlined by Hanna Arendt when she 
gives account for human action and speech as generated through an initial distinction 
between human beings. 
 I think this initial plurality could be interpreted on more than one level. For 
concerning plurality in Frey’s and Jervolino’s accounts it is difficult to understand if 
the plurality of languages and cultures are plural in the sense of a diversity of 
languages on a global scale, if this means an internal plurality to each language, and 
further if this ultimately refers to persons. And are we not all plural in the sense of 
having an internal plurality of thoughts, denominations, needs, desires, duties etc. 
which we want to communicate? If we, as Jervolino states, translate every time we 
speak it seems like all these levels should be taken into account. Translation can in 
this sense not be thorough enough.  
 How does plurality reflect our overall problematic? The plurality as point of 
departure for translation questions once again the distinction between the inside (of a 
language or a culture) and outside. The desire to translate emanates, so to speak, from 
the need to transgress one’s isolation. On the other hand, do we not then risk 
reintroducing distinction? With Hanna Arendt I have openly done so. For her an 
initial separation is what triggers us to act and speak. This contradicts, however, the 
thesis that translation questions the very assumption of an original isolation. As seen 
with Amselle, translation is precisely the point of no return where one, in order to 
identify oneself, must do it through a language which is already foreign. Either they 
disagree or the plurality must be thought of at a pre-communicative level.     
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 One difficulty with translation is that it both articulates a solution and a 
problem and that the one immediately refers to the other. As we saw with Ricoeur’s 
account, translation does not take us out of the paradox because translations are 
practices (they can never be complete and yet we have translations). In the same way 
translations assume some point of departure (distinct languages) and that the 
distinction between them are already transgressed. There is no common ground 
which can mediate a perfect translation, and, on the other hand, this common ground 
is somehow provided in the course of the act of translation itself. In the same way an 
initial plurality is a point of departure, at the same time as the transgression of this 
plurality must already be assumed.   
 
10.2.3 Translation, reflexivity, and the deconstruction of the pure 
and closed culture 
Linked to this question of plurality is reflexivity. And again Gadamer’s notion of 
tradition could be presented in contrast to translation. First of all, why is reflection 
important? Our main problem is the notion of culture as pure and abstract, this 
amounts to saying that there is no point outside the tradition from where one, as an 
adherer to a certain cultural tradition and community, can question the tradition. But 
translation articulates precisely that there is another place within one’s own language 
which always opens up to take us outside our own language, our own thinking, and 
hence our own culture. Or differently put, it questions a clear cut distinction between 
them.  
 Even though a language structures the way we think and act, and the 
structures, the grammar of language, are relatively stable, there is also room for some 
liberty in the use of this language. A speaker is not forced to say what he or she wants 
to say in one single manner. Referring to Ricoeur, Daniel Frey states that a speaker 
has the means to say the same thing in another way, due to the «language’s own 
reflexivity». It would be impossible to say something in one language without being 
able to say it in another (Frey 2008: 85). As far as I understand it Frey’s point is that 
translation, meaning the ability to say the same thing in different ways, is a 
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precondition for understanding as such. So when he, following Ricoeur, uses 
expressions like it would be impossible to says something in one language without 
being able to say it in another, this “another language” means the ability to rephrase 
ourselves.    Even though it sounds a bit odd to say that everyone in possession of 
language skills also possesses the ability to express himself in another language, the 
idea is as far as I can see that language is not closed but has an inherent openness. I 
understand another language not necessarily to mean a foreign language, but the 
plurality of expressions within one language. The reflexivity in language is this 
passage through another language really means it is within the same language. Every 
language possesses an internal plurality. This foreignness is, however, present in 
one’s own language every time one tries to reformulate an expression. It bears 
witness to the otherness in one’s own language. A translation needs a restructuring of 
the reader’s language in order for the translation to be possible. Jervolino seems to 
support this reading when he writes that “To talk, to think, means at the same time to 
translate, in a large meaning of the word, also when we speak with ourselves, when 
we discover the traces of…others in ourselves” (Jervolino 2002: 42). As discussed 
earlier this plurality and/or alterity are in the end derived from the question of identity 
and the play between self and other than self. There is another point of view we have 
access to which puts what I wanted to say into perspective. I draw on this “external” 
source when I rephrase or translate myself.        
 The need to say something in another way refers to a prior obstacle in the 
understanding. Why do we rephrase ourselves? Reflection is needed and possible due 
to the rupture in our understanding. This is a more fundamental understanding of 
translation than is commonly pictured. Ladmiral writes that: “Translation is a 
universal human activity, that has been necessary at all times and in all parts of the 
globe through the contacts between communities speaking different languages“ 
(Ladmiral 1994: 11). The question is, however, whether it is also necessary within 
communities that speak the same language and if translation thus renders account of 
an aspect of the human condition.     
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 Now, one thing is to use translation and reflection to question the notion of a 
closed language, tradition, or culture. Another is to do the opposite, to detach 
reflection itself from tradition and make it into the hallmark of an abstract reason. In 
Europa ohne Identität? (Tibi 2000), Bassam Tibi writes contrary to Ricoeur and 
Gadamer, that reflection and rationality detached from cultural traditions. The 
hallmark of modernity is to principally question everything. This is a part of 
rationality, and does not amount to relativity. Modernity is self-reflexive but without 
questioning the Reason: “The confrontation between the culturally modern and the 
neo-absolutism of non-european civilisations reveals the trap that cultural relativism 
has fallen into” (Tibi 2000: 84). But in light of what we have discussed above it does 
not seem necessary to propose an abstract rationality as a presupposition for 
reflection. We have learnt from Ricoeur’s notion of translation that reflection is 
always already at play within a tradition. The problem in Tibi’s discourse is that 
reflexivity is comprehended within the logic of opposition between abstract reason 
and cultural Neo-absolutism. So both his concept of reason and his concept of culture 
become abstract notions, whereas the practice and what is inter-cultural escape.  
 Reflexivity thus becomes pivotal to the deconstruction of an inside and 
outside. Translation shows how reflexivity is inherent to the inside of language and 
that a kind of internal variation questions purity from the inside. Again, what is 
interesting is not so much the claim that culture is not closed but the ways this 
assumption is questioned. Any prejudice of others or any idea of the purity of one’s 
own heritage depends on a notion of purity and the distinction between inside and 
outside. What translation as reflection shows is that there are always some cracks in 
the inside, there is always an internal plurality or variation.     
 In addition to see translation as the creation of a comparable, which amounts 
to saying that to a certain degree a link between different cultural affiliations can be 
achieved – another vital aspect of translation is in our context that it questions a 
notion of pure origin conserved through tradition. If a cultural affiliation gives us a 
certain Weltanschauung from which it is difficult to escape, it is on the other hand 
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equally difficult to picture an immediate access to this tradition. We might never be 
outside a tradition, but that does not mean we are inside.  
 
10.3 Some remarks 
In the third and last part of this chapter I want to focus on some questions that I have 
posed when working with translation. In the following order I will reflection on: the 
question of the original and the idea of the perfect translation, the normative aspects 
in translation, the question of who it is that translates and the consequence this has for 
the potential of translation, the difference between translating between linguistic 
domains and translation within one linguistic domain, the idea that translation 
represents some kind of solution, lexical vs. holistic understanding of translation, the 
question if everything can be translated. And and last I will turn to the question of the 
third. I have found these questions interesting and relevant for understanding 
translation in relation to the overall problematic, however they have not be my main 
focus.   
 
10.3.1 From the perfect translation to transgression of the original 
We saw in the first part that translation was described as the creation of a comparable 
without identity. The debate on whether translation is possible or not rests on at least 
one presupposition: that there is an original with which a translation can be in perfect 
correspondence. Domenico Jervolino describes this obsession for the perfect 
translation, which again rests on the idea of an original: “The only remedy for an 
improper translation is a new translation, but the perfect equivalence is not possible” 
(Jervolino 2002: 42). Jervolino here describes the internal dialectics of translation. 
For translation can never find an identical equivalent criticism and the presentation of 
new and better translations are what drives the development of translation.   
 As discussed by Ricoeur, translation can be seen as the creation of a 
comparable without identity. The comparable is, in other words, the link between 
different languages, different texts. What kind of concept of an original is 
presupposed in the practice of translation? There is an original, but the question is 
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whether the actual representation of this original can account for the potential of the 
original. Here interpretation and translation demonstrates the same principle: that the 
original is not transparent and must be scrutinised in order to make sense. When a 
translation is criticised by the presentation of an alternative, this activates, as long as 
it might seem reasonable, another not yet actualised potential in the original. This 
version of translation goes, as Antoine Berman writes, back to what he calls the 
speculative theory of translation in the 19th century (Berman 1995). From the 
perspective of Schlegel and Novalis translation was thought of as a kind of critique 
where every translation transgressed the original by extracting the meaning in a purer 
and better way. This lead to the idea, for instance, that Shakespeare was better in 
German than in English (Berman 1995: 172).      
 How does this translate to a question of culture? The point is that the plurality 
of cultures could be read as a continuum and a play of potentialities in humanity. 
Humanity as such has an actual and potential existence. What is challenged in 
translation is the grasp the actual notion of humanity (western democracy, rationality, 
language etc.) has on the real. What Kanté and Luther do is to explore the potentiality 
of the source or the original. Texts like the Koran and the Bible had in this sense a 
potential universality which transgressed the limits of the Arab and Catholic 
universality. Within this older universality a linguistic adaptation, in the sense that all 
have to learn Arab or Latin in order to receive the true meaning of holy texts, was a 
prerequisite. But the translations of the Bible and the Koran show a greater 
universality which can reach people in their own language. This makes the particular 
an actualisation of a potential universality.   
 Even though the perfect translation could be called into question and one can 
and must be creative when one translates, translation is nevertheless bound by a kind 
of normativity. In other words, it is not possible to translate something just the way 
you want. The potential is not without some limits. Anything does not go, so to 
speak.  
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10.3.2 Translation and normativity 
Even though there might not be a pure original which the translation has access to, 
there is some sort of normativity which limits the scope of possible translations. Even 
though a language is never closed and a thing can usually also be said in another 
way-and thus the notion of an original language must be abandoned-, it is still 
meaningful to speak about a good translation. Frey focuses in his article on “the 
universal principle of translatability” and he is more interested in the search for the 
concrete universal. Paraphrasing Ricoeur, Frey writes that:  
 
A good translation can only aim at an assumed equivalence; it cannot be founded on a positively given 
identity. An equivalence without identity […] which can only be searched for, worked with, assumed. It 
exists, despite this limit, a « universal principle of translatability (Frey 2009: 85-86).  
 
My point is here then, contrary to Frey, to question what limitation equivalence 
without identity implies. Yes, there is reflexivity in language and translations which 
Frey with Ricoeur articulates as “linguistic hospitality”. But at the same time Ricoeur 
articulates a limit to this transformation which has another significance. So, when 
Ricoeur says in Sur la traduction that translation does not only present us with an 
intellectual, theoretical or practical problem, but an ethical problem (Ricoeur 2004a: 
42), this could also be interpreted as a statement on the limiting normativity in 
translation.  
 This normative limitation reveals a fundamental commitment in translation. 
For what do we commit ourselves to when we translate from one language to 
another? First of all, there is a commitment towards the language one wants to 
understand. Secondly there is a commitment towards one’s own language. This is the 
ethical problem according to Ricoeur: To practice linguistic hospitality is to take the 
reader to the author and take the author to the reader (Ricoeur 2004a 42). As I 
understand Ricoeur here, both the reader’s and the author’s language are hosts for 
what is foreign. In order for the reader’s language and the author’s language to be 
hosting each other’s’ languages, the translation must risk the fidelity of each. This 
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tension is overcome in the creation of an equivalent without identity. It is a 
commitment to the two languages, but it is also a betrayal. What does this betrayal 
entail? After all it does not destroy the possibility of the translation. And what 
happens in the transition from fidelity to treason and back? A translation is not a 
repetition of an original meaning. It is the emergence of something new, either as an 
import from the foreign language or as a restructuring of our own language.  
 
10.3.3 Translation as enrichment and hospitality 
Translation gives promise to enrichment for both sides of a translation. Translation is 
not merely an act of hospitality in hosting a foreign language in one’s own. It is also 
bears witness to enrichment in terms of discovery of an unused potentiality in one’s 
own language. Translation can thus lead us in another direction than the way we 
normally think of globalisation. Translation can of course be part of a homogenising 
strategy where everything becomes translated into English for instance. But it does 
not have to be like this.  
 And here, perhaps, we approach another normative aspect of translation. Even 
though this is outside both the topic and perspective of the dissertation, translation 
reveals normativity in the sense that human plurality and the exchange of 
perspectives are made possible in translation. Other ways of perceiving the world 
inhabit our own language in translated texts. 
 This exchange of perspectives reveals yet another ethical hallmark of 
translation which is the hosting of another language in one’s own. By translating a 
foreign language into one’s own or by letting other languages host your own we both 
let ourselves be affected by that which is foreign and we loosen our own grip on our 
own language. Translation has this inherent openness which goes further than a mere 
recognition. When I recognise someone it is either as similar to me in the sense that 
we are equals or as different from me in the sense that I cannot reduce the other to the 
same as me. But in either case I and the other remain closed to one another. But in 
translation that which is other is not only recognised but invited in and may become 
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constitutive. It is a linguistic hospitality. And this linguistic hospitality could not have 
been possible without an initial openness of human beings.        
 
10.3.4 Who translates? 
Even though our main concern is the purification and abstraction of culture and 
translation is a way of deconstructing this representation of culture, we nevertheless 
touch upon another question which must be commented upon. For if translation, 
practically and theoretically, represents a questioning of the notion that culture is 
something static, closed, pure, and abstract, we are still left with the question of who 
translates what. Translation is not exempt from potential power relations between 
different cultural groups in a society or within one cultural group.  
 If we take Luther as a point of departure, we may observe that even though he 
wanted the Bible to speak the language of the people on the street and the common 
man on the marketplace, he still depended upon a homogenisation of the diversity of 
German dialects in order to arrive at a German translation. And who is Luther to 
speak in the name of all Germans? The same could be said about Kanté when he 
constructs the N’ko alphabet.  
In order for a group of people to be heard it seems inevitable to coordinate all 
the individuals into one voice. Boris Buden writes à propos this that since there is no 
third element that can ensure a unity between two languages (that of the oppressors 
and the oppressed) the only possible solution lies in some kind of translation. For him 
this strategic essentialism is a kind of translation: “The only possibility for 
establishing understanding between them is a kind of translation. And thus, the 
concept of “strategic essentialism” should be understood as a kind of translation” 
(Buden 2008: 25). Here the point is that it is necessary to speak a foreign language, to 
translate one’s own concern into a foreign language, in order to be heard. This will 
sometimes require some kind of essentialisation. And is this so far from what 
Amselle has shown with the example of N’ko, or with Luther and his translation of 
the Bible? The problem is that from this perspective translation homogenises that 
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which cannot necessarily be homogenised. In this sense there is always the risk that 
individuals speak on the behalf of, and then potentially do injustice to, others.     
 Another aspect of representation is the problem of majority and minority. If 
translation is thought of as a possibility in cultural encounters and dialogues, the 
question remains as to who shall translate. For instance, in a situation between a host 
culture and an immigrant group, translation might turn into a kind of homogenisation 
after all. It is all nice and well that translation is an enrichment of our perception of 
the world, but who is to decide what is to be translated? Integration into a society 
might easily mean that the immigrant group must learn to translate the host’s culture 
and values and not the other way around.   
 
10.3.5 Translation within a cultural domain and between cultural 
domains 
Even though translation has many levels, my point is not to claim that translation 
works in the same way in all. I think for instance that translation between what we 
normally would take to be different cultural domains, or between different languages 
for that matter, is different than the existential or reflexive translation for those within 
the “same” cultural or linguistic domain.  
I think it gives meaning to speak of my interpretations of what other people 
say, or my own rephrasing of what I say when communication breaks down, as a kind 
of translation. But in a multicultural society or in any exchange between people with 
different languages and cultures there might be challenges to translation that are far 
greater. My point is that translation works in different ways on different levels and 
from different perspectives.    
 
10.3.6 Translation is not a “solution”, and yet it solves problems 
Some thinkers, like Homi Bhabha, view translation as a field with a politically 
subversive potential (Bhabha 2008). However, this should signal to us to be cautious 
and use some prudence when it comes to its relation to politics. The reflection at hand 
is neither the project of political subversion, nor is it meant as the support for a 
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specific “politics of translation”. But this does not mean that one should be as naïve 
as to think that the theme of cultural translation is not part of the vocabulary of policy 
makers. Like the notion of intercultural, cultural translation also risk being used by 
politicians in a desperate need to describe new directions of integration.52 The task for 
philosophy is to remain in a reflective and problem oriented mode. Developing 
theoretical thinking is not the same as founding political governing.  
 So, one should remain sober. As I have underlined, there are only possibilities 
and potentialities, no absolute solutions. In order to understand the relevance of 
translation in a European democratic context, we must shift focus from languages or 
cultures to singularities. A translation is always the translation of a singular text- and 
not, as in the case of Luther, the point of departure for a larger reformation-with 
specific problems and solutions. Likewise, in a cultural context it is also always 
singular beings who will need translations in specific contexts with their specific 
problems and solutions. If we take translation to be part of a process where I try to 
make myself understood, or a certain group tries to make themselves understood, the 
translations are a continuously on-going work which must commence every time 
there are obstacles to understanding and communication. Translation is thus not the 
presentation of a ground which can mediate in an absolute and final sense. It is 
painful work which will not always lead to immediate solutions.   
My point is that translation in this sense has a singular character. Translation 
might solve problems of understanding, but these problems are singular and must be 
faced again and again. And since the perfect translation is impossible, the “solutions” 
always risk being replaced by another and better translation.  
 
                                              
52The notion of the intercultural was the key concept in EU’s 2008-campaign European year of intercultural dialogue. 
However, judging from the documents it represents nothing new (EYID, 2008).  
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10.3.7 Lexical versus holistic understanding of language and 
translation 
But from what level are we talking about translation here? From one perspective or 
level translation is work that must be done little by little and stay focused on 
singularities. Here I talk about translation as a way of thinking both linguistic and 
non-linguistic challenges. But inspeaking about a linguistic translation, Ricoeur has a 
holistic approach that is interesting:  
 
These considerations lead me to say that the work of the translator does not move from the word to the 
sentence, to the text, to the cultural group, but conversely: absorbing vast interpretations of the spirit of a 
culture, the translator comes down again from the text, to the sentence and to the word. The final act, if one can 
put it that way, the final decision is about making out a glossary at the level of words: the selection of the 
glossary is the final test where what should be impossible to translate is crystallized as it were in fine (Ricoeur 
2006: 31). 
  
Ricoeur’s view of language, of reading, and of translation joins here with not only the 
hermeneutic tradition that sees that part in light of the whole, but with a French 
tradition of approaching texts. The point is that the choice of words and the ways they 
are composed within the same textual corpus effect how they can be interpreted.53In 
other words, the ways the words are composed transgress the meaning of every word 
standing on its own. The plurality of meaning (polysemy) of a word is thus vital 
because it shows that the lexical work cannot be done prior to the context the words 
are linked to. That does not necessarily mean that the whole, the context, closes the 
possibility of interpretations: there is often more than one way of interpreting a text 
and more than one way of translating a text.     
 Now returning to the overall problem, the consequence this has for how we 
think translation as a paradigm and for how we approach culture is that we 
commence with a complex whole that cannot be reduced to its separate parts. Ricoeur 
                                              
53 I am indebted to Marianne Hustvedt for turning my attention to this.  
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here even talks of “the cultural group” (ensemble culturel) and “the spirit of a 
culture”. What is pivotal is that a purely lexical approach- even when it takes its 
plurality of meaning into account- closes the translation or interpretation. The 
openness that I try to articulate regarding translation is on the contrary linked to 
translation being a whole text or culture. The internal plurality which requires 
translations even within the same linguistic domain (Steiner 1998) is also linked to a 
whole. But this whole is not a closed totality.   
 
10.3.8 Can everything be translated? 
A question that must be asked is of course whether everything can be translated or 
not.54 Or more precisely: can everything be translated in the sense of cultural 
translations? Will there not always be some untranslatable elements? Again it is 
impossible to answer this in a general manner. We have to admit that Luther, as an 
example, hides the fact that one stays within the limits of the Christian culture which 
after all has some kind of unity both linguistically and culturally before and after the 
Reformation. Thus it is possible to object that the cultural and linguistic obstacles that 
Luther was facing were not sufficiently difficult to make this a good example. One 
also has to admit that there might be cultural differences between people which are 
permanent and insurmountable. But on the other hand, is there a limit to how 
different we can be? Another difficulty is that despite of the real cultural differences 
which produce real difficulties, there are of course those who try to purify the 
identities in the name of different ideologies and for whom the translation presents a 
menace. For instance, according to some, the Koran should not be translated, or could 
not be translated without losing its message forged in the holy Arabic language.     
 Having said that, the essential point of bringing Luther as a case is that his 
translation has showed that something (theoretically) impossible became (practically) 
possible. The translation in a philosophical and historical sense draws our attention at 
                                              
54I thank Falk Bretschneider at EHESS for making me aware of this point.  
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the same time to the general idea of practices and more specifically to the cultural 
translations that we need. Translation might serve us anyway. On the one hand, if one 
admits that cultural differences present a problem in our democratic societies, then 
translation as it has been described is a solution to these problems. It compels us to 
translate! On the other hand (with reference to what I stated above about Arendt and 
translation as the overcoming of obstacles), if one claims that it is not a problem, then 
translation has nevertheless taught us something about how it is not a problem, so to 
speak. In other words, translation is always already at work.  
 
10.3.9 The question of the third: from structure to production 
I think the time has come to see translation in relation to branchements. For even 
though I think the two to some extent are compatible, there seems to be some 
differences which might reveal some fundamental problems. Briefly put, what we are 
dealing with is unity. The problematisation of outside and inside of culture is a 
question of whether there is a unity that can account for variation without 
substantialising or abstracting this variation into heterogeneous cultures.      
 As discussed in the previous chapter, it seems like branchements should be 
understood as a kind of a pre-existing structure which everything must relate itself to. 
This structure governs or is composed of what Amselle calls universal signs. And his 
account of translation as the conversion of universal signs into particular meanings 
goes in this direction. This harmonises with the fact that he calls branchements a third 
element which again draws on Hegelian dialectics. This can of course be questioned. 
Are there such universals? And does that render any thinking outside these 
historically established universal meaningless? Even though I find his reasoning 
clever and pertinent regarding those who want to represent their culture as originally 
pure, I find it difficult to answer an unequvivocal yes to these questions. But this is 
not the issue here.   
 For with a closer look at how Ricoeur articulates what a translation is, I think 
we might have a slightly different take on unity, one which might be equally fruitful 
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regarding the problem of cultural sameness and cultural difference. Ricoeur proposes 
to see translation as the creation of a comparable and that this comparable is an 
equivalent without identity. The comparable (the translation) is this place where two 
languages meet. But can this place be assumed? Is it something that exists prior to the 
translation? No. As Ricoeur states, there is no third text which can assure the 
transition and guarantee the faithfulness to both writer’s and reader’s language. If this 
was the case, this would assume that “we would have to be able to compare the 
source and target texts with a third text which would bear the identical meaning that 
is supposed to be passed from the first to the second” (Ricoeur 2006: 22). And since 
we cannot do this we must think this in another way. We cannot assume the 
equivalent or the comparable; it must be produced:”The cultural kinship hides the 
true nature of equivalence, which is produced by translation rather than presupposed 
by it” (Ibid: 63).      
 Here translation opens another interesting and relevant aspect: construction. In 
a multicultural society where people have different languages and different cultural 
backgrounds understanding and communication cannot be assumed but must be 
constructed and produced. As far as I see it this takes us back into the question of 
how translation is a paradigm. The openness that translation reflects in what Ricoeur 
calls the linguistic hospitality is what opens for the productive and constructive 
aspect. What is more, we cannot assume some underlying rationality or common 
ground in for instance interreligious dialogues. Dialogues could, from the perspective 
of translation as a paradigm, be seen as the construction and production of a common 
ground.     
  The constructive aspect avoids the problem with the third element and the 
structure of universal signs that we faced with branchements. But for our purpose of 
deconstructing outside and inside of culture the productive aspect seems to 
reintroduce distinction. The production of a translation is after all meant to bridge a 
gap, a gap which takes us back into an initial distinction.   
 
 286 
 
 
10.3.10 Distinction or no distinction? 
A problem which I think is linked to the problem in the previous paragraph is a 
seeming a paradox. On the one hand it is possible to say that translation questions the 
outside and inside of a language. Since translation can be seen as fundamental to 
human existence and translation is the conversion of alien signs in order to express 
oneself, there is no clear distinction between me and others. And on a cultural level: 
all cultures are constituted through the conversion of signs coming from somewhere 
else. On the other hand, if we take reflexivity or internal linguistic plurality as a 
hallmark of translation, then this assumes that there is an inside. So translation seems 
to assume distinction between an inside and an outside and question this distinction at 
the same time.   
Even though translation does this, at the same time it seems like translation 
goes more in the direction of assuming an inside and outside than branchements. 
Translation is, according to Ricoeur, a production or construction that makes the 
transition from one language to another possible. But in order for this production to 
be meaningful, must we not assume an initial separation between the two that we try 
to bring together? Amselle tries to incorporate translation into branchements, which 
rather entails deconstructing an assumption of an initial distinction. Having said that, 
Ricoeur’s reflection on translation assumes somehow an initial unifying ground. This 
unifying ground lies in human beings ability and desire to communicate and to 
translate. Humans are plural in ways of expressing themselves, but they are united in 
the desire for communication. There is something that makes translations possible 
and which transcends the linguistic diversity. From this perspective translation does 
question separation and does not assume it.    
 From this it might seem like there is something that indicates that translation 
and branchements go in different directions. If this is so, I do not think it is 
unambiguous. But one possible answer is the level at which we enter the analysis. If 
we focus on the practice or the process of translating, this already assumes something 
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initially separated. On the other hand, when a translation is provided, it shows 
somehow that the transition between the two was always already possible.  
 
10.3.11 Concluding remarks on translation 
I have in the two last chapters attempted to use the insights from translation in 
general, and Ricoeur’s reflections on translation in particular, as an approach to the 
problem of cultural sameness. This cultural sameness is a conversion of Marianne 
Gullestad’s term imagined sameness which is an invisible fence that governs the play 
of inclusion and exclusion. This imagined sameness is constituted by the idea that 
culture has an inside and an outside and that a successful cohabitation depends on 
everyone in a society being culturally the same and on the inside of culture. My point 
has been to intervene into this idea by drawing on the translation of texts as a 
metaphor. At the same time the theme of translation has given me the opportunity to 
follow up a hallmark of branchements from the previous chapter where Amselle 
includes translation as one aspect of branchements. The main focus on branchements 
was, as we recall, the deconstruction of this inside and outside too. But as far as I can 
see there are aspects of translation that do not necessary go in the same direction as 
branchements.    
 What aspects of translation have we examined? Following Ricoeur, translation 
first of all leads the focus from theory to practice. Thus translation acquires two 
meanings. On the one hand there is the practice of translation and on the other the 
theoretical elaboration of the practice of translation. On a more specific level, it has 
been my intention to show that both are interesting for the reflection on culture. 
Translation may be both a way of explicating practices which are always already 
there and/or a solution to obstacles caused by cultural differences. The lesson learned 
from Ricoeur’s displacement from theory to practice is that it is applicable to the 
question of whether cohabitation is dependent on cultural sameness. I see here a 
parallel between translation and culture in the way we pose questions. Is cohabitation 
possible or is it not? If it is, this is due to cultural sameness, and if it is not, this is due 
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to cultural differences. These are theoretical questions. But from a more practical 
side, these obstacles are overcome regardless of whether they are theoretically 
possible or not. The practice of translation transgresses the opposition between the 
same and not-same. My question is whether this could be used as a way of 
articulating similar transgressions of cohabitation.    
 The historical case of Martin Luther’s translation of the Bible has served our 
reflection on more than one level. It shows how a practice of translation overcomes 
obstacles which where theoretically impossible. It also forges an image of thought on 
how to reflect on solutions to translation problems. Last but not least, it sheds some 
light on the problematic of homogenisation. The idea that people from other cultures 
have other values or represent a threat to “our” values, is partly founded on the view 
that cultures are too different for us to live together. It has been my point to explicate 
that translation as a practice questions this view. This gives us a historical, yet 
European, example of what Amselle finds in Soleyman Kanté and N’ko. It gives us 
the opportunity to reflect on the theory of cultural continuity developed in 
Branchements. Even though the context of Kanté is even more complex, Luther’s 
German Bible marks both a rupture and a continuity within the Christian world.     
 Now, translation can be used to demonstrate this idea of a cultural continuity 
by turning to a more general understanding of identity. Despite the weaknesses 
related to seeing the identity of persons and cultures as analogous to each other, the 
point has been to show how translation as a concept can account for some deep 
constitutive levels. Amselle, Ricoeur, Jervolino, and Kearney all point to translation 
as intimately linked to expression of identity. In order to express myself I must do it 
within a structure that is already known to others. I thereby translate myself. But I 
must also translate what others are saying into my own language in order to 
understand them. Translation thus distorts the notion of an inside and outside.  And 
from this perspective it fits very well with branchements.  
 In this chapter I have looked at translation in relation to tradition and plurality. 
As far as I can see, by introducing translation into his reflections Ricoeur has been 
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able to give his own signature to hermeneutics and tradition. Or differently put, 
translation fits well with Ricoeur’s way of thinking hermeneutics. For the point of 
departure for translation is the obstacle, and this obstacle is never really overcome. 
There is always a possibility that a better translation might be presented. After all, 
there is no correspondence between languages. The equivalences between languages 
must be created and produced and are thus the outcome of some sort of human effort.    
 Now there are more elements that indicate the distortion of inside and outside. 
The idea of a homogenous inside is questioned by translation in the sense that to 
translate is to say the same thing in different ways. In other words, we possess a 
reflexivity based on an internal plurality in language. And if this is possible, then this 
leads to the question of what an inside really is. Are we really on the inside in the 
sense of all being culturally the same? Through translation I think sameness as such 
has been questioned, because sameness- as one would immediately imagine it- does 
not allow variation. But with translation the same can be varied.   
 I will however claim to have located a paradox when it comes to translation. 
On the one hand translation distorts the inside and outside of a language, or, 
metaphorically speaking, the inside and outside of culture. On the other hand 
translation works on the assumption that there is a distinction between them. 
Furthermore, the outcome of this paradox is also decisive for the question of whether 
translation is complementary to branchements. Without pretending to solve this 
paradox, I find this consistent with the more general aim of the dissertation which is 
an epistemological or problem oriented approach to culture. My intention of 
introducing translation is to give us some perspectives; however, that does not entail 
that these perspectives do not have limitations. And it certainly does not entail that 
the problems they articulate can be removed once and for all. 
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11. Conclusion 
The initial problem or point of departure for this dissertation was to examine the 
question of what “culture” means when we discuss multicultural society and what it 
could mean. Culture still seems to be perceived as closed, pure, and static although 
few will explicitly hold such a view. What is more, culture is a notion that could have 
a potentially dangerous outcome as it is invoked by those who want to underline 
distinctions between human beings, focus on our differences, and turn these 
distinctions and differences into an re-essentialist understanding of human beings. 
The difference between “us” and “them” becomes a question of culture and partly 
controls the play of inclusion and exclusion. But that does not mean that this is 
inevitable. Even though my intention is ethical and in the end concerns the question 
of how we are going to live together in a culturally pluralised society, I propose an 
epistemological take on this problem by presenting branchements and translation as 
two notions that articulate openness of culture. Branchements articulate openness 
regarding identity and translation shows an openness of languages. And thus, by 
intervening into the concepts that constitute culture, the consequence might be that 
we can manage to think differently about culture.      
In the first part of the dissertation I mainly tried to describe the problem 
whereas I, in the second part, indicated a “way out” or an alternative thinking. In the 
first chapter I indicated that a static view of culture is localised and reproduced in a 
political discourse or rhetoric and that the reason for this reproduction is the specific 
unity of culture, identity, and the nation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to think 
about culture without thinking identity politics. The link between culture and identity 
seems almost natural, but it is not clear why culture should be a question of identity. 
The thought has its historical reasons, but there is not necessarily an obvious logical 
link. This led us into a critique of identity since it seems that it is from how we think 
identity that we understand culture.        
From the backdrop of this political discourse and consistent with the 
epistemological approach, I tried to trace the genealogy of culture first and foremost 
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within a constellation with identity. The link to identity seems to me to constitute the 
epistemological obstacle that both society and any academic attempt at developing 
new kinds of thinking must overcome.     
In addition to analysing translation and branchements from an epistemological 
angle, and articulating their respective theoretical content, the epistemological 
approach in the dissertation goes beyond this and has been presented as a structure 
for the dissertation at large. In other words, I have not only elaborated the internal 
points in Amselle’s and Ricoeur’s thinking from an epistemological angle, but also 
tried to see how translation and branchements could be read as ways of overcoming 
the epistemological obstacle that reproduce culture as something static. The 
epistemological take thus consists of two levels that are linked: I have analysed 
branchements and translation epistemologically in the sense of examining what these 
terms contain by looking at what “internal” obstacles or problems they are dealing 
with. But I have also examined epistemologically how these terms could be used for a 
political purpose- which is to take branchements and translation to another level- and 
deal with “external” obstacles. The point is that the problems that branchements and 
translation deals with, and their relevance for culture in the history of anthropology, 
is partly transferred to the political level. The epistemological effect of branchements 
and translation on how we see identity, language and culture might consequently 
have an effect on how culture is discussed on the political level. Even though both 
Ricoeur and Amselle have written much about the broader implications of their 
thinking, I think that the epistemological approach might have brought in some 
fruitful perspectives that these thinkers have not reflected upon. However, this 
renders the discussion in the dissertation rather complex: we have the reflections of 
Ricoeur and Amselle, we have my own elaborations of these reflections from an 
epistemological angle, and we have my own epistemological reflections on the 
consequences of the previous two levels on the discussion of culture in multicultural 
society.       
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The extent of my description of the problem or obstacle is justified considering 
the epistemological perspective I have chosen. For within the French epistemological 
tradition the understanding of the obstacle is pivotal for overcoming it. And secondly, 
different from natural sciences, the epistemological obstacles in the human and social 
sciences cannot be overcome that easily. In other words, the obstacle is something 
that continues to be a problem and cannot be superseded like scientific problems can 
be superseded in biology or physics. For the reader this could be read as a defeat and 
a negative conclusion to the dissertation as such. However, as I see it, this is part of 
the human condition. In the end when it comes to questions of how we are going to 
live together all we are left with is discussion and critical reflection. And I do not 
think that finding alternatives to essentialist and purist thinking can put an end to 
these latter understandings because in the end it depends on what we decide and how 
we choose to act. The epistemological reflections might be vital in shedding some 
critical light on the premises upon which we base our conclusions and ultimately our 
decisions. But it depends also on an evaluation of what kinds of norms we want to 
have in a society.     
Concerning this latter point I am not sure whether branchements and 
translation “just” give us tools for criticising essentialism and purism or if they really 
can point us in another direction. And if pointing us in another direction is possible, 
does that mean that we are done with these questions? As far as thinking is concerned 
I do not think that it is sufficient to develop a “new” language. There is perhaps a 
practical or empirical deficit in the dissertation. And I think that in order to strengthen 
the theoretical points made in the dissertation they should be followed by a study of 
practices. For when it comes to succesfull integration I think it depends on what kind 
of experiences people have. In this way translation and branchements could be 
strengthened as analytical terms when it comes to articulating positive practices and 
experiences.              
I have primarily based my reflections on two thinkers: the French 
anthropologist Jean-Loup Amselle and philosopher Paul Ricoeur. This link is both 
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explicit and implicit throughout the work. However, this has led to a rather strong 
emphasis on the philosophy of Ricoeur. Even though this is not an exegetical 
dissertation, it has been necessary to discuss parts of his thinking at length. Since 
Amselle refers to Ricoeur in Mestizo logics, I decided to follow this up and found 
that their thinking coincides to a large part. On the other hand this link between 
Ricoeur and Amselle has perhaps also been an obstacle since I have been searching 
for consistency between them. This might have led to me seeing branchements and 
translation as too closely related. But I leave this for the reader to decide.    
The fluctuations between the epistemological obstacle of culture for politics 
and the epistemological obstacle of culture in the humanities and social sciences has 
represented a challenge and might have led to an apparent confusion regarding what 
level the dissertation is operating on. I think the reason for this is that I have tried to 
cover and reflect on Ricoeur’s and Amselle’s thoughts and problems at the same time 
as I have had my own thoughts and problems as point of departure. This interlacing 
of levels demonstrates a challenging but very interesting aspect of the dissertation. 
On the one hand a part of the problem in the dissertation comes from or is articulated 
in Amselle’s (the comparative method, the use of metaphors in anthropology and the 
problem of origin and identity) and Ricoeur’s (the problem of linguistic diversity or 
universality) theoretical practice. Branchements and translation articulates and 
address these problems. On the other hand, another part of the problem in the 
dissertation comes from the link between identity and culture in “my own” context; 
the political discourse. So it is by reading the theoretical works of Amselle and 
Ricoeur that I have been able to articulate what I see as the epistemological problem 
of the link between culture and identity. In order to do this I have scrutinized 
branchements and translation from an epistemological perspective. But when “using” 
these theoretical tools to analyse contexts and cases that Amselle and Ricoeur do not 
directly work with this produces a dynamic in how we think theory.          
Having said that, I think that another reason for this interlacing of levels is that 
Ricoeur and Amselle are intellectuals as well as academics and that in the reading of 
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their work one is drawn in both the epistemological and theoretical direction as well 
as to their intervention into public affairs. Amselle takes on the parallel between the 
problems of an anthropology informed by postcolonial thinking and multicultural 
politics, whereas Ricoeur discusses the role of narration in human existence, in 
historiography, and in the memory of society. Thus, a theoretical reflection in 
philosophy (narrative identity) or anthropology (branchements) can thus immediately 
become an intervention into public life. And a “practical problem” such as the 
selective memory of the states’ atrocities, i.e. its forgetting, the hierarchisation of 
citizens, the culturalisation of social problems, draws on and expresses ideas that 
must be challenged academically. As I write within another context I have learned to 
understand this, but I still have some difficulties communicating it. This becomes 
particularly clear when it comes to the theme in this dissertation. Does this double 
role compromise the rigor of their writing? And does this mean that the aim is not 
scientific but practical? I do not think so, this rather gives the reflections a point of 
departure and an aim. The discussion and topic of culture are part of two themes in 
French history that are almost unparalleled: the revolution and the colonial history. 
As a Norwegian I say this with a touch of envy- not for the colonial past nor for the 
social problems caused by it I must admit- but for the tradition for seeing how 
practical and historical problems have theoretical and contemporary implications. The 
theoretical and the practical seem to be interwoven so to speak. It would be, however, 
incorrect to say that these questions are of mere theoretical interest (and not of 
practical interest) in Norway. It is rather a question of awareness. For the terms 
culture and identity are not Norwegian terms but draws on meanings shaped within 
the traditions (the German and French) from where we have imported our thinking. 
The consciousness of these historical aspects is important in the Norwegian context. 
In fact a naïve non-conscious use of language could be even more dangerous since it 
does not take its implications into account.         
Even though it has been vital to understand the human- and social-scientific 
aspects in order to shed some light on the political problems, I have mainly focused 
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on the political implications in the dissertation. An aspect that I would like to explore 
in the future would be the epistemological potential for the social sciences and the 
humanities by examining historical and contemporary phenomena that could be said 
to be branched or translated. How can old empirical examples be read again? How 
can new materials be found? And how can branchements and translation be 
developed theoretically when facing new empirical material? These are questions that 
I find interesting and that I would like to work with. A very exciting question which 
the development of new theory opens for is its relation to its material and the 
negotiating activity that lies in the articulation of humanist and social scientific 
hypotheses. In other words I would like to do some kind of fieldwork myself. There 
is an example in Norwegian history that resembles the work of Kanté and Luther: the 
work of the Norwegian linguist Ivar Aasen who constructed the “new Norwegian” 
language and grammar. I have briefly mentioned his work in the third chapter but 
would like to include his work in a comparative research with Luther and Kanté with 
the emphasis on the role translation plays in the articulation of cultural identity.    
At the more political or social side of things a new term that has been launched 
for some time now as an alternative to multiculturalism, and the concept of culture 
imbedded in this discourse, is interculturalism, interculturality, or the intercultural. 
However, this concept does not seem to have a clear theoretical profile. For the time 
being the intercultural seems to be a practice which either needs to be analysed for 
what it is: a practice, or needs further theoretical development. Perhaps translation 
and branchements could be suggestions for a theoretical elaboration of the 
intercultural. How so? A notion that I have touched upon, and that both Ricoeur and 
Amselle use, but not really analysed, is openness. Translation and branchements 
coincide in at least one point: they both thematise openness. This is interesting, for if 
we can say that cultures are open and not closed this is not the same as rejecting 
culture altogether. When something is open there are still two different sides that the 
opening communicates. Even though translation enables people with different 
languages to communicate and thus demonstrate openness between the languages, the 
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languages remain themselves. If we think this analogically to openness between 
cultures the point is that even though one might be open to that which is other, one is 
still within one’s own culture. If the term intercultural is going to both break with the 
idea of culture in multiculturalism and conserve the term culture at the same time, it 
seems like openness could be a key term. Having said that, I think that in order for a 
theoretical elaboration of the intercultural to be powerful, it should be guided by a 
case study that takes practices into account. If the point is to change the language, 
which is a so central question in the dissertation, for how we think culture, for this 
change to be effective it must be guided by some kind of experience. Or differently 
put, I do not think a theoretical reflection alone can change our view of others and of 
how we understand culture. 
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